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Peace and Security

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Acronyms and Initials

ACP-EU	African, Caribbean and Pacific-European Union
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
CPIA	Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
CTC	Counter-Terrorism Committee
CTED	Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFID	Department for International Development
ECDPM	European Centre for Development Policy Management
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
GDP	gross domestic product
GNP	gross national product
HEU	highly enriched uranium
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IDA	International Development Association
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Horn of Africa
IMF	International Monetary Fund

KAIPTC	Kofi Annan International Peace Training Centre
LEU	low-enriched uranium
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEPAD	New Economic Partnership for African Development
NGO	non-governmental organization
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
OAU	Organization of African Union
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PAL	permissive action link
PKO	peacekeeping operations
PRS	poverty reduction strategy
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SWAP	sector-wide approaches
UN	United Nations
UNDPKO	United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

Preface

Wars, conflicts and other types of violence can generate negative externalities far beyond the zone of occurrence. Today many conflicts are underway, costing millions of lives and imposing corollary health, environmental and economic costs to neighboring states and the global community. Preventing these negative effects is the global public good dimension of peace and security. It is also a necessary precondition for providing global public goods in other areas. This makes peace and security important, in both human and economic terms. It is also the area where the character of problems recently changed most radically, demonstrating that existing global arrangements are outmoded.

Peace and security are the oldest examples of formal international cooperation. The present international strategy and institutional structure for peace and security were crafted after the shock waves of the First and the Second World Wars. The creation of the United Nations in 1945 was the second attempt at establishing an international organization responsible for peace and security at a global level. The overall mandate of the United Nations is wide, but its Security Council (UNSC) has "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" (UN 1945, Article 24:1). The omission of clear definitions in the charter leaves it to the Security Council to determine what threats to international peace and security it should take

up and what measures should be taken to restore international peace and security. Its main functions can be classified in three categories: peaceful settlement of disputes, enforcement action and peacekeeping operations. The charter sought to regulate interstate relations—not internal matters—and it did not even provide an explicit legal basis for peacekeeping operations. Over the years and in practice, the Security Council faced many different types of threats and has occasionally used its powers to intervene militarily in internal conflicts or for humanitarian reasons.

Since the creation of the United Nations, independent commissions, governmental studies and individual scholars have provided hundreds of proposals for its better functioning. Successive secretaries-general and in-house units have also conducted assessments in attempts to modify the system. Recent ones include the report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (UN 2004) and the UN Secretary-General's report *In Larger Freedom* (UN 2005). A recurrent theme addressed in these assessments relates to the composition and voting procedure of the Security Council, which are often said neither to reflect the collective interests of the United Nations, nor to gather the nations willing to contribute to peace and security.

The changing character of problems for peace and security as well as the limited role of the United Nations have contributed to a growing number of actions undertaken by other bodies, such as regional organizations or ad hoc coalitions of states. Some are acting as a complement to UN peace operations—for example, operations by the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization or regional peacekeeping operations in Africa conducted by the Economic Community of West African States or the African Union. In post-conflict situations actions are taken by the World Bank, the regional development banks and civil society organizations, among others. Further, in the case of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) the treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency and not by the UNSC.

Today and in the coming years four major sources from which global public "bads" will increasingly emerge can be identified: WMD, transborder terrorism, civil wars/failed states and genocide. The Secretariat of the International Task Force on Global Public Goods has commissioned papers to explore these security threats further. In these contributions international experts analyse the issues and offer recommendations to better address them. The papers also identify institutional

and financial shortcomings and discuss the capacity-building aspect of peace and security. Individual papers are further described below.

Papers commissioned by the Secretariat of the International Task Force on Global Public Goods

In his paper on "Peace and Security" Paul Collier focuses on five security problems: the spread of WMD, military spending, international terrorism, civil war and genocide, offering in-depth analysis of these problems. Collier suggests that the international community has not yet used all options available to address these new problems. He argues that civil wars generate enormous costs, much of which are external to the country in which the civil war occurs. Collier recognizes that strategies for reducing the global incidence of civil war have three objectives: prevention, shortening the duration of conflict and improving the prospects of sustaining post-conflict peace. Each of these plays a part in the overall reduction of conflict, but each has distinctive instruments that are likely to be effective. Collier recommends, with regard to civil war, creating international templates to improve certain aspects of governance in low-income countries, increasing international involvement in peace negotiating settlements as well as increasing and sustaining aid to post-conflict situations. Further, the author provides numerous recommendations for the five security problems discussed. Collier concludes that only when the spread of WMD, military spending, international terrorism, civil war and genocide are tackled as a package—"the grand bargain"—will significant progress be made and all actors gain.

While Collier takes the security problems as the starting point, James Fearon's "Reforming International Institutions to Promote International Peace and Security" takes the international institutions for peace and security as the principal departure point. Fearon discusses how to adapt and reform international institutions to best promote international peace and security. The paper provides an analysis of where and why unilateral national strategies will be insufficient to counter the new security threats. Fearon highlights the problems in the current multilateral institutions, focusing on UN reform. He considers three scenarios to make the United Nations more effective, legitimate and better able to manage. The first is a radical proposal to disband the current United Nations and found a new and improved version. The second is an intermediate proposal, which includes adopting weighted voting in the General Assembly, with weights deter-

mined by contribution to the organization and to peacekeeping forces. The third proposal includes minor reforms, focusing on reform of the UNSC, as suggested by the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. These proposals stress that financial, military and diplomatic contributions to the United Nations constitute the most plausible and sensible criteria for membership in the Security Council. Fearon continues by discussing the institutional landscape for the control of WMD, terrorism and civil wars, respectively. In the case of WMD he argues that the major international institutions concerned with peace and security have focused very little on this problem. Without an effective international regime controlling or preventing WMD proliferation and access, major powers may act unilaterally in a manner that will cause a general increase in international insecurity.

Both Collier and Fearon have a global perspective when discussing the security threats, while John Stremlau's "Peace and Security" focuses on regionalism and the special case of Africa and discusses the broader term of human security. Stremlau puts forward a strategy with four interrelated components for advancing peace and security in regions under severe stress: promoting peace and security is a precondition for sustainable development, poverty reduction and regional and international cooperation; good governance is vital; regional cooperation is essential; and capacity building in weak states and regional organizations are primary concerns. Africa is proposed as the testing ground for this strategy. Stremlau argues that African leaders now agree that promoting peace and security is a precondition for sustainable development and building partnership with developed countries and international financial institutions. The author further discusses the emerging and important role of regional organizations in Africa, which typically enjoy greater legitimacy in tackling local security problems. Stremlau argues that in troubled regions such as Africa regional organizations often lack the capacity and political will to prevent deadly conflict within a state. The paper also comments on the institutions, rules, resources and assessment available to implement this strategy.

The strategy proposed by Stremlau recognizes that capacity development needs to be supported as a cross-cutting issue in failing states and in regional organizations to address human security, governance and regional cooperation effectively. Volker Hauck and Jan Gaspers' "Capacity Building for Peace and Security: A Look at Africa" has this assumption as its principal departure point. The authors provide a general framework for capacity building going beyond knowledge transfer and skills development. They look at the African continent to highlight experi-

ences of capacity development for the provision of peace and security in different conflict environments (before, during and after conflict). The paper focuses on the continent's most pressing challenges, namely civil war, peacekeeping, state reconstruction, regional actions and hierarchy issues. Hauck and Gaspers recognize that donor assistance in the area is fragmented in terms of support strategies, approaches and operational assistance. The paper highlights emerging lessons and shows promising approaches that can help design and implement more effective capacity development interventions in the future. Hauck and Gaspers propose a number of recommendations, arguing that in order for capacity development to be successful, a mix of approaches is needed, in combination with initiatives aiming at enhancing the capacity of specific institutions, groups of actors or networks.

As discussed briefly in the above-mentioned papers, armed conflicts impose enormous internal and external costs. Elisabeth Sköns, in "The Costs of Armed Conflict", discusses these costs by reviewing and analysing some of the major studies conducted on the issue. She shows that there are few studies on this topic, and it is only in recent years, with the increased focus on the incidence of major armed conflict in low-income countries, that researchers have begun to address the cost issue more systematically. Sköns argues that it is difficult to quantify the costs of armed conflicts, especially the external ones. As an illustration of this, one of the reviewed studies stresses that the external cost of an internal conflict during the post–cold war period range from $4.5 to $54 billion. Sköns assessment shows that in order to estimate the cost to the broader international community of internal armed conflict in low-income countries much more research is needed.

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Peace and Security

Chapter 1

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This paper focuses on five new security problems. Each can be improved by the deployment of multiple instruments and by the participation of multiple international actors. The coordination of multiple instruments is impeded by the compartmentalized structure of traditional security arrangements. The participation of multiple actors faces not only the usual free-rider problem, but also the more fundamental obstacle that no one problem adversely affects all needed actors. This suggests the need for a "grand bargain": only when all five problems are tackled as a package do all needed actors gain.

The first new problem is the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This problem is addressed by four proposals: the development and release of a permissive action link (PAL) technology to reduce the risk of mistaken use, an international system for tracking material unaccounted for, clear limits on the circumstances in which regime overthrow is legitimate and aid allocation rules that penalize countries that newly adopt WMD.

The second problem is the accentuation of military spending in low-income countries due to neighbourhood arms races—which makes each country's military spending a regional public bad. This problem is addressed by the proposal to reward reductions in military spending with corresponding increases in aid.

The third problem is international terrorism. This is addressed by three proposals: an agreement to release excess information on the groups that could be responsible, thereby diluting the publicity effect of any action; an explicit risk assessment of issues to reduce the scope for terrorist policy conditionality; and the publication of comparable measures of government anti-terrorist efforts to reduce the free-rider problem.

The fourth problem is civil war. This is addressed by three proposals, covering: preventing conflicts, ending conflicts and reducing post-conflict risks. Pre-

vention is addressed by a combination of enhanced aid to countries at risk the creation of international templates for pertinent aspects of governance such as use of natural resource revenues and the reform of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) banking laws to discourage grand corruption. Ending conflicts is addressed by increasing international involvement in negotiations, rewarding rebels who settle and squeezing the finances and access to armaments of rebels who continue to fight. Post-conflict risks are addressed by enhanced aid, extended external military involvement and the provision of templates for post-conflict governance on which both aid and military security are conditioned.

The fifth problem is genocide. This is addressed by the proposal of adopting the principle of subsidiarity: an explicit ascending hierarchy of the rights of intervention, from the national government, through neighbours, to the United Nations, and an equivalent hierarchy of instruments of intervention, from economic sanctions to military force.

Security is fundamental to well-being, both directly and because health and economic objectives become unattainable below a threshold of security. For many years the only international dimension to security was interstate warfare. The need to curtail the terrible wars between major states that ravaged the first half of the twentieth century was the predominant agenda for international security action. Now, however, the agenda is much broader and the countries with the most pressing security problems are often the poorest.

This paper focuses on five new security problems that all have international dimensions: WMD, neighbourhood arms races, international terrorism, civil war and genocide. The international community has not used the full range of options available to address these new problems of insecurity. Although it has recently recognized that development requires the use of multiple instruments, policy coherence, the same approach has yet to be applied to the even more fundamental—and consequently better financed—objective of security. Policy coherence for security will require coordinated thinking about a range of instruments—the use of military forces, the development of international standards and codes of public and private conduct, and financial and technical assistance. The following sections discuss each new security problem in turn. The final section discusses the need to reach agreement on international action through a grand bargain.

Weapons of mass destruction

Once nuclear weapons were possessed by more than one country, the fundamental strategy for preventing their use was that of mutual assured destruction. This strategy worked in the context of the cold war, and it can be expected to work more generally as long as all those with a nuclear capability are governments that have foolproof systems of preventing war by mistake and secure control of their WMD.[1] Nuclear dangers arise where either condition is not met. Throughout the cold war there were fears that war could happen through errors in the system by which the use of WMD was authorized, and the record of civilian nuclear accidents suggests that a zero-error system is extremely difficult to achieve even in technologically advanced states. States with WMD may not be able to keep them secure, enabling international terrorists to gain access to the technology. This paper first takes each of these risks in turn, addressing what can be done about them. However its conclusion is that once weak states possess WMD an irreducible element of risk remains. Hence the overarching risk-reducing strategy is to prevent WMD proliferation to weak states.

War by mistake

The problem. Maintaining nuclear weapons in a state of readiness raises the risk of errors in activation systems. It is very difficult to make a system both swift and foolproof. Even the superpowers faced occasional moments during the cold war in which their systems came dangerously close to irretrievable error. These risks are much greater among countries that have far smaller resources.

A partial solution. Recognizing these risks, both the United States and the Soviet Union developed a class of technology—PAL—that limits the risk of error. PAL technology prevents a nuclear bomb from being detonated without the explicit approval of the appropriate authorizing agent—for example, a bomb that dropped as a result of a plane crash would not detonate.

There is good reason to suspect that some current nuclear powers do not have equivalent technologies. For example, although mutually assured destruction is surely sufficient to restrain India and Pakistan from choosing nuclear attack, they are unlikely to be able to afford to develop their own PAL technologies.

One seemingly obvious way to reduce risk is for the advanced nuclear powers to share their PAL technology with the new nuclear powers. Because errors imply that a nation faces a direct risk from its own WMD, once PAL technology becomes freely available all nuclear nations will have an incentive to employ it. The incentive problem is confined to the issue of supply.

However none of the advanced nuclear powers wishes to release its PAL technology. Each fears that doing so would inadvertently disclose information about its nuclear system. Further, the major beneficiaries of a reduced risk of accidents would not be the advanced nuclear powers. So PAL technology is somewhat analogous to antiretrovirals: the costs of sharing the information outweigh the benefits for the owners of the technology. There is thus a strong case for developing a variant of the technology that can be safely shared. Such a technology would be a global public good. The costs of developing such a technology could be shared among North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) powers, because there is already a strong and effective tradition of sharing military burdens in this group.

Proposal 1: Develop a releasable PAL technology, financed by NATO, and offer it to the new nuclear powers.

Insecure control of WMD

The problem. The most likely risk from WMD is that a state that possesses them is unable to keep international terrorists from acquiring them. The strategy of mutually assured destruction is completely ineffective against a threat of nuclear terrorism: a nuclear terrorist group can adopt a tactic not available to a nuclear state, namely staying hidden. It is also likely to have adherents willing to commit suicide.

Terrorist groups are under increasing pressure to acquire more lethal technologies. A nuclear bomb is the ultimate terrorist technology. With a credible nuclear capacity a terrorist group would be in an overwhelmingly strong position to impose policy conditionality; this is, in effect, every terrorist group's dream. Thus the rational terrorist group will increasingly make intense efforts to acquire WMD capability. It should be noted that this proposition is contested. Academic specialists on terrorism are divided; some argue that terrorist methods will remain low-tech even though the scale of their target is likely to increase. Despite this

disagreement, it seems wise to pursue the more pessimistic possibility, given its dire consequences.

Precisely because nuclear capability is so attractive, the mere claim to have it is likely to be made by many terrorist groups. If one group were to achieve success—a change of policy—with a threat of nuclear attack, many other groups would imitate that group. Governments will thus be reluctant to believe such claims. A group that genuinely has a nuclear capability will therefore need to establish its credibility by using a nuclear weapon. Further, because of the intensity of counter-terrorism intelligence operations, a terrorist group has a strong incentive to establish its credibility as soon as it acquires nuclear capability. Hence the rational terrorist organization will detonate a nuclear device as soon as it gains possession of one.

A partial solution. What can be done to prevent terrorist groups from acquiring a nuclear or chemical WMD capability? In view of the likelihood of nuclear device detonation, reliance cannot be placed solely on intelligence services; the lag between terrorist acquisition and weapon deployment is likely to be too short. Hence the key point of prevention is control of access to nuclear and other WMD technologies. The basic knowledge about how to construct WMD is available on the Internet. Given access to the right material inputs, construction does not require sophisticated or large-scale facilities. Thus the only feasible control point is access to the key material inputs—nuclear bombs, nuclear material, germs and chemicals.

In trying to gain access to such materials, terrorists may deploy tactics of theft, bribery or collaboration at the level of the installation and tactics of bribery or collaboration at higher levels of government responsible for the installation. The objective of total security for all such installations is difficult but imperative to achieve.

Total security is difficult to achieve even in developed countries. In countries with weak public sectors and high levels of corruption it is likely to be beyond the capabilities of the government to deliver, even if the government is willing to do so. As in other areas with important international externalities such as health standards for food exports, the obvious approach is to develop minimum international standards, supported by generous capacity building and enforced through an inspection system. The Additional Protocol of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty aims to commit countries to such inspections, and it is important to accelerate the process of getting countries to sign up for the protocol—currently only about a third of states that are signatories to the

treaty have ratified the additional protocol. But the treaty is a slow and reactive forum, not well suited to taking strong action (International Peace Academy 2004). A complement to inspection is a complete inventory and tracking system for all nuclear material. Remarkably, nuclear material produced for civilian use has not usually been tracked to the point of destruction. The Soviet Union led the way in tracking its nuclear material, and very recently the United States has introduced a similar system. However at present there is a great deal of material unaccounted for, and the first priority is to reduce it. An international system is needed for such a retrospective tracking system to be effective.

For chemical weapons a large majority of the world's stockpiles are held in Russia. The cost of destroying these stockpiles is around $10 billion. Given its other budgetary needs, Russia has chosen not to destroy its stockpiles despite having signed agreements to do so. This is a clear case in which the public good of destroying the stockpile does not generate sufficient benefits for the country directly concerned. But in terms of the combined defence budgets of NATO, the cost is small and could reasonably be seen as appropriate for standard burden-sharing among NATO members.

Proposal 2: Develop a common international tracking system for material unaccounted for. Finance the destruction of Russian stockpiles of chemical weapons through a NATO fund.

A more general solution: containing proliferation

PALs and an international system for eliminating material unaccounted for can substantially reduce the WMD threat posed by existing states with WMD capability. However both safeguards become less effective as WMD proliferate. If all current governments possessed WMD, the risks from both leakage and error would be uncontainable. There is therefore a strong case for reducing risks by containing proliferation. Yet there are strong forces for proliferation; WMD are cost-effective deterrents, and because they are possessed primarily by elite nations, they confer status. Other states accuse nuclear states of double standards in seeking to prevent the spread of WMD that they themselves possess. Such an accusation is, however, mistaken. A world in which all nuclear nations destroyed their WMD would be highly dangerous because there would be powerful incentives for a nation to develop a nuclear capability in secret and then threaten its enemies. At least one trustworthy nation must

continue to hold sufficient nuclear weapons to have a second-strike capability. Here, trustworthy refers both to a technological capability to keep the WMD secure and to a domestic policy that would preclude first use against enemies but would be willing to protect other nations if threatened by a rogue nuclear state. Because there can be no consensus on recognizing a single nation as trustworthy, in practice it is desirable for a small group of nations to be nuclear powers. It is the spread of WMD beyond such a small group that is undesirable. Global nuclear disarmament is not a desirable objective.

A strategy for limiting proliferation might contain four components: limits on the circumstances in which WMD are useful, penalties for acquiring WMD, incentives for decommissioning WMD and inspections to make the penalties and incentives credible.

Making WMD less useful. WMD can be credibly useful only in situations of last-resort defence—where the existence of the regime, or even of the state itself, is threatened by external military intervention. To the extent that the risk of such external military intervention can be reduced, regimes have less objective need for WMD. At present, the legal basis for external military intervention to overthrow a regime is authorization by the UN Security Council. The confusion over the extent to which the Security Council authorized military intervention in Iraq has probably increased the perceived risk of regime overthrow and so increased the perceived need for WMD. There is thus a case for clarifying—and limiting—the circumstances in which regime overthrow is legitimate. For regimes with WMD, this enhanced security could be made conditional on compliance with international standards of control, verified through international inspection.

Proposal 3: The UN Security Council should clarify and limit the circumstances in which regime overthrow by external forces is legitimate.

Penalties for acquiring WMD

Although reducing the need for commissioning WMD might be helpful, there is perhaps more scope for introducing penalties for commissioning them. The most obvious penalty is financial, and the instrument available is bilateral aid programmes. No OECD government wishes to use its aid programme transparently to impose penalties on particular developing countries. However penalties are the critical international public good that curtail the proliferation of WMD. The costs of impos-

ing penalties do not fall on countries to the same degree as they are likely to benefit from reducing the risk of terrorist attacks involving WMD. For example, the cost to Sweden of linking its large aid programme to WMD conditionality might outweigh the national benefits, given that Stockholm might be thought an unlikely target of a nuclear terrorist attack. Yet collectively, if countries such as Sweden were not to participate, incentives would be greatly weakened. In effect, what is needed is a recognition of a common foreign policy goal—the curtailment of proliferation—and a commitment through the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) for all aid donors to punish proliferation with a common response. Such a link is legitimate, given that one objective of bilateral aid programmes is to enhance international security.

Proposal 4: The DAC should recognize security as a legitimate objective of aid programmes and develop common criteria for discouraging the further adoption of WMD.

Incentives for decommissioning WMD

Libya's decision to give up its WMD suggests that in some cases a combination of positive and negative incentives can induce decommissioning. Again, the public good is the incentive—it was attractive for each OECD state individually to breach the system of common penalties and do business with Libya. There is no forum that is restricted to those countries whose behaviour matters for enforcement, but includes all countries where such an alliance can be assembled. Each time such arrangements must be done through ad hoc interactions between foreign ministries. It is inconceivable that an additional piece of international diplomatic architecture should be created for this purpose. Yet there may be a case for agreeing before the event, among pertinent actors, on the criteria for action and the range of actions that would normally be undertaken, using the Libyan experience as a model.

WMD inspection. Effective incentive systems must be based on reliable information. An effective verification system needs to work on a presumption of guilt of the sort commonly applied in the financial sector. Thus if a state declares itself to be free of WMD it must be prepared to cooperate with investigations that verify the claim, and the inspection team should be able to draw upon any intelligence to the contrary. Some governments are likely to be highly opposed to international inspection because of concerns about state security. One possible solution is to combine strong

incentives with an inspection process that, while meeting the basic requirements of the international community, is acceptable to the government in question. An analogy might be the ad hoc international inspection team for the process of decommissioning weapons held by the Irish Republican Army. Further, some of the states that are likely to be most opposed to international inspection of their WMD facilities—such as Israel, India and Pakistan—are themselves not unlikely targets for terrorist attack and so may gradually come to recognize the value of cooperating.

Military spending

The problem

Military expenditure creates an international externality. Local arms races fail to enhance security and so waste resources. Aid inadvertently fuels these races and so helps generate a regional public bad. This paradoxical situation arises from the conjunction of three distinct processes: neighbourhood arms races, the ineffectiveness of military spending as a deterrence against rebellion and the leakage of aid into military budgets.

Neighbourhood arms races. During the cold war there was an arms race between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Eventually NATO won this race, in effect bankrupting the Soviet Union in the process. Albeit at a much more modest level, decentralized neighbourhood arms races have become general. The typical country sets its level of military spending in part in reference to the levels chosen by neighbours. This does not imply that neighbours are usually seen as threats. In fact countries generally respond to the share of gross domestic product (GDP) spent on the military by their neighbours, not the absolute level of such spending.[2] This implies that governments are usually copying budget benchmarks rather than defending themselves against threats.

Military spending and deterrence. Military spending is intended to achieve security. For developing countries security must be considered in two dimensions, internal and external. Internal security is much more important; many developing countries face significant risks of internal violent rebellion. In response, governments pre-emptively raise their levels of military spending. The question is whether this is effective as a deterrent. Initial theorizing was based on the intuitively simple notion that such spending would reduce the prospects of suc-

cess for a rebellion and so indeed be a deterrent (Skaperdas 1996). This is evidently what governments believe, which is why spending rises in response to the risk of rebellion. However newer and more sophisticated theory emphasizes opposing effects; far from deterring rebellion, increased military spending can actually increase the risk of rebellion (Mehlum and Moene 2006). So the effectiveness of military spending as a deterrent against rebellion is an empirical issue rather than a necessary truth. A recent test, using global data for 1965–99, finds that in general high government military spending is ineffective as a deterrent of rebellion.[3] If deterrence of rebellion is the objective, governments are wasting their money.

The other consideration in military spending is that of external security. However the external deterrence effect of military spending clearly depends not on the absolute level of such spending, but on its level relative to that of neighbours. Hence a coordinated reduction in the military spending of a neighbourhood would not affect the level of external threat faced by each country. A regionwide reduction in military spending would thus leave both external and internal security unaffected while releasing resources for other uses.

Aid leakage. Development assistance does not directly finance military spending.[4] Nevertheless, aid is fungible. Foreign finance ostensibly intended for one project often releases government resources for other uses. Thus, unless effectively checked, aid will inevitably finance military budgets to some extent. Recent research has been able to estimate this leakage; typically about 16% of aid indirectly augments military spending. This is not a high percentage, but in Africa, where aid is large relative to military spending, this estimate implies that on average more than half of military spending is inadvertently financed by aid.

An implication: an aid-financed public bad. Aid directly raises military spending country by country by relaxing budget constraints. As noted, in low-income countries with large aid programmes this effect is very substantial. This effect is then compounded by the arms race effect; as each country individually raises its military budget because of aid, its neighbours raise their spending because of benchmarking. A recent quantification finds that about two-thirds of African military spending is accounted for by the conjunction of aid leakage and local arms races. Yet such spending is ineffective in deterring rebellion and, being regionwide, is unlikely to reduce threats from neighbours. At least at the margin, military spending is a waste. Donors are thus in-

advertently contributing substantially to a regional public bad in the form of excessive military spending. The uncoordinated choice of the level of military spending country by country leads to a level of military spending that is too high from the perspective of both individual countries and donors.

Solutions

The limits of regional collective action. A decision by one developing country to raise its military spending creates negative externalities for its neighbour. So military spending needs to be curtailed by coordinated action. Neighbour-to-neighbour agreements can occasionally internalize the externality and so contain the problem. For example, Chile and Argentina recently concluded an agreement designed, ultimately, to curtail spending. This approach can work where each country regards the other as its most important neighbour. Usually, however, neighbourhoods shade into each other. Especially in Africa, even if each country responds only to the spending level of its direct neighbours, coordinated action would require that all countries on the continent act together.

Such regionally coordinated action to curtail military spending is not common because of two impediments. First, governments do not usually trust each other to report honestly on their levels of military spending. The Chile–Argentina agreement focused on exactly this problem. To facilitate comparability it required each country to report its military expenditure using the definitions that the other country used for its military budget. Second, at least in Africa, there are far too many countries to make coordinated action feasible; 50 countries cannot credibly agree to take common action to reduce military spending.

Supplying the public good of reliable and comparable information at the regional level. The need for objective, reliable and comparable information on military spending can best be met by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). At the request of a group of neighbouring countries, the IMF could act as an honest broker to perform routine scrutiny of spending levels and report the results to all parties. This task would not be burdensome for the IMF because it could be integrated with the Fund's more general routine scrutiny of budgets. It would have credibility because of the institution's expertise in budget scrutiny.

Simulating regional coordination: common regional incentives. Common action cannot be expected to come from regionally initiated coordination, given the number of countries and the consequent likelihood of

the free-rider problem. An alternative is for a common change in government behaviour across a region to be induced by a commonly experienced change in incentives. In effect, the cost of military spending needs to be increased to all countries in a region at the same time.

This could be achieved if donors made an offer of increased aid conditional on a reduction in the level of military spending. From the perspective of donors such an offer would be attractive because donors should be interested in reducing military spending for their own reasons. It is evident that donors need to offset the inadvertent increase in military spending that aid tends to cause. Such an incentive system would be legitimate; it would not reduce military spending below levels that governments would have set in the absence of aid. Instead it would use a substitution effect to counter the income effect of aid that has inflated military budgets.

Because donors also face free-rider problems and country-specific interests, such a conditional offer may lack credibility. The multilateral development agencies are better placed than individual donors to create credible incentives for reducing military spending. A potential criticism of such an action by these is that it would politicize their role. A counter to such a critique is that the action merely offsets the increase in military spending that multilateral development agency aid otherwise causes. Further, developing countries have a collective interest in offsetting the regional public bad generated by regional arms races. They need a mechanism for ensuring common action that would be mutually beneficial but is otherwise unattainable. Thus it is not a case of developed countries imposing their preferences over the preferences of developing countries. Previous attempts to link aid to military spending have also faced the difficulty of the non-transparency of such spending—governments can appear to reduce military spending by hiding it in other categories. This is a further reason why the IMF needs to provide much closer scrutiny of military budgets. The reassurance of donors requires the same solution as the reassurance of neighbours.

Proposal 5: Increases in International Development Association allocations in low-income regions should be linked to recipients' reductions in military spending.

International terrorism

The problems

Terrorism has become international in its impact, strategies and methods—all of which create substantial challenges for international cooperation.

Globalization of terrorist impact. The immediate objective of terrorist attacks is publicity. Terrorists tailor their attacks to be newsworthy, using two tactics—a large number of deaths and a glamorous venue. The media coverage that a terrorist attack receives is very highly linked to the number of victims, both in absolute terms and, more importantly for the present argument, relative to previous terrorist attacks. The attacks of 11 September in the United States have, for the foreseeable future, globalized media coverage of large attacks. Until then attacks were predominantly reported in the country in which they occurred. Benchmarks were national. Now the benchmark is international; each new attack is judged relative to previous attacks globally. And a large attack anywhere raises the media threshold everywhere. International terrorists thus need to progressively escalate the number of deaths in attacks so as to achieve the same media impact. Terrorists prefer high-glamour targets, so governments have focused their enhanced security measures on such targets. Research has shown that as security is tightened on high-glamour targets, terrorists shift to more mundane targets that are more vulnerable. Such targets are numerous (shopping malls, rail and bus stations, sporting events), so it is not possible to provide a high level of security. To make an attack on these less glamorous targets equally newsworthy the number of deaths must be further inflated. These two processes—rising benchmarks and compensation for reduced glamour—are likely to push terrorists rapidly into searching for more lethal technologies.

Globalization of terrorist strategies. The Al Qaida terrorist bombing in Madrid marked a disturbing new development in terrorist strategies. Timed just ahead of a national election, the bomb was intended to change the Spanish government and thereby its foreign policy. Regardless of how the Spanish election results should be interpreted, Al Qaida is likely to judge its strategy a success, so it is likely to target other European elections with the object of isolating the United States. Indeed Al Qaida has reportedly offered a truce to governments that modify their

policies in accordance with its demands. Similar strategies have been used in kidnappings in Iraq. Such terrorist policy conditionality creates the prospect of a race to the bottom in which each government will try to ensure that its country is not at the top of the list of likely targets. Irrespective of the objective merits of any particular foreign policy, it is clear that setting foreign policies by such a race to the bottom would be highly undesirable.

It is initially unlikely that governments will participate in such a race. Yet if the scale of deaths from terrorist attacks rises, and particularly if a nuclear threat becomes even remotely credible, governments may have little choice but to respond to scared electorates. For example, in the last elections in Catalonia, the party that sought to negotiate a regional truce with the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA, or Basque Homeland and Liberty) secured a fourfold increase in its vote. If this strategy is successful similar terrorist threats could become common across a whole swathe of issues that are part of the new global discourse and for which a few people are already willing to commit violence. For example, international terrorist groups focusing on animal rights, environmental protection and abortion could arise. For each of these issues debate has started at the national level and generated an assortment of terrorist groups. Debate on these issues has now globalized, and it seems only a matter of time before such issue-specific terrorist groups follow suit. The most obvious strategy for such a group would be to try to trigger a race to the bottom by offering a truce to governments that comply with its demands.

Globalization of terrorist methods. From the perspective of international public goods, a key distinction is whether the country where the terrorist resides and plans activities differs from that which is the target of the activities. Such transborder activity is what this paper will focus on because it generates standard international public good problems. Immigrants may also plan and execute terrorist activities in their host country. From the media perspective this may look very similar to transborder terrorism, but from the policy perspective it is very different. Basically, a government has a much stronger incentive to curtail the problem of immigrant terrorism on its own soil than to curtail the problem of transborder terrorism. Measures against immigrant terrorist activities within national borders are not international public goods, whereas measures against transborder terrorism clearly are.

Recent examples of transborder terrorism show that it is a truly global phenomenon; terrorism financed from Canada caused mass deaths in Sri Lanka, French-based terrorists caused atrocities in Spain, US-financed terrorists caused atrocities in the United Kingdom, and Saudi terrorists based in Germany and Afghanistan planned the attacks of 11 September in the United States. Often, transborder terrorists are immigrants with citizenship in one OECD country, but who target either another OECD country or their home country.

Transborder terrorism is an extreme case of international externalities: the security effort needed to curtail the activity is a cost to the host country but a benefit only to the target country. The costs extend beyond finance. Because international terrorists are often citizens of their host country, the investigation and their prosecution raise issues of community relations and civil rights.

The uncooperative outcome is that radically too little effort is put into curtailing transborder terrorism. In the extreme, informal arrangements may be reached to give terrorists safe haven as long as they refrain from targeting their activities domestically. (For example, in the past Basque terrorists apparently operated from France relatively safely on this basis.) Research shows that terrorists respond to differential impediments; as described earlier, when desirable targets become better protected they switch to less glamorous but less protected targets. The rapid growth of cross-border terrorism can thus be presumed to be a response to the differential failure of security services to inhibit it—that is, terrorists understand the difficulty of supplying international public goods.

Solutions

Countering the globalization of terrorist impact. Two possible strategies for countering the impact that terrorists seek to achieve have recently been suggested by Frey (2004). The first is very simple and concerns the information released by governments that are the victims of terrorist policy conditionality. Frey proposes that governments should release more information than terrorists would like. Specifically, governments should identify a number of terrorist organizations that might be responsible, thus diluting the publicity for the one actually responsible. Analogously, if the terrorist group actually responsible presented its demands to the media, governments should cite demands from other groups apparently related to the same attack.

Proposal 6: Governments should agree to counter the impact of international terrorism by releasing excess information on groups potentially responsible.

A second, longer term approach is to dilute the newsworthiness of targets by decentralizing them. A decentralized system offers fewer glamorous targets, making these remaining targets easier to defend.

Countering terrorist policy conditionality. The standard approach to avoiding a race to the bottom is to reach a common agreement on the policy in question. Take an example from a completely different arena: Caribbean islands faced a race to the bottom in dealing with cruise ships that dumped waste in harbours. No island dared impose restrictions individually for fear of losing the ships' traffic. So the islands grouped together and set a common standard. Hence, as an issue becomes the target of international terrorism, it becomes imperative that countries should adopt a common policy. The more legitimate is the forum for such a common policy, the less credible is it that any single country can be terrorized into a unilateral change. The countries that need to be part of a forum are simply all those at risk of being targets for terrorist influence on the issue.

Hindsight shows that when an issue close to the interests of the major global terrorist organization gave rise to a spectacular international policy disagreement, governments exposed themselves. These circumstances made it highly likely that the terrorist organization would attempt to generate a race to the bottom. One lesson to be learned is that issues should be assessed beforehand for whether there is a realistic prospect that a terrorist organization will try to provoke a race to the bottom. Where there is such a prospect, open disagreements on international policy are a dangerous indulgence. To avoid this danger each major government should propose only policies that other governments can accept. In Iraq this requirement was breached by both the German and the US proposed positions—neither of which could realistically have been accepted by the other government. Hence, irrespective of the rightness of either position, neither met the minimum requirement for avoiding the subsequent terrorist strategy of a race to the bottom. The people of Madrid were the first to pay for this error, and it is unlikely that they will be the last.

Where governments know they must reach agreement they have already developed techniques for doing so. The failure to apply these techniques to Iraq demonstrates that many governments underestimated the costs of nationally differentiated positions. Although it may be possible to salvage a common position on Iraq now that sovereignty has

passed to a domestic authority; the larger lesson is to avoid such differences on all issues that are open to terrorist threats. Building a common policy in response to the risk of terrorist policy conditionality would gradually discourage the practice.

Proposal 7: Governments should assess potential policy disagreements beforehand for the likelihood that they could inspire terrorist policy conditionality. Where the risk is high, they should limit their initial public positions to those that do not cross the "red lines" of other governments, thus facilitating the building of a common position.

Countering the free-rider problem in intelligence. In devising ways to overcome the standard international public good problem, a useful analogy is the burden-sharing problem of defence within NATO during the cold war. Most NATO members had a strong incentive to free-ride because their individual spending was small relative to the total. This was particularly true of small countries; famously, a Danish political party once campaigned on a strategy of zero defence spending, secure in the knowledge that because the forces of the Warsaw Pact would need to attack across Germany, Denmark would be defended by default.

Expenditure to curtail international terrorism is similarly subject to a free-rider problem, but the problem is much more acute because all the benefits of one country's action accrue to other countries. An analogy that captures this effect would be global warming; rising global temperatures would benefit countries that are too cold at the expense of those that are already too hot, yet many of the actions to contain rising temperatures need to be taken by the countries that are too cold. To avoid Tanzania becoming even hotter, Sweden needs to spend resources that will keep it too cold. Equivalently, to reduce terrorism in Sri Lanka, Canada needs to spend resources to curtail the activities of some of its Tamil citizens—a politically influential group.

Yet the evidence from NATO during the cold war is encouraging; to a large extent burdens were indeed shared, and there was little free-riding. The methods by which NATO achieved this successful burden-sharing may thus provide some guidance about strategies that are liable to be most effective in limiting free-riding. NATO's success may be attributed to four strategies. First, considerable information was shared on each country's defence effort, so free-riding was made very public. Second, a common international organization held regular meetings, so that ministers of defence from countries that were free-riding had to

face their colleagues. Third, there was routine operational cooperation over a long period, so that defence forces learned to work together and to trust each other. Fourth, the electorates in each country were sensitized to the security problem, so that generally they were not willing to vote for free-riding strategies.

Security from terrorism depends not on military spending but on intelligence. Intelligence organizations are traditionally highly secretive with intense international rivalries. A major task is to transform intelligence organizations into something that the electorate understands, that see themselves as part of a cooperative international community and that political leaders discuss at international meetings as a burden-sharing activity. As a first step, the number of intelligence operatives whose primary activity is to counter international terrorism could be made public in a coordinated fashion. This transparency would enable both domestic and international pressure to be placed on those countries that are most manifestly free-riding. More radically, it might be possible to develop common legislation against the offence of international terrorism—analogous to the common OECD legislation against international corruption—and common practices for prosecuting it. Common practices may go some way towards defusing community relations with ethnic and religious minorities.

Proposal 8: Reduce the free-rider problem by publishing internationally comparable measures of governments' counter-terrorism efforts and by developing templates for common legislation.

Civil war

Civil wars generate enormous costs, much of them external to the country in which the civil war occurs. A recent lower bound estimate is that the typical civil war costs about $50 billion, more than half imposed on neighbours during and indeed long after the conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2004c). These lower bound estimates do not take into account such global externalities as drugs, terrorism and epidemics. For example, about 95% of the production of hard drugs comes from countries in civil war because these are the only places with territory outside government control. More generally, such unregulated territories provide safe havens for both criminals and terrorists.

Strategies for reducing the global incidence of civil war can be grouped into three objectives: preventing them, shortening the duration of conflict and improving the prospects of sustaining post-conflict peace. Each objective plays a part in reducing the overall incidence of conflict, and each uses distinct instruments to be effective.

Solutions based on prevention

Many factors contribute to conflict. After nearly a century historians still do not agree on what caused the First World War, and the list of contributing factors is a long one. Civil wars are usually more opaque than the First World War; there are always elements of particular personalities, chance, triggering events and government error. The events are interpreted by those who want to see something that supports their perspective on conflict, and participants produce explanations of their conduct that are self-serving. Because of these difficulties in interpreting causes, a more straightforward approach is to focus on factors that statistically make a country prone to conflict. Globally, during 1965–99 three economic characteristics were surprisingly important: the level of per capita income, its rate of growth and its structure—specifically its dependence on primary commodity exports (Collier and Hoeffler 2004a). These results correspond closely to the separate analysis of Fearon and Laitin (2003), and the central importance of economic growth has recently been confirmed by Miguel and others (2004).

The traditional instrument available to the international community for increasing growth in developing countries has been aid. It has recently been recognized that a range of other instruments are also available to OECD governments to promote such growth. Here the focus is on the scope for improving governance in developing countries.

Aid. The literature suggests that aid can actually worsen conflict, but statistically aid has no systematic effect other than through growth, where its effect is favourable. By raising the growth rate, aid reduces the risk of conflict—both directly, because growth affects the risk of conflict, and indirectly, because growth cumulates to higher levels of income, which reduces the risk of conflict. The typical low-income country faces a risk of conflict of about 13.8% during a five-year period. Additional growth of 1 percentage point would after five years have reduced this risk to about 12.2%. The more problematic and contentious point is whether additional aid can substantially raise the growth rate in such countries (Collier and Hoeffler 2004a).

Three statistically defensible views of aid exist. As set out in Collier and Dollar (2002), effective aid is conditional on the quality of policy, governance and institutions and is subject to diminishing returns. In this view substantial additional aid to the poorest countries is problematic as a growth-enhancing strategy, because such countries already receive relatively large amounts of aid. Diminishing returns are thus a problem for some countries, and many have relatively poor policies and institutions. Using the Collier and Dollar figures, an extra percentage point of aid as a share of GDP would raise the typical low-income country's growth rate only by about 0.2 percentage points. This is also the order of magnitude found by a new and fairly definitive study by Radelet and others (2004). Such an increase in growth may well be worth achieving through additional aid, but it is not a dramatic effect. Nor is it a comment on the effectiveness of existing aid levels, which deliver considerably more growth because they are less affected by diminishing returns. Simply scaling up aid does not appear to offer the possibility of really substantial increases in growth rates. The implication is that for an expansion of aid to be effective, it must be complemented by an improvement in the quality of policies, governance and institutions.

A recent estimate quantifies the security benefits from extra aid as a preventive strategy and compares them to its costs (Collier and Hoeffler 2004c). It finds that the security benefits are fairly small relative to the costs. However, when additional aid is restricted to those among the poorest countries that have above-average policies and governance, the security benefits rise to about 40% of the costs. At this level, though security considerations alone would not justify additional aid, they substantially supplement the core aid rationale of reducing poverty.

Aid to low-income countries can be increased either by increasing overall aid budgets or by retargeting existing budgets. Historically, aid has not been well targeted to low-income countries. Large amounts of aid, especially from the European Union and the US Agency for International Development, have gone to middle-income countries. Reallocating aid could substantially increase flows to the poorest countries.

Of the large aid programmes, the International Development Association (IDA) has focused best on low-income countries. Yet until very recently the IDA has provided only loans. The European Union provides only grants. Consequently, the world's major grant programme has been targeted to middle-income countries, whereas its major loan programme has been targeted to low-income countries. This is self-evidently anomalous.

Improving governance. Efforts to improve governance in low-income countries are complementary to additional aid. Two possible international initiatives are discussed: promulgating templates and reforming OECD banking practices to make corruption less attractive.

Internationally promulgated templates—or standards and codes—are public goods that are far from new; indeed they are part of the normal role of international cooperation. An example is the Basel standards on banking. However there is considerable scope for initiatives that target the distinctive needs of low-income countries.

One such need concerns the management of rents generated by natural resource exports. So far possessing such rents has significantly worsened a country's governance. For example, measuring the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), controlling for the level of GDP shows that additional earnings from natural resources significantly reduce the CPIA. A country with export earnings equal to 30% of GDP has a CPIA about 0.3 points lower than that of a country with the same GDP but a different export structure.

The new Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative is an example of an internationally promulgated template. It is designed to improve governance in countries with large natural resource rents by establishing a norm for accounting for revenues from natural resources, both for companies making the payments and for governments receiving them. A template does not need to be mandatory to be effective. Some governments—notably Nigeria—are choosing to adopt the initiative's standard, and this indirectly creates pressure on others to do likewise. Transparency in revenue is only an input to better management of the resources. There is scope for templates for stabilizing expenditures through medium-term smoothing arrangements and for scrutinizing expenditures.

A second approach to improving governance is to reform OECD banking practices. At present, once a government official from a developing country has deposited corruptly acquired money in an OECD bank, it is in practice virtually impossible to force its repatriation or for the public even to find out about it. Recent concerns about the funding of terrorism have led to tightening of disclosure, but at present this tightening is not applied to corrupt money with the same vigour as to terrorist money. For example, the corrupt money deposited by General Abacha in London banks has proved so secure because of British banking laws that the Nigerian government has abandoned efforts to repatriate it.

Proposal 9: Conflict prevention strategies should target more aid to vulnerable low-income countries, in conjunction with promulgating templates and reforming OECD banking practices, to improve governance.

Solutions based on ending conflicts

The next important consideration deals with strategies for ending, or at least shortening, conflicts. Because the costs of conflicts are broadly proportional to their duration, shortening them would have substantial payoffs. Again, the problem is to find instruments that are effective. A recent study (Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom 2004) analyses all international interventions since 1960, classified according to whether they were economic or military and on the side of the government or the rebel forces. None of these types of intervention appears to have had any systematic effect on shortening conflicts. This does not imply that particular interventions have not been effective, but rather that no type of intervention has proved to be systematically effective. It is therefore necessary to experiment with new forms of intervention to find what might work.

Political scientists suggest that a major reason why internal conflicts last so long is that there is no way for either party to the conflict to bind itself to a proposed settlement. Rebels cannot prevent dissident rebel groups from continuing combat; governments cannot ensure that once rebels have disbanded it will not succumb to the temptation of reneging on terms. Because neither side trusts the other—and cannot be expected to do so—there is a role for international guarantees. International wars are usually settled much more quickly than civil wars, which can last more than 10 times as long. This is partly because the international community has learned both how to deploy pressure to end conflicts and how to create confidence in the terms of a settlement. Recently, these techniques have been applied to internal conflicts with considerable success. There is, however, a tension between the neutrality needed for successful mediation and the adverse effect such neutrality has in elevating a rebel movement to the same status as a recognized government.

An alternative or supplement to political guarantees is to provide rewards to those rebel leaders who accept a settlement. Sometimes these rewards are financial—for example, the Italian government provided relatively limited one-off financing for the leadership of Resistência Nacional Moçambicana, which was probably critical in ending the long

civil war in Mozambique. Sometimes the rewards are in the form of status, appointing rebel leaders to ministerial positions.

Complementary to such carrots are international actions that squeeze the finances of the rebel movement while it remains at war. The model for this is the Kimberley process in diamonds, a novel partnership between the United Nations, governments of diamond-exporting countries, non-governmental organizations and the private sector. The basic idea is to create a two-tier market for legitimately and illegitimately sourced diamonds. As with all such attempts, the key principle is the presumption of guilt. That is, a supply is presumed to be illegitimate unless its source is properly certified and the process of certification meets certain standards that are themselves verified. The Kimberley process may now be imitated for timber, and there is the possibility of extending it to other commodities. There is sufficient evidence that rebel forces have generated large revenues from extortion rackets in commodity exports to suggest that this approach is likely to be effective in curtailing conflict. Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom (2004) find that for those countries with large natural resource exports, a decline in the price of the export commodity has been associated with an increased chance of peace. The effect is quite substantial: a 10% decline in price is associated with a 12% shortening of conflict. One interpretation of this result is that it supports efforts, such as the Kimberley process, that are designed to lower the price received by rebel groups. In principle, lowering the price only to rebel groups and not to the government might be even more effective in shortening conflict than in lowering the price to both parties.

The process of certifying the origin of valuable natural resources liable to be looted by rebels started with diamonds but can be extended to some other commodities. As shown by the NGO Global Witness in its study *The Logs of War* (2002), timber is also a significant source of finance for rebel groups. There is a natural alliance between environmentalists and those interested in reducing the inadvertent financing of civil war in establishing a system for tracking legitimate supplies from their source. A similar approach may be necessary for oil. Currently, about $1 billion of oil is looted from pipelines in the Delta region of Nigeria, with part of the money used to arm criminal gangs that could resurrect the violent secessionist movement of the late 1960s. Trace materials could easily be put into legitimate oil shipments. As with diamonds, certification of timber and oil could be judged successful as long as it deepened the price discount for illegitimate supplies.

Commodity markets are by no means the only source of rebel revenues. Another important source has been donations from diaspora organizations in OECD countries. Again, recent recognition of this problem has led to some steps to curtail the activities of such organizations. Organized financing of violence against a recognized foreign government clearly should be classified as a criminal activity, and diaspora organizations should be duly scrutinized to ensure that this does not happen. Again, progress has been made here. For example, classification of the Tamil Tigers as a rebel organization and greater awareness of the consequences of terrorism (such as the 11 September attacks) have decreased diaspora financing. This decrease helped bring the organization to the negotiating table.

A third source of rebel financing has been from hostile neighbouring governments. In effect, supporting rebel forces was a clandestine way to wage limited international warfare. Again, the international community clearly can judge such activities to be illegitimate. Just as countries engaged in international war are normally debarred from receiving aid for the duration of the conflict, so countries proved to be financing rebel movements could be subject to similar penalties.

A final approach to shortening internal conflicts is to make it more difficult for rebel groups to acquire armaments. This requires tightening control of the arms trade. In principle, this is not difficult. Intelligence can be gathered on the trade. At some point in the trading process, OECD facilities for transportation or banking are liable to be needed. This opens up the potential for effective sanctions. Further, where arms traders are tracked to the territory of any recognized government, punishment of the traders could be required as a condition of continuing the benefits of sovereignty. The basic principle here is that recognition as a sovereign nation carries with it the obligation to sanction certain classes of behaviour that threaten security.

The costs of each of these approaches to ending conflicts are small. The benefits of shortening the typical conflict even by as little as one year are worth several billion dollars, and there is reasonable evidence that the approaches proposed would have some effect.

Proposal 10: The international community should become more involved in negotiating settlements to internal conflicts. It should complement this involvement with actions that reward rebels who accept a settlement and squeeze the finances and the military supplies of rebels who continue to fight.

Post-conflict interventions

About half of all civil wars are caused by post-conflict relapses. This means that the international system could radically reduce conflict through highly targeted interventions. It is likely that the combined efforts of the international community can make a major difference. The risks of relapse are very high during the first post-conflict decade, typically about 50%. This is partly because the countries involved have underlying and persistent characteristics such as low income and natural resource dependence that make them prone to conflict and partly because of the legacy of the conflict itself. The high level of risk is due about equally to the pre-conflict characteristics and the legacy of the conflict. The three instruments that can be deployed to reduce post-conflict risks are political design, economic recovery and military provision.

Political design. In post-conflict settings there is a strong moral case for political institutions that are democratic and inclusive. However such institutions cannot normally be relied on in the short or medium term to secure the peace. First, in low-income countries—which is where civil war is most prevalent—democracy tends, if anything, to increase the risk of civil war. Typically, it is only in countries with per capita income of more than about $700 that democracy is stabilizing. Further, post-conflict situations have to contend with spoilers—groups that benefited financially from the violence and disorder. Spoilers find it relatively easy to challenge any new political design. Finally, although elections can rapidly confer legitimacy on new arrangements, they have a tendency in post-conflict situations to polarize the political discourse and to encourage a "winner take all" mentality among the majority. The implication is that even intelligent and sensitive political design is unlikely to be the main source of security during the first post-conflict decade.

Economic recovery. Conflicts wreck economies, and the post-conflict decade provides an opportunity for rapid recovery. Rapid growth is even more effective in reducing post-conflict risks than it is in preventing conflict (Bigombe and others 2000). As with conflict prevention, post-conflict growth can be promoted through both aid and policy. However the effects of aid and policy are distinct and need to be tailored accordingly.

Historically, aid has not been significantly higher during post-conflict decades than it would have been if there were no conflict, although it is significantly higher in the first two or three years. Recent analysis of the effect of aid on growth in post-conflict situations (Collier and Hoeffler 2004b) finds that aid is supereffective in stimulating growth in post-

conflict situations—about twice as effective as normal. However this applies only during the middle of that decade. Hence to encourage growth aid should taper in during the first few post-conflict years, whereas actually it tapers out. During its peak in the early post-conflict years it is not particularly effective—probably because, although needs are great, capacities to spend effectively are very limited. Hence the post-conflict aid opportunity is for bigger budgets overall, but better timed ones. Politically the moment to commit to post-conflict aid is clearly around the time of the peace settlement, so the right approach is probably to allow much greater flexibility in timing aid disbursements. Long lags between commitment and disbursement should become normal in post-conflict situations. In their cost-benefit analysis of increased post-conflict aid, Collier and Hoeffler (2004c) find that the security benefits are about four times the costs and still substantially exceed the costs even at the adverse bounds of the confidence intervals of their estimates.

The enhanced growth effect of aid is particularly dependent on the quality of policy, governance and institutions. That is, aid effectiveness is much more sensitive to these characteristics in post-conflict situations. The quality of policies, governance and institutions is initially very low in such situations. However normally it improves quite rapidly during the first decade. This supports the notion that aid should taper in rather than taper out. It also provides a rationale for focusing international attention heavily on improving these characteristics. Typically, considerable attention has been paid to political design in post-conflict situations, to the neglect of economic design. Greater attention probably needs to be paid to economic policies and institutions.

However economic recovery takes time. It is unrealistic to expect economic recovery to reduce the risk of renewed conflict to acceptable levels during the post-conflict decade. The most that can reasonably be expected is that this reduction can be achieved by the end of the decade.

Military provision. Even with the best economic and political design, risks will remain high during the first post-conflict decade. The legacy effects of conflict cannot be removed overnight. Obviously one of those effects is hatred. But several other legacy effects may be more important in raising the risk of conflict. During the conflict skills, organizations and investments build up that are only of use through violence. Peace is costly for these interests, so they will look for opportunities to revert to conflict. In practical terms these interests have to be opposed by military force. Typically, post-conflict governments do exactly this by maintaining very high levels of military spending. However this is counterproductive (Collier and

Hoeffler 2006). Controlling for the obvious fact that in the presence of higher risk military spending increases, in post-conflict situations high levels of military spending actually increase the risk of further conflict. Note that this does not appear to happen other than in post-conflict situations. This conundrum may reflect the lack of trust and inability of the government to bind itself to the terms of a settlement, as discussed above.

Because some military force is needed in post-conflict situations, but force provided by the post-conflict government is counterproductive, there is often an inescapable need for external military force. UN forces operating under chapter 6 rules have not proved very successful. While countries are willing to supply forces under these terms, they are often not willing to see their troops exposed to significant levels of risk—and chapter 6 does not permit deploying a level of force adequate to discourage rebel groups. A spectacular demonstration of this problem was the capture by the Revolutionary United Front of 500 UN troops in Sierra Leone. The more recent deployment of British troops there under chapter 7 rules has, by contrast, been remarkably successful. The cost of the operation over a four-year period has been only about $180 million, and the pay-off has been four years of secure peace in what was surely a very high-risk situation. If the costs of the typical civil war are taken to be on the order of $50 billion, the pay-off to this respite from risk, even if only temporary, is enormously greater than its costs. The Sierra Leone model is therefore worth taking seriously. Its basic elements are the participation of a power with sufficient interest in the situation to risk taking casualties, an invitation from the government and authorization under the UN to use sufficient force to secure the peace, not merely for the immediate self-defence of troops (that is, chapter 7). Current French involvement in Côte d'Ivoire is similar. Australian involvement in the Solomon Islands is another recent instance involving a regional power; here the motivation appears to have been linked to fears about the abuse of sovereignty rights and the externalities likely to arise from such abuse.

Under the terms recently developed, external military force is thus enormously beneficial. It also generates the opportunity for a degree of governance conditionality beyond that associated with financial aid. However it is evident that such governance conditionality carries the opportunity for abuse, or at least for perceived abuse, as domestic politicians accuse external forces of neocolonialism. A way out of this difficulty is to make governance conditionality not arbitrary and to replace ad hoc intervention after the fact with systematic advanced requirements

to be applied in all post-conflict settings—ideally under the auspices of the UN. This is closely related to the previously discussed idea of governance templates for such matters as the transparency of natural resource revenues and the accountability of all public expenditures. Adopting these international templates for adequate governance could be made a condition of post-conflict military assistance in all instances.

Proposal 11: The international community should increase and sustain aid in post-conflict situations. Complementarily, governments with a clear interest should be encouraged to supply military forces under robust UN guidelines for an extended period. These benefits should be conditional on countries applying template governance processes.

Genocide

In all these international security issues, no government has very powerful reasons for not cooperating with collective action. The major hurdle is that the modest costs of participation combined with the scope for free-riding on any benefits are sufficient to prevent action. In rare cases, however, a recognized sovereign government chooses to murder its own citizens on a large scale or to acquiesce in their murder. Such governments clearly have powerful incentives not to cooperate with strategies that curtail their action. Equally clearly, the international community does not accept that governments have the right to commit mass murder of their citizens. The issue is what practical consequences should follow. Experience to date has been highly erratic. Systematic mass slaughter by the government of Rwanda in 1994 actually triggered a withdrawal of international military forces. By contrast, much more limited intimidation of the non-Serb population of Kosovo by the government of Serbia induced international military occupation. Currently in Sudan events somewhere between those of Rwanda and Kosovo are inducing regional and international responses, while events in Zimbabwe that have generated about 2 million refugees have produced little response.

Solutions need to specify both who should be responsible for taking actions and what actions they should take. For both, a useful approach is to think of an ascending hierarchy.

Who is responsible?

The duty to protect. The thesis of *The Responsibility to Protect* (ICISS 2001) was that the responsibility to protect a population extends beyond the sovereign government of the country in which the population are citizens. This thesis has proved controversial because some governments see it as licensing international intervention in their internal affairs and so challenging their sovereignty. In addition to such governments' reluctance to countenance intervention, governments that would undertake the intervention may now be more reluctant to intervene. Especially in the wake of Iraq, the costs of foreign military intervention are likely to be perceived as very high. The result is that governments with bad intentions are less likely to be deterred by fear of foreign intervention.

Subsidiarity. A refinement of the idea of generalizing responsibility that might allay some fears of reduced sovereignty is to build on the notion of subsidiarity. This principle was developed within the European Union as an explicit limitation on the powers of the European Commission relative to national governments. Specifically, the commission may not intervene in an activity if the function can be performed as well at the national level, and, more generally, a function should be performed at the lowest level at which it can be done effectively. The principle of subsidiarity thus defines the circumstances in which there is a right of intervention and postulates the level at which this right should lodge. In popular usage the term is sometimes associated with decentralization to lower tiers of decision-making. This is not the sense in which it is used here. Rather, the notion is to recognize the importance of multitiered responses within the international system and to lodge actions at an appropriate tier.

The European Commission is confined to providing those public goods that are supranational. Using this criterion, it is clear that genocide is an international public bad. As with civil war, where most of the costs are borne by neighbours, genocide typically creates massive externalities—especially at the regional level. Zaire's destabilization and Burundi's reversion to civil war as consequences of the genocide in Rwanda are spectacular examples of such spillovers. Over and above any duty to protect the citizens of the affected country, the international community has a right to protect its own citizens from spillover effects. Given such a right, the principle of subsidiarity also suggests a hierarchy in which such a right should be lodged, namely the lowest level at which the problem can be addressed effectively.

In the context of genocide subsidiarity would imply that in the first instance the government of each sovereign country has both a duty to protect its citizens and an obligation to prevent adverse consequences to other countries that would arise from genocide. If the government fails to fulfil either adequately, whether through intention or incapacity, both the duty and the obligation would pass to the next level of the international community, namely the neighbourhood. If neighbouring countries can act adequately, individually or collectively, no duty or obligation would pass further up the system. However, if neighbouring countries failed to act, whether through choice or incapacity, both the duty and obligation would pass further up the system to the regional level. If the region can act adequately, no duty or obligation would pass further up the system. However, if the region failed to act, whether through choice or incapacity, both the duty and the obligation would pass to the international community in the form of the United Nations and organizations such as the Commonwealth. Only if these organizations fail to act would the duty and the obligation pass to individual countries beyond the region. NATO's decision to intervene in Kosovo, and the African Union's decision to intervene in Sudan, both made without consulting the UN, are proto-examples of this principle.

Because the externality is in part global, the highest tier of the international system—the UN—should be the ultimate judge of whether actions at lower tiers were adequate. Hence ineffective intervention by a lower tier—such as a regional organization—would not annul the duty and obligation of higher tiers to respond.

Subsidiarity as an incentive for action. Such a hierarchy of rights and responsibilities would formalize and therefore clarify elements that are already present. For example, in Sudan the African Union has decided to act, sending a significant military force from three of its member countries and a high-level diplomatic mission. Conversely, everyone appears to recognize that in Zimbabwe the first responsibility lies with South Africa. South Africa's refusal to act has immobilized international action. Clarity in the hierarchy of responsibility would help remove such obstacles. Further, it would strengthen the incentives for action at each level. For example, in Sudan it is clear that the incipient interventions at the international level encouraged pre-emptive intervention at the regional level; the African Union wanted to be seen to solve its own problems rather than have others do so.

What actions should be taken?

Genocide can be tackled through three types of action: accountability, sanctions and military intervention.

Accountability. The principle that those who perpetrate genocide are accountable for their actions is well established. Accountability is important both because it is an incentive for reasonable behaviour and because it acknowledges limits to sovereignty. As an incentive, accountability is most effective if it is deployed both after the fact and pre-emptively. The International Criminal Court works exclusively after the fact; a genocide has to have been committed before it can be prosecuted. The prospect of such prosecution nevertheless works as a deterrent. There is considerable scope for pre-emptive accountability at all levels of the international system. Pre-emptive accountability formally signals both that the international community is concerned and that senior members of government are likely to be held liable if situations deteriorate. In justifying their positions governments are also likely to give undertakings about future developments. Such accountability can work at the neighbourhood, regional and international levels. For example, in Sudan the government has been required to justify itself before a committee of the African Union. The case has also been discussed in the Security Council, where sanctions have been agreed. The government of Sudan has thus been left in no doubt that if the death rate escalates, in contradiction to its reassurances, its members will be held accountable. The criticism that can be made of these interventions is that they have been slow in coming and, indeed, not fully expected. In effect actions have been invented as the crisis developed. If these actions become accepted as standards, they would be far more effective; the certain anticipation of such actions would act as a deterrent.

Sanctions. Sanctions can be targeted both to countries and to individuals. Thus, in Zimbabwe, donor agencies have stopped or severely curtailed their programmes, putting pressure on the regime. At the same time the Zimbabwean leadership has been subject to diplomatic sanctions on travel. The power of such sanctions is demonstrated by the vigour with which President Mugabe has attempted to thwart them. However such sanctions have also demonstrated the difficulties of maintaining collective action; two European countries have invited Mugabe to meetings. Given the weak armoury against genocide, it is important to deploy such sanctions with greater consistency.

Sanctions would be considerably more effective if they were extended from the diplomatic to the financial arena. An important de-

veloping legal right of governments (for example, in Norway and the United Kingdom) is to require citizens suspected of crime or corruption to account for their assets. Assets that cannot reasonably be accounted for are subject to confiscation. A further trend is to require international banks to know their clients and maintain databases on whether account holders are senior government officials or relatives of government officials. Because genocide usually occurs in the context of grand corruption, these two developments could be combined to create a powerful pre-emptive sanction. The Security Council might require scrutiny and accountability of the international financial holdings of senior government officials in offending countries.

Military intervention. Civil instruments against genocide work only with a moderate probability of success. Because genocides must be stopped, a residual role for external military intervention is necessary. The most critical issue relates to timing. Military intervention must be pre-emptive, yet such intervention is highly problematic. The matter becomes less difficult the greater the speed with which forces can be deployed. Even swift genocides, as in Rwanda, take weeks. The decision to deploy a force that could be effective in a matter of days could be made after a genocide had started, but before the toll became too severe. Conversely, because the existence of such a force would make deployment much less problematic, offending governments would be more likely to anticipate that deployment and so be deterred. The recent creation of an Anglo-French rapid reaction force for Africa is a step in the right direction, but it would be useful to make the criteria for its deployment public.

Sequencing

This subsidiarity approach implies a sequence of actors from neighbours, through regions, to the international community, and a sequence of actions from pre-emptive accountability, through sanctions and military intervention, to accountability after the fact. Potentially, actions can cascade across actors; the basic principle is that of effectiveness. Thus, if a regional group's imposition of pre-emptive accountability is ineffective in securing the objectives of the group, the international community would be expected to reinforce the regional action with international pre-emptive accountability.

Each instrument would be deployed first at the lowest level, and the lowest powered instruments would be deployed first. Only a failure to deploy the instrument, or its ineffectiveness once deployed, would

justify escalation to more potent instruments and to higher levels of international authority.

To an extent this sequencing of instruments and actors already happens. However there would be a considerable advantage to codifying it. The more standardized responses are the more they can be anticipated—and the more they can be anticipated, the stronger is the deterrence effect.

Proposal 12: Rights and duties to intervene pre-emptively in genocide should be clarified based on the principles of an ascending hierarchy of legitimized actors and actions.

Building a grand bargain

For international collective action some, most or all of the 189 countries in the UN need to reach agreement. This is difficult. Cutting through to the essence of the problem of reaching agreement among players with different interests requires radically simplifying groups of countries—interests being broadly similar within the groups but different between them.

On international security issues the key simplification used to focus on the two superpower blocs. This distinction is now irrelevant. It is now useful to distinguish between four types of countries, although these types are not institutionally cohesive blocs analogous to NATO or the Warsaw Pact. Each type is distinguished by different security interests and potential to contribute to international security. The core argument is that achieving the five international security objectives discussed above will probably require a grand bargain. Such a bargain is required because for each security objective action is likely to be needed from at least one type that has little interest in the objective. Yet if the objectives were treated as a package, with benefits conditional upon participation, each type would reap substantial benefits. Paradoxically, it is thus easier to achieve all five objectives as a package than it is to achieve any one of them in isolation.

The four types are:

The United States. The United States is distinctive as overwhelmingly the strongest military power, the prime target for international terrorism and the largest potential single source of finance for international action. Through both its Security Council veto and other means of

influence it has the power to block any international security cooperation that it opposes.

The other permanent member (P5) countries. The other permanent members of the Security Council are virtually the only other countries with significant international military capability. They are also the only other countries to have the individual power to jeopardize any international security cooperation to which they are strongly opposed, whether by overt use of their Security Council vetoes or by other means of influence.

The other OECD countries. None of these countries is individually critical to international security cooperation. However their collective failure to participate in an initiative would often be prohibitive, whether through sharply increasing the financial burden on the P5 or through fatally weakening incentives for action by developing countries. These countries thus constitute the core of the free-rider problem, which is an important part of the impediment to improving international security. They can kill most international security initiatives by collective inaction.

Non-OECD countries. Probably none of these countries is individually critical for international security action. However for some security objectives their collective participation would be significant. They have radically different security interests from the other three groups of countries. Collectively they have some power to block international security actions to which they are strongly opposed, because their majority consent is increasingly regarded as necessary for legitimacy.

Consider the security issues in turn from the perspectives of these four groups.

WMD are overwhelmingly of concern to the P5 since they are the most likely targets. The states with insecure WMD are themselves likely to be developing countries that have no direct incentive to comply with restrictions. In turn, the creation of a system of effective incentives will depend on the non-P5 OECD countries who have only a very weak incentive to comply.

Arms races are overwhelmingly a problem facing developing countries, whereas aid leakage is a problem primarily concerning the other OECD countries. The incentive to curtail the problem rests primarily with the P5, as the biggest donors with the most influence on the international financial institutions.

International terrorism is predominantly a problem for OECD countries and especially the P5. Yet action is required globally.

Civil war is predominantly a problem for developing countries and is most especially a threat to their governments. There are also some spillover effects to OECD countries in general. Yet actions to reduce the incidence of civil war will fall predominantly on the P5, who will reap a negligible proportion of the benefits.

A duty to protect will directly benefit only citizens in a few developing countries. Indirectly, however, it will appear to threaten the sovereignty of many developing countries. Further, the subject is primarily a matter of concern for OECD governments and their populations. Yet action will depend primarily on a combination of military action by the P5 and legitimacy conferred by developing countries.

Thus on none of these individual issues is it possible to get even the minimum condition for collective action—namely, that if everyone who is capable of supplying the good participates, everyone will benefit. The problem is thus much worse than the conventional free-rider problem facing the supply of public goods; no single dimension of international security is a sufficiently global public good. The problem is greatly obscured by the excessive usage of the language of partnership, which assumes common interests. A key point about international security is that interests are far from common. If group A cooperates, group B will benefit; fortunately, it is also the case that if group B cooperates, group A will benefit. The pretence that group A's action will directly benefit A as well as B—the pretence of partnership—inhibits the potential for a bargain. Properly constructed, there is scope for a grand bargain in which group A meets B's needs in return for group B meeting A's needs. Of course, because there are (at least) four groups of actors and five international security issues, the grand bargain is somewhat more complicated than simple reciprocity between group A and group B. This is presumably why it has not yet happened. Yet because all governments have major concerns about security, achieving collective action should be feasible. It is considerably easier than getting action on the environment, for example, where some governments that are critical for global action do not see such action as a concern.

Notes

1. In principle there is a risk that WMD might be used by an irrational dictator. In practice, however, even dictators need the consent of others to act. Mutual assured destruction makes the consequences of use

so evident that it seems inconceivable that any governing group would deploy WMD.

2. This and subsequent results are from Collier and Hoeffler (forthcoming).

3. The test corrects for the tendency of spending to be high when risks are high—the endogeneity problem.

4. In a few cases OECD governments explicitly finance military spending, but this money is not channelled through development assistance budgets.

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Reforming International Institutions to Promote International Peace and Security

Chapter 2

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This contribution considers how to adapt and reform international institutions so as to best promote international peace and security. It begins by identifying the main threats to peace and security in the coming years. The second section provides an analysis of where and why unilateral national strategies will be insufficient to counter these threats. The third section identifies and analyses the problems that multilateral institutions must address to counter these threats effectively and makes proposals for reforms. These reforms range from relatively minor adjustments within current institutions to highly ambitious projects that could involve "refoundings" of major institutions such as the United Nations. This section also discusses problems with current arrangements.

"Security" here refers relatively narrowly to freedom from risk of violent death, injury or coercion at the hands of some organization.

The main threats to international peace and security in the coming decades

The authors of the UN Charter proposed that the organization should seek to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". Understandably, they had in mind avoiding world wars and other large interstate conflicts. Sixty years later there have been hardly any "hot wars" among the militarily strongest states. This fortunate outcome probably has less to do with the functioning of the UN system than with the perceived costs of interstate war in the nuclear age and increasing doubts about the economic advantages of conquest.

The major threats to international peace and security are radically different today from those anticipated by the framers of the UN Charter. Today international institutions must be reformed to address two principal sets of security threats:

- In developed countries terrorists use of weapons of mass destruction (and especially nuclear weapons) in major urban areas.
- In developing countries there is internal war, state collapse and consequent personal insecurity; violently abusive government; and, in some cases, risk of attack by strong states or neighbours.

The destructive power of technologically advanced military services, along with the deepening of democracy and international trade, has made the citizens of the major powers safer from invasion than they have ever been. Many of the benefits of the peace between major powers have extended to smaller and militarily weaker states as well, since they are less subject to annexation or direct control by major powers playing "great games" or fighting each other.

Nonetheless, the same technological advances that have helped bring about peace between the major powers have created a new security threat that will grow worse as technology advances and scientific knowledge spreads. Interstate war is generally discouraged by the existence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), but the horrific destructive potential of these weapons makes them more attractive for terrorist use by non-state or state-supported actors—and thus a major concern. The risk of nuclear explosions in New York, Paris, London, Moscow and other large major cities is a truly existential threat. Further, because the knowledge will spread and the technological ease of making WMD will only grow greater over time, the threat is long term. It will remain long after Al Qaida has disappeared.

The main security threats in the rest of the world are quite different. Since 1945 at least 18 million people have died as a direct result of civil wars, almost entirely outside the economically most developed countries. This figure does not include the many millions killed in one-sided massacres orchestrated by governments, such as those in Argentina, Cambodia and Uganda. By comparison, about 3.3 million people were killed in interstate wars in this period. These three problems—internal war, mass killing by governments and interstate war—represent the major security risks for much of the developing world, in decreasing order of global severity.[1]

These risks are related indirectly to one of the early successes of the UN system—the promotion and management of mostly peaceful decolonization in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. The UN Charter was signed by 51 countries in a world that had about 60 independent states. Today there are 191 members, half of whom gained independence since 1960. Decolonization filled the international system with new states whose economies and administrative structures were often fragile and underdeveloped. These states have been especially prone to civil war and abusive rule (Fearon and Laitin 2003).

The UN system, or a redesigned parallel or alternative system with similar basic commitments, may be more valuable for promoting peace and security now than it ever was during the cold war. Such a system has four important functions:

- The function of authorizing the use of force is more important as more military interventions are expected in countries convulsed by civil war and as the most dangerous cases of WMD proliferation require a credible threat of military intervention.
- The function of mobilizing and coordinating peacekeeping operations to civil war–torn countries is more important now than during the cold war. Further, the diffuse benefits but concentrated costs typical of interventions in such settings imply that sharing burdens internationally through a UN-like body makes excellent sense.
- The function of legitimating transitional governance arrangements while undertaking concrete steps to rebuild basic state capacities in countries where states have collapsed following war or invasion is more important than ever.
- The function of authorizing and overseeing an international institution empowered to undertake more intrusive inspection and monitoring of possible WMD development within states is increasingly necessary.

Whether the United Nations in its present form is the best body to perform these functions is an open question. On the one hand, what is required to meet the new international security threats runs against two premises of the UN Charter. First, the charter sought to regulate interstate relations but not internal matters, such as civil war and its effects or national decisions about armaments programmes.[2] Second, the charter conceived of the United Nations as an organization open to all states irrespective of their form of government. Some of the new security

challenges—such as preventing human rights abuses by governments, and authorizing the use of force—might be better met by an organization whose members are democracies. On the other hand, the UN Charter has proven powerful and flexible. It may be possible to innovate effective solutions to the new challenges within its basic structure. This contribution offers suggestions about what might be done both within and outside the UN system.

Why unilateral national strategies will not be sufficient to counter these threats

Since a large portion of the resources for addressing both sets of threats inevitably must come from the relatively rich states, it makes sense to start by asking why these countries need multilateral cooperation to confront the threats at all. Why are unilateral policies not up to the task?

Regarding protection from terrorist use of WMD, there clearly are a range of important unilateral strategies that states should pursue. They include hardening targets, improving border and port security and putting effective emergency response measures in place—all while minimally compromising civil liberties. (Of course, international institutions may provide important assistance to states undertaking such measures; this is a valuable part of the agenda of the United Nations's Counter-Terrorism Committee.)

But these unilateral strategies are clearly not enough. Practically every other sensible response will require active multilateral or at least bilateral cooperation. Extensive coordination among states is required to:

- Gather intelligence on people and organizations who might be planning attacks.
- Control and monitor weapons materials.
- Deal with problems posed by states that might be developing WMD (which might then be passed or lost to individuals or groups intending to use them for terrorism).

The first task plainly requires international cooperation, although it is possible that bilateral exchanges might be more effective than multilateral ones. The second and third tasks require intrusive measures ranging from expert monitoring teams to, in the limiting case, military intervention. A unilateral approach here is likely to be ineffective for several reasons.

First, there is the question of legal authorization. Unauthorized, unilateral action in this sphere signals strongly that the situation is "every

man for himself" among states. This heightens incentives for acquiring weapons, which in turn undermines the goal of avoiding terrorist use of WMD. If one state unilaterally demands access to another state's laboratories and reactor projects, or unilaterally attacks a state to prevent its leaders from developing WMD, then many countries may start to find the option of secretly developing WMD—so as to deter threats and coercion—more attractive. By contrast, if there is a multilateral process for authorizing intervention and intrusive inspections that proceeds according to rules, then there can be greater confidence that a state can avoid attack at the whim of a stronger state. Nor need one state worry so much about the threat of neighbours or other states developing WMD.

Second, multilateral cooperation is required to deal effectively with the problems posed by failed or collapsed states. Such states pose obstacles to effectively monitoring weapons materials and their use. Controlling and monitoring weapons materials is much harder if parts of the world are not governed by any internationally recognized and responsible state apparatus, where international monitoring and police work are infeasible. Although it may be nearly impossible for an organization to actually develop WMD (say, to process uranium) in the chaos of a failed state, the options in these areas for trafficking in weapons materials or contraband to finance the purchase of such weapons are excellent. Moreover, as experience in Afghanistan suggests, such areas may easily serve as recruiting or training grounds for terrorist groups.

Thus, in a world where the know-how to produce WMD is increasingly widespread, zones of anarchy pose a larger international security threat than ever before. Whether state collapse arises from years of destructive civil war or from an attack on a state perceived to be developing nuclear weapons, the major powers will have incentives to cooperate to help restore internationally responsible and domestically effective political orders.

The central security problem for the major powers may be summarized as follows: WMD imply, over time, a big increase in the negative externalities associated with both collapsed states and tyrannical rule in small countries that have some technological capability. The externalities are diffuse, potentially affecting many states, but the costs of dealing with them are concentrated. Unilateral military responses are likely to increase incentives for proliferation and to increase regional insecurities—worsening rather than reducing the problem in the long run.

This is a classic collective action problem, whose natural solution should tend towards multilateral arrangements to share the burden and avoid the escalation of insecurity that would follow from a unilateralist approach. In consequence, for the resource-rich developed countries to effectively confront the threat posed by WMD terrorism, they will need to cooperate in helping address the central security threats of the developing world: civil war and widespread government-inflicted human rights abuses.

Problems with current arrangements and possible solutions

Authorizing the use of force

The dilemma. To a great extent new thinking and calls for reform of international institutions concerned with peace and security arise from concerns about the recent US-led interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. In his September 2003 speech to the General Assembly, Secretary-General Kofi Annan deftly captured the central dilemma. Referring to the Bush administration's argument that pre-emptive attack to preclude a "state of concern" from developing WMD is justified by the dire consequences of WMD terrorism, Annan averred that

> This [pre-emptive] logic represents a fundamental challenge to the principles on which, however imperfectly, world peace and stability have rested for the last 58 years. My concern is that, if it were to be adopted, it could set precedents that result in a proliferation of the unilateral and lawless use of force, with or without justification. But it is not enough to denounce unilateralism, unless we also face up squarely to the concerns that make some states feel uniquely vulnerable, since it is those concerns that drive them to take unilateral action. We must show that those concerns can, and will, be addressed effectively through collective action.

Annan suggests that unilateral military efforts by strong states (particularly the United States) to deal with the dangers posed by WMD proliferation and terrorism are likely to move the world farther under the law of the jungle. If some states see the use of force as a permissible way to resolve regional disputes, then other states will worry about the

use of force by neighbours, producing a spiral of arms build-ups, WMD proliferation and military conflict. But if the strongest states (again, particularly the United States) feel that they cannot adequately address their security concerns by working through multilateral institutions, they will go outside them.

It follows that a successful reform must strike a difficult balance. An institution that merely pronounces against acts that the most powerful state views as matters of self-defence risks irrelevance. An institution that merely ratifies whatever the strongest state wants to do will be illegitimate. Either way we would effectively have the law of the jungle, not an approximation of the rule of law.

An international institution for peace and security can foster the rule of law only if the strongest states see enough benefits to working through the institution in general that they are willing to submit to important collective decisions they do not like on some occasions. The scenario suggested by Annan can be avoided only if the strongest states are interested in using international institutions to avoid the use of force, and if they feel strong pressure to gain collective authorization for the use of force when they see no good alternative. Collective authorization of the use of force in international politics is the linchpin of a working collective security system.

It is worth stressing that the problem here is how to develop something new, not how to preserve something old. During the cold war the strongest states frequently used force without Security Council authorization. Indeed the council was mainly irrelevant during that period. The problem is not how to preserve an institution that has maintained international peace and security through a legal process for 58 years, but how to adapt or change the institution to play this role for the first time.

What has changed to produce a new demand for a working system of collective authorization of the use of force? During the cold war, the superpowers' mutual fears of nuclear war somewhat tempered and restrained their use of force, which had the effect of somewhat reducing other states' worries about attack and control. In addition, for both technological and political reasons (including the success of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty), the major powers had less to fear from WMD proliferation and terrorism during the cold war than they do now. What has changed is that the United States and possibly other major powers have new reasons to intervene abroad militarily but lack the implicit checks and balances of the cold war system.[3]

If we could start from scratch … Suppose we could start over and design from scratch a body like the UN Security Council that would issue authoritative resolutions concerning the use of force to address threats to international peace and security. What would such a body look like? What principles would determine its membership, and by what procedures would it make decisions?

The results of this exercise are likely to be politically fanciful, since all manner of institutional forms, decisions and interests sharply constrain what reforms are possible in practice. The major proposals of the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change are hard to improve on for their political feasibility and constructive change. But a "from scratch" exercise is nonetheless important for grounding our sense of the direction in which specific reform proposals should head and for evaluating the merits of specific proposals.

A successful body of this type needs to be both effective and legitimate.[4] To be effective the institution must satisfy several conditions.

> *Condition 1: Decision-making power within the institution must reflect, to some significant degree, the military, economic and persuasive power of states outside the institution.*

Otherwise, when there are conflicts over what to do, the strongest states may ignore the institution's decisions and it will seem irrelevant. This axiom underlay Roosevelt's critique of the League of Nations and the idea of creating a Security Council of major powers with veto rights. To the extent that the UN system has been more successful than the League of Nations—for example, it has preserved its structure and authority in principle despite stasis during the cold war—one major reason is that the UN Charter tried to take account of condition 1.

This is a necessary but not sufficient condition for efficacy. It was satisfied at least for the first part of the cold war, but intense conflicts of interest among the permanent five Security Council members (P5) nonetheless prevented the UNSC from playing much of a role in maintaining international peace and security. Effectiveness also depends on the perception of common interests among the Security Council powers, although how much depends on the body's decision rules, as discussed further below.

An immediate and important implication of condition 1 is that the criteria for membership in an effective UNSC-like body would ideally be dynamic. That is, membership and voting criteria need to allow membership and influence in the institution to change as a function of

shifts in the international distribution of power and influence. One of the main obstacles to UNSC reform is that the veto power of the P5 reflects the distribution of international influence immediately following World War II better than it does the current distribution. Understandably there is great reluctance among the P5 to adjust the structure. Thus a lesson learned from the experience of the UNSC is that, if we could start over, dynamic criteria for membership that build in the potential to adjust to international change would be desirable.

For a UNSC-like body's decisions to be viewed as legitimate (that is, there is a widely perceived obligation to follow them), the institution must satisfy another condition.

> *Condition 2: All members have some non-trivial influence, at least some of the time, on decisions taken, and the membership reflects in a broad sense the wider field of states and people that might be affected the body's decisions.*

What criteria for membership and what voting rules can plausibly satisfy conditions 1 and 2? This contribution next considers several principles. Each has something to recommend it, but all fail in various ways. The main conclusion is that a mix of criteria would be the best way in principle to determine the parameters of an effective and legitimate UNSC-like body.

One state, one vote? The principle of sovereign equality enshrined in the UN Charter might be taken to imply "one state, one vote", as in the General Assembly. This principle had a stronger justification when the United Nations was founded—when most of the world's 60 states were at least moderately large.

Since decolonization, however, the rationale for this principle as a basis for allocating influence within a UNSC-like body—or indeed any international organization—has weakened considerably. From the 191 current members of the United Nations, one can form a majority with a group of countries that contains less than 3.6% of the world's population. By sharp contrast 50% of the world's population resides in the six largest states, an inconsequential fraction of the total membership if counted as one vote per state. Using this principle to allocate decision-making influence in an international institution grossly violates condition 1 (effectiveness). It is also hard to justify on the grounds of legitimacy or fairness, because it vastly overrepresents people in very small states.

The General Assembly's reliance on the principle of "one state, one vote" is an important factor behind the partly correct perception that

it is little more than a forum for empty debate and symbolic posturing. All votes are equal, but they count for almost nothing. Might a majority of states in the General Assembly prefer a system in which votes were weighted by some measure of size, influence or contribution, but in which, as a result, votes could become consequential and influential?

Some form of weighted voting may thus be necessary to satisfy the condition for a UNSC-like body to be effective. But weighted how?

One person, one vote? It could be argued that legitimacy is maximized by drawing on the democratic principle of "one person, one vote", thus weighting votes by the state's share of the world's population. Of all 191 members the states with the 10 largest vote shares would be those shown in table 2.1.

Thus China and India would control 37% of the votes (based on 2003 population figures), the 10 largest states would control 60% of the votes, and the remaining 40% would be divided in tiny shares among the remaining 180 states in the assembly.

Though clearly better on this score than "one state, one vote", this principle also violates condition 1 (effectiveness). On condition 2 (legitimacy), it assumes that all governments are equally good representatives of their citizens. As discussed at length below, there is a strong argument that undemocratic governments do not merit this assumption, and thus the implied levels of representation.

Finally, there is the practical matter of how to allocate vote shares weighted by population in a decision-making body that is much smaller than an assembly of the whole (such as the UNSC). For example, if the

Table 2.1 **Votes weighted by population**

Country	Vote share
China	20.4
India	16.7
United States	4.6
Indonesia	3.7
Brazil	2.9
Pakistan	2.5
Russian Federation	2.3
Bangladesh	2.2
Nigeria	2.2
Japan	2.0
Total	60.0

Note: Top 10 in an assembly of 191; P5 members in bold.

body had the 10 largest states as members, how should the remaining 40% of the votes be allocated among these 10? Equal distribution? Proportional to size? By regional similarities or cultural ties? If the states on the council are agents acting on behalf of those in states not on the council, then it is not clear by what principle to assign agency.

Still, it must be allowed that any formula that does not give institutional standing to large segments of humanity would suffer on the grounds of legitimacy (condition 2). Given that a large body, such as an assembly, is likely to be ineffective at the crisis management that is central to the tasks of a UNSC-like council, at least some non-permanent seats are desirable in principle. Non-permanent seats chosen by rotation, election, or some other rule allow representation to be distributed over large populations while retaining the form of an executive committee that can analyse, bargain and act expeditiously (condition 1).

Influence as measured by gross national product. Though hardly perfect, the size of a state's economy as measured by gross national product (GNP) is the single best measure of its power and influence on a broad range of international matters. The states with the largest economies exercise considerable power to make things happen through international collaboration, and they have considerable power to prevent things from happening if they do not agree among themselves or with others. A UNSC-like body cannot be effective if it does not allow significant influence for the economically strongest states.

The increasing importance and scope of the Group of Eight (G-8) summits as an international institution illustrate this principle. Though the summits started as a forum for addressing international macroeconomic issues, the G-8 are increasingly taking on security affairs. Their most notable security initiative is the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials for Mass Destruction. But the G-8 have also negotiated agreements, initiatives and commitments on regional peace processes (Bosnia, Kosovo, the Middle East and central Africa), counterterrorism, landmines and peacekeeping operations in Africa.[5] The forum has also hosted political negotiations that have led to action in the Security Council. According to Malone (2003), the Security Council resolution that ratified and organized the end of hostilities between NATO and Kosovo (UNSCR 1244 of 10 June 1999) was "actually negotiated within the Group of Eight forum".

If votes were weighted by contribution to the global economy, then the states with the largest vote shares would be as those shown in the second column of table 2.2. Thus the United States would control about

Table 2.2 **Votes weighted by economic size (%)**

Country	Assembly of 191	Council of 15
United States	32.7	39.8
Japan	12.6	15.3
Germany	6.2	7.6
United Kingdom	4.9	6.0
France	4.5	5.5
China	4.0	4.9
Italy	3.7	4.5
Canada	2.2	2.7
Spain	2.1	2.5
Mexico	2.0	2.4
India	1.6	2.0
South Korea	1.5	1.8
Brazil	1.4	1.7
Netherlands	1.3	1.6
Australia	1.3	1.6
Total	82.0	99.9

Note: P5 members in bold.

33% of the votes, the top 10 states would control 75%, and the top 15 would control 82%.[6]

For an executive committee of 10 to 25 members (rather than an assembly), there is still the issue of how to allocate the remaining vote shares among committee members. If the sole criterion is relative influence, the natural solution is to allocate proportionally. This yields the vote shares shown in the third column for a council of 15. The United States and Japan would control about 55% of the votes on the council. The western European states together would control about 28%.

Although such a scheme arguably does well by the necessary condition for council effectiveness (condition 1), it suffers on the grounds of legitimacy (condition 2). Only 55% of the global population is represented on a council of 15, and Africa, the Middle East and Eastern Europe go wholly unrepresented.

There is a deeper problem with the rationale behind this scheme. The argument for representing power and influence is pragmatic. Without the major powers, an international institution risks irrelevance. But to produce legitimate resolutions on the use of force, some kind of principled justification for the body is helpful and perhaps even necessary. Could the G-8 vote on whether force was permissible in various

international crises? Yes, and perhaps doing so could help legitimize the use of force by indicating agreement among the major powers. But far better to have an institution established by some kind of initial consent among a broad spectrum of countries whose founding principles make it more than a club explicitly for major powers.

Influence as measured by military might. Total military spending correlates strongly—but not perfectly—with total GNP across countries. There can be little doubt that military capabilities are an important factor in determining the influence of a state in matters of international peace and security (for good or for ill). So at least on the grounds of effectiveness (condition 1), one could argue for giving some weight to relative military capabilities for membership and decision-making power in a UNSC-like body.

But this argument is weak. This criterion would create a bad incentive, an incentive for militarism, contradictory to the purpose of an international institution aimed at fostering peace and security. It is already a source of great trouble that some states' leaders believe that possessing nuclear weapons is a necessary condition or provides a valid claim for becoming a permanent member of the UNSC. (Given that the P5 are exactly the five nuclear weapons states recognized in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), they may perhaps be forgiven the confusion.) So not only would this principle suffer on legitimacy grounds (for the same reasons as economic might), it is also dubious on purely pragmatic grounds.

Contribution to the United Nations. A principled justification that would heavily weight the major powers is that influence should be related to contribution to the organization. This principle makes influence partly a matter of choice; if a state wants more influence, it can contribute more.

A highly attractive feature of this principle is that it provides an incentive for states to support the international institution. Lack of resources has been a persistent problem in the UN system. The UN Charter has provisions to suspend the General Assembly voting rights of a state that does not pay its dues for two successive years, but these provisions only weakly tie influence in the organization to the level of support provided and can be avoided even as a state runs up massive arrears. Imagine, hypothetically, a scheme whereby voting weights within the UNSC-like council are based on states' contributions to the organization, averaged over the preceding three or five years. This could give states a powerful incentive to make financial support of the organization a priority.

What would voting weights look like under this scheme? It is impossible to say because we don't know how much different states would choose to contribute. But we can make some guesses based on current UN dues and voluntary contributions.

UN activities are financed by state payments to three major accounts: the regular budget, the peacekeeping budget and voluntary contributions (typically to specific agencies, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees or the United Nations Children's Fund). "Capacity to pay" has long been the main principle behind the assessments for the regular and peacekeeping budgets, meaning that a country's total GNP is used as the baseline. But since the beginning it has been accepted that poorer countries should pay at a lower rate, leading to a low-income offset scheme that reduces the dues for countries with per capita incomes below the world average. From the beginning it was also agreed to cap the maximum share of any one state's contribution to the UN budget at 26%; this was reduced to 22% in recent negotiations. The second column of table 2.3 shows how voting weights would be allocated in an assembly of 191, if based on the official assessment scale for 2003.

Table 2.3 **Votes weighted by UN dues**

Country	Official assessment	GDP/World GDP
United States	22.0	32.7
Japan	19.6	12.6
Germany	9.8	6.2
France	6.5	4.5
United Kingdom	5.6	4.9
Italy	5.1	3.7
Canada	2.6	2.2
Spain	2.5	2.1
Brazil	2.2	1.4
Netherlands	1.7	1.3
South Korea	1.7	1.5
Australia	1.6	1.3
China	1.5	4.0
Russian Federation	1.2	1.1
Argentina	1.2	0.3
Total	84.8	79.8

Note: Top 15 in an assembly of 191; P5 members in bold.

Not surprisingly, given the rule for computing dues, this scheme gives results similar to basing voting power on economic size. However the United States' voting weight here is quite a bit less than its share of the global economy because of the budget cap agreement. And because of the low-income offset, the relatively rich countries—especially Japan and Germany—gain more voting weight than their proportion of world GDP. China and India, by contrast, would have markedly less voting power if they chose to contribute at their current assessed levels because of the low-income discount built into the current scheme.

A better estimate of what states would actually choose to contribute might be what they now contribute voluntarily to UN agencies. Table 2.4 shows the vote shares that reflect states' proportions of total voluntary contributions in 1998 and 1999. Somewhat surprisingly, in light of congressional intransigence on the regular budget, the United States is close to its share of global GDP and higher than its budget-capped share of 22% on regular dues. We also see a large increase in influence for the Nordic countries and the Netherlands, which are big voluntary supporters of the organization.[7]

Table 2.4 **Votes weighted by voluntary contributions to United Nations**

Country	Voluntary contribution	GDP/World GDP
United States	31.3	32.7
Japan	10.6	12.6
Netherlands	7.3	1.3
Norway	6.4	0.6
Sweden	5.8	0.8
United Kingdom	5.5	4.9
Denmark	5.4	0.5
Germany	4.1	6.2
Canada	3.7	2.2
Switzerland	2.7	0.8
Italy	2.5	3.7
Australia	2.1	1.3
France	1.7	4.5
Finland	1.7	0.4
Brazil	1.3	1.4
Total	92.1	73.9

Note: Top 15 in an assembly of 191; P5 members in bold.

Basing voting weights on contributions to the organization has two major advantages. First, it provides a principled justification for a rule that is likely to satisfy condition 1 (effectiveness). It seems fair in this context that those who contribute more should be granted more say. Second, it would provide good incentives for contributing to global public goods.

On the downside, this principle can be criticized on the grounds of condition 2 (legitimacy) for not representing large portions of humanity. There is also the reasonable question of what constitutes a contribution that should weigh in the formula for deciding influence. We take up this question next.

Contribution to international peace and security. The preceding section conceived of contributions narrowly, in terms of payments to the United Nations (or a like body). But states that send their soldiers on peacekeeping missions are surely making a major contribution, even if the soldiers are paid. And states and organizations such as the United States and NATO that supply military planning and logistical services in peacekeeping operations are making a contribution. For that matter, what about the fact that if the United States and other major powers suddenly stopped confronting aggressive cross-border attacks, we would probably see a great deal of regional violence, as some minor powers attacked smaller neighbours? Does that capability and intent not contribute to international peace and security? What about the protection of international sea lanes by various large navies? What about the contribution made by states' national development agencies? Arguably these agencies contribute indirectly to peace and security.

Even for a hypothetical exercise, it is too fanciful to imagine how any agreement could be reached on an implementable scheme that took into account all such contributions. The one measurable and clearly justifiable element in this list is contributions to peacekeeping forces. Countries that are willing to put their soldiers at risk for international peace should be recognized by more than pay. Indeed, under current circumstances, if they are compensated only by pay the arrangement begins to have an unpleasant mercenary flavour—rich countries paying for dangerous peacekeeping jobs undertaken by soldiers from very poor countries.[8] There is a strong argument on the grounds of legitimacy that those who contribute soldiers for peacekeeping missions should gain more representation in the council that decides to deploy them.

Type of government. The only plausible, principled justification for using states as the basis for organizing a UN-like body is that states are the best and most capable representatives of their citizens whose wel-

fare is their ultimate end.[9] Given that, there is a strong argument that a government that does not represent the population it pretends to, in the sense of being elected in a free and fair democratic process, should not have full or perhaps any representation in the international institution.

The UN Charter begins speaking in the voice of "We, the peoples ...", and article 56 obligates members to promote "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race sex, language or religion". In slight contradiction, the charter also explicitly conceives of its members as states and specifies that "nothing contained in the present charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state ..." (article 2.7). Certainly the charter does not identify domestic political regimes that would be more or less fit for UN membership. Rather, the only question seems to be whether the state is willing to accept the principles of international interaction outlined in the charter. Thus the proposal to make membership in a UNSC-like body conditional on a state's observance of democracy at home is at odds with the UN Charter—even if there might be a slight opening for the idea through the door of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Nonetheless, on the grounds of legitimacy the argument is quite compelling.[10] Moreover, there are good reasons to believe that limiting membership in the organization to certified democracies could have important practical benefits and advantages for effectiveness.

Most of all, making membership or voice contingent on electoral democracy would provide a powerful incentive for states to maintain or move towards democracy. In recent years compelling examples have emerged in Eastern Europe, where democratic conditionality in the European Union and related institutions has exerted strong and generally very positive effects.

If one thinks democracy is a good form of government, this is a good thing by itself. But for at least three reasons it is also a good thing for promoting and maintaining international peace and security. First, a substantial body of scholarship finds that democracies have been much less likely to fight wars against each other.[11] Second, one of the major security threats of the last 60-odd years, mass killing by governments, is much less likely to occur in democratic regimes. Civil wars are less likely in established democracies, and the levels of violence and killing appear to be lower in those civil wars that occur in democracies.[12] Thus creating an international institutional incentive for democracy and democratic

consolidation could be major contribution to reducing all three of the major security threats afflicting most of the world's population.

Third, democracies are apt to be less secretive and more willing to abide by the international rule of law and therefore with international regimes for monitoring and controlling WMD. In general, stable democracies are much less of an international threat on the WMD front than are narrowly held dictatorships. The spread of democracy could therefore lessen Annan's central concern about unilateral pre-emptive attacks by the United States or other major powers worried about WMD proliferation and aid to terrorists.

Indeed, whether or not making democracy a condition for membership in a UN-like body is politically feasible, reforms of existing international institutions should consider ways to promote democracy as a matter of promoting international peace and security. Democratic transitions can be dangerous for various reasons, but in the long run it is hard to see how the main security threats of the coming century can be well addressed except in a world of stable democracies. We return to the issue of what can be done on this front later.

Although the normative and practical arguments for making democracy a condition for membership are strong, one can pose reasonable objections on the grounds of effectiveness (condition 1). Under any serious criteria for democracy, China would either not be admitted to the organization or would have little voice in the UNSC-like body. Yet China contains 20% of the global population and is a major power. And though apart from China the world's largest economies are all democracies (see table 2.2), about 40% of the world's population lives in countries that are not democratic by standard measures (20% outside China).[13]

On the plus side, then, making democracy a condition for membership or voice could provide powerful incentives for democratizing and for consolidating democratic gains. As argued, successful democratization may be a necessary condition for promoting and maintaining international peace and security in the twenty-first century. But these advantages could come at a short- or medium-run cost of increased conflict with the dictatorships excluded from the institution.[14]

If we could start from scratch: Summary and conclusions.

- States are the most capable and plausibly the best representatives of the people whose welfare is the end of international peace and security. Thus it still makes sense to base an international institution dedicated to this end on states as members.

- However states are wildly unequal in terms of population and capabilities to affect and contribute to international peace and security. Thus basing an international institution such as the United Nations on the principle of "one state, one vote" is a prescription for irrelevance. Because states vary so radically in population and so many contain such a tiny fraction of the world's population, "one state, one vote" as the basis for making decisions is not only impractical but also unethical.
- Thus, on the grounds of both legitimacy and effectiveness, some form of weighted voting or elected temporary membership status is desirable in the institution (and especially in a UNSC-like body).
- Votes should be weighted by criteria that are dynamic in the sense of reflecting changes in the international distribution of population and influence. Without this ability, the international institution will not withstand international change.
- There are several plausible dynamic criteria for weighting influence in an international institution, particularly population, economic size, contributions to the institution and to peacekeeping forces and democracy. One commonly suggested criterion—military size or nuclear status—creates the wrong incentives and should not be incorporated in any reform scheme.
- No single criterion would yield an institution that would perform well on both effectiveness and legitimacy grounds, though all have some advantages for one condition or the other. Therefore, if we started from scratch, it would be desirable to base influence and perhaps membership in the UNSC-like body on a mix of state characteristics, combined by some formula.

These general considerations can also be turned around and used to identify the major pluses and minuses of the United Nations' present design:

- Most obviously, the criteria for UNSC membership are not dynamic for the P5. With the international changes of the past 50 years, this stasis has led to a situation where some major powers who contribute a great deal to the institution have considerably less formal power than others in the council or are sometimes not represented there at all. And the veto arguably gives some or all of the P5 more influence than would be optimal in a scheme weighted along the lines suggested above.

As a result, the UNSC in its present form is less legitimate and less effective than it could be.

- Aside from the central problem of the P5 and the veto, the use of non-permanent seats chosen by regional groupings has managed, with some success, to spread representation around a large number of countries. At the same time, the system has managed to give "weight" (in terms of time on the council) to relatively more influential states who contribute a lot to the institution.

  Figure 1 graphs the percentage of time each member state has spent on the UNSC since 1945 (or since its independence) against the country's GDP. The P5 are in the upper right corner. Notice that some of the main aspirants for permanent status have done relatively well in terms of time spent on the council under the system of choice by regional groupings.

  This suggests that greater legitimacy and, possibly, effectiveness could be gained by a reform that increased the number of non-permanent seats; increased the length of at least some temporary seat terms; and added dynamic and appropriate criteria that temporary members would need to satisfy. One such proposal was developed by the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change Report (United Nations 2004), and is discussed more below.
- Current thinking on UN reform focuses on the Security Council and mostly ignores the General Assembly. This focus reflects the largely correct perception that the UNSC is an important and sometimes effective body, while the General Assembly is not. But ignoring reform of the General Assembly reform is a mistake. Making the General Assembly more effective by changing its voting rules so that votes are weighted by contribution to the organization should be seriously considered. It is even possible that the General Assembly membership, or a large fraction of it, could come to see such a reform as desirable. What use is the equal voting power (by state) if those votes count for nothing? [15]
- There are strong arguments that making democracy a condition for membership or voice is both ethically desirable and practically important to promote international peace and security in twenty-first century conditions. But the United Nations as presently conceived cannot accommodate this condition. It can,

Figure 1. Percent time on UNSC by country GDP



of course, take various actions to promote democracy when the member states (especially on the UNSC) so agree. They have done so with surprising frequency since the end of the cold war. But to get the major international benefits of making democracy a condition for membership or voice requires a refounding.

Three scenarios. This section considers three scenarios for UN reform intended to make the body more effective, more legitimate and better able to manage the central dilemma identified in Kofi Annan's September 2003 address to the General Assembly. It begins with the most radical proposal—essentially to disband the current United Nations and found a new, improved version—and proceeds to successively more modest and perhaps more feasible proposals.

Founding a New United Nations. Though it is doubtless a radical proposal, founding a new United Nations would be easier and more feasible than one might first imagine. As suggested by the data in tables 2.3 and 2.4, a handful of advanced industrial democracies provide almost all the financial support for the current UN system. The top five contributors supply close to two-thirds of the total UN budget. If they agreed among themselves to withdraw from the organization, the United Na-

tions could not survive—for lack of resources, reduced effectiveness and possibly loss of legitimacy.

To found a new institution the major powers withdrawing from the old United Nations would need to convene international conferences to negotiate a new charter and to invite a new membership to join an institution that would take over or adapt many of the United Nations' central functions. With broad enough international assent, it would not be necessary to start entirely from scratch. Parts of the UN system, such as various specialized agencies, could be incorporated or adapted wholesale.

The most ambitious departure a new United Nations could make would be to restrict full membership to electoral democracies. As argued above, making democracy a condition for membership or voice may be essential for maintaining international peace and security in the long run. There is also a powerful argument on the grounds of legitimacy—that is, that the people of the world deserve a "United Nations" rather than a de facto "United Governments".

The main institutional innovation this would require is a credible international agency for monitoring and certifying elections. The criteria for deciding who is democratic enough to join (or to gain vote share or representation on the UNSC-like body) would have to be relatively objective and verifiable. The agency would be empowered to observe and monitor election practices of members and aspiring members and to report on how they fare relative to a set of agreed-on standards. The agency would report to a relevant council or committee of the new institution, which would make membership decisions.

The seeds for such an agency are already growing in international institutions, including the current United Nations. The United Nations' Department of Political Affairs already provides extensive assistance and expertise in setting up electoral systems and elections in new democracies. Several international groups provide election monitoring services that increasingly play a role in legitimizing new regimes as democratic or discrediting them as dictatorial.[16] Whether or not radical restructuring of international institutions is undertaken, the proposal to develop a core international institution for monitoring and certifying democratic elections should be seriously considered by the Task Force.

Following the arguments made above, the other major innovation desirable in a new United Nations would be to ground decision-making influence in dynamic criteria that reflect the diversity of the global population, the distribution of economic and political

influence and states' choices about how much to contribute to the organization.

Weighted voting should be the norm in a new General Assembly. Weighting by financial and peacekeeping contributions would be the easiest to implement, the most justifiable and the most likely to yield a body with both legitimacy and the potential to matter. With an assurance of greater influence on average, the major powers might be willing to grant more powers to a new General Assembly than the current assembly has, which in turn might be attractive to a coalition of the current members.[17]

Designing a new Security Council poses thornier problems. There would be no point to constructing a new United Nations unless the new UNSC was to be governed by some scheme of weighted voting (as in the World Bank and the IMF) and not by the current system of vetoes for the P5. But why would the P5 (or the democracies among them) agree to give up their vetoes for weighted voting in a new and untested institution? This is where this scenario looks particularly politically infeasible, at least under current international conditions.

Veto power is desirable because it allows a state to block resolutions condemning its uses of force, resolutions in favour of use of force by others that it does not approve of and sundry other resolutions it finds annoying or unhelpful. Veto power also gives a state enormous leverage in bargaining over the content of resolutions that do pass.

The P5 will be willing to trade veto power for weighted voting only if the costs of losing a vote on the use of force decline, or if weighted voting can make the council so much more productive and useful on average that occasional losses are judged worthwhile. Consider first how the costs of losing a vote on the use of force might be reduced.

The charter for a new United Nations could specify that states have the right to use force in self-defence and that, in the end, states will judge what constitutes self-defence in their particular cases. In a reformed Security Council the point of UNSC resolutions on the use of force would not be to "make international law", but instead to offer an authoritative statement of international opinion on the justification for force in particular circumstances. Resolutions would then matter by influencing how the international community of states reacts and responds to uses of force. States would have an incentive to gain the support of the council on the use of force, insofar as this support confers a sense of legitimacy and might attract broader international support and assistance.[18] But a resolution say-

ing that the justification for force was weak and that the council did not approve would not have the status of a binding obligation.

Actually, this is how the present system operates, except that UNSC resolutions are understood to be binding in some hypothetical sense of international law. The proposal here is to formally weaken this hypothetical sense of legal obligation, which has been routinely violated since the cold war, to the detriment of the United Nations' legitimacy and authority. This could make the veto less valuable and so make its possessors more willing to contemplate a possibly much more productive UNSC based on more permissive decision rules.[19]

The second change that would make the P5 more willing to consider moving towards a weighted voting scheme would be if the average benefits of international cooperation through the council increased for these states, for whatever reason. Veto power protects a state from resolutions that it dislikes intensely. But the veto system also means that resolutions that are beneficial for many states will sometimes be blocked. The more common this is—which depends on how great the average benefits are from international coordination through a UNSC-like body—the greater the attraction of majority or supramajority rule.

Put differently, vetoes protect their holders from bad outcomes but at the expense of reducing council effectiveness. If international change increases the value of international cooperation, or if council members learn that the advantages of cooperation outweigh the costs of occasional losses, then moving towards majority or supramajority rule becomes more appealing and feasible.[20] This is arguably part of the story behind the European Union's gradual moves towards weighted majority voting in the Council of Ministers.

Despite some signal failures, the UNSC was a much more productive and effective body for organizing international cooperation on security matters in the 1990s than it ever was before. There are structural reasons for this change. The major powers that dominate the Security Council are less ideologically opposed than they were during the cold war, and they share interests in addressing diverse bad consequences of terrorism, state collapse and civil war. It is conceivable—though not likely in present circumstances—that a bargain could be struck on weighted voting in a new UNSC on the basis of downgrading the hypothetical binding status of UNSC resolutions and increasing the average benefits for international coordination on terrorism, peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction and (perhaps) the control of WMD.

A final class of proposals for how to gain agreement on a veto-free Security Council involves incremental reform intended to allow states to experience the results of weighted voting in one area before extending it to other, more sensitive areas. This idea would apply to reform of the present United Nations rather than a radical refounding; it will be discussed at some length below.

The terms of reference for this study encourage developing ideas and proposals ranging from outside the box to more practical and politically feasible specific reforms. This section is, of course, written in the spirit of thinking outside the box. Disbanding the current United Nations and constructing a new international institution to promote international peace and security is an ambitious project. At a minimum it requires a major US diplomatic initiative (impossible under the current administration) and strong support from Japan, India, Brazil and several major European powers.

But even if such a major project is not feasible, serious and significant UN reform may be impossible without implicitly threatening a more radical reconstruction. If member states believe that the status quo is the default, then 60 years of growth of myriad interlocking interests will make genuine restructuring to solve the new problems of international security impossible. One contribution the Task Force could make would be to develop proposals that go outside or around the United Nations in the interest of either furthering serious action within the United Nations or instigating serious action outside it.

For example, what about having the international institutions that help coordinate the activities of the world's largest democracies undertake UNSC-like deliberations on authorizing the use of force? Could the G-8 institute a procedure whereby a member could call for a special meeting to discuss the justification for using force in a situation, with a view to taking a majority vote on a resolution endorsing (or condemning) the action? There would be no pretence that such a resolution would have the force of international law, but it could certainly help legitimize or illegitimize uses of military force.

Major UN reform. Moving to an organization of democracies that promotes and maintains peace and security cannot be accomplished under the present UN system. Several other ideas discussed above could, however:

- The UNSC could be made more effective and more legitimate by

- adding temporary members who would have to satisfy certain criteria to be eligible (in terms of contribution to the organization or peacekeeping forces, for example);
- moving to or towards weighted voting rather than the system of vetoes for the P5; and/or
- in combination with the proposal for weighted voting, and as a possible condition for its acceptance, clarifying that UNSC resolutions on the use of force may express international approval or disapproval in particular cases, but that they do not amount to legal determinations of what constitutes self-defence by a state.

- The General Assembly could be made more effective, legitimate and influential by moving to a system of weighted voting in which weights were determined by contribution to the organization and to peacekeeping forces.

These are still major projects. But without reforms along these lines, it is hard to see how to reach Annan's goal of an effective United Nations—one that makes the pursuit of national security through the institution attractive.

Adding more veto holders would decrease UNSC effectiveness by making it still harder to gain agreement on resolutions that are beneficial on average. Adding permanent members (without vetoes) merely increases the problem of a UNSC that is not responsive to international change (that is, not dynamic). It makes more sense to add non-permanent seats that have renewable terms and criteria for aspirants to meet—particularly, contribution to the organization and to peacekeeping. Doing so would allow some of the major contributors to gain de facto or nearly permanent representation without freezing the system. It would also retain an important advantage of non-permanent seats: their ability to spread representation around a larger number of states (and hence, people).

The single most difficult and probably politically impossible reform concerns how to move away from the veto system towards weighted voting. One idea worth exploring is whether the P5 could reach agreement on limiting the veto system to a certain class of issues or resolutions—for instance, those invoking chapter 7, or those calling on a state or coalition of states to use or not use military force. Other resolutions would be subject to weighted majority rule, or weighted majority rule with a quota greater than 50%. The idea would be to provide the opportunity to experience how the weighted system would perform in

less sensitive areas and to make possible greater average effectiveness in these areas. The expansion of qualified majority voting in the EU system has followed this path, broadly speaking.

A potential problem is that if two voting procedures were available in the UNSC, there would inevitably be disputes over which should be applied; the rules could not specify every contingency in advance. And in contrast to the European Union, the United Nations has no judicial authority empowered to decide such disputes. Nor is it likely to get one at least before there is major, proven, successful reform of the existing bodies.[21]

A minimalist way around this problem would be to let the UNSC itself decide which voting procedure to adopt after submission of a draft resolution. This procedural decision would be made under the veto system. Of course this would effectively allow the veto system to cover any issue and any resolution. But it would still provide an opening for making decisions under weighted majority rule and for developing informal council norms on what procedure would apply to what types of questions and problems.

Another idea would be to introduce weighted voting into the committees created by the Security Council to oversee sanctions implementation, counter-terrorism and implementation of resolution 1540 (preventing access to WMD by non-state groups). These committees operate under unanimity rule (all 15 members have vetoes), which has in some cases greatly undermined their effectiveness. Could agreement be reached on allowing majority rule, weighted or not, for some of the committees or for new UNSC committees?

Minor UN reform: the UN High-Level Panel options. The UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change proposes two possible reform schemes for the UN Security Council (United Nations 2004b, paras 244–60). In both, nine seats are added, bringing the total to 24. None of the new seats comes with veto power, and the Panel does not propose to take the veto from the P5.

In model A six of the nine new seats are "permanent"—two for Africa, two for Asia and the Pacific, one for Europe and one for the Americas. Three would be two-year unrenewable seats. One would go to Africa, one to Asia and the Pacific and two to the Americas. (Model A proposes redistributing one existing temporary seat away from Europe.) The net effect is to give six total seats to each of the four regions.

In model B no new permanent seats are created. Instead eight of the nine seats fall in a new category of four-year renewable seats, with two

allocated to each of the four regions. With the one new two-year unrenewable seat and some redistributing from the current pattern, Africa and the Americas would each gain one unrenewable seat, Europe would lose one, and Asia and the Pacific would stay the same at three. Again, the net effect is to endow each of the four regions with six total seats.

In line with the arguments made above, the High-Level Panel stresses that for any UNSC reform the extent of financial, military and diplomatic contribution to the United Nations constitutes the most plausible and sensible criterion for UNSC membership.[22] The Panel argues that "a method of encouraging member states to contribute more to international peace and security" would be to have the General Assembly elect members to the new permanent or four-year seats giving explicit preference to the top three contributors in each region (in terms of regular budget, voluntary contributions or peacekeeping troops). This is essentially all the Panel says about the specifics of deciding how to allocate the new seats.

It is interesting that the Panel was unable to agree on a single proposal for UNSC reform. It is evident that model A is inconsistent with the thrust of the Panel's arguments and was probably included for political considerations more than substantive merit. Permanent seats cannot respond to changes in the international distribution of power and influence—a problem the Panel notes with the present arrangement (para. 246), and a problem noted by those states most actively lobbying for permanent status. Nor do permanent seats provide an incentive to contribute to the organization's goals and functioning.

Almost openly contradicting the premise of model A, the report also states that the Panel was strongly of the view that no change to the composition of the Security Council should itself be regarded as permanent or unchallengeable in the future. *"Therefore there should be a review of the composition of the Security Council in 2020, including, in this context, a review of the contribution … of permanent and non-permanent members from the point of view of the council's effectiveness in taking collective action to prevent and remove new and old threats to international peace and security"* (para. 255, emphasis in original).

But if the composition of the UNSC is to be reviewed, then what exactly does "permanent" status mean? And what body would be empowered to undertake the review? And can anyone imagine that a state given "permanent status" on the UNSC would give it up because of the report of a committee, or even that a committee would be willing to recommend such a change? This paragraph makes more sense

Table 2.5 **Likely permanent/renewable members of model A and model B security councils**

Country	GDP %	Population %	UN dues %
United States	32.7	4.6	22.0
Japan	12.6	2.0	19.6
Germany	6.2	1.3	9.8
United Kingdom	4.9	0.9	5.6
France	4.5	1.0	6.5
China	4.0	20.4	1.5
Italy	3.7	0.9	5.1
Mexico	2.0	1.7	1.1
India	1.6	16.7	0.3
Brazil	1.4	2.9	2.2
Russian Federation	1.1	2.3	1.2
South Africa	0.3	0.7	0.4
Egypt	0.3	1.2	0.1
P5 total (% of world)	47.2	29.2	36.8
Model A total (% of world)	69.6	54.0	69.2
Model B total (% of world)	75.3	56.6	75.4

Notes: Italicized countries are model B only; P5 members in bold.

if model B, the option with renewable four-year terms, is selected. If the Panel thinks that the composition of the UNSC should not be regarded as permanent or unchallengeable (which, as argued above, is entirely reasonable), this paragraph of the report would seem to argue strongly for model B.

If the United Nations were to follow the Panel's recommendations about making contributions the main criterion for selecting new UNSC members, what would be the most likely result? Both models would probably add the same set of new permanent or renewable members. In model A Japan and India would probably get the two new permanent Asian seats; Germany the new European seat; Brazil the new Americas seat; and two of South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt the African seats. With model B, the difference is that there are additional renewable seats for Europe and the Americas, which gives Italy, Mexico and Argentina a strong incentive to prefer model B.[23]

Supposing these were the results, how would the UNSC's legitimacy and effectiveness be affected? Both models do well in increasing UNSC legitimacy, with model B clearly superior. As table 2.5 shows, both models, but especially B, increase the share of world population

represented as permanent or semipermanent members to well over 50%, considerably higher than the current arrangement. By allowing for change and some degree of sharing of renewable seats over time among major contributors, model B would do even better on legitimacy and efficacy grounds than indicated by the figures in the table. (For example, Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim country, might periodically serve in a four-year renewable seat.)

Regarding effectiveness, the most important feature of the Panel's proposals is that they counsel against adding vetoes (para. 256), because vetoes unambiguously reduce effectiveness. The Task Force should certainly support this recommendation, along with the Panel's support for "indicative voting" (UNSC members could call for public indications of positions on a resolution to flush out the veto), and the call that the veto not be used "in cases of genocide and large-scale human rights abuses".

Despite the Panel's conclusion that there is "no practical way of changing the existing member's veto powers", it is plausible that adding more major powers will make the body more effective by raising the costs to P5 members of using the veto. It may be harder to stand alone against 24 states covering more than half the world's population and two-thirds of the world's economic production than to stand alone against 15. If so, this change may increase the council's effectiveness by increasing the ability to get a majority with no vetoes, although it could simultaneously reduce the incentive of some major powers to play ball with the United Nations in the first place.

A weakness of the High-Level Panel Report is its treatment of the other major bodies of the United Nations. The lack of credibility and utter lack of effectiveness of the General Assembly is noted (paras. 240–43), but no concrete or serious proposals on its reform are offered. Similarly, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is largely dismissed. The argument of the Panel seems to be that the Security Council is the one working organ of the system, so reform efforts should focus there to make sure the institution as a whole remains important and relevant in the twenty-first century.

But why should member states continue to pay for an institution if all but two of its six principal organs (the Security Council and perhaps the secretariat) are broken or no longer relevant?[24] Seen in this light, the Panel may unintentionally imply that the United Nations needs much more fundamental reform than its report suggests. Is it really plausible that all hope for the United Nations as a vital institu-

tion in the next century rests on a renewed Security Council? Can it bear this weight?

The Task Force should consider endorsing the High-Level Panel's model B recommendation for UNSC reform and should consider arguing against model A. The Task Force might also consider arguing for applying the same spirit of serious, significant reform to the General Assembly and ECOSOC that the Panel Report has so capably applied to the Security Council. For example, if ECOSOC plays no critical role at this point, should it be eliminated and greatly streamlined? As suggested above, is there a structural reform proposal for the General Assembly that would increase its powers in exchange for moving away from the consensus and one state, one vote system?

Standards for the use of force to prevent genocide or to promote regime change

Despite the UNSC's failure to confront genocide in Rwanda and systematic ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, veto threats paralysed the body in early 1999 as evidence of possible genocide by Milosevic's forces mounted in Kosovo. NATO intervened without UNSC authorization but subsequently received after-the-fact UNSC endorsement, in UNSCR 1244 (1999) and the UN peacekeeping mission in Kosovo.

Along with many others, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) argued that the failure to authorize force in this impending genocide reflected badly on the UNSC and that subsequent failures of the same sort would tend to undermine its authority (ICISS 2001: 6.40).[25] The ICISS did not offer recommendations for structural reform to lower the odds of UNSC paralysis or to increase its legitimacy when it does act. Instead the commission argued for international acceptance of a new standard—that states have a "responsibility to protect" their citizens from harm and that when a state egregiously fails in this duty the responsibility should revert to the international community.

To give force to the standard, the commission recommended that the General Assembly pass resolutions endorsing the idea of a responsibility to protect and defining thresholds that must be reached to justify intervention. They asked the UNSC to develop "principles for military intervention" and to "reach agreement" not to veto interventions "for human protection purposes for which there is otherwise majority sup-

port" (8.28–29). The commission also recommended more decentralized efforts to cultivate an international norm in favour of intervention to end massive human rights abuses.

The Task Force might consider contributing to this norm in development by endorsing the commission's concept and calling on the General Assembly and UNSC to take up the matter more formally. In the light of the latest Iraqi war, the Task Force might consider recommending the development of international standards concerning intervention against the governments of states that support international terrorism or illegal nuclear proliferation.

There are, however, reasons to doubt that the "standards approach" is likely to improve the system of collective authorization of the use of force. In the first place, the conditions for particular interventions are too idiosyncratic to be legislated in advance. Generic standards must be interpreted in light of particular instances, and the closest thing to an authoritative interpreter is precisely the Security Council. The real work is to render the UNSC a more effective and legitimate body in its decisions on the use of the force. Second, given the vagaries of particular cases, it is not even clear that it would be wise to try to specify precise "thresholds" or other circumstances in which international intervention would be obligated in some sense.

Third, in political terms, it will be easier to get states to agree on international intervention in particular cases of massive human rights violations than to agree to endorse humanitarian intervention in general. In particular cases states know whose ox is gored, whereas in the abstract it could be a state's own ox. It may be more pragmatic and effective not to invest resources in getting verbal endorsements of a responsibility to protect, but instead to devote resources to making it less costly and more effective to intervene collectively.

Fourth, it is not as if powerful international standards concerning genocide do not exist. The United Nations' Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide came into force in 1951 and has been acceded to by more than 130 states. The main obstacle to international intervention to prevent genocide has not been sovereignty norms, but rather a lack of political will to bear the costs of intervention or to put aside or manage concerns about precedent. One current proposal in this sphere—to amend the Genocide Convention to compel state action to prevent genocide—would probably only make for more bitter hypocrisy.[26]

The problem of defining and getting international agreement on a broad and abstract set of standards for conditions for regime change would seem even more vexing. It might be more productive to stress and promote the following:

- Make it easier for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to report violations and to do so in a manner that makes it clear that enforcement is warranted. For example, states under investigation should not be allowed to participate in IAEA Board deliberations and votes on their own cases.
- Recommend that the Security Council not make chapter 7 demands unless it has prior agreement to support enforcement if the demands are not met. Since the end of the cold war the UNSC has routinely passed resolutions under chapter 7 that have been ignored by their targets—and that noncompliance has been ignored or simply "deplored" by the council. This tendency undermines the authority and seriousness of the institution.

Alternate platforms for legitimating the use of force

The Task Force could consider recommending that international bodies other than the UNSC pronounce on the legitimacy of the use of the force. NATO's agreement on action in Kosovo is often cited as a positive, multilateral authorization of a sort, justified in part by the UNSC's failure to act in a case that had a strong moral argument in favour of intervention.

The Group of Eight or the Group of Twenty could consider an agreement that any member could call for a special meeting to negotiate a resolution for or against use of force in some particular matter. Any member could, in effect, veto the proposal to convene, but in some cases the members would see advantages to negotiating an agreement and so would be willing to attend. Failure to convene such a meeting would itself be evidence of lack of support, and thus lower legitimacy.

A community of democracies—a new international organization admitting only certified democracies as members—might be especially effective with such a procedure (assuming a large number of members, such a meeting could convene if some threshold number agreed to attend). The point, again, would to create an alternative international forum for deliberating and endorsing or condemning proposals to use

force in the name of international peace and security. Such declarations would not have the force of international law, for what that is worth, but they would signal degrees of international assent and thus add to or detract from the legitimacy of various acts.

Effective international monitoring and control of WMD

In current international circumstances effective control and monitoring of WMD materials and nuclear proliferation is not simply a "first world" security problem. Nor can it be neatly separated from other important threats such as regional conflicts or even civil war. Without an effective international regime to control or prevent WMD proliferation and access, the United States or other major powers could act unilaterally in a manner that causes a general increase in international insecurity. Increased diversion of resources into arms programmes, increased regional conflict and war and less attention to and resources for development and peacekeeping operations are possible consequences.

The major international institutions concerned with peace and security have focused too little on this problem in recent years, although some recent UNSC resolutions are starting to make up ground. More than in most areas of international security, in this one there are reasonable, actionable proposals for what should be done, and for several of these the bang for the buck is likely to be large. Lacking space and area-specific expertise, this contribution begins by reviewing some of the major programmes and proposals on the table. It then addresses deeper problems with the present NPT-based regime, which is argued to be unsustainable in the medium run and in need of fundamental reform. Because the threat now posed by nuclear weapons is orders of magnitude greater than that posed by biological and chemical weapons, the focus is on nuclear weapons.

First, however, a few words about policies and institutional reforms to address the international demand for WMD. Most of the specific recommendations below appear, on the surface, to address the problem of how to limit or monitor the supply of WMD. However WMD are products with an unusual feature: up to a point, reduced supply implies reduced demand. This is recognized in one of the core bargains implicit in the NPT. If states agree not to seek nuclear weapons and to restrict access to nuclear materials, that agreement reduces the demand for nuclear weapons by reducing the worry that others will get them, putting any one state at a disadvantage. In other words, making it harder to acquire and keep

nuclear weapons (limiting supply) can reduce demand for WMD by making all states less concerned about their neighbours going nuclear.

Of course there are other reasons behind state demand for WMD. One is the fear of being coerced by a nuclear state—one of the main reasons the importance of Security Council reform is stressed. If the United States, fearful of nuclear terrorism, unilaterally attacks suspected proliferators, general demand for covert nuclear weapons programmes may go up as states look for security against possible threats and invasion. But if the Security Council is able to balance legitimate concerns about dangers of proliferation against concerns about unilateral, preventive uses of force, then this reason for WMD demand may be somewhat diminished. A central reason we need a reformed and more effective Security Council is to better address the dilemma of demand for WMD.

A final important source of demand for WMD is the idea that a government can gain international and domestic political prestige by building a bomb. This problem is discussed below regarding the need for fundamental reform of the NPT, which, because it privileges a fixed set of five nuclear powers, almost inevitably creates demand for WMD as a prestige item.

For policy measures to reduce demand for nuclear weapons, one should always note the importance of ameliorating regional security dilemmas, as in the Middle East, in Kashmir and on the Korean peninsula. Easier said than done, however.

Immediate measures

Ratifying and generalizing the Additional Protocol on IAEA safeguards. The experiences of Iraq and North Korea in the late 1980s demonstrated that under the NPT regime it was possible for a state seeking to develop nuclear weapons to exploit treaty-guaranteed access to nuclear materials and know-how to develop weapons surreptitiously. This led to the so-called Additional Protocol, which the IAEA Board encouraged the IAEA Secretariat to negotiate with all parties to the NPT. The Additional Protocol commits a state to allow monitoring and inspection of both declared and undeclared sites and to facilitate intrusive IAEA inspections in a variety of ways. Especially since 11 September 2001, there has been considerable progress in states signing Additional Protocol agreements with the IAEA—84 have been signed to date, and 59 are ratified and in force.[27] The NPT has 185 parties, however, so many states have yet to sign or ratify.

Giving this issue higher international visibility could help gain higher international participation. Where not signing is not a matter of technical issues (which are common), publicizing the regional frequency of Additional Protocol compliance and drawing attention to the states that have not signed and ratified could help make this agreement nearly global. Deliberate efforts by various international and non-governmental institutions should be undertaken to cultivate a sense that good citizens of the international community must provide open, unfettered access to IAEA monitoring and certification. In the long run there is no hope of preventing the use of nuclear weapons by states or terrorists unless the international community can develop strong norms of participation in and openness to international institutional monitoring of weapons materials and production sites.

Revising the NPT to lengthen advance notice of withdrawal and to prohibit use of nuclear facilities developed with NPT assistance after withdrawal. These reforms have the same end as generalizing the Additional Protocol: to prevent states from exploiting their access to nuclear materials and assistance under the NPT to develop weapons programmes. It should be made clear that facilities and materials acquired under the treaty regime must be returned or dismantled if a state intends to withdraw and that failure to do so will subject the state to serious sanctions.

Increasing financial support for the IAEA. The IAEA is supported by the voluntary contributions of member states with a budget of a mere $268 million in 2004. Several core IAEA programmes have suffered persistent shortfalls, and the safeguards programme is arguably underfunded. Given the central importance of the IAEA in an effective multilateral approach to the problems posed by WMD, putting IAEA funding on a solid and stable foundation would contribute significantly to international peace and security.

Backing up UNSCR 1540 in international law and UN organization. On 28 April 2004 the UNSC passed resolution 1540, which enjoins states to undertake a broad range of domestic actions and reforms to reduce the likelihood that WMD materials will fall into the hands of non-state actors, particularly those with terrorist purposes. The resolution asks states to pass legislation criminalizing possession of or attempts to acquire materials or weapons of mass destruction and to establish accounting and physical security mechanisms, border and export controls and appropriate law enforcement regarding such materials or devices. Aside from resolution 1373 in 2001 on terrorist groups (discussed

below), no UNSC resolution has ever made such sweeping demands on states' domestic legal and enforcement systems.

Resolutions 1373 and 1540 represent pioneering efforts of the UNSC to take the initiative and make an important contribution to reducing major twenty-first century threats to international peace and security. These efforts should be applauded and supported. However, as with any new approach, problems arise and must be addressed. If they are to amount to more than fine words, both 1373 and 1540 need to be backed up in two major respects.

First, international treaties and conventions must be signed and ratified that support the two resolutions' demands on member states. Some states have raised reasonable questions about whether the UNSC is stepping out of bounds—acting as a legislative body rather than an executive for crisis management. They observe correctly that the traditional path in international law to the ends of these resolutions would be through international treaties and conventions negotiated at conferences and ratified domestically. Certainly such a process is based on a much higher level of active consent.

Given the urgency of the issues and the slow pace of negotiating and ratifying broad international conventions, it arguably makes sense for the Security Council to take the initiative.[28] But the authority and details of the demands in the two resolutions need to be backed up and fleshed out in international conventions that gain broad international approval. Where existing treaty efforts do not adequately cover the concerns of the resolutions, new conventions should be proposed and negotiated.[29] WMD terrorism will pose a persistent danger in coming decades. Because unilateral responses are likely to be ineffective and to make things worse in the long run, it is imperative that the international community work out a well grounded international and domestic architecture for minimizing the threat.

Second, resolutions 1540 and 1373 need organizational support. Both resolutions propose that their implementation be overseen by committees of the Security Council, but that is a wholly inadequate mechanism for resolutions of such broad scope, reach and complexity. Indeed it is difficult to see how either resolution can be implemented—or rather, how the United Nations can effectively help member states to implement it—without providing for a small agency in each case. The agenda implied by each resolution parallels that of the IAEA, though focused on domestic laws and institutions rather than weapons materials and reactor facilities. The Task Force should consider proposals for

how to fund and develop deeper institutional backing for these initiatives than UNSC committees can provide. For resolution 1540, potentially the most natural thing would be to incorporate its agenda into a new division of the IAEA. Alternatively, an agency that combined implementation efforts for resolutions 1373 and 1540 might make sense, given overlapping issues and demands for information.[30]

Supporting a global clean-out and internationalization of highly enriched uranium or Nunn-Lugar programmes. Highly enriched uranium (HEU) is the most likely source of bomb materials for terrorist groups, which are unlikely to be able to enrich uranium on their own. Unfortunately a few kilograms of HEU are sufficient to make a simple "gun type" nuclear device, and hundreds of tons of HEU are not accounted for or not adequately safeguarded in Russia and a number of other countries (Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate 2004).

Programmes to account for, secure and if possible eliminate HEU are probably the single most cost-effective way to significantly reduce the risk of nuclear explosions in major cities. Considerable progress on this front was made in the 1990s through Russian efforts, some made with US aid through the Cooperative Threat Reduction Initiative (Nunn-Lugar programmes). But vast quantities of unaccounted-for or weakly secured HEU remain, much in Russia but much also in research reactors and stockpiles in dozens of countries.

Several national and international initiatives seek to globalize the clean-out of HEU, the conversion of HEU to LEU reactors and the "down-blending" of HEU to low-enriched uranium (LEU). Sponsored by the United States and Russia and supported by the IAEA, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative seeks to convert HEU reactors to LEU ones and to repatriate spent Russian- and US-origin HEU fuel. The G-8's Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction aims to raise $20 billion ($17 billion has been pledged, but very little spent on projects so far) for a broad range of projects for securing, destroying or cleaning out weapons and weapons materials, mainly in Russia.[31]

The Global Partnership initiative is promising but seems stalled. Very little concrete action has been taken, some countries have reduced their initial pledges, and movement to globalize the programme (beyond Russia) has been slow and perhaps reluctant. The Task Force should endorse the Global Partnership and consider ways of stimulating real action and global expansion of the initiative.

Developing an international legal basis, standards and possibly organization for WMD interdiction efforts. Announced 31 May 2003 the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a US-led effort to organize a coalition of countries willing to interdict WMD materials shipments by "states and non-state actors of proliferation concern". The initiative has 11 core members and now claims the backing of more than 60 states (Prosser 2004). The main "state of concern" motivating the initiative has been North Korea.

It should be possible for states to legally board and inspect ships at sea for nuclear weapons or weapons materials if they have solid intelligence that suggests illegal trafficking. But international law as it stands may not allow this. The Law of the Sea convention permits violation of freedom of the seas only in cases of piracy, the slave trade, unauthorized broadcasting and drug trafficking.

If it is possible to permit search and seizure in cases of drug trafficking without crippling international commerce, then surely it should be possible to do the same with regard to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons materials.[32] Providing an international legal basis for WMD interdiction efforts is important because the PSI as it stands will weaken freedom of the seas by tempting states with an excuse to search and seize for other, more strictly national purposes.

The main problem with this route is that amending or adding a protocol to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea could take many years. The Task Force might consider whether and how a revision or amendment to the treaty could be accomplished quickly, or if there is another, faster route to the same end. For example, the Security Council could declare concern about the possibility that a particular state may threaten international peace and security by exporting unconventional weapons or weapons materials and authorize inspection of ships leaving its ports. This route avoids the problems of a blanket license to search and seize, but faces the usual problem of the vagaries of UNSC performance.

The longer run problem with the NPT regime

Although the NPT regime remains the basis for international collaboration to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, it has frayed in recent years. Israel, India and Pakistan opted not to join the treaty and have become nuclear weapons states, with the latter two openly testing bombs in the 1990s and receiving rather weak international condemnation and

pressure to reverse course. North Korea and Iraq joined the regime but secretly exploited its article 4 aid to develop weapons, and North Korea now appears to have succeeded in building them. Article 6 commits the nuclear weapons states in the regime to seek complete nuclear disarmament, a goal these states recommitted to in the 1995 agreement to extend the NPT indefinitely and reiterated in the 2000 NPT Review Conference. But the nuclear weapons states have not disarmed.

Moreover, the current US administration has threatened to "unsign" (in addition to not ratifying) the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and appears to be proceeding with new nuclear weapons development programmes. The 2005 NPT Review Conference (2–27 May, New York) ended in disarray. Members were not even able to agree on an agenda. At the 2000 Review Conference, NPT members agreed on an ambitious 13-step programme towards the disarmament of the existing nuclear states called for in article 6 (including signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty). In the preparatory conferences leading up to the May meeting and especially in the most recent one (May 2004), the United States in particular all but renounced these commitments. US arms control diplomats have instead focused on the problem of noncompliance and possible noncompliance with the treaty by North Korea and Iran. The May 2005 review conference saw another unproductive split between the United States and others who want to focus on improving monitoring and enforcement of compliance and others who want to focus on the nuclear five and their article 6 requirements.

The NPT regime is based on a dangerous hypocrisy, or at best on highly wishful thinking. In 1968 the five nuclear weapons states agreed in article 6 to "pursue negotiations in good faith ... on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control". In the 1995 extension of the treaty and at the 2000 review conference, they agreed to "an unequivocal undertaking by nuclear weapons states to accomplish the total elimination of their arsenals".

While in fact the United States and Russia have made great progress in nuclear disarmament since the end of the cold war, it is simply implausible that the United States Russia or China would completely eliminate their nuclear arsenals by treaty. Indeed it is not even clear that international peace and security would be well served if they did. Unless international conflict disappears entirely, the strongest incentives to develop nuclear weapons are obtained in a world where no other state has them. And by far the most dangerous situation occurs between nuclear states when one or both do not have enough weapons to ensure a second

strike. In this situation the temptation to exploit a first-strike advantage in a crisis can be powerful. By contrast, "mutual assured destruction"—which can be feasible at quite low levels of armament (perhaps 100 weapons for a large country)—can make for a highly stable, peaceful strategic situation, even between intense political adversaries. Paradoxically, then, attempting complete nuclear disarmament could end up increasing the risk of nuclear war by putting us into a world in which temptations to build and, subsequently, to strike first would be much greater.

Perhaps some day international conflicts will be so few and so mild that no one need worry about another state secretly going nuclear to gain or press an advantage. But we are definitely not there yet. As a result, international peace and security may be better served in the medium run if at least some states possess nuclear arsenals that minimally ensure a second-strike capability.

The problem, however, is which states? Certainly it would be terrible if dozens of countries possessed nuclear weapons, simply on account of risks of accidental detonation, theft by terrorists and wasted economic resources. But if only a few states are to possess them, why the five states that first developed nuclear weapons and no others? The following regime is surely unsustainable: One or more of the five authorized nuclear powers threatens to attack any state that once signed the NPT but subsequently decides to go nuclear, but there is no question of the nuclear five giving up their nuclear forces. This is where the NPT regime is headed.

What alternative is there? Given the rather paralysed state of the NPT and Conference on Disarmament negotiations, muddling along within the current treaty system is overwhelmingly likely. But in the spirit of looking forward (and outside the box), it is worth trying to imagine more sustainable alternatives.

One possibility would be to revise the NPT regime to allow new nuclear weapons states, provided that such states meet a battery of restrictive, difficult and expensive conditions concerning the nature, size, control and management of the arsenal. The general idea would be to extend IAEA inspections and monitoring into the nuclear weapons states to begin to develop international surveillance and control not just of nonnuclear states but of nuclear states' force postures and force management as well. The implicit deal would be that the nuclear weapons states get to keep minimal second-strike forces for the foreseeable future, but they must submit their programmes to international inspections, monitoring and standards. They might also be required to make

some other costly contribution to international peace and security, such as agreeing to contribute higher percentages to peacekeeping or international development programmes.

Information sharing for global police work against terrorist organizations

An effective strategy for reducing the international threat posed by WMD terrorism needs to address both the root causes of resentment, despair, hatred and ideology and the attack plans of existing groups.

Root causes. Social science research has not clarified where the greatest marginal gains are to be found. The following are all plausible ways of addressing possible root causes of terrorism:

- Development assistance and (hopefully) more rapid economic growth and reduced poverty.
- Promotion of the rule of law and the control of organized crime.
- Support for primary education, perhaps especially for young women.
- Support for international standards for education that emphasize developing the skills necessary to prosper in the modern world.
- Efforts to resolve regional conflicts that generate great anger, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular.
- Policies and aid to promote genuine democratization, especially in the Middle East.
- International efforts to reach out to and involve the system of Islamic charities in the global system of non-governmental organizations concerned with development and education.
- International efforts to develop a stronger norm against what might be called the ideology of terrorism, the idea that killing civilians is a legitimate way to draw attention to a grievance.

Several of these approaches are mentioned in passing in the UN High-Level Panel's Report in a paragraph on root causes of terrorism (para. 148).

In the absence of even very basic research on the root causes, one can say little more than that perhaps all these approaches could be helpful and should be supported. At this point we simply do not know what the most important root causes are or how best to address them. The Task Force might profitably discuss whether it wants to make some

general statement on reducing terrorism by focusing international collective action on particular root causes.

Backing up UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001). More concrete multilateral options have been advanced on multilateral coordination to defeat the activities of already formed or forming terrorist groups. UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001) obligates states to undertake a battery of domestic legal and administrative reforms to disable terrorist financing and enable the apprehension and prosecution of terrorists. It also demands that states in no way support or assist terrorists in their own or other states' territories.

As noted above, resolutions 1373 and 1540 represent ambitious departures for the UNSC in that they place extensive demands on members states for domestic legislation and often administrative capacity building.[33] The traditional international legal approach would be to pursue these ends through international conventions and treaties.

As with resolution 1540 (2004, on preventing terrorist acquisition of WMD), if the UNSC and member states are serious, they need to back up resolution 1373 in two main ways: greater institutional commitment and a systematic effort to gain broad international accession to the several conventions prohibiting terrorism.

On institutional commitment, the UNSC has already recognized that a UNSC committee lacks adequate resources to oversee and assist states with implementing 1373's demands. An Executive Directorate for the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) was recently established (the CTED) with an executive director and a small staff (S|RES|1535 2004). Although this is a step in the right direction, it is probably not enough. There is also a risk of general ineffectiveness owing to the lack of proliferation of institutional players with closely related mandates—the IAEA, the CTED and presumably another committee for implementing resolution 1540. Again, the Task Force might consider whether it would make more sense to have a new UN agency devoted to counterterrorism or how best to institutionally allocate responsibilities for the various ends served by the IAEA, the CTC and the yet-to-be-formed UNSC 1540 committee.

In terms of its operations, the CTC needs to develop a publicly available set of standards on national legislation and border and export/import controls germane to resolution 1373. Ideally, states should be publicly graded on their implementation of the standards list—providing an impetus for states to take implementation seriously. Under current norms and practices of UNSC committees (and perhaps general UN customs), this is not done. Without even the rather mild sanction of publicly point-

ing out poor compliance, the CTC will be toothless and ineffectual. One reform that might make public citation easier would be an agreement on weighted voting in this committee. Even without this reform the UNSC could direct that one of the CTC's functions is to publicly identify non-compliance or weak compliance with the resolution.[34]

Intelligence and border control. The first lines of defence against WMD terrorist attack are national intelligence, police and border control services. Because WMD terrorism will be transnational in some large part, multilateral cooperation on these services is highly valuable in principle.

In practice, however, it is exceedingly difficult. In intelligence, the value of a piece of information depends on who else knows it, so that sharing information with an unreliable national service can devalue it (if they pass or somehow release the information to the potential targets). Thus states are typically only willing to share intelligence information with highly trusted partners on narrowly defined issues and cases. Although Interpol has had many successes and serves a valuable function for the international policing of certain sorts of crime, in general it suffers from a weakest link problem. National police and intelligence services are only willing to provide information to Interpol databases that they would be willing to provide to the least reliable member of the system.

For this reason, significant intelligence cooperation appears to be overwhelmingly bilateral, based on relationships between national police and intelligence services that develop over many years. It is conceivable that there might be gains from supporting some kind of multilateral forum in which police assigned to counterterrorism could meet with counterparts from other countries to develop new connections. But probably much more positive effects would come from international support for developing national police and judicial investigative capabilities and competence in countries where they are low and where terrorist groups currently operate. CIVPOL (the United Nations's international civilian police agency) may be a mechanism for such a programme, but a more efficient and effective one might be through a G-8 initiative.

Border control and monitoring is another international public good whose supply could be easily improved by fairly minor acts of international cooperation. For example, if one country's passport control does not routinely check for false passports when people enter and leave, all countries are negatively affected. Developing and implementing international standards for passport and other basic border control functions

should be a relatively easy task and one that could benefit greatly from international funding to help poorer countries adopt better systems.

Ending civil wars and reconstructing collapsed states

Civil war has posed by far the most active security threat to the largest number of people in the world since the end of World War II. Almost half of countries with populations greater than 500,000 have had at least one civil conflict that killed at least 1,000 since 1945. In the worst of these conflicts—such as in Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, the DRC, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Nigeria, the Philippines, Sudan and Rwanda—hundreds of thousands have been killed and many millions have suffered extreme deprivation and misery. Moreover, massive human rights abuses and in the extreme, genocide, have rarely occurred except during civil war.

Although the number of civil wars in progress has declined a bit from the high point in the early 1990s, some 25 conflicts are still ongoing. In part because civil wars in this period have been so persistent—lasting almost nine years on average (Fearon 2004b)—the international spillover effects of long-running civil wars on peace and security have been large and negative. For example, persistent war in Afghanistan gave birth to the Taliban and a shelter for Al Qaida's training camps for international terrorism. The process also contributed greatly to heading nuclear Pakistan in the direction of state failure. Yoweri Museveni's successful war against the Obote regime in 1980s Uganda indirectly played into the early 1990s civil war in Rwanda. This led to the Rwandan genocide, which in turn helped cause a holocaust in Eastern Congo that continues today.

International efforts to address this major security challenge may focus on any of the following phases:

- prevention;
- ending civil wars by force (peacemaking) or mediation;
- peacekeeping operations to help implement peace agreements in countries that reach them; and/or
- "peace-building" interventions to stabilize and reconstruct the political and economic institutions of countries in the aftermath of ruinous civil war.

Prevention. In public health matters, it is often the case that it is more effective to spend money on preventing a disease than on treating it. It is not clear whether this is true for civil war. Economic development

is robustly associated with a lower risk of civil war, but when one factors in the slippage between development aid and economic growth, increased development aid does not look like a particularly efficient way to prevent civil wars.

Civil wars in the world's poorest countries often emerge as follows. A tiny guerrilla force starts operating in a poor, remote region that is poorly provided with government services. A poorly trained and poorly disciplined military then responds with indiscriminate slash-and-burn tactics that destroy whole villages and send more young men into the rebellion.[35] In other words, inept counterinsurgency tactics drive the escalation of many a civil war in poor countries.

It would be a novel approach, but the Task Force might consider recommending the development of international standards and practices for counterinsurgency operations. Governments must, of course, be able to respond to violent challenges, but they should not do so in a highly indiscriminate fashion that is counterproductive in the long run. Standards and information provided by international organizations might help. Another idea is to recommend that an existing or new international institution (or possibly a non-governmental organization) rate standards of military discipline and justice country by country. A more ambitious project in the same vein would be to recommend the creation of a UN or other agency to advise countries on how to bring their systems of military justice and their counterinsurgency practices into line with internationally acceptable standards.

Mediation services supplied by the UN Secretariat are inexpensive and may be quite effective in some circumstances. The secretariat needs more institutional capacity to identify and analyse situations that could profitably use mediation services and a larger pool of skilled and capable mediators at the disposal of the secretary-general (in particular, a larger set of skilled and capable special representatives, SRSGs). The Task Force might consider recommending the more formal development of an SRSG career track, one in which promotion depends on merit and performance rather than purely political considerations.

Peacekeeping, peacemaking and state building. There is a powerful case that international support for peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction is an important but undersupplied international public good. A growing body of evidence suggests that the regional economic consequences of a civil war in one country are surprisingly large and negative (Sandler and Murdoch 2004; Collier and Hoeffler 2005). Much anecdotal evidence suggests that the regional and international political consequences can

be large and negative as well. Beyond spillover effects, many now argue that the international community has a humanitarian obligation to help restore peace and order to countries devastated by civil war.

In fact an impressive amount of international collective action has been mobilized in response to this problem. Most significantly, UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) proliferated rapidly starting in 1988 with the UN Transition Assistance Group to Namibia. From five missions per year between 1960 and 1987, the rate leapt to about 17 per year by 1994, where it has remained (with minor fluctuations). The UN Security Council authorized some 32 distinct PKOs since 1988, compared with just 13 between 1945 and 1987 (Fearon and Laitin 2004, p. 10). The 1990s also saw an increase in PKOs in which the principal forces came from regional organizations such as NATO or ECOMOG (albeit with UNSC blessings and mandates).

The experience of these missions has been quite mixed, including significant, unheralded success stories (such as UNTAES in Eastern Slavonia, missions in El Salvador and Guatemala and UNOMOZ in Mozambique) and some major disasters (such as UNPROFOR in Bosnia, UNAMIR in Rwanda and UNOSOM II in Somalia). This is not surprising given that the nature of PKOs also changed radically with the end of the cold war. Whereas the typical PKO before 1988 interposed UN blue helmets on a cease-fire line between states that had been at war, PKOs since 1988 have almost always inserted blue helmets into civil war–torn countries and have often given them highly complex, multifaceted missions (including administering territory and conducting elections). The corrosive effects of persistent and widespread civil war on states and regions has posed a new set of difficult international problems. It is not surprising that the international community is still learning how to deal with these problems effectively.

The PKO system since 1988 has suffered from two major shortcomings. The first is a highly politicized process for deciding which countries get PKOs, in which a key initiator and coordinator, the UN Secretariat, lacks the analytical and intelligence resources to plan ahead and to make effective arguments about the merits and demerits of intervention. The second is inadequate financial and human resources. Resource shortfalls weakened or undermined existing missions or precluded missions that probably should have been undertaken.

The UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change correctly observes that the UN Secretariat lacks the bureaucratic and intelligence capacity to provide real-time analysis of impending conflicts,

and as a result UN-sponsored mediation efforts are less effective than they could be. This incapacity hinders the prevention of civil wars. It also makes decision-making on involvement in PKOs more random and prone to failure.

The Brahimi Report (United Nations 2000) recommended an in-house intelligence and analysis unit to assist the secretary-general, a proposal subsequently rejected by member states. The need is still there. At present the secretariat is highly reactive and completely dependent on the quality of the guesswork of a small number of senior officials for its decision-making. Strategic planning and solid analysis about the difficult choices constantly thrown before the organization concerning PKOs remains near impossible. The Task Force should consider endorsing the UN High-Level Panel's recommendation for a new under-secretary to act as a "security adviser" whose team would analyse and present options.

A more fundamental problem with PKOs and post-conflict peace-building efforts since the end of the cold war has been inadequate resources, both financial and human. When the international community has intervened to help implement or enforce peace agreements in civil war–torn countries, it has generally done the absolute minimum necessary to prevent a return to major civil war, and nothing more. As a result, PKOs have been much less effective than they could be, and they often tend to drag on, with few signs of progress in peace-building.

The Task Force might consider ways to get the development sector (and especially the World Bank) to bring its resources to bear directly on peacekeeping and peace-building, which are after all the central prerequisites for economic development in an increasing number of countries. Could the World Bank or the IMF fund peacekeeping operations through loans to be repaid gradually when the country gets back on its economic feet? If this is not feasible within these institutions' mandates, could a new international institution be set up that would see to both the funding of peacekeeping operations through loan schemes and the development of well-trained, interoperable PKO forces around the world? Potentially this institution could be developed within the UN Secretariat, out of the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) and UN Department of Political Affairs, but it need not be.

The idea here is not to create a standing UN army or to increase the tax burden of PKOs on the major powers (though there is a

strong argument that PKOs are in the major powers' interests, given the large negative externalities of civil war in twenty-first century conditions). Rather, the idea is to fill in gaps in funding PKOs by developing loan mechanisms that pay for short-run post-conflict security with the long-term revenues of a reconstructed economy. In addition, fairly low-cost international training programmes could raise the average quality and interoperability of peacekeeping forces from different countries, which in turn could make PKOs more effective at lower cost.

In the 1990s PKOs were typically conceived as relatively short-term operations to help former combatants implement a peace agreement. Painful experience has since demonstrated that basic state institutions destroyed by civil war must be reconstructed if peacekeepers are to be able to leave a country without it returning to violence. Unfortunately neither the United Nations, nor any major power or other international institution appears to know how to accomplish this task. As a result, the world is gradually accumulating what might be called semiprotectorates, as in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and perhaps Iraq.

Until we have better theory and evidence on whether and how international actors can help reconstruct political authority in a collapsed state, it is not clear what to recommend for what the United Nations calls "peace-building". It does seem clear, however, that the timing of the distribution of post-conflict aid is typically suboptimal. Large amounts arrive in the immediate peacekeeping phase, when it is hardest to use productively. Less aid than is optimal arrives four or five years out, when it could be better absorbed and more productively used. In brief, more funding for internationally provided security is needed in the short run after a conflict, and more funding for development aid to stabilize the peace is needed in the medium run.

Redrawing international boundaries within a framework of international law

One of the most interesting and disturbing features of post–cold war international politics is the steady increase in unrecognized but de facto sovereign (or nearly sovereign) political entities. These include Northern Somaliland, Puntland in northeast Somalia, Abkhazia, Nagorno Karabagh, Transdniestria, the Croatian and Serbian political units within Bosnia-Herzegovina, most of Kosovo, "Farclandia" in Colombia and in some respects the West Bank and Gaza.

Sovereign capability without formal sovereign responsibility to the community of nations can be a dangerous combination, a source of major international public bads. In a number of these cases the unrecognized political entity has followed natural pressures to become a hub for organized crime and smuggling, particularly of narcotics. De facto "statelets" also provide natural centres for black market transactions in materials and weapons of mass destruction.

Short of occupation, the international community has relatively few instruments for obligating good international behaviour from the rulers of unrecognized statelets. They cannot be party to most international treaties and so cannot be bound by them. For the most part they are not eligible for development aid, so that good behaviour cannot be conditioned on its provision. (This is also why black markets and drugs are relatively attractive to such entities.)

Some propose that the best solution is simply to recognize these statelets and bring them into the formal community of nations. For instance, it is argued that the international community should face reality in Bosnia and Kosovo—an independent Bosnia is not feasible as a federation nor is Kosovo feasible as part of Serbia, so the actual reality in practice should be made the reality in principle.

In some cases there are powerful considerations supporting this view. However a policy of internationally supported partitions without attention to the implications for the international system could be disastrous. International support for partition in civil war–torn countries increases incentives for violent challenges to state authority in general, in the hope that doing so will bring the international community in on the side of the rebels.[36] Support for partition could also make it harder to resolve existing intrastate disputes by making it seem that fighting will increase the odds of international intervention favouring partition as a solution. Finally, if the international community can decide to impose partition on a reluctant member state of the United Nations, then most or all states with potential internal challengers will feel much more insecure and will be inclined to arm themselves to prevent such coercion.[37]

There is a genuine dilemma here. On the one hand, a blanket international refusal to consider redrawing state boundaries can mean that minority groups face horrendous persecution with no good long-run recourse. This is not only grossly unjust, but also favours civil war and its attendant international public bads.[38] On the other hand, international support for partition as a solution to large-scale civil violence between ethnic or religious groups could make for international anarchy. Statehood is such an

attractive prize that states would face no end of violent internal challenges if the prospect of international support for breaking up a state is good. This would not be an incentive-compatible system, as the economists say.

The only feasible resolution involves conditioning international support for partition on bad behaviour and policies by governments with respect to minorities and conditioning support for governments on intransigence by rebel groups. States should be able to protect themselves against international support for domestic rebel groups by adopting and implementing policies of non-discrimination in government and society. A state that can show that it enforces non-discriminatory policies should be a candidate for international support against domestic challengers. By contrast, a state that significantly discriminates against religious or ethnic minorities—and, in the extreme, commits major human rights abuses or genocide—should be a candidate for international pressure for partition as a possible resolution.

The behaviour of rebel groups should matter as well. Rebel groups that deliberately attack and kill large numbers of civilians, and groups that fight for an independent state irrespective of the policies of the current state, merit either international opposition or international indifference.

The argument here is consistent with, but pushes slightly further, the argument of the ICISS report on the responsibility to protect (ICISS 2001). According to that report, governments that grossly fail in their responsibility to protect their citizens by committing massive human rights abuses or genocide should be candidates for authorized international intervention. The report does not mention international support for partition as a possible remedy, but it is consistent with the overall thesis of a responsibility to protect. If a state has consistently and systematically failed to protect a minority group, then why shouldn't the international community support a separation so that the group can attempt to protect itself within international boundaries?

The main objection, as noted above, is the dangerous effect of precedent. It is essential that the international community not simply rush to push for partition whenever a state-minority conflict heats up. That would be disastrous. Instead, the Security Council, a committee of the Security Council or some other international body should assess state policies that bear on minority opportunities and representation. Depending on the assessment, this assessment might lead to support for the government against the rebels, recommendations to change government policies, sanctions against the government or more radical action. Rebel groups who do not publicly accept the prospect of living within current boundaries

if discrimination is ended should not be supported. A possible model for such an approach is the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's (OSCE's) actions in regard to the nascent insurgency in Macedonia in 2001.

The Task Force should consider arguing for the development of institutional means to globalize the approach of the OSCE's High Commissioner on National Minorities and its response to the Macedonian conflict. Such a body would undertake missions to assess the state of minority rights and government policies in a country with nascent conflict. Its report would then influence the type of pressure the international community exerts to try to resolve a simmering dispute. Governments should know that abusive and discriminatory policies may lead to international support for greater autonomy or even independence for a minority group. Would-be rebel groups should know that by fomenting violent conflict they run the risk of generating international opposition rather than support if they are not willing to negotiate on policies within the framework of the existing state, or if they themselves commit human rights abuses.

Promotion of effective, responsible, democratic governments

In addition to failing in its responsibility to protect its citizens, a government that commits massive human rights abuses within its borders imposes a variety of serious costs on other states, such as refugee outflows and increased odds of regional armed conflict. Types of government that are more prone to fight wars with neighbouring states likewise create international public bads. "Tinpot" dictatorships that run the economy into the ground and create conditions for state collapse impose all the attendant costs of civil war and local anarchy on the international community. Insecure, secretive, unstable governments that cannot or will not enter into agreements on intrusive monitoring for nuclear materials and weapons pose significant international costs.

These are all reasons why promoting responsible, capable, democratic governments should be viewed as an important international public good. As argued earlier, the spread of capable democratic governments is likely to reduce all four of the major threats to international peace and security in the coming years—nuclear terrorism, civil war and state collapse, genocide and interstate war.

Making political democracy a condition for membership in a reformed United Nations or UNSC, or innovating a new international institution or

group limited to genuine democracies (in parallel to the United Nations), could provide a powerful stimulus to political democracy. But even if these options are infeasible or undesirable because of other effects they might have, minor reforms of international institutions could do a great deal to further transitions to and consolidations of democracy.

New democracies often fail when elected leaders gradually become authoritarian, undermining electoral institutions and practices bit by bit. The "salami tactics" of creeping authoritarianism make it difficult for the public to coordinate to oppose dictatorship, because there is no clear signal that democracy has ended and dictatorship begun.

An international institution dedicated to monitoring and certifying election practices and results could help coordinate opposition to creeping dictatorship. (And for that reason such an institution could make rulers less likely to commit electoral fraud.) Good effects of this sort are already evident in the increasing use of unofficial and semi-official election monitoring services and groups.[39] The Task Force might consider recommending the development of a more authoritative international institution specializing in this function. Or it might consider endorsing the idea that all states that claim to be democratic should make it a practice to invite international observers and monitors for their elections. Such a norm and institutional backing could make it much more difficult for governments to slip into authoritarianism or to run a sham democracy.

Another relatively low-cost international reform that could powerfully stimulate democracy would be to tie development aid more explicitly to political reform and political practices. This might be infeasible for universal institutions such as the World Bank, but it should not be for OECD governments' aid agencies. The effects of EU "democratic policy conditionality" on reducing ethnic and other intrastate conflicts in Eastern Europe in the past 10 years appears to have been large.

Summary of recommendations

In the coming years the most important international public goods in peace and security will involve redressing negative externalities that stem from problems within states and from technological change that exacerbates these externalities. In particular, major international public bads will increasingly emerge from three major sources:

- *Nuclear proliferation and terrorism with WMD.* The growing international black market for WMD materials and the increas-

ing availability of weapons technology are international public bads. So is nuclear proliferation to nonnuclear states, because this heightens regional security dilemmas, raises the global risk of nuclear terrorism and raises the risk of destabilizing unilateral interventions by major powers.

- *Civil war, peacekeeping and state reconstruction*. Civil wars cause costly and destabilizing refugee flows; create zones of anarchy that favour drug trafficking, terrorist finance and training; and can increase interstate conflict within a region. These are all international public bads. In many cases states may be able to make themselves better off by organizing collective action to prevent civil wars, bring ongoing wars to a close and help stabilize and reconstruct post-conflict states. (Of course civil wars also cause massive suffering for citizens in the afflicted countries—including genocide, in some cases—which some might consider an international public bad in itself.)
- *Global governance and unilateral military intervention*. Without some form of collective international authorization, unilateral military interventions against neighbours or states thought to be threatening can create an international public bad, even when the action is plausibly justifiable—for example, for humanitarian reasons. The problem is that unilateral interventions create general incentives for states to acquire more weapons (particularly nuclear weapons) and to see the unilateral use of force in their own cases as more justified and permissible. States may be able to reduce the international public bads of arms races, regional wars and nuclear proliferation if they can coordinate on mechanisms of global governance that will work to authorize the use of force when it favours international peace and security on average, but not otherwise.

Nuclear proliferation and terrorism with WMD

The task force should consider six recommendations:

1. *Reforming NPT* by:

- making efforts and generating international pressure to gain universal accession to the Additional Protocol to the NPT, under which states agree to allow snap IAEA inspections and various other measures for improved monitoring;

- extending the lead time necessary to legally withdraw from the NPT treaty from three months to at least one year; and
- revising the NPT, or add a protocol to it, so that it is illegal to use materials or facilities acquired under the treaty after a state has withdrawn from the treaty.

2. *Initiating global clean-out of HEU and global accounting for all nuclear materials*. The Task Force should consider measures to reinvigourate the G-8's Global Partnership against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction; for example, by identifying new sources of funding or by identifying the political logjams impeding progress. The Task Force should also consider supporting the extension of the partnership outside the Russian Federation, working towards a complete and correct global registry of nuclear materials.

3. *Building institutional capacity within the United Nations to implement UNSC Resolutions 1373 and 1540*. These resolutions put extensive demands on the member states to reform domestic laws and administrative procedures relevant to identifying and undermining terrorist efforts to acquire and use WMD. The Security Council committees charged with overseeing implementation of these resolutions are inadequate to the task in terms of resources and possibly their ability to publicly identify noncompliant states. The Task Force should consider recommending the creation of a small new UN agency or the incorporation of the 1373 and 1540 mandates into the IAEA.

4. *Putting interdiction of WMD on more solid international legal footing*. The Task Force should consider recommending development of a protocol for the Law of the Sea treaty that would legalize search and seizure of nuclear weapons or materials being shipped illegally.

5. *Providing better financial support for the IAEA*. Given the direction of international political and technological change, the IAEA provides essential international public goods that are increasing in their importance. Further, it provides them at relatively low cost. The Task Force should consider recommending improved funding mechanisms for the IAEA.

6. *Fundamentally reforming the NPT*. In the long run the NPT regime is probably not sustainable, because there is little chance that the nuclear states will ever fully comply with article 6. The Task Force might consider recommending conditions that aspiring and present nuclear states must satisfy to be considered in compliance with a revised NPT regime that would conditionally permit nuclear status. Currently non-nuclear states agree to submit to international monitoring. Under

a revised regime, nuclear weapons states would have to agree to submit their command and control systems to some form of international standards and monitoring as well.

Civil war, peacekeeping and state reconstruction

Peacekeeping operations in the 1990s consistently underperformed because they were underfinanced, undermanned and understaffed. The Task Force should consider six recommendations:

1. *Ways to allocate development assistance to peacekeeping and post-conflict state building*. The World Bank, the IMF or a new international institution could be authorized to provide loans to pay for peacekeeping operations in a post-conflict country, to be repaid after the economy had sufficiently recovered. Alternatively, a new loan authority and institution for this purpose could be established within the United Nations, or another international organization such as the Group of Eight or Group of Twenty. (This institution might also develop and provide a variety of post-conflict reconstruction services.)

2. *Programmes to standardize the training and capabilities of international peacekeeping forces*. The Brahimi Report (United Nations 2000) made a number of recommendations on how to standardize and improve the training of UN peacekeeping forces, many of which were not implemented. These should be reconsidered and reemphasized. In addition, the Task Force should consider recommending that the major powers develop and fund more extensive training programmes, possibly through a G-8 initiative in conjunction with the United Nations.[40]

3. *UNDPKO/UN Secretariat reform to improve analytic capabilities*. At present the secretary-general must rely on the hunches and guesswork of a small number of senior aides in deciding whether to recommend UN intervention in conflict or post-conflict zones. The secretariat lacks an analytic "shop" for analysing the prospective costs and potentials of proposed missions or planning for possible missions on the horizon. The Task Force should consider strongly endorsing the UN High-Level Panel Report's recommendation for a new under-secretary position advising the secretary-general on security matters. Alternatively or in addition, the Task Force should consider making the argument for why improving the analytic and intelligence capabilities of the UN Secretariat would provide a public good for all states in the long run. (For one thing, this would allow the secretariat to depend less on the analytic and intelligence inputs of the major powers on the council.)

4. *Improved timing of post-conflict aid*. Possibly too much development aid flows to a civil war–torn state in the first two years after a peace agreement for it to be absorbed usefully. By contrast, too little aid and peacekeeping support flow to it in the next five years, when the aid can be better used and continued assurance of security is necessary to avoid a return to conflict. The Task Force should consider mechanisms to rationalize the timing of aid to post-conflict countries. It should also consider ways to make the medium-run involvement of international peacekeeping forces in a reconstructing country less offensive to international norms on sovereignty. For example, the Task Force could recommend the development of standardized templates or contracts for security partnerships between international or regional organizations and the new authorities of post-conflict states.

5. *International standards for and information about counterinsurgency operations*. The Task Force should consider recommending the development of international standards and practices for counterinsurgency operations that are not likely to escalate rather than resolve nascent rebellions. The Task Force might also consider recommending that an international institution (or possibly an NGO) rate standards of military discipline and justice country by country. A more ambitious project in the same vein would be to recommend the creation of a UN or other agency to advise countries on how to bring their systems of military justice and their counterinsurgency practices in line with internationally acceptable standards.

6. *Formal development of a meritocratic SRSG track within the United Nations*. The secretary-general needs a larger pool of skilled mediators and conflict managers, and needs to be more free from political pressures in his or her ability to promote and appoint SRSGs on the basis of their performance.

Global governance and unilateral military intervention

The Task Force should consider endorsing the UN High-Level Panel Report's recommendations on Security Council reform as the most politically feasible way to increase the council's legitimacy and effectiveness. The Task Force should consider opposing the addition of new permanent seats, because this is likely to exacerbate serious problems in the current construction. The Task Force should consider proposing a formula for a new set of renewable seats favouring states that make a greater contribution to the institution in terms of finance and soldiers

for peacekeeping missions. Tying influence explicitly to contributions is a promising way to improve UN finances and to promote the general standard that authority within the organization requires investment and responsibility (a standard the P5 should feel obligated to meet as well).

The Task Force might also consider a set of successively more ambitious recommendations concerning authorization of the use of force and structural reform of the United Nations:

1. Support the ICISS's recommendation that the General Assembly and the Security Council endorse the concept of the responsibility to protect and its standards for humanitarian intervention.

2. That committees created by the Security Council should operate under majority rule or weighted majority rule.

3. That the members of the Security Council should agree to "indicative" voting. In this system any member may request an indicative vote on a resolution meaning a non-binding show of hands. This procedure could slightly increase the costs of threatening a veto on matters not directly linked to a state's national security interests.

4. That the permanent members of the Security Council should publicly agree not to use the veto on resolutions concerning humanitarian intervention that does not affect their own vital interests.

5. That the permanent members of the Security Council should publicly agree not to use the veto on resolutions that do not invoke chapter 7 of the UN Charter.

6. That the Security Council should consider ways to introduce weighted voting into its deliberations, at least for some classes of issues.

7. That a coalition of states interested in making the General Assembly a more effective and influential body should work to change the General Assembly's voting procedures in the direction of weighted majority rule.

8. Outside the UN system: The Task Force could consider recommending that other international organizations—such as the G-8, regional organizations or a new international organization of democracies—formally introduce the possibility of deliberating and pronouncing on possible uses of force for the sake of international security. Such votes and pronouncements would not have the force of international law but might help mitigate the international public bad of fully unilateral interventions. At the same time, the existence of alternative forums might lower the odds of paralysis on the UN Security Council.

Additional recommendations

Norms and practices on redrawing state boundaries to resolve civil conflicts. The Task Force should consider arguing for the development of institutional means to globalize the approach of the OSCE's High Commissioner on National Minorities. Such a body or office would undertake missions to assess the state of minority rights and government policies in a country with nascent conflict and then issue a report. Governments should know that abusive and discriminatory policies may lead to international support for greater autonomy or even independence for a minority group. Would-be rebel groups should know that by fomenting violent conflict they run the risk of generating international opposition rather than support if they are not willing to negotiate on policies within the framework of the existing state or if they themselves commit human rights abuses.

Measures to promote responsible, stable, democratic government. The Task Force should consider recommending the development of an authoritative international institution or body dedicated to monitoring and certifying elections. It should also consider endorsing the idea that all states that claim to be democratic should invite international observers and monitors for their elections and that OECD countries should be prepared to condition development aid on democratic practices in states receiving aid.

Notes

1. Numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons, as well as levels of economic devastation, tend to be roughly proportional to numbers killed, so this is a reasonable first-cut indicator.
2. Although article 26 envisions that the Security Council will, with the help of the stillborn Military Staff Committee, formulate "plans to be submitted to the members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments".
3. Not to say that these checks were always effective, especially in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Another important difference is that during the cold war, states could and did coordinate their positions on the use of force through the cold war alliance systems. With those gone and no set of sharply divided alliance systems yet formed among the major powers, coordinating efforts through the UNSC has become something of the default.

4. The UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change reports discuss related requirements under the headings of "effectiveness", "efficiency" and "equity" (United Nations 2004).

5. See www.g7.utoronto.ca/ for summaries of Group of Eight initiatives and commitments.

6. World Bank GDP figures for 2002 in constant US dollars were used. Using figures adjusted for purchasing power parity gives rather different results, but also makes no sense here since we are trying to measure economic influence rather than make welfare comparisons.

7. The data are from table 8 at http://ceb.unsystem.org/hlcm/programmes/fb/financial.situation.htm. It should be noted that the total size of voluntary contributions from the richest states is very large, sometimes greater than their assessed dues. At least in the US case, one reason for greater congressional willingness to make voluntary contributions is that Congress can negotiate the specifics of the use of money, whereas the regular dues are unrestricted funds. In-kind contributions are also common to some voluntary agencies. The US contributes massive amounts of food to the United Nations's World Food Program, but this is basically the unloading of subsidized and protected US farm production. For humanitarian purposes, it would be far better to lower agricultural protection and subsidies to level the playing field with Third World farmers.

8. During the cold war, when most peacekeeping operations concerned monitoring cease-fire lines between states as opposed to mounting complex operations in civil war–torn countries, blue helmets came mainly from middle powers, often those with high incomes per capita. Since the end of the cold war this has changed markedly. Most peacekeeping troops now come from very poor countries. See the Brahimi Report (United Nations 2000) and Fearon and Laitin (2004).

9. The UN Charter begins by saying that the purpose of the organization is to save "succeeding generations", not states, from "the scourge of war"; to affirm "fundamental human rights" and the "dignity and worth of the human person"; and to promote "social progress and better standards of life" (preamble). This interpretation of the ends of the institution seems to have become increasingly accepted over time, as evidenced by, for example, ICISS (2001) and United Nations (2004).

10. In defence of an organization open to all states, one might counter that the argument incorrectly assumes electoral democracy to be the only form of government that can properly represent a nation, either because some governments always know better than their citizens what

is good for them, or the citizens may approve of undemocratic government. The first denies the premise of human equality in the UN Charter and is even more radical than the proposal for democratic membership. The second can be revealed only by holding free and fair elections at regular intervals.

11. See Russett and Oneal (2001) for a good recent statement and presentation of the evidence.

12. Whether electoral democracy causes a state to have a lower risk of civil war is not clear; it may be that established democracies tend to be wealthier, and high income reduces the odds of civil war. On democracy and casualties in civil war, see Lacina (2006).

13. This estimate is derived by coding as "democratic" those states that scored higher than 5 on the Polity IV index for 2002. See www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/.

14. These costs might be mitigated by providing for associate membership or by retaining universal membership while shifting funding and programme action to an international institution for democracies.

15. In the mid-1980s the United Nations faced a financial crisis stemming in large measure from a US congressional bill that "stipulated that one-fifth of US dues were to be withheld until the General Assembly and the specialized agencies adopted the practice of financially weighted voting on budget matters" (Luck 2003, p. 42). The crisis was resolved with an agreement that budgetary decisions would require consensus, thus keeping formally within the "one state, one vote" system but reducing the ability to get anything done.

16. Carter Center, OUNSCE in Europe, OAS in Latin America and others.

17. It is worth pointing out that weighted voting in General Assembly would pose no barrier to states using it for symbolic politics, which certainly have their place. Nothing would stop members from introducing resolutions destined for defeat but designed to make opponents embarrassed or uncomfortable in voting them down.

18. An analogy from international monetary affairs: private lenders often condition their behaviour on whether the IMF has entered into an arrangement with a state experiencing balance-of-payment problem, even though the IMF does not formally "make law" about who can lend to whom, when and where.

19. It is ironic and curious that the US politicians and pundits who are most dismissive of UN authority are also the most strongly opposed to considering any plan that would weaken US veto power in the Security

Council. If the United States "needs no permission slip" to use force, then why insist on having a veto?

20. When interests are perfectly coincident, the specific decision rule (vetoes, majority rule, weighted majority rule and so on) does not matter, since cooperation will occur regardless. When state interests are often strongly opposed, a veto system is more desirable. In between, weighted majority rule is more attractive.

21. In fact article 27 provides for two voting procedures for the UNSC. Decisions "on procedural matters" are to be taken by majority vote, whereas "all other matters" are to be decided under the rule of nine affirmative votes plus concurring votes by the P5. Unfortunately "procedural matters" is never defined or even fleshed out in the charter, and the approach has only been used once in the history of the UNSC.

22. Reforms "should, in honouring article 23 of the charter of the United Nations, increase the involvement of those who contribute the most to the United Nations financially, militarily and diplomatically—specifically in terms of contributions to United Nations assessed budgets, participation in mandated peace operations, contributions to voluntary activities of the United Nations in the areas of security and development and diplomatic activities in support of United Nations objectives and mandates" (United Nations 2004b, para 249).

23. There may be a real danger of a logroll in which the states agree to model B with permanent seats—thus adding eight permanent seats instead of six, as in model A.

24. The other principal organs established by the UN Charter are the General Assembly, ECOSOC, the Trusteeship Council and the International Court of Justice. The Panel recommends shutting down the Trusteeship Council.

25. Whether the events of 1998 in Kosovo were "genocide" was debated at the time, although subsequent investigations have tended to support the claim (IICK 2000). In any event, massive human rights abuses certainly occurred.

26. At present the convention asserts that persons committing genocide "shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals" (article 4) and essentially recommends that the United Nations take up the question of enforcement (article 8).

27. See www.iaea.or.at/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.html.

28. Moreover, the international system has not developed any agency or source of initiative for enforcing international conventions, which in

many cases renders the conventions scraps of paper. There is thus an argument for supporting UNSC interest and efforts to take a more active role in encouraging compliance with broad international agreements.

29. For example, we need an international convention that criminalizes trafficking in illicit nuclear materials (HEU). Also, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material should be amended to apply to civilian nuclear materials.

30. See United Nations (2004a) and Jeremy Greenstock's report on problems with CTC, S/2004/70, section II.E.

31. A good summary of where the project stands is available at www.sgpproject.org/.

32. There are some tricky issues here—for example, concerning dual use technologies—but the worries about these may be overstated.

33. Some also find resolution 1373 bold in that its central terms—"terrorism" and "terrorists"—are not defined in the resolution or in other UNSC resolutions. A reasonable reply might be that for an international legal basis for the concept, the UNSC can refer to the 12 international conventions prohibiting various sorts of acts of terrorism.

34. It is not clear that the United Nations can reform itself into an institution that sets and enforces genuine standards of behaviour among its members. A case in point is the UN Commission on Human Rights, which is regularly populated by states that commit major human rights violations and that use the commission to block any action or publicity of any sort. This is another consideration that makes a person wonder whether an organization of democracies with serious conditions for membership might better promote international peace and security in the medium run.

35. For a recent example from Darfur, see Somini Sengupta, "Sudan Government's Attacks Stoke Rebels' Fury," *New York Times*, 11 September 2004.

36. Clear examples of this sort of reasoning have been observed with the KLA in Kosovo and the Darfur rebels in Sudan.

37. For more on the problem of a policy of ad hoc partition to resolve civil wars, see Fearon (2004a).

38. Indeed some have suggested that the prevalence of civil war since 1945 is the result of the "frozen international boundaries" regime of this period, itself a reaction to interwar period experiences such as Munich (1938). By this logic, the inability to readjust international boundaries causes intrastate strife. Although there are a small number of cases where

partition would be a good strategy for conflict resolution if it did not have such bad precedential effects.

39. Carter Center, OAS and other regional bodies.

40. Even Donald Rumsfeld has floated the idea of standing, trained forces from a large number of countries that could be assembled for international PKOs on short notice. Bradley Graham, "Pentagon Considers Creating Postwar Peacekeeping Forces," *Washington Post*, 24 November 2003, p. A16.

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Peace and Security

Chapter 3

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The diffusion of power within and among states is transforming international understanding of what is required to achieve regional and global peace and security as preconditions for sustainable development.

Boundaries between war and peace and between domestic and foreign affairs have become blurred in a world too reliant on respect for sovereign equality and territorial integrity as requisites for regional and global order. Promoting and protecting human rights is also vital to preventing and resolving deadly conflict. What is required are international norms and institutions and the political will to prevent the abuse of power within states, but without unduly undermining the sovereign norms or institutions that help prevent war between states. Regional and global order based on imperial domination or a balance of military power are no longer acceptable in an era of grass-roots political empowerment, sectarian conflict, economic globalization and global threats of terror using weapons of mass destruction. Huge disparities of wealth and power within and among the world's nearly 200 sovereign states also demand fresh thinking about peace and security as an international public good. How can those with the means to protect the many do so in a politically acceptable and affordable manner?

This paper proposes a strategy for beginning to grapple with peace and security as an international public good within a global context so new and uncharted we may be at a hinge point in history on a par with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, a defining moment for our current sovereign order. The first section discusses this context, noting the growing interdependence of peace and security at the global, regional and national levels. It assumes nation states will remain the central actors in allocating public goods but that they will strain to adapt to local and foreign demands that touch bedrock issues of freedom and safety, peace and justice and private wealth and public welfare. It also assumes that, unlike previ-

ous international attempts to achieve lasting peace and security, powerful new forces of political pluralism and economic globalization motivate states to adopt a more bottom-up, cumulative, consensus-building approach—one more dependent on regional economic integration than on military alliances, with political space to accommodate diverse national and regional differences, while meeting universal standards of basic human rights. This section concludes by noting that it is too soon to say what roles the world's first and only global political body, the United Nations, and most influential global power, the United States, will play in providing peace and security as a public good. Recent interventions in Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq are powerful precedents based on weak principles. Legitimacy is as important to success as power.

The second section proposes a strategy. Promoting peace and security is only one of four interdependent ingredients required to build politically capable states in regions where deadly conflict and extreme poverty are endemic. Politically capable states are the essential precondition for sustainable peace and development, which also require greater efforts to promote good governance, regional cooperation and capacity building. Africa is proposed as the testing ground for this strategy because of the severity of local threats to peace and security, a new recognition among African leaders of the need for collective action—including commitments to good governance and regional cooperation—and the generally positive response to recent African-led initiatives in these areas by western donors, the UN and international financial institutions. The strategy is affordable and could apply to other troubled regions. There remains, however, a lack of capacity in African governments, their regional economic communities and the African Union to implement these commitments, as well as persistent uncertainties about the political will of African and western leaders to pursue the principles and priorities outlined in the New Partnership for Africa's Development. Other sections of the paper comment on the institutions, rules (norms), resources and assessments available for implementing the strategy, and a concluding section offers recommendations.

Context

People and governments value peace and security for their own sakes and as preconditions to achieving political, social and economic development. Peace and security for development must be pursued simultaneously at the national, regional and global levels, primarily by national governments straining to manage new and complex forces of globalization and cultural identity that are transforming politics within and among sovereign states. International consensus backs the United Na-

tions Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), but that consensus belies deep differences over ways and means to achieve them. The complex bargaining required for setting realistic priorities and reasonable formulas for distributing costs cannot proceed without at least minimal degrees of peace and security. The following paragraphs present the global, regional and national context (plus the US factor and UN challenge) before discussing strategies, institutions, rules, resources and recommendations for providing peace and security as an international public good.

Global

Globally, and within regions, the powerful states often bear disproportionate defence burdens, thereby generating free public goods for other nations. But are the effects of these international public goods positive or negative? How are the flows and scale of these goods changing, and should those who benefit or suffer have a say in them, whether or not they pay for them?

Economic historians can debate the extent to which the estimated $13 trillion that the United States spent to wage and win the cold war constitutes an overall global public good, as well as the differential impact that US cold war policies had on the international public good of Europe, Southeast Asia, Latin America, Africa and elsewhere. Today US defence expenditures exceed $400 billion annually, which some analysts estimate to be more than the combined military budgets of all other UN members. Such vast investments by one country, on an unprecedented global scale—not to mention the impact of national security justifications on foreign aid, trade and other aspects of US international engagement—inevitably generate large public goods at no direct cost to other nations, which have little say in the policies but often big stakes in the results.

Meanwhile the terrorist attacks of 11 September showed that even the world's most powerful state faces severe security threats it can neither deter nor manage on its own—threats that could be much worse in the future. Neither its unprecedented military pre-eminence nor its huge new Department of Homeland Security have eliminated credible threats of terrorist attacks, which could possibly occur with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It is difficult to imagine any long-term solution to this threat that does not include much more substantial mutually advantageous cooperation with other states, including sustained assistance to help weak autocratic states become

more politically and economically successful so as to discourage the extremists with their tendencies towards terrorism.

New forces of globalization further complicate the provision of peace and security. Globalization does not apply easily to politics. Its main focal point is economics. What distinguishes the current phase of a centuries-long process is the revolution in communications and transportation—which not only bring people closer together in time and space, but can aid powerful new threats to national and human security by entities that are not states. The political effects of high-tech communications and transportation often appear to worsen political divisions and other problems within countries, while facilitating transnational networks that support local extremism, terrorism and criminal activities.

There are today no substantial global political institutions to deal with peace and security issues. The nearest thing is the United Nations, which derives its very limited powers from states. And it took the system of sovereign states nearly 300 years to reach a point, after the two worst wars in history, to commit to what some believed in 1945 was sufficient collective action to prevent a third world war. But the UN was powerless to prevent the cold war, with its threat of global nuclear catastrophe, or a spate of deadly domestic and regional conflicts, or the current global war on terror.

The UN's weakness is unremarkable. Throughout history there have been only two models of global and regional order—imperial domination or a balance among sovereign powers—neither of which has much relevance today. In the current context we are beginning to see the outlines of a third model of regional and global order that for the first time would not be imposed from above by one or more major powers, but develop from the bottom up, incrementally, as peoples and governments voluntarily associate for mutual protection and economic advantage. Building communities rather than forming alliances will be the paradigm.

A central question this paper raises is whether the international public goods generated by the huge commitments the United States has begun making in support of its new global national security strategy will benefit or hurt the new thinking about peace and security and its links to good governance and sustainable development in troubled regions such as Africa.

Whatever the true nature of the peace and security public goods now being generated, they are surely different from those of the cold war era. The US threat perception is different, and the world in which

the United States operates has also changed. Smaller powers are far more assertive in pursuit of their interests.

The world has reached a hinge point in the hitherto slow evolution of norms, institutions and political determinations about how best to ensure regional and global peace and security. The highly controversial US intervention in Iraq raises peace and security issues as fundamental as any since the founding of the United Nations, as Secretary-General Kofi Annan pointed out in his September 2003 address to the General Assembly. In fact the intervention and surrounding debates are raising issues about sovereign rights and obligations that date back at least to the mid-seventeenth century but only really began to boil in the 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. For reasons noted below, this paper assumes that the primary testing grounds for whether a new global security order is fracturing or coalescing will be at the regional, rather than national or global, level of world politics.

Regional

"Regional solutions for regional problems" still resonates positively with publics and governments receptive to the common sense value in being a good neighbour and in the practical efficiency of subsidiarity. Regional organizations also typically enjoy greater legitimacy in tackling local problems than intervention by one or more major powers. But regional organizations, especially in troubled regions of Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and elsewhere, lack the capacity and political will to be effective—particularly if the challenge is preventing deadly conflict within a state.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATO) belated response to ethnic cleansing in the Balkans was a turning point. Then the US interventions after 11 September 2001 in Afghanistan and Iraq further confirmed how quickly and profoundly the politics and technologies of military intervention are changing, perhaps permanently.

New ideas about the centrality of peace and security as a precondition for development and democracy have begun to emerge around the world, including in its poorest region: Africa. Whether the vital interests of public goods providers are converging or diverging with the interests of recipients is difficult to assess in the aftermath of the cold war and the terrorist attacks of 11 September. However growing political pluralism within and among states means that the security policies of weak and strong powers alike are increasingly being challenged by other governments and aroused publics at home and abroad.

At the inaugural summit of the African Union (AU) in 2002 more than 30 heads of state unanimously endorsed peace and security as the first of three essential preconditions for a new plan to achieve sustainable development and integration in the global economy, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). The other two prerequisites are good governance and regional cooperation. Good governance and peace and security—particularly conflict prevention—are increasingly recognized as two sides of the same coin, with regional cooperation important to monitor and promote both, while helping pool resources and overcoming disparities among partners.

National

Ideally all societies should be allowed the democratic freedom to decide priorities for themselves, with the results respected by others. But when the disparity of power and wealth among states is as unprecedented as the number claiming to be sovereign equals, this ideal remains a distant dream for the vast majority.

Peace and security are expensive. Yet states readily justify major public investments and sacrifices for this purpose, often crowding out other urgently needed social and economic expenditures. If, however, peace and security are preconditions for achieving other social and economic goods, is there no price too high?

After a decade of post–cold war turmoil the four key structural weaknesses that preclude sustainable peace and security in troubled states are well known and at least informally accepted in UN policy circles:

- Authoritarian rule.
- Exclusion of minority or majority groups from governance.
- Socio-economic deprivation combined with inequity.
- A lack of institutional and human capacity to manage conflict.

Emphasizing the interdependence of peace and security and good governance, with the aim of encouraging states to develop the capacity to be reliable and productive regional partners in ensuring each other's national and regional security, gives issues of governance both analytic and practical value in preventing conflict and building peace. Whether human rights and democratic values are a new form of cultural imperialism is beside the point. As former UN high commissioner for refugees Sadako Ogata warns: "Today's human rights abuses are tomorrow's refugees." A denial of human rights thus becomes an early warning sign

of possible deadly conflict and a need for greater foreign engagement, perhaps intervention.

Governments remain resistant to ceding authority to multilateral organizations and are "sovereignty sensitive" when aiding people in peril in another state that is opposed to external involvement in its internal affairs. A new and overdue global debate about lowering sovereign barriers to multilateral interventions on behalf of people at risk or to deal with terrorist and other threats has finally begun. A good example of this new thinking is the recent report titled *The Responsibility to Protect*, by the Canadian-sponsored International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, chaired by former Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's special adviser, Mohammed Sahnoun (ICISS 2001).

During the cold war a weak state's alignment with either the United States or the Soviet Union required very little political capacity. Neither patron cared very much how its clients managed domestic affairs, but this is now rapidly changing. As the scope and nature of threats to security change fundamentally, so too must the states at risk, including the most powerful. Yet as Yale professor Paul Kennedy recently noted: "Most political leaders in the world today are overstraining themselves just to keep afloat of current problems. Very few of them have the capacity and energy to strategically rethink the nature of the state."

With conflicts over the denial of political rights and rising sectarian violence escalating in dozens of troubled states during the 1990s, traditional distinctions between domestic and international security and between war and peace have been thoroughly and perhaps permanently blurred. Even the most stable developing countries are under greater stress, lacking basic human capacity for analysing and dealing with new forces of globalization, more politically potent donor conditionality, demanding multilateral trade and other negotiations and greater citizen activism—often abetted by powerful foreign and local non-governmental organizations.

The US factor

The world still has not absorbed the effects of the demise of the Soviet Union, the world's last real empire and possibly the last check on a single dominant superpower. The United States may be the first power in history capable of asserting global hegemony, but it is constrained by its internal system of governance and by regional and global forces be-

yond its control. No coalition of major powers appears willing or able to challenge US dominance to create a new global balance. Yet despite its unprecedented military preponderance, power alone cannot deter terrorists nor secure Iraq.

Most governments do not give as high a priority to fighting politically motivated terrorism as the United States does. But many do face internal threats (such as Algeria, the Philippines and Russia), have become surrogates for attacks against western interests (such as Indonesia, Kenya, Tanzania and Turkey) or face a mixture of local and external threats (such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, among others). Others are at the mercy of criminally motivated terrorism, notably the drug-related violence that has put the democracies in Andean countries (Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) at severe risk, despite billions of dollars spent by the United States to shore up local security forces. Nearly all governments cooperate with US intelligence in attempting to track and eliminate terrorism, because although the United States is the main target today, such threats could eventually challenge political authority anywhere. Weak states lack the capacity and resilience to respond to terrorist threats and to create local conditions conducive to eliminating them.

One major but often overlooked feature of the current global context is the lack of domestic consensus behind the current US role in world affairs. The extent and composition of official international opposition to US foreign policy exceeds even that of the Vietnam era. As members of a full-fledged democracy, US leaders are accountable to a public that can force a reversal of foreign policy. Meanwhile foreign actors—including the International Task Force on Global Public Goods—must decide whether and how to try to influence the debate about the US global role in peace and security. The implications for international public goods—their benefits and their costs—for the rest of the world will be different but perhaps no less significant than they were during the cold war.

Current US domestic divisions over foreign policy are becoming more pronounced—in ways that defy easy categorization. Some US globalists, for example, support free trade while other globalists are so concerned with promotion of human rights and democracy, or improving the environment, that they advocate trade sanctions and other market restrictions. While some US nationalists, or anti-globalists, may advocate isolationist policies reminiscent of the 1920s, others oppose isolationism, wanting the United States unrestrained by multilateral institutions

and preferring unilateral intervention whenever they conclude vital US interests are threatened. Nationalist interventionists currently drive US foreign policy, with support from many prodemocracy globalists. It has divided the West and alienated the rest of the world. When and how these issues are resolved will have far-reaching consequences for regional and global order.

The lack of a post–cold war consensus on the US global role was evident in the 1990s. Except for decisive but limited action against Iraqi aggression in 1990–91, US rhetoric of global leadership was belied by its cut-and-run policy in Somalia, its unwillingness to act against genocide in Rwanda and the Balkans and its failure to secure a viable two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine dispute—not to mention its unwillingness to pay accumulated UN obligations.

Current divisions over the US global role contrast with the strong domestic and international support the country received throughout its long campaign to contain the Soviet Union. This support endured despite outbursts of strong domestic and international opposition to a series of armed interventions, most notably in Vietnam, and despite US readiness to align with a long list of repressive governments, including apartheid South Africa, to further its containment policy and to ensure reliable supplies of oil and other natural resources deemed vital to its national security.

But back then the United States was regarded by many countries, especially in Europe, as the world's leading provider of peace and security from 1945 to 1990, a position achieved by assisting European recovery and integration, by winning the cold war and by promoting a more open and prosperous global economy. Whether it can or will recover the degree of international authority and legitimacy it enjoyed during this period is being tested in Iraq. The ease and impunity with which small states, including several traditional US clients, refused to support US appeals for UN Security Council backing for the intervention may reflect the declining influence of the United States and its legitimacy as a world leader.

The Bush administration has provoked the most consequential debate about global and regional peace and security since the one that followed the Second World War. In September 2002 it announced a new global National Security Strategy, the first major change in US doctrine since President Harry Truman approved the strategy of containment against the Soviet Union in 1950 (NSC 68 1950). The new

doctrine—which could prevail for another 50 years or be repudiated by Bush's successor—has three interdependent elements.

The first and most controversial element is the threat of pre-emptive intervention, something NSC 68 explicitly renounced as contrary to US principles and certain to be opposed by the US public. It also challenges a fundamental prohibition against the use of force under current international law. Former secretary of state Colin Powell interpreted this commitment as applying "only to the undeterrable threats that come from non-state actors such as terrorist groups." While the majority of UN members are opposed to the US-led intervention in Iraq, the criteria and means for pre-emptive or preventive military action has since become an increasingly legitimate topic for international debate.

The second element in the US National Security Strategy also has far-reaching implications for efforts to provide peace and security as a public good. It too is a reversal of long-standing US foreign policy. Rather than regard China and Russia as potential challengers to US global dominance, Washington now seeks to forge strategic partnerships with these powers, a necessary if unstated condition for gaining international acceptance—if not support—for pre-emptive action.

The third element of the National Security Strategy commits the United States to "extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent", an acknowledgement that only politically capable governments, responsive to the needs of the citizens, will be able to rein in terrorists and help prevent the spread of WMD. Although the nature and extent of US commitment remains untested, it signals a potential convergence with many of the indigenous demands for more politically capable democratic governments that are increasingly evident in Africa and other regions.

The UN challenge

Although the UN's authority is extremely limited and dominated by a Security Council that poorly reflects current political and economic realities, it can play a vital legitimizing role in peace and security operations around the world, as is currently being reconfirmed in Iraq. Even when consensus on the council proves impossible, and despite granting no greater formal weight to India or Brazil than it allows Fiji or the Comoros, the voice of the secretary-general resonates globally and increasingly on issues of human security.

Secretary-General Kofi Annan responded to the new US security doctrine and its subsequent intervention in Iraq by declaring in his 2003 address to the General Assembly that the United Nations had reached a turning point as decisive as any since its founding in 1945. He challenged UN members to debate peace and security by framing a series of key questions, beginning with issues of protection against international terrorism and the spread of WMD. When is the use of force permissible—and who should decide? Is "preventive war" sometimes justified, or is it simply aggression under another name? And, in a world that has become unipolar, what role should the UN play?

These issues, he noted, compound those that arose during the many deadly civil wars in the 1990s that were already calling into question the most basic principles of international and regional peace and security. Is state sovereignty an absolute and immutable principle, or does our understanding of it need to change? To what extent is the international community responsible for preventing or resolving conflicts within states—particularly when they involve genocide, ethnic cleansing or other extreme violations of human rights? Do we have effective mechanisms for carrying out that responsibility?

Annan also reminds us that for many people in the world, especially in poor countries, the risks of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, or even genocide, are relatively remote compared with the so-called "soft" threats—the ever present dangers of extreme poverty and hunger, unsafe drinking water, environmental degradation and endemic or infectious diseases that kill millions each year.

Leaders of weak states often revert to repression just to stay in power. As Burmese democrat Aung San Suu Kyi notes: "It is not power that corrupts but fear. Fear of losing power corrupts those who wield it." Burma is Southeast Asia's weakest and least secure state. In Latin America the five Andean democracies (Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) are at risk, as is Haiti. But the three regions most afflicted by weak states are Africa, the greater Middle East and the new states of the former Soviet Union. The most conflict-ridden and impoverished region, Africa, appears most advanced in devising new, locally rooted approaches to dealing with its problems of peace and security.

To inform the 2005 UN General Assembly debate on peace and security, including the issue of whether and when pre-emptive or preventive intervention is justified and by whom, Kofi Annan has tasked the 16-member High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, chaired by former prime minister Anand Panyarachun of Thailand, to

analyse current and future threats to peace and security; prepare a rigorous assessment of the contribution that collective action can make in meeting these threats; and recommend changes needed to make the UN a legitimate and effective instrument for a collective response. Their report became the basis for the secretary-general's own report to the General Assembly, "In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all," released on 21 March 2005.

Strategies for peace and security

Debates about peace and security get vast very fast, especially when they go beyond traditional issues of war and peace among sovereign states to include issues of human security within states and beyond the ambit of normal diplomatic practice. So, as issues of human security acquire greater legitimacy in international relations, setting priorities is essential for managing a productive discourse.

A strategy comprising four interrelated parts is recommended for advancing peace and security in regions under severe stress, where multilateral action is feasible and might complement related efforts to promote other international public goods.

- Promote peace and security as a precondition for sustainable development, poverty reduction and regional and international cooperation, with an emphasis on moving the focus of policies and practice towards ensuring peace and protection for people.
- Promote good governance as vital to preventing deadly conflict, consolidating peace and security and preventing further conflict, and as essential for sustainable development, poverty reduction and regional cooperation, focusing on those aspects of governance (political and judicial capacity) needed to protect the basic freedoms vital for human security rather than calling for the sweeping democratic reforms that stymied much of the governance policy debate between donors and recipients in the 1990s.
- Promote regional cooperation as essential for preventing deadly conflict, making and keeping peace and supporting good governance and sustainable development in member nations. This need not detract from efforts to achieve economic cooperation and integration but reflects a new and promising recognition

by many governments that regional organizations, especially in conflict-prone regions, must assume a greater role in promoting the sound political practices required for partnerships that can deliver peace and security for all people in the region.

- Support capacity building in weak states and regional organizations in all of the areas above. Recent shifts in the rhetoric and policies of governments on issues of peace and human security, good governance and regional cooperation are encouraging. Yet chronic shortages of indigenous skills in key policy positions in national executives and regional secretariats must be addressed; otherwise, any new strategy to promote peace and security as a public good will fail.

Case for an Africa-focused strategy

Africa has become a major bellwether for whether local and international actors can come up with the principles, processes and partnerships required to devise more effective norms, institutions and the political will to prevent and resolve conflicts within states—without undermining traditional sovereign rights that restrain deadly conflicts between and among states.

Of course talk of sovereign rights and obligations can be misleading, especially in circumstances where state structures are too weak to even pay police or where leaders are so vile that there may be no limit to their abuse of power. Concerned African leaders in the regions most seriously affected propose that those neighbouring states with the capacity to engage in trying to prevent, or more to often mediate, conflicts in troubled states be recognized and given wider international support, as the leaders in any peace process.

Although weak states and poverty predominate in Africa, there are promising new opportunities for international engagement to support capacity building to ensure peace and security as an international public good. After decades of declines in incomes as a proportion of the world economy, failed efforts to develop and threats to human security (political and natural), African leaders have publicly endorsed a new model for development. This model stresses the need for greater accountability and differentiation in providing greater resources and beneficial cooperation, as rewards to those who perform best—not only economically but also politically—and in support of efforts to ensure regional peace and security.

African leaders agree, at least formally, that promoting peace and security is a vital precondition to their new model for sustainable development and for building new partnerships with Western donors and international financial institutions. Recent progress by African-led peace initiatives in Burundi, the Congo and West Africa augurs well for Africa becoming an important testing ground for regionally based peace and security programmes that might also serve as useful examples for other regions.

Most African states also lack capacity to pool their limited resources to form effective regional coalitions. For now, securing and sustaining politically capable states would be in the best interests of poor and rich countries alike. Only politically capable states can deal with local sources of international terrorism and reach viable regional agreements to achieve regional peace and security, the building blocks of global security. Where poverty is pervasive opportunities to build political capacity are severely constrained. The average African state has an economy no larger than that of a US or Western European town with a population of only 50,000.

Regional economic communities may eventually facilitate the aggregation of small economies in Africa and elsewhere to help overcome the huge developed-developing country disparities that constrain global economic development. The difficulties in achieving such integration are enormous because of the huge disparities and redundancies that exist within poor regions. In southern Africa, for example, Mozambique, despite recent high rates of growth, has an economy no larger than a mid-size city in neighbouring South Africa. Finding public good formulas to begin to bridge such disparities of state capacity that are regionally acceptable to big and small countries alike and that can lead to greater regional integration is the main institutional challenge in achieving peace and security.

Rwandan political scientist Dr. David Himbara of the University of the Witwatersrand's Centre for Africa's International Relations has embarked on a major study to devise new strategies for African capacity building. As he notes:

> In the context of increased insecurity, violence and donor squeeze on public expenditures of the increasingly discredited [African] state of the 1980s, standards of living of almost all types of professionals and technicians depreciated to appallingly low levels, while a significant part of the retrenched ones joined the ranks of the unemployed. The result was massive human capital flight, or 'brain drain', from Sub-Saharan Africa to North America and Europe … between 30,000 and

> 70,000 skilled Africans each year. The irony is that Sub-Saharan Africa continues to export the commodity that it needs most—scarce and valuable human capital—[with] some 200,000 African professionals overseas, while more than 300,000 expatriates are imported to support policy management processes in the context of technical cooperation with the industrially advanced countries.

Among Africa's emerging regional economic communities, the most noteworthy are the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the much weaker Intergovernmental Authority on Horn of Africa (IGAD). The commitment to strengthen them within the NEPAD framework is a recent important development that should attract donor interest, because Africa's regional organizations do have the potential to help end Africa's wars, provide early warning and conflict prevention functions and defend less violent threats to human security from disease, environmental degradation, forced migration, transnational crime, terrorism and the disruptions caused by globalization.

In 2002 Africa's politically decrepit Organization of African Unity was reborn as the African Union, and on 30 December 2003 its Peace and Security Council came into force, with a majority of the union's 53 countries ratifying it. Fifteen countries, three from each of the continent's main subregions, were elected to the council in early 2004. What could distinguish the African Union from its predecessor is that membership on the council is not supposed to be automatic, according to rules of subregional rotation. Election is supposed to depend on a state's capacity and willingness to contribute to peacemaking in Africa, plus its respect for constitutional governance, the rule of law and human rights. Failure to reasonably satisfy these new standards will undermine international confidence—and confidence translates to essential resources, because the African Union is overwhelmingly dependent on Western donors for African peace operations. These resources now include an innovative €250 million Peace Support Facility from a newly formed donor group, known as the "friends of the AU".

The African Union's new development programme, which functions largely independently, is the largely autonomous NEPAD, which now enjoys strong political backing and the prospect of greater project funding from virtually all bilateral and multilateral donors. At the heart of NEPAD is the idea of mutual accountability among African countries. They will monitor and judge each other's domestic economic and

political performance, with good governance as a key criterion and an African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) to check on performance. By mid-2005 some 24 African countries, just under half of the AU's membership, had signed up for peer review, with Ghana and Rwanda the first countries to provide APRM reports.

Sceptics question the political resolve of African governments to fulfil the promise of the APRM, under which good performance brings economic rewards from donor governments, international institutions and non-governmental organizations. Success is vital not only to providing economic development but also to improving prospects for national and regional peace and security. The Achilles heel of the APRM, admits South African President Thabo Mbeki, is the lack of capacity of most African countries to meet the requirements for policy reform—or even to do the necessary analysis and design work to participate in the APRM process.

With the US-led intervention in Iraq causing deep divisions between the United States and its traditional allies, cooperation in helping Africa build capacity in peace and security could help restore confidence among major donors. It would also allow its traditional international partners and African states to test the nature and extent of the US commitment to assist capacity building in Africa, under the third pillar of its new national security strategy. It would also test whether NEPAD's similar commitment to promoting capable states, albeit for different reasons, in practice converges with or diverges from US policy.

The Bush administration has shown a surprising degree of interest in Africa's security, including a major new commitment to fight HIV/AIDS, large increases in development assistance and support for peace operations. Washington is also focusing on possible terrorist threats emanating from 10 priority countries, according to a recent update from the Council on Foreign Relations.

Yet Africa is not dominated by any major power to the extent of Russia's role in the countries of the former Soviet Union or US involvement in the Persian Gulf and Middle East. Several important Western nations, including International Task Force on Global Public Goods sponsors Sweden and France, have long-standing interests in Africa. Indeed the role that Nordic countries played in support of liberation struggles in southern Africa, their strong identity with the UN and their record of generous development assistance should make easier their future involvement in developing and testing the politically sensitive strategy suggested above.

The scale of political and financial engagement to partner with African countries in these new and innovative approaches is certainly

affordable, amounting to only a tiny proportion of the public and private assistance already flowing to Africa annually. Many donors appear to have concluded that this aid has not produced the results hoped for. Redirecting current aid flows, rather than appropriating large additional amounts, may be all that is required to test African commitments to meeting higher standards of performance under NEPAD.

The strategic objective is to help develop and sustain politically capable states. Even within Africa the disparities among states in their capacities to contribute to regional peace and security operations—or to negotiate and adopt cooperative agreements to fight HIV/AIDS, deal with problems of economic and forced migration or manage shared water and other resources—are enormous. They must be bridged if human security needs are to be met and viable regional partnerships forged. Isolation is not an option. Devising national and regional policies for better managing the effects and vast disparities in capability among states, however, will be difficult. Consistent with subsidiarity, more robust efforts to build the capacity of the secretariats of Africa's subregional and continental organizations are also necessary, so they can monitor and foster better national and regional programmes and relate more effectively to global bodies, within the UN system.

Capacity building to ensure greater peace and security is different than traditional development assistance. Achieving greater efficiency, equity or even economic growth is not the immediate challenge. What is needed is the capacity to allow for greater public accountability and transparency in running states and in setting and implementing national policy. This includes greater restraints on executive authority, a more reliable due process and rule of law, protection of human rights, independent media, civilian control of the military and all the other ingredients that define a politically capable state that can manage the "evils of factionalism" at home and become a more reliable partner in regional and international relations.

Institutions

States

In keeping with the proposed strategy, strengthening weak states and regional organizations would be primary concerns. Focusing on these institutions will help gauge the public goods effects of the peace and

security expenditures of rich states—and any efforts to influence these expenditures and policies.

States are the focal points of this strategy. Although their priorities and policies need to change, their role in establishing and maintaining peace and security is no less important. Lasting peace requires not an absence of tension but the presence of justice. States must arbitrate public goods domestically and internationally. They are the only actors capable of negotiating, ratifying and enforcing collective security.

The strategy should concentrate on the role and capabilities of the executive, where security policy is ultimately decided. Experience and scholarly research point to restraints on executive authority as the key variable for preventing the abuse of power, including the extreme corruption that perpetuates poverty and provokes conflict. Encouraging states to adopt institutional reforms that ensure checks and balances is critical. This is becoming a less politically sensitive topic of international discourse. This may be due, in part, to the changing international political context, which is promoting transparency and accountability as necessary for any leader who does not want to be left behind, at the mercy of globalization, without the multilateral cooperation and financial assistance necessary to survive.

Regional organizations

Strengthening regional and subregional organizations is another vital element in this strategy. They can reinforce and help supplement those actors within states who are committed to ensuring greater transparency and accountability for the sake of gaining the resilience and public support needed to maintain peace and security. With the obvious exception of the European Union, most regional organizations remain poorly staffed and underfunded, and are allowed very little freedom of action by their members. This may be starting to change, in part because the European Union's success inspires dreams of emulation, but also because increasingly open economies and politics have persuaded many national leaders of the advantages of greater regional cooperation.

In Africa regional economic communities have been designated as the agents to facilitate peer review of national economic and political performance. They could play a greater role in preventing conflict, as many hoped the Southern African Development Community would—but so far has failed to—do for Zimbabwe. Comparative reviews of other regional economic and security organizations should be

done with a view to proposing ways that donors and others could help strengthen their capacity for preventing conflict and keeping peace. Preventing conflict, of course, means engaging member countries on such sensitive issues as their human rights record, election monitoring and assistance, media freedom, the role of parliaments, civilian control of the military and other issues.

The number of organizations to be analysed and approached for cooperation is really quite small. Obvious candidates in Africa are the secretariats of the African Union, the ECOWAS and its security wing, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the Southern African Development Community. In Latin America the best comparisons would be to the Organization of American States and Mercosur. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation and the Gulf Consultative Conference are essentially dialogue organizations.

United Nations

The United Nations and its Security Council have been given a mandate to uphold international peace and security. Yet the organization remains an alliance with limited powers, so far largely restricted to conflict between states. The UN was neither designed for nor can it easily be adapted to meet today's increasingly diverse, unconventional and overwhelming domestic threats to peace and security.

Thoughtful efforts by the current and former secretaries-general to develop a more appropriate Agenda for Peace and proposals from Kofi Annan's expert panel for meeting post–cold war threats help shape the debate on international peace and security. But proposals to revise the UN Charter (including expanding the Security Council) will continue to be thwarted by nations and parliaments that must ratify such treaty amendments. This has been accomplished only once before, with the agreement to expand the council's temporary members. However desirable, efforts to reform the UN should not detract from more promising institutional reform initiatives regionally and nationally, especially in regions at greatest risk of deadly conflict.

The UN's role in legitimizing the peace and security initiatives managed and funded primarily by regional actors, ad hoc coalitions and others can be vital to success. The institution also provides critically needed technical assistance, oversight and coordinating functions. Its political functions in post-conflict management of constitution writing,

elections and other reconstruction, reconciliation and recovery efforts are becoming more important—with Iraq looming as its most important test so far.

The UN can help establish and legitimize new principles and standards of accountability and transparency for national and international institutions. But most of the real work must be and is best left to those most affected, namely the troubled states and their neighbours. Among the state-building challenges are creating and sustaining regulatory and oversight institutions, whether media, judicial, human rights, parliamentary or in other areas. This work raises sensitive political issues, which are often best handled by civil society institutions, assuming they can be adequately funded, empowered and protected. Such activities lie beyond the mandates of traditional international organizations. Yet such "non-institutions" as NEPAD are beginning to create bridges for ensuring greater international accountability for domestic behaviour.

Rules

Sovereign rights and obligations

Old rules of war and peace no longer apply. Throughout the cold war the so-called "golden rule" of international security prevailed, at least on the central front of history's most dangerous balance of power. No one dared invade another sovereign state for fear of altering the balance and provoking a nuclear holocaust. That self-limitation no longer applies in the same way. NATO's intervention in Kosovo, recent conflicts in West and Central Africa and the US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq were all armed actions but did not entail traditional declarations of war. Overwhelming international opposition condemned the US intervention in Iraq as illegitimate, but pre-emptive or preventive intervention has become a defining issue in the debate over reforming UN rules and practices.

"We live in a world of old rules and new threats", write Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter in the January/February 2004 issue of *Foreign Affairs*. They propose a doctrine of collective intervention, a "duty to prevent nations run by rulers without internal checks on their power from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction." In the same issue, the former dean of Harvard University's Kennedy

School, Graham Allison, proposes new rules to prevent nuclear terror, what he calls the "three no's: no loose nukes, no nascent nukes and no new nuclear states."

Traditional rules of self-defence and existing arms control regimes, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, provide a more developed basis for rule-based international action than would otherwise be available to African and other governments worried about the possibility of intervention by the United States in waging its own war against terror, without the formal backing of the United Nations. Today's main security threats arise not out of conflicts among the world's nearly 200 independent sovereign states, but from deadly conflicts within them. Such troubled states include not only tiny poor countries in Africa, but the new states of the former Soviet Union, including Russia. The break-up of Russian authority over Eurasia, from Poland to the Pacific Ocean, occurred with remarkably little violence but without regard to any international norms or rules. The United States and its allies did stipulate 14 criteria as the basis for granting recognition, emphasizing that any changes of borders had to be done peacefully, with the voluntary consent of the people concerned and in ways that protected human rights and the rule of law and promoted democratic values. These "rules" were at best informal guidelines. Everyone muddled through, with violence altering borders in the Balkans and East Timor. Elsewhere traditional rules respecting sovereign equality and territorial integrity generally prevail—even in Africa, where the paradox of defending colonially imposed frontiers in the name of self-determination persists.

Devising and applying new rules of association and disassociation within and among states will be vital to meeting long-term peace and security challenges. When the political philosopher Isaiah Berlin was asked, shortly before his death, to name the biggest challenge that will face humanity in the twenty-first century, he replied: "Cultural self-determination within a political framework is precisely the issue … Unless there is a minimum of shared values that can preserve the peace, no decent societies can survive."

Human rights

States, of course, are mere political inventions, with rules subject to change. People, as international relations theorist E.H. Carr observed in *Nationalism and After*, are created by God with inalienable human rights that transcend political conventions. But states and multilat-

eral institutions are man-made and can claim no inherent rights or equality. The global human rights movement has become very powerful in the last half century, making it the target of sectarian attacks. If narrowly defined so as to assure universal support, basic human rights—what Isaiah Berlin calls the "negative liberties" of freedom from oppression, bondage and gross physical harm—can become the foundation for a new rules-based international order based more on upholding human security than on maintaining the security of sovereign states.

In the long and politically difficult process of developing new international norms as precursors to enforceable rules, a recent innovation accelerating the process has been the convening of unofficial high-level and globally representative commissions and other groups, such as the International Task Force on Global Public Goods. Such transnational civil society initiatives have had a positive cumulative effect in recent years. In the field of peace and security, the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict inspired the more prescriptive and narrowly focused Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and still more narrowly defined but politically useful Independent International Commission on Kosovo, sponsored by the government of Sweden and chaired by the former chief prosecutor of the UN International War Crimes Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, Justice Richard Goldstone. The Commission on Kosovo grappled with the thorny issue of whether the US-led NATO intervention against Serbia violated rules. It concluded that although the intervention was technically illegal under international law, it was morally justified and hence legitimate—a major step toward redefining international norms for providing peace and security as an international public good.

The Independent International Commission on Kosovo is also a reminder of the inadequacies of current global rules on peace and security. Had concerned governments held to the rules requiring UN Security Council approval for the use of force in Kosovo, then the prospect of a Russian veto would have precluded intervention. In the case of the Rwandan genocide, African regional organizations lacked the capacity to intervene, while major Western powers with the capacity to do so lacked the political will—despite clear and compelling early warnings that a political catastrophe was brewing.

Since the Rwandan genocide, African governments have established new rules to intervene to prevent or stop genocide and other

massive human rights abuses, as part of the African Union's constitutive act adopted in 2002. African states do not yet have the capacity to prevent further political disasters, assuming they could agree to intervene. But given Africa's sovereign sensitivities, this recent formal acknowledgement of the obligation to protect is a major milestone. In 1999 African leaders also pledged not to accept unconstitutional changes of government; since then they have mounted successful diplomatic campaigns to overturn military coups, most notably in São Tomé last year.

Resources

Nearly everyone in the field of development complains about inadequate resources, usually money. The UN's core annual budget of some $1.5 billion is about what the US military spends every 32 hours—not including another $87 billion for supplemental support for the Iraq operation. But failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia and state failures in Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and elsewhere were political—not natural—disasters. Lack of money was not the real constraint. As a proportion of world military expenditures, UN and regional peace operations account for trivial amounts.

In a similar vein, prevention is always touted as cheap when compared with the costs of conflict resolution and reconstruction. Yet governments typically decline to take preventive action—even when clear and overwhelming evidence showed genocide was imminent in Rwanda. The real constraints are invariably political, although human; institutional and financial resources can all be in perilously short supply. Unlocking the necessary financial resources remains a political, not a budgetary, challenge.

Very little additional money can go a long way. Examples abound, as demonstrated by the small grants from Western donors to underwrite some of the costs of African-led peace talks in Burundi, the Congo and elsewhere. Allocating $1–2 million annually to fund a discretionary conflict prevention fund for the UN Secretary-General, a notion pioneered by Norway, is another illustration.

But even when the political will and financial backing exists to strengthen national and regional peace and security capabilities, the human and institutional resources to carry out such efforts typically are in short supply.

Assessments

The UN's peace and security roles and mission have been assessed by the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. Therefore others should give greater attention to assessing the roles and missions of regional organizations—especially in Africa, where peace and security is a particularly scarce public good.

The APRM provides an opportunity for assessment of African governments by Africans according to criteria that, in theory, should be highly relevant to the delivery of peace and security as an international public good. The first reports by Ghana and Rwanda demonstrate, especially in the former case, a refreshing willingness to rigorously self-examine such highly charged issues as the quality of governance, prevalence of corruption, economic transparency and accountability in both the public and private sectors, and the short-comings of recent plans to achieve social integration and development.

The APRM promises a historic break with past dependencies and donor-recipient relations, but for such partnerships to succeed all members must meet their commitments. Western countries and the international financial institutions have embraced NEPAD, but there are growing complaints that NEPAD has not generated the additional donor funds that some African leaders and many commentators expected. An independent assessment of the quantity and quality of performance support for the NEPAD partnership, with reference to the OECD peer review process and performance and other regional efforts to promote greater accountability among member governments, also could be useful.

Several well known databases on local, regional and global peace and security trends are easily accessible. They include those of the Swedish International Peace Research Institute, the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London and the Minorities at Risk Project at the University of Maryland, as well as databases at a growing constellation of smaller national and regional security studies centres around the world.

Recommendations

Any recommendations at this stage must be tentative, because the strategy outlined here has not been debated or approved and needs to be

developed in consultation with at least a representative sample of prospective stakeholders. Initially, the International Task Force on Global Public Goods report should be sought on the specific meanings the strategy assigns to the value-laden and politically contested terms "peace and security", "good governance" and "regional cooperation", and on whether potential synergies the strategy suggests are possible and desirable to achieve. The Task Force must also decide if is appropriate to develop and test this strategy first in Africa—for reasons of need, importance, local receptivity, affordability and recent positive signs of new donor interest and partnerships.

United Nations

The UN Secretary-General also lacks the capacity and the mandate to take preventive action, unless invited to so by a member government or specifically mandated to take a particular action by the Security Council. Kofi Annan is demonstrating shrewd active leadership in refocusing the UN's peace and security concerns in ways highly consistent with the proposed strategy, including its focus on Africa. His office needs strengthening through voluntary untied contributions from "friends of the UN", governments, private foundations and even corporate donors to provide the funds to hire additional personnel and to designate staff for service in the field with regional organizations that are attempting to build peace operations capabilities.

Improved cooperation and a better division of labour are needed between the United Nations and regional security organizations—in Africa at the continental level (the African Union's newly formed peace and security council) and at the subregional level (SADC and ECOWAS). These links are needed not only to improve peace operations capabilities, but also to develop new and legitimate norms of greater member state accountability, in keeping with the recent agreements to adopt the APRM. The urgent needs and increased openness to international engagement among African states in sensitive areas of governance offer important opportunities to redefine peace and security more broadly as an international public good and to mobilize international financial and political support. Forming special donor groups to simultaneously assist capacity building of the UN and its regional partners is vital.

Within the UN system, the recent increased consultation between its political arms and peace and security arms and its international finan-

cial and development agencies should be assessed and given every possible encouragement. International Task Force on Global Public Goods members may have specific recommendations in this regard that could mean the difference between success and failure in African-led peace initiatives under way in Burundi, the Congo, Sudan and elsewhere. The cooperation between the UN and ECOWAS in managing the current transition to post-conflict reconstruction, reconciliation and development in Sierra Leone deserves special attention from the Task Force for lessons that might apply to other UN-regional partnerships.

Careful, comparative, policy-relevant analysis, where not already done or under way, should be supported. It should highlight the lessons of and any best practices from the proliferation of UN peace operations during the 1990s—particularly those that can inform decisions about how to proceed but may need additional research. There were 30 UN peace operations between 1988 and 1997, compared with only 13 in the preceding 40 years. There is substantial, useful literature evaluating their successes and failures. Recent experiments with regionally led peace operations in Africa are also especially noteworthy.

Regional organizations

Greater attention to raising African resources to finance regional peace operations is needed to ensure the local credibility and legitimacy of such operations. As the US Office of Foreign Assets Control has long since shown, it is possible to identify tens of billions of dollars banked in Europe and the United States by corrupt African leaders that could be frozen and repatriated. A second major source of revenue would be to negotiate much higher assessments for peace operations from small, oil-rich African states such as São Tomé, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and even Libya. Finally, help should be given in devising effective (and carefully audited) fund-raising peace campaigns among Africans in the diaspora.

The mixed experience that bilateral, international and non-governmental donors have had in trying to promote good governance may also be relevant. Anecdotal evidence suggests considerable disillusionment, with Nordic and other European donors turning instead towards helping build capacity to improve national and regional security. African governments have recently been talking more openly about a willingness to define and abide by standards of human rights and democratization within the NEPAD framework. A reassessment of what has and has not been deemed effective could advance International Task

Force on Global Public Goods consideration of how to prevent conflict within states as a precondition for development.

Making a compelling case for better approaches to recruiting, training and retaining the indigenous skills needed to manage peace operations, the institutions required for more accountable and transparent governance and regional institutions is a key element in any practical strategy to promote peace and security. Ways to support such new regional ventures as the Kofi Annan Peace Centre in Ghana, and to replicate the experiment elsewhere, should be assessed and specific recommendations offered.

Focusing on winning support for capacity-building programmes in regional and continental organizations, such as the African Union's new peace and security facilities, should be a high priority. Conflict prevention is acclaimed by African leaders, as it is elsewhere, as a more cost-effective and morally desirable priority for peace and security than more expensive programmes of peacekeeping, peace enforcement and post-conflict reconstruction. Yet the African Union's resources are targeted more toward building better early warning mechanisms than investing in the political capabilities to monitor indicators of the degree of human security and potential conflict such as human rights, the emergence of democratic institutions, the rule of law and effective police and judiciary institutions, transparency, accountability, the forced movement of people and the role of the media. Donor governments and international agencies should give higher priority to assisting capacity building and partnering to foster greater resolve to deal with the political side of prevention.

Examples of good practice by more advanced multilateral arrangements in Europe should be reassessed in light of the new political interest evident in developing regions. The lessons of OECD peer review processes have already informed the development of the APRM. Coordination of Nordic defence policies may deserve closer inspection as possibly more relevant for developing countries than the joint military exercises run by the United Kingdom, the United States or NATO. In a similar vein, checks and balances on defence policy at the national level, such as Denmark's policy of a five-year compact between the executive and parliament to ensure that any major changes in spending or policy priorities are fully transparent, are examples of the scope of good practices that should be surveyed.

Private donor assistance in post-conflict situations can be quite small but of great value in assisting a revival or start-up of civil society to help ensure respect for human rights, an independent media and many other aspects of good governance. Private donors helped a group of Peruvian scholars and policy analysts, led by Francisco Sagasti, to devise an economic stabilization and reconstruction plan while civil strife still reigned and the economy teetered close to total collapse. Once peace was restored that plan helped ensure peace could be more quickly consolidated. This kind of help is another way peace and security can be provided as an international public good. A similar exercise could be of enormous future help to Zimbabwe and troubled African countries.

If the group of 20 or so enlightened multilateralist countries that Gro Brundtland referred to as the "real international community" contributed to a capacity-building fund, they could contribute substantially to helping African governments meet NEPAD standards. Annual expenditures would be only a small percentage of the aid budgets of the richer members of this group. High-value targets for such a "conflict prevention and sustainable development capacity-building fund" would be presidential staff and those close to key ministers, parliamentary leaders and non-governmental organizations dealing with human rights, good governance and other public accountability issues.

In developing its own peace and security strategy the International Task Force on Global Public Goods might consider doing preventive action simulations, informed by the lessons of prevention failures in the 1990s. There have been various evaluations of why prevention failed and what alternative measures might have been taken. This could advance the work of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in its report, *The Responsibility to Protect*, by giving it greater operational meaning within the new African context of AU and NEPAD commitments to promote peace and security.

A watching brief on US foreign policy should be maintained, keyed to its official and non-governmental organizations' interests in and support for elements of this strategy. Understanding and influencing US foreign policy could help advance this strategy under the third pillar of the new US National Security Strategy, while also helping restrain the unilateralist tendencies declared under the first pillar.

As a core part of the proposed strategy, capacity building must be carefully focused. The general term has been a major goal of donor agencies for four decades. The World Bank estimates that between 1990 and 2001 more than $200 billion was spent on technical assistance grants to developing countries. To recruit, retain or retool the analytic and policy skills that concerned governments and regional organizations need to develop and implement the proposed strategy poses special political challenges, but the actual costs of doing so would be relatively minor. There also needs to be a broad assessment of the lessons the big donors have learned after four decades of trying to build capacity in weak states, especially in Africa.

If peace and security guarantees are to focus more on people than states, greater attention should be given to allowing people to voice their concerns. The path-breaking Global Attitudes Project of the Washington-based Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (2003) offers important insights into how people around the world view peace and security issues. However the thrust of that survey of some 50 countries was keyed primarily to attitudes about the US role in the world. Investing in developing the capacity to conduct regional opinion surveys on human security issues, with surveys designed and carried out by regionally based independent institutions, is another way to advance the proposed strategy.

With regard to the capacity-building component, a recommendation for scholarship programmes may sound old fashioned. But targeted to the analysis and implementation of the other three parts of the strategy, professional training and upgrading opportunities are critically important. Poor, weak states cannot advance the interests of their people, regardless of the political will of their leaders and donor partners, in the New Partnership for Africa's Development, in negotiating free trade agreements with the European Union and United States or in building regional peace and security capabilities, unless they have at least a few skilled personnel—not just more foreign consultants. Namibia, for example, claims that promoting trade and investment is its highest foreign policy priority, but the government reportedly has only one well trained, experienced trade negotiator.

Offering opportunities to acquire advanced professional credentials through scholarships, periodic short courses and Internet-based courses may help improve and retain key policy people in the offices of presidents and key ministers. Working with regionally based universities to develop such policy-relevant training programmes would also serve the long-term capacity-building strategy.

Final thought

If the huge expenditures rich countries make to advance their own security included more effective capacity-building programmes supportive of indigenous nation building and regional cooperation, this could mark the beginning of a new era. Public goods generated by the powerful might more broadly and significantly enable the weak to meet their own security needs on terms acceptable to their people. This, after all, was the genius of enlightened self-interest in assisting the political and economic recovery of postwar western Europe and Japan—a rare moment in history when peace and security was a genuine international public good.

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Capacity Building for Peace and Security: A Look at Africa

Chapter 4

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Capacity building for peace and security has become a test case for countries ridden by civil war and instability, having important regional and global spill-over effects, including the spread of international terrorism. This chapter looks at Africa to highlight experiences with capacity development for providing peace and security in conflict environments (before, during and after) and what can be learned from them. Capacity development is approached as a broad set of interventions, encompassing actions at the local, national, regional and global levels whereby individuals, organizations and systems of organizations are seen as participants—not just recipients—in shaping peace and security.

The emergence of an African peace and security agenda, endorsed by more than 30 heads of state during the 2002 inaugural summit of the African Union (AU), and the recent mediation efforts by the AU and African leaders to solve the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire show a new thinking on the continent: African ownership and responsibility for peace and security are essential preconditions for achieving sustainable development. Others are good governance and regional cooperation. The lack of capacity to achieve the ambitious goals set by the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is recognized, creating a challenging capacity development agenda for countries and their international partners. Hence the need to look in more detail at providing capacity development for peace and security.

The analysis of practice shows that capacity development at continental and regional levels, as well as at the national level and below, encounters significant institutional bottlenecks. They block substantial change in security (military and police forces), rule of law (political freedoms, good governance, human rights) and welfare (economic, social, environmental). Important reforms at the continent level were started by African leaders with the formation of the AU, but the full results have yet to show. Assistance from donors is highly fragmented in terms of

support strategies, approaches and operational assistance. Policies to link capacity development interventions for peacekeeping with state reconstruction and long-term conflict prevention exist but are not sufficiently supported in terms of long-term commitment and resource allocations. The importance of linking national actions with regional, continental and international action is recognized but not sufficiently prioritized by African leaders and their international partners.

But the analysis shows some promising approaches for designing and implementing more effective capacity development interventions. Pan-African governance and ownership of the peace and security agenda is increasingly taken seriously in international policy. There is also a move by donors and their partners in fragile states to learn from harmonization and alignment experiences and apply them to conflict prevention, rehabilitation and reconstruction. Also emerging are so-called whole-of-government approaches whereby donors provide assistance through well coordinated actions by the military, the humanitarian and the development sectors. Donors have also formulated and implemented policies to link military interventions with peace settlement, demobilization and disarmament, rehabilitation and long-term conflict prevention. Traditional and endogenous approaches to peace-building have been successfully applied in several post-conflict situations, at times combined with long-term commitments leading the countries back towards sustainable development, as the examples of Mali and Mozambique in the 1990s show. Finally, integrated approaches have been pursued—such as promoting the participation of all actors in conflict prevention or using all available instruments to address conflict in a concerted manner—though the demand for necessary resources to make them work more broadly has not been met.

Scope

Capacity building, or capacity development, is more than knowledge transfer and skills development. Factors that shape and develop capacity can include:

- Political, cultural, economic, social and historical influences.
- The dynamics of the organizational and institutional system in which interventions take place.
- Underlying strategies of the interventions.
- The nature of the demand and supply for capacity.

Supporting and undertaking capacity development therefore requires a broader systems perspective. It is seen in this paper as a broad set of interventions, encompassing actions at the local, national, regional and continental level.

Instability or chaos within a country can have severe spillover effects on neighbouring countries, threatening the stability of an entire region. Hence capacity development for peace and security needs to be addressed across different entry levels and from the perspective of cross-cutting change processes. Addressing it from global and regional perspectives only, without recognizing the interdependence with lower levels and the need to initiate interventions at different entry points, is doomed to fail.

This chapter addresses capacity development from an actor's perspective. Individuals, organizations and systems of organizations are participants in the process of shaping peace and security. This means looking at the required capacities of the actors and how they can be developed to let them contribute to peace and security.

To arrive at operational recommendations this contribution zooms in on Africa, a highly relevant "testing ground" for the provision of global public goods, including the most pressing challenges: civil war, peacekeeping and state reconstruction, and regional actions and hierarchy issues.[1]

Content and structure

Building on recent work, this chapter provides in the second section a framework that helps explain promising capacity development practices for the provision of peace and security. In the third section the concept of state failure is laid out, taking into account the current international discussion on fragile, or weak, states. Although there are states that are failing without necessarily leading to conflict, this chapter links this presentation to the international discussion on peace and security and maps capacity development interventions along three stages of failure: before, during and after conflict or breakdown of state functioning. Some statistics on assistance provided for peace and security by major donors over recent years complement this information.[2]

Examples are analysed in the fourth section to trace good practice and to identify bottlenecks to address in future policy-making. The section highlights emerging lessons and several promising approaches. A list of key recommendations is presented in the last section, with a particular focus on capacity development for peace and security at the continental level, as well as on the interlinkages between the national and regional levels.

Framing capacity development

Over the past 15 years or so, the notion of capacity development has been intensely discussed. It is now reflected in most international and national policy documents dealing with peace and security. Many efforts have been made to define this notion, yet different meanings and practices are associated with the term. This section aims to understand capacity development and provide a framework to analyse good practice.

Understanding capacity development and its entry levels

The terms "capacity" and "capacity development"[3] are both vague. Using the work of the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) on capacity development (Earl, Carden and Smutylo 2000), this contribution defines capacity outcomes as "changes in the behaviour, relationships, activities or actions of the people, groups and organizations with whom a programme works directly". Capacity thus represents the overall ability of an organization or a broader system to perform, bringing together individual competencies and collective capabilities. Capability is a collective skill or ability of a group of individuals to perform a task or function. Competency is the ability of an individual to perform.

From this understanding of capacity development it follows that the concept deals with levels ranging from the micro to the macro, as well as interrelationships between the levels. This contribution considers five levels for the purpose of this chapter (see figure 4.1). The entry levels start at the individual level, comprising knowledge and competencies, and terminate at the (African) continental level, represented in terms of organization by the African Union.

The complexity of facilitating capacity development raises a series of methodological questions on how to do it. Case study research has shown that factors shaping and developing capacity can include political, cultural economic, social and historical influences; the dynamics of the organizational and institutional system in which an intervention is being made; the strategy underlying the intervention, including the entry point, scale of resources and change process; and the nature of the demand and supply for capacity.[4] Supporting and undertaking capacity development requires therefore a broader systems perspective. It asks for interventions that go beyond a more narrow strategy focusing essentially on knowledge transfer and skills development. An overview

Figure 4.1 **Points of entry for capacity development**

Note: Continental refers to the African Continent, regional to the five regions (North, East, South, West, Central) and its subregions.

of different types of capacity development interventions is provided at www.ecdpm.org/dcc/gpgstudy.

A framework for good capacity development practice

The lessons learned in different areas of capacity development show that a more development-oriented and comprehensive approach is needed to support peace and security more effectively. This approach should take account of the need to create the required "capacity infrastructure" in regions under stress. This infrastructure is manifested through trained people, well functioning organizations, good management and available equipment—the so-called "hard capacities". But it should include activities that aim to enhance the overall capacity of individual and groups of actors.[5] Those so-called "soft capacities" can be grouped into four clusters:

- *Governance capacities*—the ability to create and use an enabling institutional and action environment that allows for articulating views, testing new approaches, setting up accountability mechanisms or forming alliances and structures in public. This "shaping of space" is an important ingredient in developing effective governance mechanisms—essential to shaping peace and security.

- *Bridging capacities*—the ability to use and effectively connect to the broader context in which the actor operates. Think here of a productive liaison with support organizations or independent institutions that can share resources and knowledge from the outside, help facilitate complex negotiation processes or even use leverage to break through political or diplomatic blocks.
- *Linking capacities*—the ability of an actor to formulate and implement a strategy that recognizes the need to link up with other organizational and societal levels in its surroundings and to liaise and interact with a multi-actor environment. These actors can be civil society organizations, government institutions and the knowledge and research community. It is important to seek alliances, synergies and complementarities in contexts often characterized by fragile or even absent structures.
- *Rooting capacities*—the ability of the actors to use endogenous knowledge, processes, structures or traditions to build peace and security. The creation of these abilities is needed to get buy-in and ownership, thereby rooting activities in their action environment in a way that creates legitimacy and sustainable outcomes.

This framework can serve as an orientation to design both hard and soft interventions. It must be adapted to the environment in which interventions will take place. A one-size-fits-all approach will not work. It needs to be applied flexibly, depending on the level of instability of a region. Furthermore, it needs to take account of the social, economic, political and military context, as well as the structures and strengths of intermediate institutions and structures, the private sector and other networks.

Scanning capacity development interventions in failing states

Discussing and defining the notion of state failure

"State failure" is a slippery and elastic term. The range of names the international community has given it—"collapsing states", "low-income countries under stress", "states at risks", "dysfunctional states", "difficult partners", "weak states" or "fragile states"—shows the search for conceptual clarity. It also shows the difficulty of finding operational ap-

proaches to deal with a growing number of states that are somewhere between "not well functioning" and "failing".

A recent attempt at clarity was made during the Senior-Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States, held 13–14 January 2005 in London under the overall coordination of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC). The forum underscored that "fragile state" is a generalized and abstract term covering a broad range of phenomena encompassing states that the international community has difficulty dealing with (such as Zimbabwe), that are weak but willing to change (such as the Central African Republic) or that are in a state of armed conflict (such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo). The notion of fragility is thus very complex. It concerns states that can be fragile in terms of capacity but also weak in terms of willingness to engage in fundamental reform leading to development.

Fully failed states occur extremely rarely. The former German Democratic Republic and the former South Yemen failed—and ceased to exist. But a country like Somalia—admitted by the recently elected president to be a "failed state"—has not disappeared from the map despite part of its territory, Somaliland, reconstituting its authority and functioning institutions (Batt 2004).

Scholars have tried to conceptualize state failure. According to Holm (2001), a state is failed where basic state functions are no longer carried out, where certain groups or an entire population has no security anymore and where military and police forces fail to maintain order and to prevent chaos—in short, where the most basic level of the provision of public goods (peace, security and stability) is far from being guaranteed. In terms of the political system, Rotberg (2003) emphasizes that a failed state is merely a hollow polity that is no longer willing or able to perform the fundamental tasks of a nation-state. He further stresses that substate actors take over parts of the collapsed system and that certain public goods are thus obtained through private means. The rule of law is non-existent or strongly circumvented. In economic terms failing states usually serve only small elites, while the majority of the population suffers and is deprived of elementary services. In most cases failing states also lack the most basic infrastructure.

From this understanding, we identify three functional dimensions of state failure: security (internal and external), legitimacy and rule of law (political freedoms, human rights, courts and administration)

and welfare (economic, social and environmental). States might not be failing in all three dimensions. The causes and nature of their difficulties vary. Not surprising, then, is that a very high number of states can therefore be categorized as "failing" in one sense or another. It follows as well that not all failure is related to conflict. But failing in one of these dimensions can lead into a vicious circle from which it is hard to break free. And it can lead to an entire destabilization of a state and neighbouring states, resulting in the banding together of states in different stages of failure.

We focus on states that are close to conflict, in conflict or have come out of a conflict situation caused by military action, civil war or armed rebellions in part of their territory. For the purpose of our analysis, we define state failure as complete or nearly complete breakdown of state functioning on all three dimensions—security, legitimacy and rule of law and welfare. The international community commonly deals with such failure through managing crises, sending peacekeeping troops or monitoring missions at the macro level or providing emergency aid and supporting small-scale interventions through NGOs at the micro level.

The distinction between pre-conflict and post-conflict permits us to see what type of interventions are undertaken in situations before failure or after the breakdown. It also allows us to analyse the level of attention given to interventions in terms of policy and implementation, as well as the quality of the intervention with regard to security, legitimacy and rule of law and welfare. And it permits us to see to what extent attention and support was provided for local attempts to take ownership of processes and to mobilize internally owned capacities aimed at either preventing conflicts or dealing with and escaping from conflicts.

Generally speaking, preventive engagement in a pre-failure or pre-conflict context is the most challenging, particularly from a political perspective. It requires long-term analysis and engagement and the investment of considerable economic, social and political capital to prevent local structures turning from bad to worse. In post-conflict situations interventions can be conceptualized for concrete actions—disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, reintegration and reconstruction become critical. To make these interventions a success, however, requires long-term commitments as well as interventions that build capacities to ensure that rehabilitation and reconstruction lead to sustainable development.

A mapping of capacity development interventions at different entry levels

Threats to international peace and security often stem from national conflicts with spillover effects on neighbouring countries, sometimes quickly affecting entire regions. Because peace and security is a cross-cutting, or fluid, good and prerequisite for other public goods, a wider perspective needs to be taken, encompassing situations leading to conflict, resolving conflicts and steps to get out of conflict situations.

Building capacity for peace and security at a higher (international) level is therefore inevitably linked to building capacities from the bottom up. The range of capacity development interventions to support peace and security at pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict situations can therefore take very different forms and must, in principle, be addressed with equal attention. But it is not sufficient to address capacities at the international, regional or national levels. Linking capacities need to be developed to ensure that connections are made and that interaction between these levels takes place. Additionally, preventive and transformative capacities need to be in place to keep weak states from disintegrating and to help stabilize conflict areas.

Different types of capacity development interventions are undertaken to achieve peace and security (see table 4.1). Initiatives are summarized here and described in more detail at www.ecdpm.org/dcc/gpgstudy. The list of examples is not exhaustive. The idea is to highlight to the extent possible what the outcomes of these interventions are, what can be learned from them and what can be improved.

The matrix is split on one axis into before, during and after failure. The other axis lays out the different entry levels, starting with the continental and regional. Most examples at this highest level are cross-cutting and therefore not split into the three failure stages. The other examples show the myriad of activities, encompassing training at the individual level as well as systems development within government. These activities are undertaken by different actors and mapped according to different stages of failure to highlight "what we are talking about in the context of capacity development for peace and security". The material is drawn from different regions in Sub-Saharan Africa, notably the Horn of Africa/Sudan, the Great Lakes region, Congo and Central Africa, western Africa and southern Africa.

African continental and regional initiatives. Support for strengthening African capacity in peace and security gained considerable momentum after the transformation of the Organization of African Union (OAU) into the

Table 4.1 **A mapping of capacity development initiatives for peace and security**

	Prefailure stage	Failure stage	Post-failure stage
Continent/regions	Interventions for peace and security at continental and regional levels (cross-cutting and not specified by stage): • African institutional development for peace and security (including support to the African Peace Facility) • Support to African-led peacekeeping operations (Burundi) • The AU's intervention in Darfur • The creation and deployment of ECOMOG by ECOWAS • Support to SADC • Support to IGAD • EU support to the SADC and ECOWAS for peace and security • Civil society engagement for regional peace and security		
Country/institutions	Governance programmes (support to parliaments, electoral processes and the like) Institutional reform programmes (national and local government, public finance management, key economic sectors, macroeconomic reform, poverty reduction strategies)	Initiatives for peacekeeping (national level), capacity development programmes (military training and education) Combining military intervention, peace settlement and disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration (Liberia) International mediation for peace (southern Sudan)	Security sector reform in Sierra Leone, Burundi and South Africa Introducing poverty reduction strategies in failing and conflict areas Linking disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants to long-term development (Sierra Leone)
Systems of organizations/mid level	Strengthening and structuring civil society (Guinea, Chad, Congo, DRC)	Contributions to peacebuilding in a conflict region by a mid-level organization (northern Uganda)	Peacemaking (Mali) at the regional and commune levels Councillor training (Sierra Leone)
Organizations/units of organizations	NGO peace-building (Kenya) Specialized NGOs and multimandate organizations such as the National Council of Churches (Kenya)	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (training for African military intervention forces) The people-to-people peace process (records from southern Sudan)	Conflict prevention through NGOs (multifaceted support to NGOs in Burundi) Peace-building across communities (the Kenya-Ethiopia border region)
Individuals	Education and training as integral to the above-mentioned activities—classroom teaching, workshops, transfer of skills through technical assistance		

AU in July 2002. This development marked a commitment by African leaders to deal with conflict and development on the continent. It also marked the start of reviewing the overall governance of pan-African institutional peace and security arrangements—including the relationship of the new AU with such regional organizations as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and their involvement in peacekeeping operations.

The constitutive act to set up the AU was adopted in July 2002, providing it with the right to intervene in member states. This act by itself is a positive step by African states to take ownership of the peace and security agenda and to increase their common capacity. It included the creation of a Peace and Security Council to function as a collective security and early warning system. The donor community has started to support this new dynamic. Capacity development support provided to the AU includes the operational activities of the Peace and Security Council, the financing of the AU's mediation and peace monitoring activities on the continent and the reinforcing of the AU's interaction with other African regional organizations when implementing conflict prevention and peace operations. African leaders and the EU, for example, agreed to use funds from the African, Caribbean and Pacific–European Union (ACP-EU) Partnership's European Development Fund to finance the African Peace Facility. The African Peace Facility allows the financing of AU-led peacekeeping operations, as in Burundi or Darfur. But first experiences show that the lack of resources and capacity is still striking. The AU and its member states, pressed to address several conflicts at the same time, are still far from providing effective peace enforcement. The recent performance of the AU in Darfur, for example, resulted in calls to reinforce its mission with international forces operating under the UN mandate.

ECOWAS and the SADC are the only subregional economic communities with peacekeeping capacities. The IGAD's security capacity is limited to deploying observer missions and participating in international mediation. Of the three organizations, ECOWAS is seen as the strongest and most experienced. Capacity development support was provided since the first mission of its armed Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1990 to restore law and order in Liberia. Under a series of military capacity development programmes financed by the international community, the organization gradually built its capacity to take action. The institutional strength of ECOMOG is reflected by the high

level of participation of member states in ECOWAS operations—13 of 15. Its legitimacy provided the base to shift its mandate from peacekeeping to peace enforcement and peacemaking and helped it mobilize international support for training and education.

The SADC's role in conflict management and resolution in its region has not proved very effective. The low participation of member states in military interventions (only 5 out of 14), rivalries among its members and its weak institutional capacity account for this situation. More recently, different donors stepped up their support for the regional organizations. This new capacity development support needs to move beyond the provision of technocratic assistance—an approach that dominated the capacity development agenda of the past—to the transfer and absorption of skills and experiences within African institutions (Alexander and others 2003).

Finally, African civil society needs to be included in capacity development strategies aiming at regional peace and security. Because conflicts are often interconnected across regional boundaries, collective regional responses on issues of human security—whereby civil society is consulted and involved—need to be pursued. The first efforts in this regard took place in June 2003 when West African civil society representatives consulted with ECOWAS. That resulted in a series of agreements, such as the creation of a joint task force to help develop a strategic plan for safeguarding human security in West Africa. Since civil society in Africa has overall little experience with the regional dimensions, the capacity development agenda needs to take account of these actors and recognize them as strategic partners to address peace and security.

The pre-failure stage. As Stremlau (2006) set out in his framework, the provision of peace and security needs to be approached from an all-encompassing perspective. Preventive capacity development measures need to be taken at an early stage at different levels to prevent weak or weakening countries from gradually sliding into chaos. Such initiatives are particularly important for low-income and low-capacity countries located close to conflict regions and where cross-border operations originating from conflicting parties can affect their relative stability. The capacity development agenda for failing countries is in principle the same for those that are weak, but without an immediate threat of sliding into chaos and disintegration, and for countries that are on a "sliding scale" leading to conflict.

At the national levels capacity development support is increasingly directed towards democratic reform and the strengthening of gover-

nance structures. This can include strengthening parliaments or reforming the legislative branch, as well as supporting electoral processes. Civil society and media reform, support to human rights and the fight against corruption are complementary elements that can receive capacity development support. Such measures are often linked to the reforms of central institutions and local government, to public expenditure management, to the regulation of key industry sectors, to sound macroeconomic management and to the development of a poverty reduction strategy. These comprehensive reform packages aimed at the overall stabilization and development of a country have recently been funded by the donor community through new aid modalities such as joint budget support, sector-wide approaches (SWAP) and pooled support for selected cross-cutting or vertical programmes—for example, decentralization, the environment or HIV/AIDS.

At the mid level within societies the strengthening of civil society networks or associations is getting more attention. The rationale for these capacity development measures is to facilitate enhanced involvement of civil society in governance processes, such as promoting participatory democracy, performing advocacy and fostering synergies between the government and civil society. Capacities are needed to engage in policy dialogue processes—for example, to prepare poverty reduction strategies (PRSs) or to represent the voices of an often mushrooming civil community to central government and the donor community. There have been many initiatives in African countries to establish such intermediary structures, but experience shows that the principal funding needs to come from the outside. Local member organizations are not strong enough to finance such structures on their own.

At the level of individual organizations a thriving NGO community has emerged over the past 15 years in almost all African countries. Most are weak on structure, funding and human capacity, but they constitute important entry points for stabilizing potential conflict environments, particularly at the micro and mid levels in border and cross-border regions. Capacity development activities through these organizations are undertaken through very different measures, ranging from conflict research, conflict resolution training and mediation to early warning systems and peace advocacy. Although they mostly depend on external funding, it is commonly accepted that their membership base, legitimacy and ability to mobilize non-financial resources, such as motivated manpower, can be of even greater importance to making an effective contribution to national peace-building processes.

The conflict/failure stage. In recent years capacity development measures initiated in the context of state failure, armed conflict, long-term chaos and anarchy have been directed towards building and strengthening African capabilities to execute military action. These measures are combined or complemented with actions directed towards the transformation from conflict and emergencies to rehabilitation and development.

At the national level multilateral and bilateral agencies have invested in developing the capacity of national military forces for preventing conflict and carrying out peacekeeping in the context of UN blue-helmet missions or missions under the leadership of the AU, SADC or ECOWAS. Activities range from field training exercises and classroom education to specific training focused on particular groups, such as officers or higher level military staff. Support for military interventions under the leadership of regional African organizations, as in Liberia or Sierra Leone, was linked with assistance programmes for disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and rehabilitation. A further way to build capacities for peace and security is to involve neighbouring countries in diplomatic or confidence-building missions, undertaken through international or regional mediation efforts. Such hands-on exposure can deepen the understanding of governments on how to manage conflicts, how to recognize the often multilayered nature of conflicts and how to engage in multi-actor approaches to solve problems.

At the mid-level organizations or networks of organizations that can work across different levels in conflict situations or across borders can be an invaluable asset to achieving peace. Capacity support allows these organizations to take an independent position in the conflict and to provide peace education among communities. Working as independent intermediates, they can also make contacts with the conflicting parties, set up human rights campaigns, advise national and international institutions and engage in policy dialogue with authorities at the district or national levels.

Capacity development activities at the organizational level are often geared towards solving conflicts within a particular region, within a country or across borders. Local or community-based initiatives are supported through NGOs, which function as mediators or facilitators to stimulate peace-building processes such as peace conferences. Where possible, traditional methods of peacemaking are used. NGOs supported at this level are potentially important organizational structures to engage

in capacity development for rehabilitation and development, once the conflict is resolved.

A noteworthy example of African military capacity development at the organizational and individual level is the Kofi Annan International Peace Training Centre (KAIPTC). Since 2003 African soldiers have been trained to work under the umbrella of regional and international peacekeeping missions and how to set up campaigns for disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating rebel soldiers. Similar training programmes are executed in the context of support to national military schools, but the KAIPTC constitutes a first step supporting the creation of an African military capacity linked to the mandate of the AU and ECOWAS.

Post-failure stage. A range of capacity development measures are executed in post-conflict situations. They resemble partly those described for the pre-conflict and conflict stages. In recent years considerable effort by the international community went into building capacities directed at coping with rehabilitation and pacification. Sophisticated approaches have been pursued, through which different actors—from the military, development and diplomatic fields—combined their efforts. New approaches and aid mechanisms developed in more stable countries have been used by the international community.

At the national level capacity development support provided by the donor agencies in post-failure or post-conflict situations is more often directed at taking ownership by new governments or by the remnants of a former government. The approaches are based on a strategy that aims to streamline assistance by improving coordination, reducing fragmentation, providing support to government-formulated policy frameworks and delivering assistance under government systems and procedures. In many post-conflict situations the preconditions for such an approach are absent and have to be constructed from the ground up through participatory approaches involving the new central government as well as non-state actors.

Security sector reforms are being developed in several countries to test this new paradigm (OECD 2004). Long-time support is provided to reform the policy, justice and defence sectors, but it is linked to commitments by the partner country to make substantial institutional reforms of central and local government, in public expenditure management, governance and the formulation of a poverty reduction strategy. Given the minimal capacity in many post-conflict situations, a PRS can at best provide an entry point to build or rebuild capacities

for short-term reconstruction, instead of strengthening them. When security is better established, long-term development goals can build on these first-generation PRSs. The donor community has also started to work with multidonor trust funds to finance support for disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation. In Sierra Leone this multi-actor approach results from a combined effort of the international donor community, the partner government and ECOWAS.

At the mid level a variety of capacity development activities are directed at non-state actors as well as local governments. These are similar to approaches in the pre-conflict and conflict situations. They aim to create mid-level structures and networks to bridge the gap between the micro level of community implementation with policies and processes negotiated by governments and the international community. Building and strengthening networks and associations of civil society are addressed, as is building basic local government capacity in administration, raising local revenue, dealing with non-state actors and communities and the like.

The mobilization of local social capital and mechanisms for reconciliation and mediation has proved of paramount importance in rebuilding societies, such as during the peace-building process in Mali in the mid-1990s. In this case efforts built on the traditional peace culture and societal and religious values as well as mechanisms for economic and social integration were mobilized. Civil society at the mid level participated actively, involving religious and community leaders, women's associations and local mediators.

Capacity development support for individual organizations or units of organizations also shows a wide spectrum of activities. They can range from training individuals in mediation to supporting the monitoring of government performance and research to enhance transparency or engagement in outreach activities—for example, through radio programmes or public awareness campaigns. Independent organizations can be of particular help in promoting peace in post-conflict cross-border areas.

Assistance provided for peace and security

Statistical data on peace and security assistance is very difficult to get. The topics for which funding is mobilized are very broad and often not very transparent as they originate from different departments in donor countries.

Table 4.2 **Assistance for peace and security—some facts and figures (millions of Euros)**

Donor	Burundi (2002–n.a.)	Congo, DRC (2003–n.a.)	Liberia (2003–05)	Rwanda (2003–05)	Sierra Leone (2001–06)
European Union	17.3	120.0	115.4	10.0	74.8
Sweden	0.3	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
United Kingdom	n.a.	90.9	33.2	5.0	189.0
United Nations	249.0	563.0	653.0	n.a.	541.0
United States	5.9	439.4	339.3	38.6	197.1
World Bank[a]	63.7	151.0	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Total	336.2	1,273.4	1,140.9	53.6	1,001.9

n.a. is not available.
a. The World Bank administers the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme, which is based on a partnership among regional governments, donors, the United Nations and its agencies, regional organizations and international financial institutions. The programme supports the demobilization and socioeconomic reintegration of ex-combatants in the Great Lakes region of Africa. In 2004 it was funded by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom (MDRP 2004). For an updated list of donors supporting the MDRP, see www.mdrp.org/partners.htm.

We have prepared some figures to indicate the amount of assistance needed for pulling countries out of a conflict situation (see table 4.2). The table contains summary figures for assistance from several major donors to five countries in Africa.[6] The assistance programmes were initiated over the past four years and include a broad range of activities relating to military advisory and training programmes, demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of security forces, resettlement, reconciliation and good governance and democracy-building programmes. Although huge, the amounts are merely enough to respond to the most urgent needs. For example, the international community would invest more than €1 billion from 2003 to 2005 in a small country (such as Liberia). But today that country is still far from a stable path towards enduring peace and development.

Support for the pan-African peace and security infrastructure generates immense demands—evident from the AU budget. A strategic three-year budget plan introduced before the AU's budgetary negotiations in December 2004 proposed about $1.7 billion for revitalizing the African continent, of which $200 million was intended for a standing peacekeeping force. The AU agreed on a much lower annual common budget of $158 million for 2005 but still managed to quadruple its 2004 budget. The lion's share of the 2005 budget, about $75 million, was al-

located to fostering peace and security on the continent, but nowhere near enough to finance key operations. The Darfur mission alone, concerned for the most part with protecting the observers of the ceasefire agreement in the region, is estimated to have cost about $222 million.

The ability of African governments to meet commitments made to the AU has been disappointing in 2004. Only $26 million of the stipulated $43 million for the AU budget was actually transferred to the AU by its members, and there are big doubts that the $75 million earmarked for fostering peace and security in 2005 will really be available. The African Peace Facility, funded with €250 million from the Ninth European Development Fund of the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, will be an important contribution to AU operations, but nowhere near enough to fill the obvious financial gaps if the originally proposed $1.7 billion budget is used as a reference point (*IRINNews* 2004; Westerhof 2004; Mitchell 2004).

Capacity development for peace and security—emerging lessons and good practice

The emerging lessons presented in this section are based on an analysis of the mapping provided in the last section and informed from international research on capacity development. This section highlights several promising broad approaches to capacity development. These are being applied more often to address bottlenecks in and failures of capacity-building practices for peace and security (see box 4.1).

Capacity development at the continental and regional levels

The overall review of activities shows that the continental and regional levels attracted relatively little attention in terms of capacity development for peace and security until early 2000. It is only more recently that important steps were taken on the African continent, resulting gradually in more ownership of the peace and security agenda of several African states. Some lessons follow.

Institutional development matters. The thorny African institutional landscape has substantially blocked progress and continues to hamper advances in most regions. Moreover, the capacities of the regional organizations differ hugely, and relations between them are complicated by overlapping memberships. Duplication of functions and capacities is

Box 4.1 Capacity development for peace and security: difficulties encountered in current practice

- The international community has made progress in recent years in harmonizing their actions, but support strategies and approaches are still highly fragmented (uncoordinated support to different actors at different levels, insufficient attention to horizontal and vertical interaction and cooperation).
- Links between continental and regional organizations are not sufficiently explored. There is no strong exchange between continental and regional levels and national governments.
- Given the continuous crisis in many parts of Africa, continental and regional organizations risk being drawn more into conflict management than conflict prevention. Capacity development to ensure a balanced approach needs to be pursued.
- Non-state actors and their networks are not systematically involved to bridge the continental and regional–national divide; their potential for cross-border and cross-region consultations and policy dialogue is not fully used.
- The tendency by donors to address long-term problems through short-term funding continues. There is overall little awareness that effective conflict prevention requires long-term commitments and funding horizons, with a minimum of 10–12 years to address deeply rooted causes and symptoms of failure.
- The high demand for state and non-state actors' capacities to deal with the transition from conflict and failure environments to rehabilitation and development is not fully addressed. This concerns international and national military forces in particular, as well as humanitarian assistance organizations whose actions are not sufficiently linked to the development agenda.
- Overall, few monitoring and evaluation efforts are undertaken to obtain reliable assessments of the effectiveness of capacity development interventions at different failure stages. Knowledge about continental and regional and national interactions is low.
- There is no systematic use of local capacities to generate knowledge about peace and security and the transfer from failure to post-failure stages.
- Capacity development support for peace and security tends to focus on providing hard capacities; overall, less attention is given to developing soft capacities (understanding the links and networks, dealing with multi-actor environments).
- Current thinking on conflict prevention strategies stresses the importance of an integrated approach (promoting participation and ownership by including all actors; addressing causes and symptoms of conflict; connecting interlinkages at the continental, regional, national and local levels; using all available instruments in a concerted manner). But this has not been supported with the required long-term and adequate funding sources.

therefore a real risk. The change of the OAU into the AU and the attention paid by West African leaders to ECOWAS scored early, though limited, results and positive echoes internationally. But the lack of institutional reform of the SADC and IGAD has prevented the use of effective capacity development measures for peace and security in their regions.

- *Institutional reform at the continental and regional levels is most effective where African countries and their leaders take ownership of the reform process. Where such ownership has not yet matured, support is required to facilitate the emergence of a locally owned change process.*

A plea for donor coordination and harmonization. Donor approaches to supporting regional and subregional organizations are fragmented,

ranging from an entire absence of support by some bilaterals to a cautious wait-and-see approach by others, to full-scale support—as with the European Commission, Canada and Germany and their assistance to the AU. Various other donor contributions for the AU are in the pipeline. The AU seeks to concentrate donor efforts in a common mechanism that ensures predictability, flexibility and transparency in implementing its strategic plan. First initiatives to establish a common pool have started. The challenge is how to organize potential support for the AU in a rational, coordinated and coherent way that allows the objectives of the strategic plan to prevail over individual donor interests.

- *A divided donor community, applying different and sometimes fragmented support strategies, risks undermining instead of building capacities. African regional organizations have started initiatives to better coordinate donor approaches so as to gradually build up the capacities of pan-African peace and security mechanisms.*

Combining hard and soft capacity development. Capacity development in regional organizations is in many instances directed at providing hard capacities and technocratic solutions, such as equipment or database systems. Embedding this assistance in a wider strategic framework and transferring and absorbing skills and experiences within African institutions takes lesser place. Recent developments at the AU show progress. The development of soft capacities such as improved regional governance and better cooperation mechanisms within a region, between subregions and member states and with international levels are on the agenda. But they risk being overruled by the (hard) security agenda of the international community, which aims capacity development at specific activities, such as training for intelligence and information sharing (Olonisakin 2004).

- *New approaches that address the soft side of capacity building and institutional development—such as governance development, knowledge management and learning, engaging in multi-partner dialogue processes, negotiations and networking—are important ingredients in capacity development. Some donors have recognized that these activities merit support, but efforts need to be made to ensure that such issues as governance and peace-building receive continued attention.*

A need for human capacity to deal with peacekeeping, conflict prevention and long-term development. A prevailing feature among regional and subregional organizations is the shortage of human capabilities, which has been a major stumbling block for strengthening their role in African peace and security, as well as development. The ongoing wars and hu-

manitarian crises in countries such as Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo risk drawing scarce human resources into crisis management at the expense of long-term conflict prevention.

- *It is important to link conflict prevention with long-term development and to find the delicate balance between addressing security problems and promoting long-term development. Careful assessment, planning and targeted support is required to make best use of the scarce human resources at regional organizations. Otherwise the international community and Africa will forever be managing—not preventing—crisis.*

Involving non-state actors in peace and security at the regional level. Non-state actors are involved only marginally at the regional and subregional levels.[7] Capacity development for peace and security has primarily been looked at from the angle of state-to-state cooperation—this, despite that non-state actors are often the only viable partners through whom minimal forms of stability can be held or rebuilt in cross-region or cross-border conflict areas. So far only limited support has been provided to identify legitimate, relevant actors that could play important roles in monitoring regional peace and security, as well as in regional consultative and political dialogue processes.

- *Capacity development approaches that built on these actors and their informal economic, religious and ethnic networks at the regional and cross-border levels to promote peace and security have scored positive results. First moves to link such actors to the regional level have been welcomed by regional organizations, such as ECOWAS.*

Capacity development at the national level and below

The increasing number of regional conflicts, civil wars and humanitarian crises since the early 1990s provided African governments and the international community with much experience in dealing with crisis management, conflict prevention and security issues. Some approaches were deployed successfully, such as the linking of disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration with longer term development in Mozambique or more recently the formulation and implementation of security sector strategies in Sierra Leone and Burundi. Some lessons follow.

Towards holistic and comprehensive approaches. A review of experiences at the national level shows that many interventions have addressed particular entry levels without paying much attention to vertical or horizontal links. This has been addressed in recent years and more holistic approaches have been supported with relative successes, such as the

involvement of Kenyan multi-mandate NGOs and their networks in peace-building at different levels of society (ranging from training at the individual level to policy dialogue at the national level).

- *The general trend in capacity development for peace and security has been towards more sophistication, all-inclusiveness and strengthened interlinkages between different levels of society. These approaches also looked at new ways to facilitate the difficult transition across stages, from conflict and failure environments towards rehabilitation and development. While these approaches have been promising, overall support from the international community for such initiatives has been far from sufficient.*

Putting more focus on prevention. The international community has devoted less attention in recent years to the pre-failure stage—that is, preventing conflict by developing capacity for institutional reform, governance support, participation and democratization. Politically this is a delicate matter, because many states refused to cooperate effectively or were unable to do so because of internal governance problems or appallingly weak human capacities. This neglect resulted in a relative abandonment of some regions, causing further threats to stability and integration.

- *Over the past six or seven years the international donor community paid more attention to the so-called "good performers" and funded them generously, resulting in unbalanced regional support. This has created gaps in terms of support for preventive measures in less well functioning states, including insufficient support for service delivery through non-state actors.*

Accepting long-term engagements. The long-term commitment of several international donor agencies in such countries as Sierra Leone and Burundi shape prospects for stability and improved governance, which can lead to effective development. The assistance provided to Mozambique, for example, shows that long-term financial commitments to fund governance programmes, far-reaching institutional reforms and poverty reduction strategies helped stabilize the country and put it back on a path leading to development.

- *Both partner countries and donor agencies need to accept that a long-term engagement of both sides is required to lead a country or region out of conflict. This requires funding commitments by donors to long-term conflict prevention strategies and commitments by partner governments to engage in profound reform programmes to stabilize the country.*

Learning from good practice. The combined support of various donor agencies to the so-called "good performers" in Africa (Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique) scored positive results in terms of donor-government coordination, harmonization of approaches and alignment with partner country strategies, rules and systems. These experiences shaped new insights and informed new approaches to capacity development among partners dealing with peace and security issues. The OECD/DAC, with the EU, UK Department for International Development (DFID) and the World Bank, has put this topic on the policy agenda with a view to improving learning for policy-making and implementation in fragile states.

- *Learning from good practice matters. Development agencies working on peace and security issues are learning from the implementation of new aid mechanisms in other fields. Positive experiences from improved coordination and harmonization are being built on for assistance to failure and post-failure environments.*

Linking national and regional levels. Overall little attention has been given by African governments and their international partners to strengthening the links of national security forces and institutions with regional and continental levels. Although these government institutions have a primarily national mandate, they also play a role in regional cross-border cooperation (cross-border military inspections, handling illicit traffic in small arms and so on) and in ensuring coherence between national and regional conflict prevention strategies.

- *Linking national institutions with regional organizations scores positive effects, as the high level of participation of ECOWAS member states in peacekeeping operations shows. Modest but increasingly encouraging results with long-term capacity development of military forces has prompted some donor agencies to pay more attention to this aspect of the peace and security agenda.*

Building African training capacities for peace and security. In recent years Western countries have initiated, financed and implemented various training programmes for African forces. These interventions are important but need to be intensified and eventually replaced by African institutions that provide capacity development for African peacekeeping operations. The opening of the KAIPTC is an important milestone in this direction and shows how skills and experiences can be transferred to African armed forces and absorbed within African institutions.

- *Capacity development can be sustainable only if it is firmly rooted in local and regional organizations. Building African training and re-*

search capacities to serve the African peace and security agenda under the leadership of the AU is of paramount importance in this regard.

Promising capacity development practice

From this mapping and analysis of capacity development initiatives, one can distil several promising practices by using the broad framework sketched in the second section. This framework underlined the need to look at capacity development in terms of linking the provision of hard capacities with a series of soft interventions and support mechanisms, summarized as strengthening governance, bridging between sectors, linking across levels and rooting within local structures. Looking at capacity development for the provision of peace and security from this perspective, the following promising approaches can be cited.

Strengthening capacity for building governance, creating space and taking ownership.

- *Supporting initiatives leading towards pan-African ownership of the peace and security agenda.* The declaration by African leaders of tackling African peace and security through African mechanisms was followed by the initiation of an ambitious institutional reform agenda and the deployment of African peacekeeping forces under the leadership of the AU. The creation of this pan-African governance structure marks a clear cut with the past institutional arrangements of the OAU and can be seen as a positive step by African states to increase their common capacity and political space to operate. Although the organization is still far from fulfilling its mandate effectively and not yet able to resolve highly complicated conflict situations, the first modest—though promising—steps towards functioning as an important continental player should be noted. Based on current experiences, one can expect that well targeted, well coordinated and long-term capacity development support to this organization will score more positive results in the future.

Building capacity to bridge between sectors.

- *Combining "all-donor" with "whole-of-government" approaches.* Capacity development for peace and security takes place on a continuum, ranging from assistance provided under conflict and failure conditions to the transitional period of post-failure, to long-term development (failure prevention). This requires different sectors and disciplines on both the donor and re-

cipient sides to work together. The background and expertise of the respective actors differs considerably, calling for new approaches and strategies to create synergies, common understanding and effective cooperation. The United Kingdom, for example, has tested the whole-of-government approach with the establishment in 2001 of conflict prevention pools for several geographic and thematic areas—one for Africa. A standing interdepartmental body, combining the expertise of the Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Defence and DFID, coordinates the interventions and ensures that appropriate measures are taken at the different failure stages. Although it is too early to assess the impact of this mechanism, the progress achieved through the conflict prevention pools is considered significant enough to justify their continuation (Austin 2004). The next step in coordination and joint action would be to use this whole-of-government approach to coordinate and harmonize with other donors and align systems and procedures on the recipient's side—a highly complex undertaking, but necessary to make coherent contributions to both individual countries and the continent as a whole.

- Linking military intervention with peace settlement, disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration and long-term development. Military and humanitarian crises in the 1990s forced the international community to develop strategies and policies to guide the transition from pre-conflict and conflict to long-term conflict prevention. The European Commission's Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development Policy (EC 2001) resulted from this learning process. Those policies developed into important building blocks for more recent interventions—as in Sierra Leone or Liberia, where donors are joining forces to put the country's security forces on the path of reform—combining this assistance with the reintegration of ex-combatants and linking it with a poverty reduction strategy, including macroeconomic reform and key institutional reforms in the public sector. According to the evaluation of the conflict prevention pools (Austin 2004), the United Kingdom's all-government approach was an effective instrument to ensure the transition from failure to conflict prevention in Sierra Leone. Bringing peace to a country with this approach can provide a model for an otherwise conflict-

ridden and war-torn region, with the potential of helping stabilize neighbouring areas.

Capacity development through linking across levels.

- *Pursuing integrated approaches across different entry levels.* Important steps were taken in recent years by the international community and local actors to approach conflict prevention from a holistic and integrated angle. For example, actors that can connect activities at the continental, national and local levels, such as multimandate organizations, networks or associations working at the mid level, carry good prospects to contribute to peace and security and conflict prevention. Ideally these organizations are included in consultations, policy dialogue, monitoring and evaluation up to the regional and continental levels. The notions of multi-actor involvement and all-inclusiveness have scored promising responses in long-term development efforts and merit more systematic implementation and testing in different failure environments as well. Recent steps at the continental level to integrate approaches to peacekeeping and conflict prevention of different institutional actors were promising.

Creating capacity by rooting initiatives at the national and local levels.

- *Building ownership of the national peace and security agenda through new aid mechanisms.* New aid mechanisms that have been implemented in recent years in so-called well performing countries, such as SWAPs, programme-based support or budget support, are being tested in fragile countries and even in conflict regions. The basic idea behind these approaches is to reduce fragmentation among donors and to provide assistance through a common framework under the leadership of the recipient government or organization by using the same systems and procedures. The aim is to create local ownership of the change process, with the expectation that "capacitated" and motivated local institutions or structures will take responsibility for peace and security, stabilization and long-term development.[8]
- *Using traditional and endogenous approaches to conflict resolution and peace-building.* The example of peacemaking in Mali in the 1990s and records from Mozambique's demilitarization process shows the importance of traditional and endogenous approaches to resolve conflict and to contribute to peacebuilding.[9] Such experiences reinforce the message of African

leaders that problems on the continent at different levels need to be addressed through African mechanisms, based on local knowledge and guided by new African institutional frameworks. External actors can facilitate and support these efforts but need to stay in the background where possible to stimulate local ownership and responsibility.

Recommendations

Effective capacity development requires the application of a mix of promising approaches by donor agencies and their partners. These approaches need to be combined with targeted initiatives to enhance the capacity of specific institutions, groups of actors or networks. Thus this section is split into recommendations for the application of particular approaches and recommendations to address certain entry levels, organizations and activities.

Recommendations for capacity development approaches

Drawing on lessons learned and the emerging good practice presented earlier, several key principles emerge that should be taken account of when designing and implementing capacity development initiatives for peace and security. Capacity development approaches should be informed by the following seven key principles.

Include conflict prevention in strategies aiming at creating peace and security as a public good. Initiatives to build peace and security are primarily looked at from the perspective of peacekeeping and the deployment of measures to bring a country or region out of conflict. A better, wider perspective recognizes the need to invest in measures to prevent weak or fragile states that are not yet in conflict from sliding into chaos and anarchy. This principle would also require providing balanced support to conflict management and conflict prevention.

Pursue ownership throughout pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict stages. In conflict and post-conflict situations, the notion of creating ownership is often introduced later, when initiatives aimed at long-term development are launched. But pursuing ownership needs to start right from the beginning of all peace and security initiatives, however difficult it may be. Locally owned capacities, knowledge and energies can be much more effective than externally provided capacity development. The mo-

bilization of local ownership is particularly relevant to formulating and executing well informed demands.

Be holistic and comprehensive in terms of actors, sectors and layers to be included. Because peace and security is a precondition for other public goods, capacity development approaches need to be all-inclusive in terms of actors that are worked with (including government, non-state actors and external actors); all-connecting in terms of sectors involved (governance and rule of law, security and welfare); and multi-layered in terms of entry levels to be linked (from the micro through the mid to the macro level).

Combine the provision of hard capacities with soft capacity development. Peace and security interventions are often directed towards providing hardware and training at the expense of soft elements needed to integrate interventions within local systems and mechanisms. Hard and soft capacities need to be recognized as equally important elements of providing peace and security. This requires well balanced support based on a careful assessment and continuous monitoring of interventions.

Take a new look at learning and knowledge networking. The notion of learning and creating skills and knowledge is recognized in approaches to capacity development but translated primarily into training and education in the context of peace and security interventions. New perspectives are needed that enable continuous learning among groups of actors to develop common languages, understandings and approaches. Given the multi-actor, multisector and multilayer character of effective capacity development, new forms of knowledge creation and management through informal networks as well as through institutionalized learning mechanisms need to be explored and expanded.

Pursue harmonization among donors and alignment between donors and local structures and systems. The fragmented provision of support to bring peace and security to a country or region risks undermining local capacities and distracting local attention and energies into different areas. Harmonizing donor approaches and support is of paramount importance in fragile and conflict environments where local capacities to inform and guide the work of external partners are weak. Where alignment with local systems is not possible, so-called "shadow system" alignments should be initiated.[10] When pursuing harmonization and alignment, donor agencies and partners should apply new aid mechanisms such as (sector) budget support and programme-based approaches, where appropriate.

Address peace and security through long-term commitments. Capacity development interventions for peace and security are often characterized by short-term funding horizons. Experiences have shown that sometimes very long-term commitments (even beyond 10 years) are required to prevent countries from sliding into conflict or to ensure that post-conflict measures can be linked to long-term development goals and interventions.

Recommendations for capacity development initiatives

Continental and regional levels

Offer support for linking the evolving pan-African peace and security architecture with the international level. The UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change Report (2004) makes several proposals to reinforce the integration of international and regional responses to peace and security, including prevention. It asks for the AU, African regional organizations and African governments to participate in the further development of new mechanisms, such as the Peacebuilding Commission, a new intergovernmental body to help states transitioning from immediate post-conflict to long-term reconstruction and development. Pan-African institutions need to share in the development of international regimes and norms to govern some of the sources and accelerators of conflict (for example, legal mechanisms for natural resources, including such transborder resources as water, oil and gas). Establishing closer links and good cooperation should also be supported in the domain of early warning systems (sharing of information and analysis) and in the military domain, where regional conflict prevention and peacekeeping capacities should be placed within the wider framework of the UN Standby Arrangements Systems.

Provide long-term institutional support to the AU and regional organizations. Institutional support needs to be fully embedded with the AU's strategic framework and should be directed to building African capacities to deal with conflict management and prevention. Institutional and technical support should be provided for the functioning and operations of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and to facilitate the complementarity of action between the continental and the regional levels. It should include the creation of backstopping capacities within the secretariats of the main subregional organizations and the AU, perhaps by seconding UN staff (Olonisakin 2004). Moreover, it should include enhanced joint early warning systems, effective functioning of regional networks and supporting links with their member states. It

further requires making effective use of regional initiatives, particularly NEPAD's peace and security agenda and the Conference on Stability, Security, Development and Cooperation in Africa (adopted by OAU leaders in 1999 and subsequently integrated as AU programmes).

Grant support for building African peacekeeping and conflict prevention capacities. Funding for such initiatives as the African Peace Facility under the AU or the ECOMOG missions of ECOWAS needs to be linked to the gradual building of African military peacekeeping capacities. This support should include knowledge and skills among African forces on how to ensure a transfer from conflict management to disarmament, rehabilitation and long-term development. It also needs to ensure that regional operations meet universally accepted human rights standards. The enhancement of pan-African conflict research and training institutions, such as the KAIPTC in Ghana, should be recognized as a crucial instrument for enhancing African peacekeeping and conflict prevention capacities and should receive long-term support from donor agencies.

Support regional cooperation around illicit manufacture, transfer and circulation of small arms and light weapons (illicit trade). Support is required to enhance pan-African peace and security institutions in dealing with illicit trade and to tie into their strategy the activities of regional bodies to report, monitor and verify state compliance. An example is the Nairobi Secretariat, which monitors the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa. Capacities also need to be in place to effectively use more recently designed regional initiatives, such as NEPAD's peace and security agenda, in dealing with illicit proliferation of small arms, light weapons and landmines.

Recognize the importance of non-state actors for regional peace and security. Civil society organizations with legitimacy and institutional potential as regional actors should be invited to link up with regional peace and security initiatives. Support should be provided to ensure monitoring of the regional peace and security agenda (such as cross-border conflicts, arms trade and peace negotiations), participation in policy dialogue, maintenance of regular links with African peace and security institutions and active networking among civil society member organizations dealing with cross-border and regional peace and security issues.

National level and below

Support security sector reform programmes linked to economic reform, institutional development and poverty reduction goals. In pre-conflict and post-conflict states reform programmes for the security sector (military and police) should be linked to a commitment by the partner government to engage in profound institutional, economic and social sector reforms. Priority should be given to stabilizing countries of strategic importance to peace and security within those regions characterized by unstable or conflict-ridden neighbouring countries or areas.

Provide institutional support for African governments on peace and security. Institutional development support, including training, technical assistance and hardware, needs to be provided to national government institutions dealing with peace and security issues. Institutional twinning arrangements between developed and developing countries or between developing countries could be considered as well. This support should enhance national capacities to deal with internal security and should also strengthen links to regional organizations and peacekeeping operations. Support could be directed at government coordination departments dealing with peace and security issues, as well as to military and police forces that support peacekeeping operations under the leadership of the AU or subregional organizations.

Strengthen organizations and networks of organizations working at the mid level. Long-term capacity development support needs to be provided to non-state actors working at the intermediary level between national governments and local actors. These actors can be individual organizations, associations, networks or platforms of organizations. They often have the ability to provide services to the local population in the absence of a legitimate government, to set up early warning systems, to engage in mediation, to undertake training at the community level, to pursue research and also to bring forward their knowledge and information during policy dialogue at higher levels. Moreover, they often avail themselves of channels and contacts across boundaries to areas where no government has control. As such, these intermediary and multilevel actors can be of paramount importance in stabilizing regions or parts of a country and bringing a country back on a path of long-term development once a conflict is over. In pre-conflict and post-conflict situations, local governments should equally receive capacity building support to the extent they are present and functioning in fragile environments.

Notes

1. To arrive at operational recommendations the Secretariat of the International Task Force and ECDPM agreed to limit the scope of the paper to these two challenges. Addressing the other challenges threatening international peace and security—building capacities to avoid the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to combat international terrorism and to reform global governance—fall outside the scope of this paper.
2. The material originates from a three-week desk study that searched the Internet for reports, evaluations, project information, press releases and the like with a view to identify different approaches to and experiences with capacity development. Different types of capacity development interventions that took place during the past eight years or so were scanned against the matrix developed for our mapping of interventions at different entry levels. Additional material was consulted from ongoing and past work of ECDPM in the area of fragile states.
3. The term "capacity development" is used here interchangeably with similar terms used in the literature, such as "capacity building", "capacity enhancement" or "capacity strengthening".
4. See Morgan, Land and Baser (2005).
5. Actors are understood here as individuals, units or departments within organizations, NGOs, private sector organizations, associations, local and national government institutions and subregional and regional organizations.
6. The details of this table can be found at www.ecdpm.org/dcc/gpgstudy.
7. Non-state actors are defined here as citizens of society (individuals or organizations) outside the government or public administration that work to promote general or specific issues or interests. They include civil society, the commercial sector and non-state militarized groups (Alexander and others 2003).
8. Approaches to harmonize donor support to fragile states and to align assistance to the systems and procedures of partner countries and organizations are high on the agenda of the international aid community. The Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States, organized by the OECD/DAC, discussed this during a 13–14 January 2005 meeting in London.
9. During a recently held seminar on failing states (see Batt 2004), Aldo Ajello, the EU's special representative for the African Great Lakes Region, reported about Mozambique's demilitarization process, during which tra-

ditional ceremonies to "purify and forgive" ex-combatants before reintegrating them into their communities, were successfully applied.

10. "Shadow systems alignment" implies organizing aid delivery to be compatible with existing or future state structures rather than duplicating or undermining them (OECD/DAC 2005).

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The Costs of Armed Conflict

Chapter 5

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Knowledge about the costs of armed conflict is important for many reasons. One important reason is to make possible a comparison between the external costs of conflict and the costs to external actors of the alternative: implementing policies intended to reduce the incidence of conflict or to prevent it from becoming violent—that is, the option of funding international public goods in peace and security.

Empirical studies on the costs of armed conflict are still scarce. Recent years have seen a few major studies, but they are different in focus and therefore difficult to compare. They differ in the types of conflict examined and types of costs included and in whether they examine the costs to the countries in conflict, to neighbouring states or to a broader international community. The purpose of this chapter is to review existing studies of the costs of armed conflict. It covers studies on internal (intrastate) and international (interstate) armed conflicts and looks at the estimates provided for the costs of conflicts to the parties of conflict and for external costs beyond the parties—to the neighbouring countries or even globally.

The studies reviewed show that it is difficult to identify and quantify the costs of armed conflict, particularly their external costs. Cost estimates vary widely. According to one study, the external costs of internal armed conflicts during the post–cold war period range from $4.5 billion to $54 billion. Another study has produced an average estimate for the costs of internal armed conflict in low-income countries to the country in conflict and to its neighbour states. This estimate is based on cost estimates calculated as a share of GDP during an average conflict period of 7 years and an additional 14-year average post-conflict period. This share is then applied to the average GDP of low-income conflict-affected countries, resulting in an average cost of $64 billion. The costs of international (interstate) armed conflicts are generally much higher, particularly if a developed country is involved in the conflict, as in the US-led war in Iraq.

It is difficult to generalize about the average costs of armed conflict, but it is possible to generalize about the dynamics of armed conflict and the overall structure of costs. Three conclusions applying to internal armed conflicts in low-income countries during the post–cold war period can be drawn from the studies reviewed.

First, the indirect costs of conflict are important, although the complex economic dynamics of conflict make them more difficult to understand. It is also difficult to distinguish empirically between developments that result from war and those that would have happened anyway.

Second, the costs to external parties are often greater than the costs to the country in conflict. Neighbouring countries suffer significantly, but there are also major global costs of internal armed conflicts in poor countries.

Third, the costs after the end of violence are often as great as the costs during conflict. They are particularly significant if the definition of post-conflict costs includes external assistance to the country, such as peace operations and foreign aid for post-conflict reconstruction.

The estimates produced by the studies examined are conservative approximations, representing the lower limits of the overall costs of different types of armed conflict. In the absence of data required for empirical estimation, they are based on innovative conceptual approaches, consisting of a set of assumptions applied to the scarce data available. As such, they are only crude estimates. For example, the average costs of a typical post–cold war conflict in a low-income country are difficult to estimate, since there is great variation in the types of conflict and thus their costs. To arrive at improved cost estimates more knowledge is needed about individual conflicts. Estimates of the average costs should be supplemented with detailed empirical cost assessments based on case studies for each major armed conflict. This would be a major task, though still manageable considering that the number of major armed conflicts was only 19 in 2003 and only 59 during the entire post–cold war period (1990–2003). Studies could be commissioned to researchers with expert knowledge in the specific conflict, and the cost estimates could be updated at regular intervals. The data bank of knowledge thus created would be of great use for future studies of the cost of armed conflict.

Most studies have produced estimates for the cost of conflict to countries in conflict and to their neighbours. Much less is known about the global costs. This area most urgently needs to be addressed, since knowledge in this area is needed to analyse the relative costs and benefits of external action to reduce the incidence of conflict. More knowledge—both conceptual and empirical studies—is needed about the

specific links between internal armed conflict in low-income countries and the security of the developed world. Current research may benefit from more qualitative studies on the specific links between armed conflict in low-income countries and the well-being of the high-income industrial countries, what these links entail and how they work. Such studies could contribute to cost-benefit analyses of policies to reduce the incidence of such conflicts.

This paper describes and analyses the cost components of armed conflict and war and provides, to the extent possible, an order of magnitude for each. This task falls in the broader context of the final objective of the work of the Task Force's Secretariat, which is to determine the benefits to the international community of providing peace and security–related international public goods—or the costs of underproviding such international public goods. The external costs of armed conflicts can be seen as one estimate of the costs of underprovision.

Armed conflicts impose enormous costs of many different types on individuals, societies and states. First are the direct costs of warfare, funded by military expenditure. Second are the costs of the consequences of warfare during the conflict period—loss of life, injury, human suffering, destruction of infrastructure and economic and social disruptions. Third are the costs after the conflict has ended.

From a global perspective a rational calculus based on a cost-benefit analysis would favour expenditures on measures and policies to reduce the risk of conflict. One major reason such expenditures are not made is that from other perspectives warfare may be a rational choice, albeit an egoistic one that occurs at the expense of others. So it is the actors external to the armed conflict—not the warring parties—that may be persuaded by a cost-benefit analysis. In a globalized, increasingly interdependent world, armed conflicts have significant external negative effects. This is the essence of the concept of global public goods applied to peace and security. The hypothesis is that it is more cost-effective for external actors at the regional and global levels to engage in policies to reduce the risk of conflict than to let conflicts break out. However no cost-benefit analyses are available to inform such decisions. Despite the enormous conceptual, methodological and empirical difficulties of producing such a cost-benefit analysis, doing so is an important task, and any input that can be provided as a basis for decisions is a contribution to accomplishing it.

This chapter begins with a conceptual overview of what an assessment of the costs of armed conflict involves. The overview discusses

different types of conflict, levels of costs incurred and types of cost components. It attempts to clarify what types of data are relevant for estimating the costs of underproviding peace and security–related international public goods. It reviews and evaluates some of the few major studies on the costs of armed conflict and the methodologies used for the cost assessment in them. The few available quantitative estimates of the costs of armed conflicts are presented. The conclusion discusses the value of the studies for assessments of the magnitude of the benefits to external actors of a reduction in the incidence of internal armed conflicts in low-income countries.

Assessing the costs of armed conflict

Only a few studies are available on the costs of armed conflict, and even fewer have been conducted systematically and comprehensively. A systematic review of this field of studies states: "The costs of warfare have rarely been studied systematically, and those studies that have addressed the costs have often simply drawn up a 'list' of these costs—without either establishing clear analytical categories or analysing the likely impact of these costs on the future direction of conflict" (Keen 2001, p. 45). Only recently, with the increased focus of the international community on the incidence of major armed conflict in low-income countries, has the research community begun to address costs more systematically.

The reason for the dearth of cost studies is that they are hard to do because there are no statistics. There are no accountants registering the consumption and destruction of resources during wars. Therefore assessing the costs of conflict is by necessity a process of estimation. Many types of cost do not easily translate into monetary units: it is difficult to set economic values on numbers of casualties, refugees and displaced persons. It is even more difficult to set values on the more diffuse consequences of war, such as the breakdown of infrastructure, social chaos and loss of political authority. Even if data were available, there is the conceptual problem of what to include in estimates of costs. Choosing which items to include involves several methodological decisions. For example, which costs are due to the war and which costs would have been incurred anyway? What is the time frame for the indirect consequences of war? How far into the post-war period should the costing exercise reach? How should one determine the scope of consequences

to include? For some purposes net costs rather than gross costs may be of most interest; should the benefits of war be deducted from the gross costs of war? Wars may have short- and long-term benefits for some groups. How should these be defined and identified?

There are also some more basic methodological issues. First, what types of conflicts should be chosen? There are many types of conflicts, and their costs vary enormously. Second, a distinction needs to be made between the different levels at which costs are incurred—the national (domestic) level (countries involved in the conflict), the regional level (neighbouring countries) and the global level (the international community or subsections thereof). Third, what types of cost components are relevant for studies on peace and security–related international public goods?

Types of armed conflict

Armed conflict is not a homogeneous phenomenon. Armed conflicts vary in magnitude (scale, duration and intensity), in geographical scope—international (interstate) or internal (intrastate, domestic, civil)—in the extent and nature of foreign intervention and in the level of military technology used.

For our purposes there are two important considerations: which types of armed conflict are most common in the current security environment and likely to be most common in the near future, and what types of armed conflict can be reduced or prevented by peace and security–related international public goods?

Internal conflicts are the most common type of armed conflict in terms of geographical scope. Since the end of the cold war most major armed conflicts have been internal. During 1990–2003 there were 59 major armed conflicts in 48 locations (Eriksson and Wallensteen 2004b, p. 132). All but four were internal conflicts. The four interstate conflicts were Iraq versus Kuwait, Ethiopia versus Eritrea, India versus Pakistan and the conflict between Iraq and the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and others. In 2003 there were 19 major armed conflicts—two were interstate conflicts. In terms of costs the US-led war in Iraq dominated. The costs of this war to the parties were estimated to be higher than the combined sum of all other wars in 2003.

There are major differences between internal (intrastate) and international (interstate) conflict, and they should therefore be analysed separately. A fundamental difference is that in traditional international wars, the power of the state tends to increase as a result of war, and

nationalism can contribute to greater social cohesion. In contrast, civil wars tend to reduce the control of the state over national territory and lead to societal disintegration (Stewart and FitzGerald 2001, p. 3), implying additional types of costs.

The majority of armed conflicts take place in low-income developing countries. Only a few internal armed conflicts have occurred in industrial countries. Industrial countries have been involved primarily in interstate wars with developing countries.

The current pattern of armed conflict is likely to continue. However there may be more cases of military intervention by industrial countries in developing countries, whether as a result of US pre-emptive strategy, as in Iraq, or within the framework of military intervention for humanitarian purposes. The international debate about such interventions during the first decade of the post–cold war period became politically problematic after the Iraq war began. Even if it is not a common type of conflict now, it may have its followers in the near or medium-term future.

Armed conflicts are commonly divided into major and minor ones by size. Limiting the discussion to major armed conflict narrows the scope of the examination substantially. The number of major armed conflicts is relatively small compared with the number of minor armed conflicts—116 in 78 locations during 1989–2003 (Eriksson and Wallensteen 2004a). However most studies on costs examine a mix of conflicts of different sizes.

Current work on proposals for peace and security–related international public goods focuses primarily on internal armed conflicts in low-income developing countries, because that type is most common. It is also easier to develop proposals for risk reduction and conflict prevention for this type of conflict than for major international conflicts involving developed countries.

Levels of costs

The most important distinction regarding level of costs is between national, regional and global, where "national" refers to the costs incurred by the country or countries in conflict, "regional" refers to the costs incurred by neighbouring countries, and "global" refers to the costs to the international community.

The global level is most relevant to this review because the objective is to explore the net benefits to the global community of engaging in conflict prevention and risk reduction. However there are also links between the costs to the parties in conflict and the external costs of

conflict. Global interdependence is becoming more recognized. To the extent that armed conflict slows development, it also affects the development policies of donor countries. The costs to the parties can also have more serious long-term effects for the developed world. For example, countries in conflict may become safe havens for terrorism or the source of refugee flows. Interdependence is a complex relationship that cannot easily be broken down into a cause-effect relationship and can even less easily be costed. Suffice it to say that national and regional costs of conflict are also likely to have some external impact, although impossible to quantify. This section addresses costs at all three levels, although to the extent the literature allows an effort is made to separate the three.

Cost dimensions

Cost components of armed conflict are usually categorized in three basic dimensions: military versus civil costs, costs during conflict versus after conflict and costs to the party or parties in conflict versus costs to external parties (see table 5.1). Another less precise distinction is between direct and indirect costs. Stewart (1993) draws this distinction between the direct effects of violence (deaths and injuries) and the indirect effects on human welfare of war-induced changes in economic, social and political life.

Studies on the costs of armed conflict

The five studies selected for this review are those that are most comprehensive and most relevant for the international public goods ap-

Table 5.1 **Cost dimensions of armed conflict**

	Military costs during conflict	Civil costs during conflict	Military costs after conflict	Civil costs after conflict
Costs to the parties of the conflict	Military expenditure Military casualties	Economic and social impact Civilian casualties	Military expenditure	Economic and social impact Post-conflict reconstruction
Costs to external parties (regional and global)	Military expenditure in neighbouring countries	Refugees Humanitarian aid Aid for reconstruction	International or regional peace operations	Humanitarian aid Aid for reconstruction

Table 5.2 **Selected studies on the costs of armed conflict**

Scope of the study	Brown and Rosecrance (1999)	Stewart and FitzGerald (2001)	Collier and others (2003); Collier and Hoeffler (2004)	Nordhaus (2002)	Bennis and the IPS Iraq Task Force (2004)
Type of conflict					
Internal conflicts	X	X	X		
International conflicts	X			The Iraq war	The Iraq war
Type of costs					
Military costs	X		X	X	X
Other direct costs	X	X	X	X	X
Indirect costs	X	X	X	X	X
Level of costs incurred					
National costs		X	X	X	X
Regional costs			X		X
Global costs	X		X		X

proach (see table 5.2). Brown and Rosecrance (1999) analyse the direct and indirect costs of both internal and international armed conflicts during the post–cold war period. It is the only study focused exclusively on the external costs of conflict (regional and global) and is thus the most relevant study for the international public goods approach. Stewart and FitzGerald (2001) cover only the costs of internal armed conflicts, focusing on the post–cold war period but not exclusively. This study covers primarily the indirect costs of conflict to the parties. Its strength is in conceptualizing the indirect costs of conflict. Collier and others (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) cover the costs to neighbouring countries and the world of internal armed conflicts during the post–cold war period.

The costs of the Iraq war have been the subject of many more or less comprehensive studies. Two are included in this review. Nordhaus (2002) offers a detailed and methodologically interesting account of the potential costs of the Iraq war. It covers both direct and indirect costs over a 10-year period after the end of the war but is limited to the costs to the United States. Bennis and the IPS Iraq Task Force (2004) is a less rigorous study on the actual costs of the Iraq war. It covers all types of costs, direct as well as indirect, to the country in conflict and to others. These five studies provide a broad range of approaches and types of analysis of the costs of armed conflict.

The costs to external parties: Brown and Rosecrance

The Brown and Rosecrance (1999) study was conducted in the late 1990s by a group of researchers for the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. The purpose was to investigate whether "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure" from the standpoint of parties external to the conflict. More specifically, it aimed to determine whether conflict prevention makes sense in selfish cost-benefit terms to neighbouring states, regional powers and the international community. Thus it examined the costs to external parties and excluded the costs to the parties themselves.

The study identifies a broad array of costs of armed conflicts on external parties (see table 5.3). The military costs to external parties can include the costs to neighbouring countries of strengthened border controls, additional troop deployments in troubled regions and generally higher defence budgets to prepare for potential stability problems. The refugee costs refer first to the economic burden for neighbouring states caused by the influx of tens or hundreds of thousands of refugees. There can also be costs due to political and social problems created by refugees in the host countries and costs due to the use of refugee camps as military bases by fighters from the country in conflict. Other direct economic costs and instability costs also affect primarily the neighbour-

Table 5.3 **Types of external costs of armed conflict**

Type of cost	Content
Military costs to neighbouring states	Territorial infringements Military skirmishes Higher defence budgets
Refugee costs	Economic burdens Political and social problems Military complications
Other direct economic costs and economic opportunity costs	Lost investments Lost imports Lost export markets Disruptions to labour supply Regional burdens
Instability costs	Ethnic radicalization Drug trafficking Nationalistic and diversionary campaigns Opportunistic interventions and invasions
Costs of international peace operations	Humanitarian relief efforts Multifunctional conflict resolution operations

Source: Brown and Rosecrance (1999, p. 18).

ing countries, although the costs of drug trafficking eventually may affect countries further. The cost of peace operations, which is sometimes treated as part of the costs of providing peace and security, is included in the costs of conflict in this study. The argument for their inclusion is that "it is reasonable to include the costs of all the things that neighbouring states, distant powers, international organizations and NGOs eventually do because they failed to prevent conflicts from breaking out in the first place" (Brown and Rosecrance 1999, p. 20).

Economic consequences of major internal armed conflicts: Stewart and FitzGerald

The two-volume publication edited by Stewart and FitzGerald (2001) presents a set of studies for a broad research project on internal armed conflict. The authors emphasize, however, that most internal armed conflicts involve significant foreign intervention. They conclude that the degree and type of foreign intervention is an important differentiating characteristic among internal conflicts.

The project is concerned with major armed conflict, those involving deaths of at least 1,000 per year. It does not produce cost estimates but aims to contribute to an improved understanding of economies at war and thus to the identification of appropriate policies to reduce human hardship. One study identifies 10 types of economic behaviour in times of internal armed conflict (see table 5.4). A major finding of this study is that the greater part of the human costs of armed conflict results not directly from battle deaths and injuries but indirectly from the loss of livelihoods caused by the disruption of economy and society. Indirect human costs by far exceed the deaths and injuries from war itself.

This project has provided valuable conceptual contributions to the identification of the indirect costs of armed conflict. It discusses the distinction between short-term and long-term costs, the utility of the entitlement perspective, the use of different indicators of human well-being (such as health, nutrition and psychological damage), and the distinction between war's impact on capital and investment and its impact on labour, capital and markets. The authors acknowledge that it is difficult to determine whether such indirect economic and social developments are due to the armed conflict and that similar economic developments have taken place in many other poor countries that did not undergo the additional shock of open war. However they conclude that while caution is needed before attributing all these observed effects

Table 5.4 **Types of economic consequences of armed conflicts**

Economic dimension	Effect
Economic growth	Negative, sometimes dramatically
Exports	Negative, due to production fall, shift to domestic sales and disruptions in international markets
Sectoral distribution	Shift from tradable to non-tradable sectors, because of disruptions such as the undermining of banks and failure of transport systems
Consumption	Negative, despite reduced domestic savings and increased foreign borrowing and aid
Investment	Sharp fall in government capital formation and private investment, due to budgetary restrictions and increased uncertainty
Budget deficit	Increase, due to increased spending
Distribution of government spending	Increased share allocated to the military, making it difficult to sustain social and economic expenditure
Civic entitlements	Non-governmental organization efforts to provide food and services could in some cases partially compensate for lost public entitlements, while in other cases non-governmental organizations could do little as communities disintegrated
Human costs	Heavy human costs—increased infant mortality rates and deteriorating nutrition, health and educational standards—as a result of falling entitlements and war-induced famines
Development costs	Heavy development costs due to destruction of capital and reduced investment

Source: Stewart and FitzGerald (2001, pp. 230–32).

to conflict, comparisons made for the study show that on many counts the experience of the conflict-affected countries was worse than the average economic performance of their regions.

The national, regional and global costs of internal armed conflict: Collier and others

In a research project for the World Bank, Collier and others (2003) used a large set of data on armed conflicts in low-income developing countries—which coincides to a great extent with countries receiving development aid from the World Bank and its partners.

Their research yields three main findings. First, civil wars have highly adverse ripple effects, which are obviously not taken into account by those who decide to start or end the wars. Second, the risks of civil war differ massively according to a country's characteristics, including its economic conditions, and consequently civil war has become more concentrated in relatively few developing countries, particularly in marginalized countries and countries that have recently been engaged in

Table 5.5 **Types of cost for civil wars in poor developing countries**

	Economic costs	Social costs	Political costs
During conflict	Increased military expenditure Destruction of infrastructure Looting and destruction by soldiers Loss of private capital Increased criminality	Fatalities Population displacements	—
After conflict	Continued high military expenditure Capital flight	Mortality rates Health	"Conflict trap"

— is not available.
Source: Collier and others (2003); Collier and Hoeffler (2004).

conflict. Third, feasible international action could substantially reduce the global incidence of civil war. The finding about the ripple effects of conflicts is further developed in Collier and Hoeffler (2004), in which an effort is made to quantify these effects in monetary terms.

Collier and others identify the cost components of internal armed conflict (minor and major). Their study does this along three dimensions: during and after conflict, type of costs (economic, social and political) and level of costs incurred (national, regional and global) (see table 5.5). The costs during conflict are limited to economic and social costs, and the costs after conflict include the political costs.

The economic cost of war is defined as the negative effect of war on GDP. The economic cost during conflict arises from five effects of civil war:

- Increased military expenditure, which crowds out productive expenditures.
- Destruction of infrastructure.
- Looting and destruction by soldiers.
- Loss of private capital as a result of population flight.
- Reduced constraints on criminal behaviour.

The social costs of war during conflict consist primarily of the costs of fatalities and population displacements. After conflicts many economic and social effects continue for several years—and new ones are added. The study finds that military expenditure does not return to prewar levels, capital flight continues, the mortality rate increases and the physical and psychological health of the population remains negatively affected. The study includes political costs among the legacies of armed conflict. Once a country has had a civil war, it is far more at risk of further war. This is partly because war leaves the society divided and embittered and partly because war creates

interests that favour continued violence and criminality (Collier and others 2003, p. 22). The authors call this the "conflict trap" effect, defined as the cost of the risk of resumption of civil war in post-conflict situations.

The potential costs of the Iraq war: Nordhaus

Before the beginning of the war in Iraq in March 2003 several estimates were made of the likely costs. These forecasts were based on US experience with interstate wars and on assumptions regarding the duration and consequences of a war. While most estimates included only the direct military costs, a study by Nordhaus (2002), sponsored by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, made a more comprehensive effort to estimate the total costs of war by including the non-military costs and the longer term indirect costs. Estimates were made for two scenarios: a short and favourable war and a protracted and unfavourable war.

The types of indirect post-conflict cost components identified by Nordhaus (see table 5.6, listed as follow-on costs) differ from those identified in the studies on internal armed conflict in poor countries. They reflect the costs of a superpower going to war against a developing country. They include costs for US military and police engaged in postwar security activities, the primarily non-military costs of reconstruction and nation building and two types of long-term indirect costs—the impact on the US economy from the effect on international oil markets and the overall macroeconomic impact on the US economy. These two types of indirect costs also have a broader international economic impact.

The costs of the Iraq war: Bennis and the IPS Iraq Task Force

Another study of the costs of the Iraq war has analysed the actual and potential costs of the Iraq war and the ensuing occupation (Bennis and the

Table 5.6 **Types of costs to the United States of a potential war in Iraq**

Direct military expenditure
Follow-on costs
Occupation and peacekeeping
Reconstruction and nation building
Humanitarian assistance
Impact on oil markets
Macroeconomic impact

Source: Nordhaus (2002).

IPS Iraq Task Force 2004). It analyses the human, economic, social, security, environmental and human rights costs. It covers both the costs to the two main parties, the United States and Iraq (see table 5.7a), and the external costs (see table 5.7b). This study has a somewhat less rigorous conceptual approach than the other studies in this review, particularly to external costs. Whether these are seen as costs depends to some extent on political perspective. Nonetheless, its list of external costs of the war provides an interesting input into any efforts to develop a conceptual model for assessing external costs of armed conflict (see table 5.7b).

Estimated costs of armed conflict

While studies on the cost of conflict focus on the conceptual issue of how to identify the impact of armed conflict, most studies also tried to quantify the effects of conflict and produce estimates in monetary

Table 5.7a **Types of costs to the parties of the Iraq war and occupation**

Type of costs	Costs to the United States	Costs to Iraq
Human	Military deaths and injuries Private military company staff and journalist deaths and injuries	Civilian deaths Civilians wounded Insurgents killed Effects of depleted uranium used on coalition missiles
Security	Rise in terrorist recruitment Loss of US credibility	Rise in violence and crime Failure to train Iraqi police and army Smuggling Psychological impact
Economic	Military expenditure Long-term impact on the US economy Oil prices Impact on military families	Rise in unemployment Effects on Iraq's oil economy
Social	Impact of increased military expenditure on US budget and government social expenditure Social costs of the military Cost of healthcare for veterans Mental health costs	Health infrastructure Education Environment Electricity
Human rights	Impact on constitutional right to assembly and free speech Government surveillance of anti-war activity	Impact of war on treatment of prisoners and on violations of human rights more generally
Sovereignty	n.a.	Iraq remains an occupied country Limited economic independence

n.a. is not applicable.
Source: Bennis and the IPS Iraq Task Force (2004).

Table 5.7b **Types of external costs of the Iraq war and occupation**

Type of costs	External costs
Human	War casualties caused by US-allied coalition troops
Legal	The impact on international law of the unilateral US decision to launch the war
Political	The impact on the United Nations, especially on the notion of national sovereignty as the basis for the UN charter The impact on democracy in coalition countries where public opposition to the war was strong
Economic	The opportunity cost of US expenditure for military operations in Iraq The economic impact of oil price rises
Security and disarmament	The impact on international terrorist organizations
Environment	The environmental impact of US-fired depleted uranium on Iraq's land and water
Human rights	The impact on the use of torture and mistreatment of prisoners by governments around the world

Source: Bennis and the IPS Iraq Task Force (2004).

terms. This section reviews the results of the various studies in producing quantified estimates of the costs of conflict.

Estimates of the external costs of armed conflict

The Brown and Rosecrance study made a brave attempt to develop estimates of the cost to external parties for a number of armed conflicts. As noted by the authors, these estimates probably are the lower bounds of such costs. The study covers nine case studies, of which seven are cases of armed conflict and two are cases of conflict prevention (that is, cases where armed conflict did not break out, possibly as the result of conflict prevention). The seven cases are Bosnia, Haiti, the Persian Gulf (the 1991 war), Rwanda, Somalia, Cambodia and El Salvador. The first five are post–cold war conflicts, while the last two originated during the cold war but continued beyond its end. The two cases of conflict prevention are Macedonia and Slovakia, for which the actual costs of prevention are compared with the hypothetical costs of the armed conflicts that could have happened.

For the purposes of this chapter, the first five cases are most relevant, because we are interested in armed conflicts during the post–cold war period. The total minimum costs to external parties of each of these five conflicts show extremely high variation (see table 5.8), making it impossible to generate an average cost from these five cases. This would be true even if the average excluded the dominant case of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, a major international war fought by developed countries.

Table 5.8	Estimated costs to external parties of five armed conflicts (US$ billions)				
Type of cost	**Bosnia**	**Haiti**	**Persian Gulf**	**Rwanda**	**Somalia**
Military	19.06	. .	45.10	0.45	3.90
Humanitarian	11.98	. .	. .	1.79	1.30
Economic, direct	6.36	. .	161.95	1.53	. .
Economic, indirect	10.00	. .	2.50	. .	2.1
Individual nations	6.28	. .	. .	0.73	. .
Total	53.68	4.95	209.55	4.50	7.3

. . is not available
Source: Brown and Rosecrance (1999).

Estimates of the costs of internal armed conflict: national and regional

In a discussion paper Collier and Hoeffler (2004) attempt to develop rough estimates for the average costs of armed conflict in a low-income country. Estimates of regional costs are also made, but no attempt is made to arrive at global estimates. The calculations are based on a data set of conflicts developed for a study for the World Bank (Collier and Hoeffler 1999) and the Collier and Hoeffler data set (Collier and Hoeffler 2002), which covers 161 countries over the period 1960–99 and identifies 78 civil wars.

The economic costs during and after conflict are estimated in terms of effects on economic growth, as measured by GDP growth. The calculations are based on assumptions that a typical internal armed conflict in a low-income country lasts 7 years, and that it takes 14 post-conflict years for GDP to return to its pre-conflict level. This time span of 21 years is the period for which the cost estimates are made (see table 5.9).

According to these calculations, military spending increases by 1.8% of GDP during civil wars. During the first post-conflict decade governments tend to maintain military spending at much higher levels than before the conflict—they are reduced by only about 0.5%. For the period beyond the first post-conflict decade, there is no evidence on the trend in military spending, and the study therefore makes the conservative assumption that military spending falls back to pre-conflict levels after 10 years. Taking these trends into account, the study arrives at an average estimated cost of increased military expenditure over a 21-year period corresponding to 18% of the level of GDP just before the conflict began (initial GDP).

Table 5.9 **Estimated average costs of armed conflicts in low-income countries**

Type of cost	Approximate costs (share of initial GDP, percent)[a]	Approximate costs (US$ billions)
Military expenditure (the diversion of government spending to the military) in the conflict country	18	
Economic costs (the loss of GDP) in the conflict country	105	
Military expenditure (the diversion of government spending into the military) in neighbouring countries	12	
Loss of GDP in neighbouring countries	115	
Total average military and economic costs to the region	250	49.0[b]
Health costs to the conflict-affected country		5.0
Subtotal (military, economic and health cost)		54.0
Conflict trap effect		10.2
Total costs		64.2

a. Initial GDP is gross domestic product just before armed conflict.
b. This estimate is based on an average GDP of $19.7 billion in conflict-affected low-income countries.
Source: Collier and Hoeffler (2004).

Regression analysis on the impact of civil wars on the rate of economic growth shows that each year of civil war reduces the growth rate by about 2.2% (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Assuming that this rate of reduction continues during the average length of conflict, it results in 15% lower GDP at the end of the conflict. Based on the assumption of a cumulative recovery during a 14-year post-conflict period the total impact of war on economic growth is estimated at 105% of GDP.

Similarly, estimates are generated for average military and economic costs for neighbouring countries. The study finds that the economic costs to neighbouring countries are greater than the cost to the country in conflict. Similar conclusions have been drawn by Murdoch and Sandler (2002). Their empirical work shows that civil wars have significant negative influences on economic growth in neighbouring countries and that in some cases neighbourhood effects on growth are equal to or greater than those within a conflict-ridden country.

The social costs of armed conflict are estimated in terms of health effects and based on the assumption that these decline to zero 21 years after the outbreak of conflict (14 years after the end of a 7-year conflict). Based on the observation that most deterioration in the health of populations arises from forced population movements and the collapse of basic preventative health services, these costs are estimated primarily on the basis of studies of the effect on disability-adjusted

life years (DALYs). Using the results of World Health Organization (WHO) studies on the loss of DALYs as a direct effect of civil wars, the study arrives at an average loss of 5 million DALYs for a typical internal armed conflict in a low-income country. To assign a minimum value to these effects, a DALY for low-income countries is estimated at $1,000—approximately the purchasing power parity level of per capita annual income in many of the countries at risk of conflict. This yields a health cost of the typical civil war of about $5 billion (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).

An innovation of this study is the estimation of post-conflict political costs—the costs of the conflict trap effect, defined as the cost of the risk of resumption of civil war in post-conflict situations. It finds that there is an increased risk of armed conflict in countries that recently have had an armed conflict. This can be due to factors that caused the first conflict and thus not an effect of that conflict, but the authors reject that argument, arguing that "civil war is itself such a profound experience for a society that it is likely to dwarf other non-persistent events that precede it" (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, p. 9). The authors arrive at an increased risk of renewed armed conflict of 19%, which when applied to the sum of national and regional economic and health costs of $54 billion produces an additional cost of $10.2 billion.

The military and economic costs to the country in conflict and neighbouring states add up to 250% of GDP. They are related to the average GDP of conflict affected low-income countries just before conflict, amounting to $19.7 billion. That calculation produces an estimate of the total average national and regional economic cost equal to $49 billion. Adding to that some of the health costs ($5 billion) as reflected in the reduction of DALYs, and the monetary evaluation of the conflict trap effect ($10.2 billion), the study arrives at an estimated total cost of $64.2 billion on average for a typical internal armed conflict in a low-income country over 7 years of conflict and 14 post-conflict years.

The authors emphasize that this is a conservative estimate. Each cost component is calculated as a conservative estimate, and the total includes only a few cost components. The only social costs included are those for reduction in DALYs. The study does not estimate the social costs of refugees and displaced persons. Adding these costs would increase the estimates significantly. In 2001 the UN High Commission on Refugees provided assistance to about 12 million refugees and 5.3 million internally displaced persons. The global costs of the three social evils that have been facilitated by civil wars—drugs, AIDS and interna-

tional terrorism—are clearly huge, but the authors refrain from estimating them because of the uncertainties involved.

Estimates of the potential costs of the Iraq war

Nordhaus (2002) provides estimates for the direct and indirect costs to the United States for 10 years following the war ranging between $99 billion under the most favourable conditions and $1.9 trillion under unfavourable conditions (see table 5.10). The high case is described as "a collage of potential unfavourable outcomes rather than a single scenario. It shows the array of costs that might be incurred if the war drags on, occupation is lengthy, nation building is costly, the war destroys a large part of Iraq's oil infrastructure, there is lingering military and political resistance in the Islamic world to U.S. occupation, and there are major adverse psychological reactions to the conflict" (Nordhaus 2002, p. 77). The study estimates these potential costs to the United States at about $1.9 trillion, most falling outside direct military costs.

Table 5.10 **Estimates of 10-year costs to the United States of a potential war in Iraq**

(US$ billions at constant 2002 prices)

	Costs of war	
Type of costs	**Low (short and favourable)**	**High (protracted[a] and unfavourable)**
Direct military spending	50	140
Follow-on costs		
Occupation and peacekeeping[b]	75	500
Reconstruction and nation building[c]	30	105
Humanitarian assistance	1	10
Impact on oil markets[d]	–40	778
Macroeconomic impact[e]	–17	391
Total	99	1,924

Note: These costs are the total for the decade following the conflict (2003–12). Negative numbers are benefits.
a. Protracted conflict assumes that the monthly cost is 50% greater and that the conflict lasts eight months longer.
b. The low and high numbers assume, respectively, 75,000 and 200,000 peacekeepers, at costs of $200,000 and $250,000 per peacekeeper per year for periods of 5 and 10 years.
c. This includes, at the low end, reconstruction costs of $30 billion and minimal nation building costs. At the high end, it adds a "Marshall Plan for Iraq".
d. These estimates refer to a full-employment economy. The high estimate assumes a production decline of 7 million barrels per day offset by withdrawals from reserves of 2.5 million bpd. The low estimate assumes that OPEC increases production by 0.67 million barrels per day in the five years after the end of hostilities and that production stays at the higher level.
e. This excludes the full employment impacts and includes only the first two years of a cyclical impact.
Source: Nordhaus (2002, p. 77).

This pre-war estimate cannot be compared with actual outcomes until 2012. The war started on 19 March 2003 and was declared by President Bush to be completed on 1 May 2003, although the ensuing period has been marked by violent activities, resulting in a continued high rate of casualties. By mid-2004 it was already evident that the Nordhaus study grossly underestimated the military costs of the Iraq war, since the Bush administration had provided a total sum of $151 billion in supplementary allocations for military operations in Iraq by that time. Subsequent developments have reinforced the gap between these estimates and reality.

The Bennis report lists many additional costs according to the cost structure in tables 7a and 7b, but they cannot be described because they are neither quantified nor costed.

Conclusion

The studies reviewed in this chapter are valuable and much needed contributions to our knowledge about the costs of armed conflict in the contemporary security environment. Costing armed conflicts is to a great extent a conceptual exercise. While it is difficult to find appropriate data and other empirical material, the most difficult task is determining what to cost. Such decisions rest on knowledge and perceptions about what armed conflicts entail. The studies reviewed in this chapter have made important contributions to that end.

But, being pioneer studies in a virtually unexplored field, the reviewed studies also have a number of limitations. The cost estimates produced by them are crude and incomplete. Breaking new and uncertain ground, the studies also opt for conservative estimates. In a global public goods perspective the most important limitation is that they provide little information on the costs to countries at a greater distance from the conflict. Even the Brown and Rosecrance study, which examines only external costs, covers primarily the costs to neighbouring states and only briefly explores costs to the international community—global costs.

To estimate the costs to the international community of internal armed conflict in developing countries, more conceptual knowledge is needed on how countries in the developed world are affected by these conflicts. More knowledge and experience are also required on how best to promote conflict and contribute to peaceful conditions

in conflict-prone countries. Collier and others have done some general work in this direction. But more studies—both conceptual and empirical—are needed to generate knowledge about the specific links between internal armed conflict in low-income countries and the security of the developed world. Other studies that have made contributions in this direction (for example, Rice 2004 on the implications for developed countries of poverty and income equality; Pieterse 2002 on global inequality) argue that the conditions leading to conflict in poor countries cannot be contained in these societies at the margins of the international system and therefore eventually also impose costs on the developed world. Thus current research on the costs to developed countries should be complemented with more qualitative studies on the specific links between armed conflict in low-income countries and the well-being of high-income industrial countries, what these links entail and how they work. Such studies could provide important contributions to cost-benefit analyses of global policies to reduce the incidence of armed conflict in these countries.

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