


# Government Communication

## 2016/17:114



### Strategic Export Control in 2016 – Military Equipment and Dual-Use Items

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Skr.  
2016/17:114

The Government submits this Communication to the Riksdag.

Stockholm, 16 March 2017

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## Main contents of the Communication

In this Communication, the Swedish Government provides an account of Sweden's export control policy with respect to military equipment and dual-use items in 2016. The Communication also contains a report detailing exports of military equipment during the year. In addition, it describes the cooperation in the EU and other international forums on matters relating to strategic export controls on both military equipment and dual-use items.

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# 1 Government Communication on Strategic Export Control

Skr. 2016/17:114

In this Communication the Government provides an account of its policy regarding strategic export control in 2016, i.e. the export control of military equipment and dual-use items.

Control of exports of military equipment is necessary in order to meet both our national objectives and our international obligations, by ensuring that the products exported from Sweden go to approved recipient countries in accordance with established guidelines. Under Section 1, second paragraph of the Military Equipment Act (1992:1300), military equipment may only be exported if there are security and defence policy reasons for doing so, and provided there is no conflict with Sweden's foreign policy. Applications for licences are considered in accordance with the Swedish guidelines on exports of military equipment, the criteria in the EU Common Position on Arms Exports, and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).

The multilateral agreements and instruments relating to disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are important manifestations of the international community's efforts to prevent the proliferation of such weapons. By controlling the trade in dual-use items (DUIs), which principally concerns technology that can be used to produce weapons of mass destruction, proliferation can be counteracted. This is work with objectives that are fully shared by Sweden. Strict and effective national export control is required for this reason. Export controls are a key instrument for individual governments when it comes to meeting their international obligations with respect to non-proliferation.

This is the thirty-third time that the Government has reported on Sweden's export control policy in a Communication to the Riksdag. The first Communication on strategic export control was presented in 1985. Sweden was, at that time, one of the first countries in Europe to provide a transparent account of the preceding year's activities in this area.

Since that time, the Communication has been developed from a brief compilation of Swedish exports of military equipment to a comprehensive account of Sweden's export control policy in its entirety. More statistics are available today thanks to an increasingly transparent policy and more effective information processing systems. In parallel with Sweden's policy of disclosure, EU Member States have gradually developed, since 2000, a shared policy of detailed disclosure. The Government continually strives to increase transparency in the area of export control.

In addition to informing the Riksdag of Sweden's export control policy, the Communication is intended to serve as a basis for wider discussion of issues related to export controls on military equipment and dual-use items.

This Communication consists of three parts and a section on statistics. The first part contains an account of Swedish export controls of military

equipment. The second part deals with Swedish export control of dual-use items. In the third part, the Government presents the authorities responsible for this area. Then follow annexes containing statistics covering Swedish exports of military equipment and dual-use items. The Inspectorate of Strategic Products (ISP) and the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) contribute material for the Communication at the request of the Government. The statistics in this Communication supplement the information available in these authorities' own publications.

### **Significant events during the year**

The Swedish export control regulations are updated continuously, partly under cooperation in the EU. The opportunities for successfully addressing the many problems and challenges that are a feature of non-proliferation efforts are consequently improved.

Activities under the UN Arms Trade Treaty were consolidated in 2016 through the establishment of a secretariat in Geneva, three permanent working groups for treaty work between the conferences of states parties and a fund to support states parties needing assistance in implementing the Treaty. In 2016, Sweden continued to be responsible for coordinating work on reporting and transparency under the Arms Trade Treaty as chair of one of the new permanent working groups. Sweden has also continued to take an active part in efforts to strengthen implementation of the Treaty by the states parties and to promote further accession to the Treaty. By the end of 2016, the Treaty had 91 states parties, representing an increase of 12 countries during the year.

One of the recurrent reviews of the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) also took place in 2016. Sweden chaired the group of Member State experts that conducted a review of, and supplied feedback on, the outcome to the First Committee of the General Assembly during the autumn.

Sweden also held the rotating Plenary Chair of the General Working Group (GWG) of the Wassenaar Arrangement in 2016. The presidency has meant being responsible for leading the practical work of negotiation and preparing decisions for the annual Plenary of the Arrangement. In 2016, this meant additional efforts to lead the recurrent review process that takes place in the Wassenaar Arrangement every five years.

In June 2015, the Cross-Party Committee of Inquiry on Military Equipment Exports (KEX) presented its final report, Tightened Control of Exports of Military Equipment (SOU 2015:72), to the Government. In 2016, work on collating responses to the consultation exercise was completed and discussion of the Committee's proposals continued at the Government Offices of Sweden.

Following a comprehensive review that had been under way since 2011, the European Commission presented a proposal in September 2016 to recast Council Directive (EC) No 428/2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items (the Dual-Use Regulation). During the autumn, the Member

States initiated negotiations on the proposal in the responsible Council working group, the WPDU (Working Party on Dual-Use Goods).

In the autumn of 2016, the Commission also completed its review of Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community (the ICT Directive) in accordance with Article 17 of the Directive. On 30 November, the outcome was presented as part of the communication on the European Defence Action Plan, Background Brief 2016/17:FPM46). In December 2016, the European Council welcomed the Commission's proposals on a European action plan in the area of defence as its contribution to the development of European security and defence policy. In the autumn of 2016, the Commission also published two recommendations for increased harmonisation of the contents of the general transfer licences. Work on harmonisation is expected to continue in 2017.

In May 2016, Minister Morgan Johansson assumed responsibility for issues concerned with export control of military equipment and of dual-use items, as well as responsibility for the Inspectorate of Strategic Products (ISP).

### **Summary of the statistical data**

Combined statistics on licence approval and Swedish exports of military material and dual-use items (DUIs) are presented in two annexes to this communication.

Exports of military equipment in 2016 are presented in Annex 1. Statistics from two years previously are also presented for comparison. A more accurate picture is provided when looking at exports over the course of time, as individual sales or deliveries of major systems may cause wide fluctuations in the annual statistics. The information contained in the Communication is based on the responsible authority's own decisions and on statutory annual reporting from military equipment-exporting companies and the authorities for 2016. The material has been compiled by the ISP.

Fifty-six countries, as well as the UN, received deliveries of Swedish military equipment in 2016. The value of the exports of military equipment actually delivered over the course of 2016 was approximately SEK 11 billion. Exports consequently increased by around 45% in comparison with the previous year.

It was deliveries of larger systems in particular that increased in 2016 and affected the statistics. The largest individual recipient countries for Swedish military equipment in 2016 were Brazil (just over SEK 2.8 billion), Norway (SEK 2.7 billion), the United States (SEK 719 million), Germany (SEK 619 million) and Thailand (SEK 424 million). Deliveries to Brazil in the JAS Gripen project began. The deliveries of Combat Vehicle 90 to Norway continued. Deliveries to the United States were mainly of anti-tank systems and ammunition, as well as naval artillery and radar systems. Exports to Germany were mainly of components for missile systems and radar and ground sensors. Exports to Thailand were dominated by naval command systems. With regard to traditional partner countries, it may be noted that exports to France, the Netherlands, South

Africa, South Korea and the United Kingdom were also relatively extensive. The category of established partner countries now also includes Brazil.

In addition, a number of countries only received civilian hunting and sport shooting ammunition in 2016: Andorra, Kazakhstan, Namibia, New Caledonia (France), Sri Lanka and Zambia.

The value of the export licences granted in 2016 totalled SEK 61.9 billion, which is an increase of 1 150 per cent on 2015, when the value of approved licences was SEK 4.9 billion. By far the greater part of this increase is due to licences issued for the sale of JAS Gripen to Brazil. Licences issued under a deal relating to further airborne radar systems to the United Arab Emirates also contribute to the increase. Exports of civil firearms and associated ammunition were approved to a value of SEK 310 million.

The statistical report also contains an account of Swedish exports of dual-use items (DUIs). Unlike the situation with exports of military equipment, the companies involved do not submit any delivery declarations. There is consequently a lack of data on actual exports.

The number of cases involving DUIs and sanctions continued to increase somewhat in 2016. Cases relating to financial transactions linked to sanctions ceased on 16 January 2016, following the adoption of a new ordinance concerning Iran (see Table 1 in Annex 2).

## 2 Military Equipment

### 2.1 Background and regulatory framework

A licence requirement for exports of military equipment is necessary to ensure that products exported from Sweden and technical assistance provided go to approved recipient countries. The regulatory framework for Swedish export controls consists of the Military Equipment Act (1992:1300) and the Military Equipment Ordinance (1992:1303), as well as the principles and guidelines on exports of military equipment decided upon by the Government and approved by the Riksdag. Under Section 1, second paragraph of the Military Equipment Act, military equipment may only be exported if there are security and defence policy reasons for doing so, and provided there is no conflict with Sweden's foreign policy. Sweden's international obligations also have to be taken into account in the examination of applications for licences, including Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment, as well as the criteria set forth in the UN Arms Trade Treaty.

Swedish examination of licence applications is based on an overall assessment following government guidelines and established practice. The international rules are more in the nature of individual criteria to be observed, assessed or complied with. As an independent authority, the ISP is tasked with assessing licence applications independently in accordance with the whole regulatory framework.

Under the Military Equipment Act, export controls cover the manufacture, supply and export of military equipment, as well as certain agreements on rights to manufacture military equipment etc. In accordance with the same Act, a licence is required to carry out training with a military purpose. The Act applies both to equipment that is designed for military use and that constitutes military equipment under government regulations and to technical support regarding military equipment that, according to the government regulations, constitutes technical assistance. The list of what constitutes military equipment and technical assistance is contained in the annex to the Military Equipment Ordinance. The Swedish list of military equipment is in line with the EU's Common Military List, aside from three national supplements: nuclear explosive devices and special parts for such devices, fortification facilities etc. and certain chemical agents.

The Ordinance (2016:845) amending the Military Equipment Ordinance updated the list to reflect the changes decided as a result of European Commission Directive (EU) 2016/970, which entered into force on 16 June 2016.

Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community has also primarily been implemented in Swedish law by means of the Military Equipment Ordinance.

### **Discussion of proposals from the Cross-Party Committee of Inquiry on Exports of Military Equipment**

A parliamentary inquiry to review export controls on military equipment (KEX) was appointed on 1 June 2012. The Committee's principal aim was to present proposals to tighten export controls in relation to non-democratic states (ToR 2012:50). In December 2014, the Committee presented the interim report *Sanktionsväxling – effektivare sanktioner på exportkontrollområdet* (Sanction shift – more effective sanctions in the area of export control) (SOU 2014:83), and in June 2015 the final report *Skärpt exportkontroll av krigsmateriel* (Tightened control of exports of military equipment) (SOU 2015:72). In the final report, the Committee proposed that a democracy criterion be introduced into the guidelines on export of military equipment. The Committee further proposed that the rules on follow-on deliveries and human rights be tightened, that PGD be considered in the examination of applications for licences, that openness and transparency increase and that supervision and control be tightened.

The Committee's proposals were sent out to around a hundred referral bodies, including courts of law, authorities, municipalities, companies and non-governmental organisations. Around 70 of these bodies presented their views. The work of collating and analysing these views was completed in 2016. A committee then took over at the Government Offices of Sweden to look at the Committee's proposals and the views expressed by the referral bodies.

The Government has since made it clear that it intends to return to the Riksdag with a Government Bill in the spring of 2017.

### **Export control and the Policy for Global Development**

One of the Government's explicit aims is to strengthen work on the Policy for Global Development (PGD, Govt Bill 2002/03:122, Report 2003/04:UU3, Riksdag Communication 2003/04:122). This relaunch of the PGD is taking place in light of the fact that the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development has been adopted internationally. The Government presented the communication Policy for Global Development in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda (Comm. 2015/16: 182) to the Riksdag in May 2016. The 2030 Agenda contains 17 Sustainable Development Goals. Implementation of the new agenda requires consensus to be strengthened between different policy areas, with the aim of increasing the contribution of combined policy to fair and sustainable development. Conflicting objectives should be clarified and be the subject of conscious and considered choices. The Policy for Global Development is based on the idea that global challenges require shared solutions in which all parties assume responsibility.

The three dimensions of sustainable development – social, economic and environmental – as well as the rights perspective and the perspective of the poor on development, are key points of departure for work on the Policy for Global Development.

The Government Offices of Sweden are pressing for the PGD perspective to be elucidated in material for the Export Control Council when it may be significant in the assessment of individual cases. In 2016, the Government Offices of Sweden supported skills development at the Inspectorate of Strategic Products with regard to application of the sustainability aspects in Criterion Eight in the EU's Common Position governing the controls of exports of military technology and equipment, and more generally with regard to issues of fair and global sustainable development, with the aim of strengthening the authority's analysis capability in the area.

The Government's desire is to avoid any effects of Swedish exports of military equipment that negatively affect efforts to contribute to equitable and sustainable global development. Aspects of the PGD are taken into account in assessments of Swedish exports of military equipment, for example through the application of the EU Common Position governing the controls of exports of military technology and equipment, the eighth criterion of which highlights the technical and economic capacity of recipient countries and the need to consider whether there is a risk of a prospective export seriously hampering sustainable development.

### **Export control and feminist foreign policy**

By conducting a feminist foreign policy, the Government is endeavouring systematically to achieve outcomes that strengthen the rights, representation and resources of women and girls. The Government attaches great importance to preventing and counteracting sexual and gender-based violence.

A cornerstone of this work is the strict control of exports of military equipment from Sweden.

There is often a correlation between accumulations of small arms and light weapons and the occurrence of violence in a conflict or in a society.



Illegal and irresponsible transfers of weapons and ammunition are a particular problem in this context, as is inadequate control of the stockpiling of such equipment.

In line with this, the Government is making active efforts to ensure that attention is paid to these issues and that they are followed up in the UN's Arms Trade Treaty. This is done in part by Sweden pressing for Article 7(4) of the Arms Trade Treaty to be put into operation and applied in practice by the states parties. The Treaty provides in this article, which was introduced into the Treaty with strong support from Sweden, among others, that the states parties have to take into account the risk of exported equipment being used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children.

It should be noted that consideration of Article 7(4) of the Arms Trade Treaty takes place in addition to the assessment made previously with respect to human rights under the Swedish guidelines, and according to Criterion Two of the EU's Common Position (2008/944/CFSP) on exports of military equipment. The latter regulatory frameworks are therefore also significant in this context.

These issues were considered in work on formulating new legislation for military equipment in 2016. The Government Offices of Sweden also endeavoured in 2016 to ensure that the Inspectorate of Strategic Products has sufficient expertise to be able to include general aspects and risks of gender-based violence in assessments with regard to human rights and international humanitarian law, and to implement Article 7(4) of the Arms Trade Treaty, among other things by arranging a targeted skills development effort for the Inspectorate and the Government Offices of Sweden.

The Government also endeavours to increase knowledge in this area, in part by promoting more comprehensive data gathering on the presence of small arms and light weapons, and what effects this has on women and men, girls and boys.

### **Export controls and sustainable business**

The Government has developed an ambitious sustainable business policy. In December 2015, a communication was presented to the Riksdag containing the Government's view on a number of issues in relation to sustainable business, for example human rights, working conditions and environmental concerns (Policy for Sustainable Enterprise, Government Comm. 2015:16:69). A national action plan has also been developed for enterprise and human rights. As indicated by the new policy, the Government anticipates that companies will base their work on international guidelines for sustainable business, both at home and abroad, such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the UN Global Compact, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the ILO's Fundamental Conventions and the ILO's Tripartite Declarations. The Government also encourages companies to analyse the UN's 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and work on some of the most relevant issues on the basis of their own operations.

Anti-corruption is a key issue in the Government's more ambitious policy for sustainable enterprise. In addition to what is governed by Swedish legislation, the Government expects Swedish companies to apply a clear anti-corruption policy and contribute to greater transparency.

Both the giving and accepting of bribes have long been criminal offences under Swedish law. In addition, the reform of bribery legislation in 2012 introduced among other things a provision making the funding of bribery through negligence a criminal offence. This provision is aimed, for example, at cases in which a trader provides money or other assets to a senior executive in a subsidiary or an independent contractor which represents the trader in a particular matter and consequently, through gross negligence, promotes a crime of bribery in that matter. The new penal provision can also be assumed to be significant for the international defence equipment market.

In various international forums, Sweden actively promotes the effective application of conventions prohibiting bribes in international business transactions. For example, this applies to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions from 1997 and the UN Convention against Corruption from 2005. It has been noted in the review, on the basis of the different conventions, that Sweden has a robust institutional framework in place to fight corruption. The Government welcomes the initiative taken by European manufacturers of military equipment through the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD), and its American counterpart, to develop and apply an international code of conduct, including zero tolerance of corruption. The largest Swedish trade association, the Swedish Security and Defence Industry Association (SOFF), which represents more than 95 per cent of companies in the defence industry in Sweden, requires prospective members to sign and comply with its Code of Conduct on Business Ethics as a condition of membership. The Code of Conduct aims to ensure a high level of business ethics. Individuals who represent the companies also undergo special e-training on anti-corruption that has been developed jointly by SOFF and the Defence Materiel Administration (FMV). To date, 4 500 individuals have undergone this training.

## 2.2 The role of defence exports from a security policy perspective

The foundations of today's Swedish defence industries were laid during the Cold War. Sweden's policy of neutrality, as drawn up following the Second World War, relied on a total defence system with a strong defence force and a strong national defence industry. The ambition was that Sweden would be independent of foreign suppliers. The defence industry thus became an important part of Swedish security policy. Exports of military equipment, which during this time were limited, were an element in ensuring capacity to develop and produce equipment adapted to the needs of the Swedish armed forces.

After the end of the Cold War, this striving for independence in terms of access to military equipment for the Swedish armed forces has gradually been replaced by a growing need for equipment cooperation with like-minded states and neighbours. Technical and economic development has meant that both Sweden and its partner countries are mutually dependent on deliveries of components, sub-systems and finished systems manufactured in other countries. These deliveries in many cases are ensured through contractual obligations.

The Government confirmed in May 2015 in Defence Policy Orientation – Sweden's Defence 2016–2020 (Govt Bill 2014/15:109) that Sweden's security is built in solidarity together with others and that threats to peace and security are best averted together and in collaboration with other countries and organisations. Sweden's security and defence cooperation is developed together with Finland, the other Nordic countries and the Baltic states, as well as in the framework of the EU, the UN, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the NATO partnerships and the transatlantic link.

Both Sweden's involvement in international crisis management and its enhanced cooperation in its vicinity emphasise the importance of a capacity for practical military collaboration (interoperability) with other countries and organisations. Interoperability is dependent on Sweden's military equipment systems being able to function together with the equipment of partner countries, as well as being technically mature, reliable and available. In many cases this is at least as important as the equipment being of the highest level of technical performance. It is in Sweden's security policy interest to safeguard long-term and continuous cooperation on equipment issues with a number of traditional partner countries. This mutual cooperation is based on both exports and imports of military equipment.

In the Budget Bill for 2016 (Govt Bill 2015/16:1), the Government emphasises that the armed forces are a national concern, and that the choice of security arrangements made by EU Member States is reflected in equipment supply, e.g. regarding the view of security of supply and the maintenance of strategic competence for military capacities. The continued work on industry and market issues within the EU should therefore consider the distinctive nature of the military equipment market, and the need to meet the security interests of the Member States within the framework of the common market. The possibility of maintaining the transatlantic link should also be considered in this context.

The Government further believes that participation in bilateral and multilateral equipment cooperation should constitute a clear and cost-effective contribution to the Swedish Armed Forces' operative capability.

As civilian-military collaboration increases and new technologies are made available for military applications, growing numbers of IT companies and other high-technology companies deliver products and services to the defence sector.

An internationally competitive level of technological development contributes to Sweden continuing to be an attractive country for international cooperation. This also implies greater opportunities for Sweden to influence international cooperation on export control as part

of an international partnership. While this applies principally within the EU, it can also be applied in a broader international context.

The meeting of the European Council in June 2015 re-confirmed the importance of continuing to work on the basis of the European Council's discussion in December 2013 on Common Foreign and Security Policy. Particular emphasis was given to the importance of strengthening the competitiveness of the European defence industry. A new level of ambition for Common Foreign and Security Policy was adopted at the meeting of the European Council in December 2016. The Council welcomed the Commission's proposals on a European action plan in the area of defence as its contribution to the development of European security and defence policy.

Sweden participates in various cooperation projects conducted by the European Defence Agency (EDA). The Government's fundamental position is that Sweden should participate in and influence the processes that are getting under way in European cooperation, which also relates to the work as part of the EDA. Cooperation as part of the EDA has led to better opportunities for the Swedish Armed Forces to function effectively, and has also improved prospects for more effective research cooperation.

By participating in the Six-Nation Initiative between the six countries in Europe with the largest defence sectors (Framework Agreement/Letter of Intent, FA/LoI), Sweden can influence the development of defence industrial policy and defence export policy in Europe. This will have a major impact on the emerging common defence and security policy in Europe, both directly and indirectly.

Cooperation in multilateral frameworks pays dividends in terms of improved resource utilisation from a European perspective and increasingly harmonised and improved European and transatlantic cooperative capability. In this context, the EDA and NATO/the Partnership for Peace, together with the FA/LoI and Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFECO), are vital.

### **Areas of activity**

Currently, the most important military product areas for Swedish defence and security companies are:

- combat aircraft,
- surface vessels and submarines
- combat vehicles, tracked vehicles,
- short and long-range weapons systems: land and sea-based and airborne, including missiles,
- small and large-bore ammunition,
- smart artillery ammunition,
- land and sea-based and airborne radar and IR systems,
- electronic warfare systems: passive and active,
- telecommunications systems, including electronic countermeasures,
- command and control systems for land, sea and air applications,
- systems for exercises and training,

- signature adaptation (e.g. camouflage systems and radar),
- systems for civil protection,
- encryption equipment,
- torpedoes,
- maintenance of aircraft engines,
- gunpowder and other pyrotechnic materials,
- services and consultancy
- support systems for operation and maintenance.

## 2.3 Cooperation within the EU on export control of military equipment

### **EU Common Position on Arms Exports**

The EU Member States have national rules concerning the export of military equipment. However, the Member States have to some extent chosen to coordinate their export control policies. The EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, adopted in 1998, specified common criteria for exports of military equipment, applied in conjunction with national assessments of export applications. The Code of Conduct was made stricter in 2005, and was adopted as a Common Position in 2008 (2008/944/CFSP). It is applied by all the EU Member States and a number of countries that are not members of the EU (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Georgia, Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro and Norway).

The Common Position contains among other things eight criteria that are to be considered before taking a decision to approve exports of military equipment to a given country.

*Criterion One* stipulates that the international obligations and commitments of Member States must be respected, in particular the sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council or the European Union.

*Criterion Two* is concerned with respect for human rights in the country of final destination as well as respect by that country of international humanitarian law. Export licences are to be denied if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used for internal repression.

*Criterion Three* is concerned with the internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts.

*Criterion Four* is aimed at preservation of regional peace, security and stability. Export licences may not be issued if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient would use the military technology or equipment to be exported aggressively against another country or to assert by force a territorial claim.

*Criterion Five* is concerned with the potential effect of the military technology or equipment to be exported on the country's defence and security interests as well as those of another Member State or those of friendly and allied countries.

*Criterion Six* is concerned with the behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards for example its attitude to terrorism and respect for international law.

*Criterion Seven* is concerned with the existence of a risk that the military technology or equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.

*Criterion Eight* stipulates that the Member States must take into account whether the proposed export would seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country.

Individual Member States may operate more restrictive policies than are stipulated in the Common Position. The Common Position also includes a list of the products covered by the controls (the EU Common Military List). A User's Guide has also been produced that provides more details about the implementation of the agreements in the Common Position on the exchange of information and consultations, and about how these criteria for export control are to be applied. The User's Guide is continually updated.

### **Exchange of information on denials**

In accordance with the rules for implementing the Common Position, Member States must exchange details of export licence applications that have been denied. If another member state is considering granting a licence for an essentially identical transaction, consultations are to take place before the licence can be granted. The consulting Member State must also inform the notifying state of its decision. The exchange of denial notifications and consultations on the notifications make export policy in the EU more transparent and uniform in the longer term between the Member States. The consultations lead to greater consensus on different export destinations. Member States notifying each other about the export transactions that are refused, and explaining the grounds for such refusal, reduces the risk of another member state approving the export. The ISP is responsible for issuing details of Swedish denials and arranging consultations.

In 2016, Sweden received 350 denial notifications from other Member States and Norway. Sweden issued 21 denial notifications. They applied to Bahrain, China, Ecuador, Jordan (2), Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia (2), Taiwan (3), Turkey (5) and the United Arab Emirates (2). In addition, four consultations were held, one outgoing with Germany and three incoming from the Czech Republic, Italy and Lithuania.

The fact that exports to a particular recipient country have been denied in a specific case does not mean that the country is not eligible for Swedish exports in other cases. Swedish export control does not use a system involving lists of countries, i.e. predetermined lists of countries that are either approved or not approved as recipients. Each export application is considered individually in accordance with the guidelines adopted by the Government for exports of military equipment, the EU Common Position on Arms Exports and the UN Arms Trade Treaty. To allow a licence to be granted, the application must be supported by the regulatory framework as a whole.

## **Work as part of COARM**

The Working Party on Conventional Arms Exports (COARM) is a forum in which EU Member States regularly discuss the application of the Common Position on Arms Exports and exchange views on various export destinations. An account of this work, the agreements reached and statistics on the Member States' exports of military equipment is published in an annual EU report.

Since the criteria in the Common Position span a number of different policy areas, the goal is to achieve and increased and clear coherence between these areas. Sweden is making active efforts to attain a common view among the Member States on implementation of the Common Position. An important way of bringing this about is to increase transparency between the Member States.

Within the framework of the COARM dialogue there is also a continuous exchange of information between EU Member States regarding existing international cooperation in the area. The ambition is to find common ground that can strengthen the Member States' actions in other forums, such as ATT.

In 2016, as a result of an update of the user guide, the group introduced a new information management system which, among other things, aims to improve efficiency in dealing with what are known as denials.

Under COARM, the EU additionally pursues an active policy of dialogue with third countries on export controls. In this context, exchanges took place in 2016 with Canada, Japan, Norway, Ukraine and the United States, among others.

Another aspect of the work aimed at third countries is the support programmes the EU has to improve export controls with respect to military equipment, and to promote implementation of the UN Arms Trade Treaty, for those countries choosing to accede to the Treaty.

## **Work on EU Directive 2009/43/EC on transfers of defence-related products within the EU and the EEA**

Under the Swedish Presidency in 2009, Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community, the ICT Directive, was adopted. The intention with the Directive was to allow for more competitive groups of defence industry companies and defence cooperation at the European level. The European Commission is in charge of implementation of the Directive with the assistance of a committee of Member State representatives, the ICT Committee. This committee held two meetings in 2016.

At the same time, in 2016 the Commission continued its review of the Directive in accordance with its Article 17. As part of this work, the ICT Committee organised a technical working group to develop a basis for harmonising the implementation of the Directive at national level. To this end, the working group held eight working meetings with representatives of the EU Member States.

On 30 November 2016, the Commission presented the outcome of the review as part of the communication on the European Defence Action Plan, Background Brief 2016/17:FPM46).

Skr. 2016/17:114 The Commission's assessment was that the ICT Directive has contributed to greater transparency and savings for businesses but not to the extent that had been anticipated. Based on this conclusion, on 3 December 2016 the Commission published two recommendations for increased harmonisation of the contents of two of the general transfer licences, the one where the recipient is armed forces or contracting authorities in an EEA Member State, and the one where the recipient is a certified enterprise in an EEA Member State.

The Commission intends to continue with the work of harmonising implementation of the Directive in 2017, among other things by itemising the options for a simplified procedure for certification and more uniform assessment of the classifications according to the EU's Common Military List.

The significance of the Commission's communication and of recommendations is currently being analysed at the Government Offices of Sweden and the Inspectorate of Strategic Products. According to a preliminary assessment, it will not affect current Swedish regulation and will therefore not lead to amended legislation.

### **Control of arms brokering**

To tackle the problem of uncontrolled arms brokering and avoid the circumvention of arms embargoes, the Council adopted a Common Position (2003/468/CFSP) on the control of arms brokering in 2003. In accordance with this, the Member States agree to adopt the measures necessary to control arms brokering within their territory. Control of arms brokering in Sweden was already good due to the provisions of the Military Equipment Act. Work to produce appropriate mechanisms for the exchange of information about registered arms brokers between Member States is taking place as part of COARM. In Sweden, 34 companies are registered as brokers of products classified as military equipment or of technical assistance.

### **Article 10 of the UN Firearms Protocol**

Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council implementing Article 10 of the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN Firearms Protocol), and establishing export authorisation, and import and transit measures for firearms, their parts and components and ammunition was adopted in 2012. The intention of the regulation, and of the UN protocol, is to combat crime by reducing access to firearms. References to exports in the Regulation indicate exports outside of the EU; as far as Sweden is concerned, this means, on the one hand, exports from Sweden to third countries and, on the other, exports from any other Member State to a third country in cases where the supplier is established in Sweden.

The Regulation covers firearms etc. for civilian use. It does not apply to firearms etc. specially designed for military use, or to fully automatic weapons. Furthermore, bilateral transactions, firearms etc. destined for



the armed forces, the police or the public authorities of the Member States, collectors and bodies concerned with the cultural and historical aspects of firearms etc., deactivated firearms and antique firearms and their replicas fall outside of the scope of the Regulation.

Those firearms etc. that are encompassed by the EU Regulation are also encompassed, with the exception of smooth-bored hunting and sporting weapons, by the appendix to the Military Equipment Ordinance. According to Regulation No 258/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, those aspects that are encompassed by the Common Position must be taken into consideration when assessing licence applications.

The Regulation is valid in Sweden immediately and is applied with effect from 30 September 2013. There are provisions that complement the EU Regulation in the Ordinance (2013:707) concerning the control of certain firearms, parts of firearms and ammunition. The ISP is the authority responsible for licences in accordance with the EU Regulation. In 2016, 271 cases were received and 279 decisions were issued.

### **Arms embargoes etc.**

Within the scope of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the EU implements embargoes adopted by the UN on, for example, the trade in arms and dual-use items. The EU can also decide unanimously on certain embargoes extending beyond those adopted by the UN Security Council. These decisions by the Council of the EU may be regarded as an expression of the Member States' desire to act collectively on various security policy issues. An arms embargo adopted by the UN or the EU is implemented in accordance with each Member State's national export control regulations. EU arms embargoes normally also include a prohibition on the provision of technical and financial services relating to military equipment. These prohibitions are governed by Council Regulations. Embargoes on trade in dual-use items are governed by both Council Decisions and Council Regulations. These are normally also accompanied by a prohibition on the provision of technical and financial services relating to these items.

A decision by the UN Security Council, the EU or the OSCE to impose an arms embargo represents an unconditional obstacle to Swedish exports in accordance with the Swedish guidelines for exports of military equipment. If an arms embargo also applies to imports, special regulations on the prohibition are issued in Sweden. Such regulations have previously been issued for Iran, Libya and North Korea. As a result of EU sanctions against the Russian Federation, the Government decided in December 2014 to impose an arms embargo on Russia.

There are currently formal EU decisions, either independent or based on UN decisions, that arms embargoes apply to Afghanistan, Belarus, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar (Burma), North Korea, the Russian Federation, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Yemen and Zimbabwe. The embargoes vary in their focus and scope. There are also individually targeted arms embargoes against individuals and entities currently named on the UN terrorist list. The EU also applies an arms embargo against China, based on a Council declaration issued as a result of the events in

Skr. 2016/17:114 Tiananmen Square in 1989. Sweden does not permit the export of any military equipment to China. Under an OSCE decision, a weapons embargo is also maintained on the area of Nagorno-Karabakh.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has collated information on what restrictive measures (sanctions) against other countries exist in the EU and thus apply to Sweden. Information can be found on the website [www.regeringen.se/sanktionerand](http://www.regeringen.se/sanktionerand) is updated regularly. This website provides a country-by-country account of arms embargoes or embargoes on dual-use items that are in force. It also contains links to EU legal acts covering sanctions and, where applicable, the UN decisions that have preceded the EU measures.

## 2.4 Other international cooperation on export controls of military equipment

### **Transparency in conventional arms trade**

The UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on transparency in the arms trade in 1991. The resolution urges the UN Member States to voluntarily submit annual reports on their imports and exports of conventional weapon systems to a register administered by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA).

The reports are concerned with trade in the following seven categories of equipment: tanks, armoured combat vehicles, heavy artillery, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships and missiles/missile launchers. The definitions of the categories have been successively expanded to include more weapons systems, and it is now also possible to voluntarily report trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW). Particular importance is now attached to Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADs), which have been included in the category of missiles/missile launchers since 2003. The voluntary reporting also includes information on countries' stockpiles of these weapons and procurements from their own defence industries. In consultation with the Ministry of Defence and the ISP, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs compiles annual data, which is submitted to the UN in accordance with the resolution.

In 2016, the UN Register of Conventional Arms was reviewed by a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE). Sweden has taken part in the group and has taken the chair through Ambassador Paul Beijer. The outcome of the review was reported to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in the autumn of 2016.

As the Register is based on reports from many major exporters and importers, a significant share of world trade in heavy conventional weapon systems is reflected here.

Sweden's share of world trade in heavy weapon systems continues to be limited. The report that Sweden will make to the UN Register for 2016 will include exports to Norway (Combat Vehicle 90) and to Hungary (JAS Gripen). Trade in heavy weapons systems and small arms and light weapons is reported annually to the OSCE in the same way as to the UN.

The reporting mechanism of the Wassenaar Arrangement regarding exports of military equipment largely follows the seven categories reported to the UN Register. However, certain categories have been refined through the introduction of subgroups and an eighth category for small arms and light weapons has been added. The Member States have agreed to report twice yearly, in accordance with an agreed procedure, and further information may then be submitted voluntarily. The purpose of this agreement is to draw attention to destabilising accumulations of weapons at an early stage. Exports of dual-use items and technology are also reported twice yearly.

### **The UN Arms Trade Treaty**

On 2 April 2013, the UN General Assembly voted to approve the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). The Treaty created an internationally binding instrument that requires its parties to maintain effective national control of the international trade in defence equipment and sets standards for what this control will entail. The anticipated long-term effects of this treaty are (a) countries that regularly produce and export military equipment taking greater responsibility; (b) a reduction in unregulated international trade, as more states accede and ahead of checks on trade; (c) better opportunities to tackle the illegal trade, through the increased number of countries that exercise control and through improved cooperation between them.

Sweden and other EU countries were active advocates for the instrument during the negotiations on a treaty. All the EU Member States have since ratified the Treaty and are therefore full states parties to it. The Treaty entered into force in 2014. By the end of 2016, 130 countries had signed and 91 countries had formally ratified the Treaty.

The second Conference of States Parties was held in 2016. A permanent secretariat has been established in Geneva and three working groups have been set up for treaty work between the Conferences of States Parties. The working groups will focus on implementation of the Treaty, universalisation of the Treaty and transparency and reporting issues. Finally, a voluntary trust fund has been established for support to those states parties needing help in improving their controls of the international arms trade.

Sweden has coordinated work in the area of reporting since 2014. The Conference of States Parties in August 2016 adopted the detailed procedures for mandatory reporting under the Treaty. Sweden currently co-chairs, together with Mexico, the working group focused on transparency and reporting, as well as taking part in other working groups and in the steering group for the voluntary trust fund.

EU Member States continued in 2016 to coordinate their actions concerning the ATT using a special subgroup of COARM. Significant efforts are also being made to promote universal accession to the Treaty. The EU's triennial programme to support implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty by other countries and therefore their prospects of acceding to the Treaty has been met with significant interest, and activities have so far been carried out in more than 10 countries and in a number of regional contexts. A new triennial programme is being prepared.

In 2016, Sweden contributed for the third time to the UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR), which includes funding to projects that support the implementation of the ATT. Sweden is one of around 10 countries that have contributed to this fund. Sweden has also contributed to the voluntary trust fund set up under the Arms Trade Treaty. The two funds complement each other in that they are focused on different support channels. UNSCAR operates through international organisations and civil society organisations, while the voluntary trust fund under the Arms Trade Treaty is aimed directly at states parties. The Government attaches great importance to a widespread adoption and effective implementation of the UN Arms Trade Treaty. A universal, legally binding treaty that strengthens the control of trade in conventional arms is an effective tool to deal with the cross-border flows of weapons that nurture armed violence and armed conflicts. Sweden will therefore play an active part in continued work aimed at realising the objectives of the Treaty.

### **Small arms and light weapons (SALW)**

The expression small arms and light weapons (SALW) essentially refers to firearms which are intended to be carried and used by one person, as well as weapons intended to be carried and used by two or more persons. Examples of the former category include pistols and assault rifles. Examples of the latter include machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and portable missiles. Work to prevent and combat the destabilising accumulation and the uncontrolled proliferation of small arms and light weapons is currently taking place in various international forums such as the UN, the EU and the OSCE. No other type of weapons causes more deaths and suffering than these, which are used every day in local and regional conflicts, particularly in developing countries, and in connection with serious crime.

In 2001, the United Nations adopted the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA). The aim of the UN's work is to raise awareness about the destabilising effect small arms and light weapons have on regions suffering from conflict. Non-proliferation is also important in combating criminality and, not least, terrorism. As a result of the entry into force of the ATT, and as the number of states parties to it grows, efforts under the PoA will be able to benefit from greater control of international trade and focus on measures at national level to combat the illegal proliferation of SALW.

In 2016, Sweden made an active contribution to this, partly through work on preparation for, and participation in, the Sixth Biennial Meeting of States on the Programme of Action.

The annual OSCE Ministerial Council adopted a declaration on the organisation's activities in the area of SALW, including safe stockpiling of conventional weapons.

During the year, Sweden reported exports of small arms and light weapons to the UN Register of Conventional Arms as well as to the OSCE Register of Conventional Arms. The Wassenaar Arrangement

(WA) also includes an obligation to report trade in these arms, among others. Skr. 2016/17:114

Sweden is working towards a situation where every country establishes and implements a responsible export policy with comprehensive laws and regulations. The aim is for all countries to have effective systems that control manufacturers, sellers, buyers, agents and brokers of SALW.

### **The Six-Nation Initiative – Letter of Intent (LoI)**

In 2000, the six nations in Europe with the largest defence industries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) signed an important defence industry cooperation agreement at the governmental level, known as the Framework Agreement. This agreement was negotiated as a result of the declaration of intent adopted by the countries' defence ministers in 1998, the Six-Nation Initiative or Letter of Intent (LoI). The purpose of the agreement is to promote the rationalisation, restructuring and operation of the European defence industry. Activity in the six-nation initiative and its working groups has also covered export control issues.

In 2016, the Export Control Informal Working Group, chaired by France, continued to deal with the implementation and application of the ICT Directive (2009/43/EC), in close collaboration with the Commission's Directorate-General for Internal Market, Entrepreneurship and SMEs and the group that has been established for work under the ICT Committee. The LoI working group has focused on opportunities for harmonising the scope of and conditions in general licences the Member States are to issue under the Directive. Work has also been initiated to come up with a joint definition in the EU's Common Military List for the concept "specially designed for military use".

## **3 Dual-Use Items**

### **3.1 Background and regulatory framework**

The issue of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has long been high on the international agenda. Particular attention has been given to the efforts to prevent further states from obtaining weapons of mass destruction. Since the act of terrorism on 11 September 2001, there has also been a strong focus on non-state actors.

There is no legal definition of what is meant by weapons of mass destruction. However, the term is commonly used to indicate nuclear weapons and chemical and biological warfare agents. In modern terminology, radiological weapons are also sometimes considered to be covered by the term. In efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, certain delivery systems, such as long-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, are also included.

Multilateral measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have primarily been expressed through a number of international conventions and cooperation within a number of export control regimes, in which many of the major producer countries cooperate to make non-proliferation work more effective.

The term dual-use items (DUIs) is used in reference to items produced for civil use that may also be used in the production of weapons of mass destruction or military equipment. Certain other products of particular strategic importance, including encryption systems, are also classified as DUIs. In recent decades, the international community has developed a range of cooperation arrangements to limit the proliferation of these products. EU countries have a common regulatory framework in Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items (the Dual-Use Regulation). Export control itself is always exercised nationally, but extensive coordination also takes place through international export control regimes and within the EU.

EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction from 2003 contains a commitment to strengthen the effectiveness of export control of DUIs in Europe. One fundamental reason is that various sensitive products that could be misused in connection with weapons of mass destruction are manufactured in the EU. The export control measures required in the EU must, at the same time, be proportionate with regard to the risk of proliferation and not unnecessarily disrupt the internal market or the competitiveness of European companies.

Within the international export control regimes, control lists have been drawn up establishing which products are to be subject to licensing. This is justified by the fact that some countries run programmes for the development of weapons of mass destruction despite having signed international agreements prohibiting or regulating such activities, or because they remain outside of the agreements that prohibit or regulate such activities. Such countries have often reinforced their capacity by importing civilian products that are then used for military purposes. History has shown that countries which have acquired military capacity in this way have imported those products from companies that were not aware of their contribution to the development of, for example, weapons of mass destruction. Often the same purchase request is sent to companies in different countries. Previously, one country could refuse an export licence while another country granted it. Consequently, there was an obvious need for closer cooperation and information sharing between exporting countries. This need prompted the establishment of the export control regimes. The need for control has been underscored in recent years by the threat of terrorism.

The inclusion of a DUI on a control list does not automatically mean that exports of that item are prohibited. Rather, the listing indicates that the item is sensitive. In the EU, the control lists adopted by the various regimes are incorporated into Annex 1 of Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 and constitute the basis for decisions for granting or denial of export licences.

It follows from the EU Regulation that the Member States can use a mechanism that enables products not on the lists to be made subject to

controls in the event that the exporter or the licensing authorities become aware that the product is or may be intended for use in connection with the production etc. of weapons of mass destruction or for other military purposes. This is known as a catch-all mechanism, and is also common practice within the international export control regimes.

Much of the work within the EU and the regimes consists of the extensive exchange of information, both internal and in the form of external outreach activities – directed at domestic industry and at other countries – on the need for export control and the development of export control systems.

The export control of DUIs and of technical assistance in connection with these products is governed nationally by the Dual-Use Items and Technical Assistance Control Act (2000:1064). The Act contains provisions supplementing the DUI Regulation in EU law.

It is difficult to provide an overall picture of the industries that work with DUIs in Sweden, since a considerable proportion of products are sold in the EU market or exported to markets covered by the EU's general export licences. The principal rule is that no licence is required for transfer to another EU member State. The general licence EU001 applies, with some exceptions, to all products in Annex I to Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 regarding export to Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland (including Liechtenstein) and the United States.

In addition, another five general licences were introduced (EU002–006) for certain products going to certain destinations, export after repair/replacement, temporary export to exhibitions and trade fairs, certain chemicals and telecommunications. The number of countries covered by licences EU002–006 ranges from six countries in EU002 and EU006 to nine in EU005 and 24 countries in EU003 and EU004. The purpose of the general licences is to make it easier for the companies, which only need to report to the licensing authority 30 days after the first export has taken place.

Unlike the companies which are subject to the military equipment legislation, no basic licences under the export control legislation are required for companies that produce or trade in DUIs. Nor are these companies obliged to make a declaration of delivery in accordance with the export control legislation. However, a company is obliged to make a fee declaration if it has manufactured or sold controlled products subject to supervision by the ISP. This includes sales within and outside of Sweden.

In the event that a company is aware that a DUI, which the company concerned intends to export and which is not listed in Annex I of the EU Regulation, is intended to be used in connection with weapons of mass destruction, it is required to inform the ISP. The ISP may, following the customary assessment of the licence application, decide not to grant a licence for export (catch-all).

The majority of the DUIs exported with a licence from the ISP are telecommunications equipment, primarily encryption and thermal imaging devices that are controlled in the Wassenaar Arrangement's export regime (WA). Carbon fibre and frequency inverters for the dairy/food industry also account for a significant proportion. Another

major product in terms of volumes is heat exchangers. These are controlled within the Australia Group (AG). Other products, such as isostatic presses, chemicals or UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) and equipment related to such vehicles represent a smaller share of DUIs but can require extensive resources in the assessment of licence applications.

The embargo on trade in DUIs is in accordance with decisions by the UN and has been implemented and expanded by the EU to encompass North Korea. Under an EU decision, this embargo is complete, i.e. it covers all products on the EU control list. Certain similar items are also covered by an embargo. The same applies with regard to the embargoes introduced by the EU due to the human rights situation in Iran, which are, however, linked to different types of licensing procedures. Against the background of Russia's actions in Ukraine, the EU has furthermore adopted certain restrictive measures (sanctions) against Russia. Export restrictions cover the entire EU control list for DUIs, when intended for military end use or for military end users. Exceptions are made for certain products/technologies intended for the aerospace industry for non-military use and non-military end users. In accordance with EU decisions, exports of certain DUIs are also prohibited or covered by a licence requirement in relation to Syria. The agreement reached on 14 July 2015 between Iran, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, Germany and the EU on Iran's nuclear programme (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPoA) anticipates that all EU sanctions against Iran related to nuclear technology will be lifted the day the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can confirm that Iran has fulfilled its obligations under the plan. As part of the implementation of JCPoA and following verification by the IAEA concerning Iran's obligations, on 16 January 2016 the EU altered the economic and financial sanctions introduced in response to Iran's nuclear technology programme. Licensing procedures now apply to DUIs that have been previously been subject to embargoes. However, this does not apply to items covered by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

### 3.2 Cooperation within international export regimes

#### **International agreements**

With regard to the international agreements, specific reference should be made to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT), the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BTWC) and the 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC). Sweden is a party to all three conventions (see SÖ 1970:12, SÖ 1976:18 and SÖ 1993:28).

Under the NPT, non-nuclear-weapon states undertake not to receive or manufacture nuclear weapons, while the five nuclear-weapon states



(China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) commit themselves to disarmament. Furthermore, the parties undertake not to transfer source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to any non-nuclear-weapon state, unless the source or special fissionable material or equipment is subject to the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards.

In the BTWC, the parties undertake not to transfer, either directly or indirectly, equipment that can be used for the production of biological weapons.

Similarly, the CWC stipulates that its parties are not to transfer, either directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to any other state.

Although the primary objective of these international agreements is to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to promote disarmament, they also require the parties to promote trade for peaceful purposes. The reason for this is that a substantial proportion of the products and technologies concerned are dual-use items.

### **The international export control regimes**

To strengthen international cooperation on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, some forty countries have, on their own initiative, come together in five international export control regimes: the Zangger Committee (ZC), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Australia Group (AG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA).

The purpose of the regimes is to identify goods and technologies that can be used in connection with weapons of mass destruction and to enhance the uniformity of the participating countries' export control of these. To support this work, each regime has a list of items subject to control. The lists are revised on a regular basis. This work also includes exchanging information on refused exports, proliferation risks and contacts with third countries for the purpose of promoting the regimes' non-proliferation objectives.

Cooperation in the multilateral export control regimes is grounded in a shared political will to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This is achieved through national legislation enabling the export control of goods and technologies identified as strategic. Participation in these regimes makes it easier to meet the legally binding international commitments in the above-mentioned international agreements to refrain from assisting other states, directly or indirectly, in acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

### **The Zangger Committee**

The Zangger Committee, which was established in 1974, deals with export control issues related to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The Committee defines the meaning of equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the production of special fissionable material. Consequently, its responsibilities overlap to some extent with those of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), of which more below. The NPT

stipulates that export of such equipment and material, as well as fissionable material, to a non-nuclear-weapon state is only allowed if the fissionable material is subject to IAEA safeguards. The equipment and materials are specified in the Committee's control list, which is updated to keep pace with technological developments. The list can be found in the IAEA's Information Circular No 209 (INFCIRC/209/Rev.3). The Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) is responsible for setting up the regime's website.

### **The Nuclear Suppliers Group**

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has its origins in the "London Club", established in the mid-1970s. The work of the NSG is concerned with the export control of products listed in Part 1 and Part 2 of the NSG Guidelines, including products with nuclear applications and DUIs that can be used in connection with the development or production of nuclear weapons. These products are listed in the IAEA's Information Circular No. 254, which includes two control lists for each group of items (INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2).

In 2016, the Technical Working Group (TEG), chaired by Sweden, continued its work on technical proposals and on updating the contents of the control lists. The plenary meeting for the year was held in Seoul and was chaired by South Korea. Discussions were held, among other things, on the technical, legal and political aspects of participation in NSG by states that are not parties to the NPT.

### **The Australia Group**

The Australia Group (AG) was formed in 1985 on the initiative of Australia. Its aim is to harmonise member countries' export controls to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. Originally, the Group's work only encompassed chemicals and chemical production equipment. In 1990, however, it was decided to expand the control lists to include microorganisms, toxins and certain manufacturing equipment for biological weapons. In 2016, the AG continued its outreach work with countries that are not members of the regime. At the 2016 plenary in Paris, the Group's members agreed to strengthen work on non-proliferation of biological and chemical weapons through a special focus on emerging technologies and to prevent terrorism in which these weapons are used.

### **The Missile Technology Control Regime**

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was set up as a result of an American initiative in 1982. It focuses on export controls of complete rocket systems (including ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles and sounding rockets) and other unmanned aerial vehicles (including cruise missiles, drones and reconnaissance platforms) with a range of 300 kilometres or more. Controls also extend to components of such systems and other items that can be used to produce missiles, and also smaller unmanned aerial vehicles designed to be able to spread aerosols.

In 2016, the work within the MTCR included continuing the review of the contents of the lists of controlled items, exchanging information on the sensitive spread of rocket equipment, technological development, national weapons programme and procurement strategies and conducting outreach activities with a range of countries. The 2016 plenary meeting was held in Busan and was chaired by South Korea. For the first time in twelve years a new member was welcomed to the MTCR: India. Membership issues for other countries continued to be discussed. A number of EU countries remain outside the regime.

Sweden has a mandate to lead the technical working group until the next plenary meeting in 2017.

### **The Wassenaar Arrangement**

The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) was formed in 1996 as a successor to the international export control cooperation that had previously taken place within the framework of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCOM). The Arrangement's work covers the control of conventional weapons, as well as dual-use items and technologies not controlled by other regimes. Consequently, it represents an important complement to the work of other regimes that focus exclusively on weapons of mass destruction and certain delivery systems. The Arrangement has 41 participating states, among which are most of the major producers and technology owners in the area concerned.

The Arrangement's aim is to contribute to regional and international security and stability by promoting openness and responsible action with regard to transfers of conventional weapons and DUIs, thus helping to avoid destabilising accumulations. The basic view taken by the Wassenaar Arrangement is that trading of the items in the control lists should be permitted, but must be controlled.

An important function upheld by the Wassenaar Arrangement is to bring together the technical expertise from the participating states to update the common control lists that guarantee that no "gaps" occur in control of the items concerned by the different countries. The Arrangement maintains two control lists attached to its basic document: the Munitions List, which covers conventional military equipment, and the List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, which covers products and technologies with both civilian and military uses that are not included in the other regimes' control lists. In practice, the two Wassenaar lists guide the contents of the EU's corresponding control lists.

The Wassenaar Arrangement's annual plenary meetings are held in the late autumn. These meetings address matters of fundamental significance to the continued development of this cooperation. On the basis of the ongoing technical work throughout the year, formal decisions are also made on updating the control lists to reflect the technological development of different types of weapons and underlying technologies.

In 2016, Sweden chaired the Wassenaar Arrangement's General Working Group (*GWG*), which is the negotiating forum that prepares issues for decision in the plenary. The role of chair of the group this year also included responsibility for a process that takes place approximately

every five years, with the task of reviewing the working methods etc. of the Wassenaar Arrangement. The plenary meeting was held in December 2016 and was chaired by Finland. New consensus recommendations describing various aspects of good export control practice were adopted. Decisions were also made concerning improvements to current working methods. Finally, a number of updates to the control lists were established.

### **Consular vigilance**

One element of the work to limit the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is what is known as consular vigilance. Sweden has both legally binding commitments, in the form of sanctions adopted by the UN and the EU, and political commitments, within the scope of the export control regimes, aimed at limiting the spread of sensitive information and technologies. One way of spreading sensitive information is through knowledge transfer. This issue becomes relevant when assessing applications for admission or residence permits for studies relating to such sensitive information and technologies. Cooperation between the authorities concerned, which aims, for example, to increase awareness of proliferation risks with regard to sensitive university study programmes or research partnerships, continued in 2016. An extensive survey was conducted among the Member States at EU level to gather information on national rules and experience, which is to form the basis for future discussions and cooperation.

## **3.3 Collaboration within the EU on dual-use items**

### **The export control regimes and the EU**

Work within the EU on the export control of dual-use items is closely associated with the international work that takes place as part of the export control regimes. Coordination in the EU takes place principally in the Council's Working Party on Non-Proliferation (CONOP), which deals with non-proliferation issues in general, and in the Working Party on Dual-Use Goods (WPDU), which works, among other things, on policy issues and updating the control list of DUIs which fall under Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 (the Dual-Use Regulation). The following section addresses the work of the WPDU.

In accordance with the EU's strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the Member States have to work towards becoming leading cooperative partners in the export control regimes by, for example, coordinating the EU positions within the regimes. The EU has long held the view that all EU Member States should be invited to join all of the export control regimes. The main reason is the desire to ensure that all EU countries maintain harmonised and effective national export controls based on the regimes' control lists, guidelines for export control and exchange of information on proliferation risks. The EU constitutes a common market for the vast majority of dual-use items.

Trade within the EU is not regarded as export in this context. However, transfer of goods and technologies to a third country does constitute export. EU Member States are thus dependent on one another's export control systems. This is an additional reason why the issue of membership in the export control regimes is a substantial one.

All EU countries are members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Australia Group (AG). This is not the case for the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), where Cyprus, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania still remain outside the regime. The same applies to Cyprus with regard to the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA).

### **Work on the control lists in 2014**

The changes made to the regimes' control lists over the course of the year are detailed in Annex I of the Council Regulation referred to above and thus become legally binding for EU Member States. In accordance with the powers delegated to it (Regulation (EU) No 599/2014), the Commission has updated Annex I to reflect the changes determined within the export control regimes. These changes became effective on 16 November 2016.

### **The WPDU's work**

The activities of the Working Party on Dual-Use Goods (WPDU) in 2016 were dominated by completion of the review of the Dual-Use Goods Regulation initiated in 2011.

The Commission published its proposals for recasting of the Dual-Use Regulation on 28 September 2016. This is a comprehensive revision of the current Regulation. The aim, according to the Commission, is to modernise the rules in consideration of technical and political developments and to make the procedure more efficient. The Commission proposes among other things that the EU's export control system be expanded to cover a new concept, human security, which is proposed to encompass both human rights and security for the EU and its Member States. The Commission focuses in particular on technology that can be used for IT surveillance and data intrusion. Attention is paid among other things to equipment for the interception of mobile telecommunications, intrusion software, monitoring centres and digital forensic technology. The Commission is also asking for a mandate to draw up guidelines in close consultation with the Member States and the affected parties to support the practical application of export control of such technology to "protect public security and public morals".

The Commission proposes an expansion of the catch-all so that licences will be required for exports from the EU for all dual-use items, including those that have not been listed, if the exporter has received information that there is a risk of their being used by persons who are involved in serious infringements of human rights or international humanitarian law, or contribute to domestic oppression in the country of final destination. Furthermore, for the catch-all to be applied, evidence is

Skr. 2016/17:114 required that the intended final user uses the item or similar items for such infringements.

The simplifications include the introduction of new general EU export licences relating for instance to encryption, shipments of low value and intra-company transfer of software and technology. On the basis of the proposal, the Government presented a background brief (2016/17:FPM22) to the Riksdag on 2 November 2016. The principal parts of the proposal and the Government's preliminary position were outlined in the background brief. The Government stated that it shared the Commission's aspiration to endeavour to bring about a strict, effective and modern export control system in the EU and among the Member States. The Government also agreed with the Commission on reducing the risks of IT surveillance software being used in a harmful manner that seriously infringes human rights. With regard to the aspect of human rights in the new proposal, it was noted that human rights are a priority issue for Sweden and the EU, and that it is in our interests to make a positive contribution to integrating human rights into the external aspects of EU policy. It was also highlighted as important that mechanisms introduced to strengthen human rights and influence repressive regimes are appropriate, precise and effective. This applies in particular if the measures taken concern obstacles to international flows of trade that are crucial to the continued prosperity of both the EU and third countries. The Government emphasised the importance of a close and broad analysis of the proposal and its repercussions.

In December 2016, the Government Offices of Sweden (Ministry for Foreign Affairs) arranged a stakeholders' meeting attended by representatives of the Swedish business community and civil society to receive information about the proposal from the Government Offices of Sweden and present their views.

The negotiations in the WPDU on the Dual-Use Regulation are expected to take place throughout 2017. In parallel with consideration by the Council, the proposal is also under discussion in the European Parliament. The proposal needs to be approved by both the Council and the Parliament.

### **Work in the Dual-Use Coordination Group (DUCG)**

The activities of the Dual-Use Coordination Group (DUCG) are aimed at coordinating application of the Dual-Use Regulation. During the year, the Group principally exchanged information on practical handling and development of the electronic dual-use system (DUES). In addition, information was exchanged among other things on the transfer of encrypted technical data and cyber-related monitoring technology.

### **3.3.1 UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)**

The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 in April 2004. The Resolution, supported by Chapter VII of the UN Charter, through binding decisions, obliges all UN Member States to prevent non-

state actors (terrorists) from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and items connected to such weapons. It sets out, among other things, that all states are to establish effective national controls on exports, brokering, transit and transshipments. The Resolution also contains provisions on assisting other countries with the implementation of the obligatory measures.

It was also decided through Resolution 1540 to establish a committee tasked with reporting to the Security Council on the Resolution's implementation. The UN's Member States are urged to report to this committee on the steps that they have taken to implement the Resolution. The mandate of the 1540 Committee runs until April 2021.

In December 2016, the Chair of the Committee presented a Comprehensive Review of the status of implementation of Resolution 1540 to the UN Security Council. A new Security Council resolution on this matter was adopted on the same occasion. Sweden played an active part in the review work, among other things by joining the Group of Friends of Resolution 1540 and contributing to the open consultations that took place in the summer of 2016.

An international initiative that shares several points with Security Council Resolution 1540 and partly overlaps with it is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), to which 105 countries have acceded. This initiative, supported by the EU and Sweden, aims to strengthen international cooperation in order to be better able to prevent the transport of weapons of mass destruction and the components of such products to unauthorised recipients within the framework of international and national law.

National efforts to maintain the necessary preparedness and to act in an urgent matter of this type are divided between the authorities concerned according to established remit principles. Sweden took part in a Mid-Level Political Meeting under the PSI in January 2016, as well as through the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and a number of affected authorities in a regional PSI exercise with several Baltic states, hosted by Estonia in June.

## 4 Responsible Authorities

### 4.1 The Inspectorate of Strategic Products

The Inspectorate of Strategic Products (ISP) is the central administrative authority for cases and supervision pursuant to the Military Equipment Act (1992:1300) and the dual-use items and Technical Assistance Control Act (2000:1064), provided that, in the latter instance, no other authority has this task. The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) has the same responsibility with reference to particularly sensitive nuclear technology products.

The Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) and the Swedish National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA) assist the ISP by providing

specialist technical expertise and organisation including the Swedish Military Intelligence and Security Directorate (Must), the Swedish Security Service (Säpo) and FRA supply the ISP with information. The ISP also has an established partnership with Swedish Customs. Some of the ISP's supervisory inspections are carried out jointly with Swedish Customs and the authorities also exchange information on export licences.

The Government has appointed the ISP as what is known as the competent authority, responsible for executing certain duties stipulated by Council resolutions concerning sanctions decided by the European Union. The ISP also has supervisory duties in relation to special prohibiting regulations issued by the Government with the support of the Act (1996:95) on Certain International Sanctions.

In addition, the ISP is the national authority under the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and performs the duties pursuant to the Act (1994:118) concerning inspections under the CWC. This aspect of the ISP's activities is not dealt with in the present Communication.

The ISP is also the licensing authority for cases in accordance with Regulation No 258/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2013, regulating licences to export civilian firearms, their parts and components and ammunition outside of the EU and certain import and transit measures.

The authority's responsibilities are set out in the Ordinance (2010:1101) with instructions for the Inspection of strategic products. The Ordinance stipulates that the ISP shall present to the Government prior to 15 February each year 1) a report on Swedish exports of military equipment and other strategic products during the previous calendar year and 2) a description of significant trends in Swedish and international export control.

In 2015 and 2016, the Swedish National Audit Office conducted a review of the ISP and the export control of military equipment. Control of DUIs was not included in the study. The purpose of the review was to examine whether export control of military equipment takes place in an effective way and works as intended. The outcome of the review has been presented in a review report (RiR 2017:2) published on 17 January 2017. It contains conclusions and recommendations relating to the Government and the ISP. The report notes that the ISP has a functioning working method, but that there is some room for improvement in administration. The Government will respond to the Swedish National Audit Office report in the customary manner through a Communication to the Riksdag in the spring of 2017.

### **Contacts with companies**

The ISP maintains regular contact with the companies whose exports are subject to control. The Military Equipment Act and the Military Equipment Ordinance set forth most of the obligations for companies to present notifications and data to the ISP. For example, companies have to report regularly to the ISP on their marketing activities abroad. These reports form the basis for the ISP's periodic briefings with the companies regarding their export plans. The ISP may issue positive or negative



advance decisions to the companies concerning destinations that are sensitive or have not yet been assessed.

In addition to processing export licence applications, the ISP reviews the notifications that companies and authorities are obliged to submit at least four weeks prior to submitting tenders or signing contracts concerning exports of military equipment or other cooperation with foreign partners in this field. At this stage, the ISP has the opportunity to provide notification that the measure they were informed of in advance is prohibited. Exporters of military equipment must also report the deliveries of military equipment that are made under the export licences issued to them.

Unlike military equipment, no licence is required to manufacture dual-use items (DUIs). Furthermore, as a general rule licences are not required for sales within the EU (a licence is only required for what are referred to as Annex IV items). The control lists that are drawn up in accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 (the Dual-Use Regulation) state which categories of items require licences to be exported outside the EU. When classifying whether a product is to be considered a DUI or not, it is primarily the companies that classify their own items. When a company is unsure whether its item belongs to the controlled items category, the company can submit an enquiry to the ISP. In light of this, the ISP's contacts with DUI companies are different than is the case with regard to military equipment. With the exception of a few companies, the ISP meets DUI companies less regularly.

In its supervisory role, the ISP carries out compliance visits to companies to monitor their internal export control organisations. In 2016 the ISP carried out 27 compliance visits.

## **Funding**

Rules concerning the ISP's funding are detailed in the Ordinance (2008:889) on the financing of the operations of the Inspectorate of Strategic Products (ISP). A large proportion of the authority's activities are funded by fees. The Ordinance stipulates that the fee structure is broken down into three categories: military equipment, dual-use items and products covered by the Act Concerning Inspections in Accordance with the UN Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

When the Ordinance (2013:707) concerning the control of certain firearms, parts of firearms and ammunition handed the ISP the task of assessing export licence applications in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 258/2012, the ISP was also given the right to charge licence application fees.

Parts of the ISP's international operations and work related to international sanctions are funded by appropriations through the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The ISP's exports of services should primarily be funded by parties other than the ISP. No services were exported in 2016.

**The Export Control Council (ECC)**

In 1984, on the basis of Govt Bill 1984/85:82, proposing greater transparency and consultation on matters relating to exports of military equipment, the Riksdag decided to establish an advisory board concerned with exports of military equipment. The Government reorganised this board into the Export Control Council (ECC) in connection with the establishment of the ISP in 1996. The rules governing the composition and activities of the ECC are included in the ISP's instructions. All parliamentary parties are represented on the ECC. It is chaired by the Director-General of the ISP. A list of the Council's members in 2016 appears below.

The Director-General of the ISP is responsible for selecting those cases that will be subjected to consultation with the Export Control Council. Consultation often takes place before a company is informed of an advance notification. In addition, the Director-General has to consult the Council before the ISP submits an application to the Government for assessment under the Military Equipment Act or the dual-use items and Technical Assistance Control Act.

At meetings of the ECC, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs presents assessments of the relevant purchasing countries, and the Ministry of Defence provides assessments of the defence policy aspects of the applications. The Director-General may also summon other experts. One task of the Council is to present opinions on proposed exports based on the Swedish guidelines, the EU Common Position on Arms Exports and the UN Arms Trade Treaty, in order to provide further guidance to the ISP.

The members have unrestricted access to the documentation of all export licence application proceedings. The Director-General reports continuously on all export licence decisions, processed tender notifications and cooperation agreements, as well as advance decisions that have been ruled upon. With effect from 2005, the ISP has also reported all export licence decisions for dual-use items to the ECC. Taken together, this system ensures good insight into application of the rules on export control for members of parliament from all parties represented in the Riksdag.

The intention of the Swedish system, uniquely in international terms in that representatives of the political parties can discuss potential export transactions in advance, is to build a broad consensus on export control policy and promote continuity in the conduct of that policy. Unlike in many other countries, the Export Control Council deals with cases at an early stage, before a specific transaction is carried out. Since it would harm the exporting companies commercially if their plans were made known before they had concluded a deal, the Export Control Council's discussions are not made public. Apart from this, the assessments of individual countries are normally subject to confidentiality in relation to foreign affairs.

The Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs, and not the Export Control Council, is still consulted in cases where this is prescribed by the Instrument of Government. The Export Control Council met eight times in 2016.

In 2015 the Government decided to appoint the following present and former members of Parliament to the Export Control Council. The appointments expire at the end of 2018: Skr. 2016/17:114

Jan R Andersson, Member of Parliament (Moderate Party)  
Annicka Engblom, Member of Parliament (Moderate Party)  
Stig Henriksson, Member of Parliament (Left Party)  
Mikael Jansson, Member of Parliament (Sweden Democrats)  
Kerstin Lundgren, Member of Parliament (Centre Party)  
Mattias Ottosson, Member of Parliament (Social Democrats)  
Pernilla Stålhammar, Member of Parliament (Green Party)  
Caroline Szyber, Member of Parliament (Christian Democrats)  
Anna-Lena Sörenson, Member of Parliament (Social Democrats)  
Lars Johansson, former Member of Parliament (Social Democrats)  
Nina Larsson, former Member of Parliament (Liberal Party)  
Per Westerberg, former Member of Parliament (Moderate Party)

### **The Strategic Cooperation Council**

The Strategic Cooperation Council is a forum attached to the ISP for cooperation on issues related to non-proliferation. It consists of a Director-General and members from the cooperating authorities appointed by the ISP. The Strategic Cooperation Council met once in 2016.

### **The Technical-Scientific Council**

In connection with the discussion of matters concerning the classification of military equipment and dual-use items, the Director-General of the ISP is assisted by a Technical-Scientific Council attached to the Agency. This consists of representatives of institutions with expertise in the technology's civilian and military applications. The Technical-Scientific Council held two meetings in 2016.

## **4.2 The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority**

In accordance with the Ordinance (2008:452) with instructions for the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) is the central government authority for issues relating to the protection of human health and the environment against the harmful effects of ionising and non-ionising radiation, security and physical protection in nuclear and other activities involving radiation and nuclear non-proliferation.

The SSM's non-proliferation remit in connection with exports of nuclear material and nuclear technology products is stated in the Ordinance mentioned above and in the Dual-use Items and Technical Assistance Control Ordinance (2000:1217). This states that the SSM decides whether or not to authorise exports to a country outside the EU or for transfers within the EU of nuclear material and nuclear technology products, except in certain specific cases, defined in the Ordinance, for

which the Government is the decision-making body. The items are specified in Annex I, Category 0 and in Annex IV of Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009. SSM is also the national supervisory authority with regard to compliance with these provisions.

On 19 April 2012 the Government gave the SSM expanded tasks regarding consideration of applications linked to Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran and Council Regulation (EC) No 329/2007 concerning restrictive measures against North Korea.

In the field of nuclear non-proliferation, the SSM, in accordance with the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities, is the national supervisory authority ensuring that Swedish nuclear activities are conducted in accordance with the obligations resulting from the international agreements to which Sweden is party that aim to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The SSM is also the national contact point for the IAEA database covering the illicit trafficking and other unauthorised handling of nuclear materials and other radioactive substances.

The SSM cooperates with other authorities on export control matters, in particular the ISP and Swedish Customs. The SSM is also supported by the specialist technical expertise of FOI, but does itself have a high level of specialist expertise in the field of nuclear technology.

### **Control of nuclear exports**

Nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium and thorium) and nuclear technology products are classified as DUEs; consequently, their export is governed by Regulation (EC) No 428/2009. Exports to countries outside the EU require licences, but the EU's general export licences do not apply to these items. In addition, transfers within the EU involving several products, including particularly sensitive nuclear materials and nuclear equipment, also require licences.

When an application for a licence to export nuclear fuel is submitted, the SSM assesses, in parallel, the issue of the possible transfer of the nuclear material in accordance with the Act (1984:3) and Ordinance (1984:14) on Nuclear Activities. For spent nuclear fuel, the SSM also investigates the issue of the materials' final disposal. With regard to spent nuclear fuel originating from nuclear activities in Sweden, the application has to include an assurance that the exporter will recover the material if it cannot be disposed of in the intended manner. Furthermore, the SSM decides how nuclear material will be transported with the aim of preventing radiological accidents and to ensure that there is adequate physical protection.

The conditions imposed in decisions concerning export licences are based on the guidelines agreed in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). These include obtaining certain specified assurances from the government of the recipient country before an export licence can be granted. These assurances will state that the items are for peaceful use, that the IAEA have full safeguarding rights in the country and that nuclear material has adequate physical protection in the country. In addition, there must be a guarantee that re-exportation will not take place without corresponding assurances. The SSM is tasked by the

Government with obtaining these assurances from the government of the country in receipt of exports of nuclear technology, as well as with drawing up and submitting Swedish assurances to exporting countries when Sweden imports such material. However, in the case of initial transactions, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs obtains the assurances for exports or provides assurances for imports.

All EU Member States are part of the European Atomic Energy Community (the Euratom Treaty), one purpose of which is to establish a common market for special materials and equipment in the field of nuclear energy and to guarantee that nuclear material is not used for anything other than its intended purpose. All the EU Member States have also ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and have concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA with associated additional protocols. The Government is of the opinion that the existing licensing procedure for trade within the EU, in accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 and the commitments of the Member States within the scope of Euratom, normally provides sufficient safeguards in the transfer of nuclear material and nuclear technologies between EU Member States and are in accordance with the NSG Guidelines.

Within the scope of the Euratom Treaty, the EU has the right to enter into agreements with third countries. Bilateral agreements on the peaceful use of nuclear energy have been entered into between the EU and the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. There is an equivalent agreement between the EU and South Africa, but this had not yet entered into force in 2016.

All EU Member States have undertaken to report all exports of nuclear material and nuclear technologies to the IAEA, under the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, in the case of Sweden INFCIRC/193/Add.8. For Sweden, this means that the European Commission, through its safeguards under the Euratom Treaty, reports all exports of nuclear material to the IAEA and that the SSM reports all exports of nuclear technologies to the IAEA. As opposed to the case with other DUIs, the SSM must be notified of exports of nuclear technologies listed in Annex 1, Category 0 of Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 for this reporting to take place.

SSM handled 50 applications received for export licences in 2016. These exclusively concerned products for nuclear reactors and nuclear fuel, around a third of which comprised technical documentation and software. Details of the export licences granted by the SSM in 2016 can be found in Annex 2, Table 5.

The SSM makes contact with the companies affected by its safeguarding activities when necessary. In its supervisory role, the SSM carries out visits to companies to ensure that they are aware of and comply with the requirements made on them in the event of intra-EU transfers or extra-EU exports of DUIs. Three such visits took place in 2016.

## 5 Statistics and Terminology

The Inspectorate of Strategic Products (ISP) provides the Government with the statistical material on which the reporting of Swedish exports of military equipment and dual-use items is based. The data in the Communication is based on the statutory reporting submitted annually to the ISP by companies and authorities exporting military equipment. The report on Swedish exports of military equipment in 2016 is presented in Annex 1 and the account of exports of dual-use items in Annex 2.

The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) monitors the development of nuclear technology in Sweden and provides statistical data for the Government's reporting of dual-use nuclear technologies. This report is in Annex 2.

### **Reporting of activity related to military equipment**

#### *Manufacturing and brokering*

Companies licensed to manufacture and supply military equipment are required to submit reports concerning various aspects to the ISP. This reporting requirement also applies to authorities that conduct export-controlled activity abroad.

178 companies and two authorities were covered by the reporting requirement in 2016. 60 of the companies and two authorities exported military equipment or technical assistance during the year.

#### *Export licences granted and actual exports*

The reporting of exports of military equipment relates both to export licences granted by the ISP during the year and to actual exports made from Sweden. Statistics from previous years are also shown in some tables for comparison. It should be pointed out that individual sales and deliveries of major systems may cause wide fluctuations in the annual statistics.

The value and scope of the licences issued by the ISP provide merely an indication of what actual exports may look like in subsequent years. This is due in part to not all licences being utilised and to the fact that actual deliveries may take place several years after the export licence has been issued. The aggregate value of granted export licences become an increasingly poor indicator of the following year's deliveries as more global and general licences are issued. The value of these types of export licences is not as a rule specified. Licences of "unlimited value" are highlighted by the symbol  $\infty$  in Table 7.

Statistics on actual export are based on the companies' invoiced and delivered military equipment and technical assistance. Leasing agreements with foreign customers are not currently included in the export statistics data.

Swedish exports of military equipment are also reported in the general statistics on foreign trade, which are based on the data submitted to Statistics Sweden by Swedish Customs. Statistics Sweden uses different product categories than the ISP in its reporting, however, and the figures are thus not directly comparable with the ISP's statistics.

### *Military training*

The Swedish Military Equipment Act (1992:1300) stipulates that military training of foreign nationals may not be conducted in or outside Sweden without permission from the ISP. This prohibition does not apply to training associated with sales of military equipment for which export licences have been granted.

Four permits for military training were issued in 2016 (Indonesia, Norway, Poland and the United Kingdom).

### *Follow-on deliveries*

It can sometimes be interesting to study in greater detail what proportion of granted export licences for sales to a particular country involve follow-on deliveries. The statistical report provides such an account for countries outside the EU/OECD. This also indicates the type of item covered by new licences.

## **Categories of military equipment**

Following the implementation of Directive 2009/43/EC simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community the Swedish list of military equipment is now identical to the EU Common Military List, with three national supplements (nuclear explosive devices, fortification facilities and certain chemical weapons).

The Swedish list of military equipment is also supplemented by a division into military equipment for combat purposes (MEC) and other military equipment (OME). Each classification is defined more closely in the Ordinance (1992:1303) on Military Equipment and the EU's Military List. This Communication presents the breakdown into MEC and OME, as well as the military list designations (ML) and national additions (NL), where applicable. The MEC category includes equipment with a destructive impact including sights for such equipment and fire control equipment. The OME category includes parts and components for MEC, as well as equipment that does not have a directly destructive impact in a combat situation.

Where a table states that export licences have been granted or that exports have been made within a particular ML category, this refers to one or more items in that category. This does not mean that export licences have been granted for or that there have been exports of every one of the items in the category of equipment.

In 2016, the ISP petitioned the Government for certain adjustments to the concepts of MEC and OME.

**Agreements on manufacturing rights and cooperation and ownership in foreign legal entities**

In 2016, the ISP approved two licences for Swedish companies to enter into agreements involving the granting or transfer of manufacturing rights to parties outside Sweden (Section 7 of the Military Equipment Act). These licences were in reference to the following countries: Poland and the United States.

In 2016, the ISP approved 24 licences for Swedish government agencies and Swedish companies to enter into cooperation agreements with parties outside the country to jointly with said parties, or on their behalf, provide technical assistance to parties abroad, develop military equipment or methods for the manufacture of such material or to jointly manufacture military equipment (Section 8 of the Military Equipment Act). These licences were in reference to the following countries: Brazil, Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States.

In 2016 the ISP approved seven licences for Swedish government agencies and Swedish companies to enter into agreements regarding additions or changes to such agreements as require licences under Section 7 or 8 of the Act referred to (Section 9 of the Military Equipment Act). These licences were in reference to the following countries: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Arab Emirates and the United States.

Entities having transferred manufacturing rights for military equipment by agreement to a party in a foreign country or having entered into a cooperation agreement with a foreign partner must report on an annual basis whether the agreement is still in force, whether production or other cooperation under such an agreement still takes place and how such cooperation is conducted (Section 23 of the Military Equipment Ordinance). In 2016, 12 companies and one government agency reported 138 agreements on transferred manufacturing rights or agreements entered into for cooperation in 27 countries.

A party holding a manufacturing or brokerage licence for military equipment (and government agencies undertaking corresponding activity) is obliged to provide information to the ISP on ownership in foreign legal entities undertaking development, manufacturing, marketing or sale of military equipment (Section 17 of the Military Equipment Act). In 2016, nine companies reported ownership in 82 foreign legal entities in 31 countries.



# Exports of Military Equipment

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Bilaga 1

**Table 1** Number of applications received concerning the export of military equipment

Type of case	2014	2015	2016
Advance notifications	39	37	47
Notification of tenders	254	294	267
Export licences	1 043	1 123	1 059


The number of cases received concerning exports of civil firearms (hunting and sport shooting weapons) and parts and ammunition for such weapons outside the EU is shown in Table 16.

**Table 2** Value of export licences granted in 2012–2016, divided into military equipment for combat purposes (MEC) and other military equipment (OME)

Year	Value at current prices (SEK million)			Change in per cent		
	Total	MEC	OME	Total	MEC	OME
2012	7 936	5 147	2 789	-27	+74	-65
2013	9 829	6 339	3 490	+24	+23	+25
2014	4 481	1 349	3 132	-54	-78	-10
2015	4 949	2 790	2 159	+10	+107	-31
2016	61 879	47 790	14 089	+ 1 150	+1 613	+553

The value of granted export licences concerning civil firearms (hunting and sport shooting weapons) and parts and ammunition for such weapons outside the EU is shown in Table 16.

**Table 3** Value of granted export licences, grouped by military equipment for combat purposes (MEC) and other military equipment (OME) 2012–2016 (SEK million)




**Table 4 Actual exports of military equipment 2012–2016 compared with total exports of goods**

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Bilaga 1

Year	Sweden's total exports of goods (current prices) SEK million	Military equipment exports Proporti on of exports of goods %	Change in					
			Current prices (SEK million)			per cent		
			Total	MEC	OME	Total	MEC	OME
2012	1 168 300	0.84	9 760	3 746	6 014	-30	-35	-25
2013	1 090 800	1.09	11 942	5 554	6 388	+22	+48	+6
2014	1 127 000	0.71	7 958	3 258	4 700	-33	-41	-26
2015	1 180 600	0.64	7 603 <sup>1</sup>	3 560	4 043	-4	+9	-14
2016	1 193 700	0.92	10 989	4 410	6 579	+45	+24	+63

<sup>1</sup> Of which SEK 143 million pertains to exports of civil firearms and ammunition for these.

**Table 5 Actual exports of military equipment 2012–2016 (SEK million)**



**Table 6 Categories of military equipment**

<b>EU ML Products classed as MEC (others are OME)</b>	<b>Scope</b>
<p>1 ML 1 a except for revolvers and pistols and weapons designed for hunting and sport shooting.</p> <p>Breeches, barrels, jackets and magazines.</p> <p>ML 1c</p>	<p>Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20 mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12.7 mm (calibre 0.50 inches) or less and accessories and specially designed components therefor.</p>
<p>2 ML 2 a except for signature reduction devices.</p> <p>Barrels, mechanisms, ground plates and recoil mechanisms.</p> <p>ML 2d</p>	<p>Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of 20 mm or more, other weapons or armament with a calibre greater than 12.7 mm (calibre 0.50 inches), projectors and accessories and specially designed components therefor.</p>
<p>3 ML 3 a except for smoke, flare and training ammunition and expanding bullet ammunition of a type employed for hunting or sport shooting.</p> <p>Projectiles, shell bodies, homing devices and warheads.</p>	<p>Ammunition and fuse setting devices and specially designed components therefor.</p>
<p>4 ML 4 a except for smoke pots, cartridges and simulators.</p> <p>Homing devices, warheads, fuses, proximity fuses, motors, control systems, barrels and carriages.</p> <p>ML 4 b. Only activating, firing, laying, detonating and discharge of MEC defined equipment.</p>	<p>Bombs, torpedoes, rockets, missiles, other devices and charges with explosive effect and associated equipment and accessories and specially designed components therefor.</p>
<p>5 ML 5 a)</p> <p>ML 5 b only target capture, target designation and target tracking systems.</p>	<p>Fire control, and related alerting and warning equipment, and related systems, test and alignment and countermeasure equipment, specially designed for military use, and specially designed components and accessories therefor.</p>
<p>6 ML 6 with restriction to note 1 a) and b)</p>	<p>Ground vehicles and components.</p>
<p>7 ML 7 a), b) and e)</p>	<p>Chemical or biological toxic agents, "riot control agents", radioactive materials, related equipment, components and materials.</p>
<p>8 ML 8 a), b) and c)</p>	<p>"Energetic materials" and related substances.</p>

EU ML Products classed as MEC (others are OME)	Scope
9 ML 9 a) 1, 2a) and b)	Vessels of war (surface or underwater), special naval equipment, accessories, components and other surface vessels.
10 ML 10 a) combat aircraft and c) armed UAVs	"Aircraft", "lighter-than-air vehicles", "unmanned Aerial Vehicles" ("UAVs"), aero-engines and "aircraft" equipment, related equipment, and components specially designed or modified for military use.
11	Electronic equipment, "spacecraft" and components, not specified elsewhere on the EU Common Military List.
12 ML 12 a)	High velocity kinetic energy weapon systems and related equipment, and components specially designed for these weapons.
13	Armoured or protective equipment, constructions and components.
14	'Specialised equipment for military training' or for simulating military scenarios, simulators specially designed for training in the use of any firearm or weapon specified by ML1 or
15	Imaging or countermeasure equipment, specially designed for military use, and specially designed components and accessories therefor.
16	Forgings, castings and other unfinished products, the use of which in a specified product is identifiable by material composition, geometry or function, and which are specially designed for any products specified by ML1 to ML4, ML6, ML9, ML10, ML12 or ML19.
17	Miscellaneous equipment, materials and 'libraries', and components specially designed therefor.
18	Production equipment and components, as follows.
19 ML 19 a), b), c) and f)	Directed Energy Weapon (DEW) systems, related or countermeasure equipment and test models, and specially designed components therefor.
20	Cryogenic and "superconductive" equipment, and specially designed components and accessories therefor.
21	"Software".
22	"Technology".

**Table 7 Export licences and actual exports in 2016, broken down by recipient country and product category (SEK million)**

Granted export licences for civil firearms (hunting and sport shooting weapons) and parts and ammunition for such weapons outside the EU are shown in Table 16. Export licences granted and actual exports of ammunition for hunting and sport shooting weapons (OME) to recipients within the EU are included in the values stated below. Export licences granted and actual exports of civil firearms (hunting and sport shooting weapons) and parts of such weapons within the EU are handled by the Swedish Police and are therefore not reported in this annex.

Region/ Country	Export licences granted		Actual exports		
	Number of licences granted	Main category of the licensed equipment (EU Common Military List)	Value of the licence (SEK million)	Main category of the licensed equipment (EU Common Military List)	Value of the exports (SEK million)
<b>EU</b>					
Belgium	16	1,3,5,8	12.1	1,3,5,8,13	11.2
Bulgaria	5	8	82.0	3,8,14	18.5
Denmark	11	2,3,5,8,11,14,17,21,22	199.8	3,5,6,8,13,14,17,22	172.4
Estonia	7	3,5,14,17	65.7	2,3,5,6,14,17,22	109.3
Finland	29	1,3,5,6,8,10,17,21,22	238.4	2,3,4,5,6,8,10,13,14,17,21,22	216.4
France	20	1,3,5,8,11,17,22	217.3	1,3,5,6,8,10,11,13,15,17,21,22	351.8
Greece	1	2	0.1	2,13	0.6
Ireland	2	3,4,14	27.4		
Italy	15	3,4,5,6,8,11,17,21,22	35.5	3,5,6,8,11,13,17,22	78.7
Croatia	1	3	2.0	3,13	0.7
Latvia	12	1,3,4,17,18,21,22	95.2	1,3,4,17	43.7
Lithuania	2	3,17	0.2	1,3,4,17	43.7
Luxembourg	3	1,4,22	187.9	1,4	27.6
Netherlands	9	1,2,3,6,17,21,22	7.8	1,3,6,13,17	274.1
New Caledonia					1 0.05
Poland	20	1,2,3,4,5,6,8,11,21,22	320.7	3,4,5,6,8,13,14,22	88.8
Portugal	1	3	3.0	3	1.5

Region/ Country	Export licences granted		Actual exports			
	Number of licences granted	Main category of the licensed equipment (EU Common Military List)	Value of the licence (SEK million)	Main category of the licensed equipment (EU Common Military List)	Value of the exports (SEK million)	
Romania	2		3,8	3,2	3,8	1,5
Slovakia	2		3,17	5,0	3,8,13,17	11,5
Slovenia	2		17	0,002	3,13,17	0,4
Spain	9		3,8	7,5	3,8,1,13	20,5
United Kingdom	21	3,4,5,8,14,17,21,22	748,3		3,4,5,6,8,10,11,13,14,17,18,21,22	237,9
Czech Republic	5	3,4,5,8	38,3		3,4,5,8,13,22	20,7
Germany	49	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,11,14,15,17,21,22	251,6		1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,11,13,14,15,17,18,21,22	619,2
Hungary	1	8	1,9		3,8,17	7,0
Austria	3	3,6,8	0,1		2,3,6,7,8,10,13,14,17,22	97,7
<b>Total</b>	<b>248</b>	<b>1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,10,11,14,15,17,18,21,22</b>	<b>2 551,0</b>		<b>1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,10,11,13,14,15,17,18,21,22</b>	<b>2 455,4</b>
<b>Rest of Europe</b>						
Andorra					3	0,4
Iceland	5		3,8,17	0,1	3,8,17	0,7
Norway	31	1,2,3,4,5,6,8,17,21,22	286,8		1,2,3,4,5,6,8,9,10,11,13,14,17,21,22	2 727,3
Switzerland	24	3,4,5,6,8,10,17,22	84,3		3,4,6,8,10,13,17	54,6
Turkey	3	8,11,17,21,22	217,9		8,13	88,6
<b>Total</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>1,2,3,4,5,6,8,10,11,17,21,22</b>	<b>589,1</b>		<b>1,2,3,4,5,6,8,9,10,11,13,14,17,21,22</b>	<b>2 871,7</b>
<b>North America</b>						
Canada	9	2,3,5,6,8,17,22	28,9		2,3,5,8,13,17,18,21,22	96,8
United States	44	2,3,5,6,8,11,14,17,21,22	809,3		2,3,5,8,11,13,14,17,21,22	718,7
<b>Total</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>2,3,5,6,8,11,14,17,21,22</b>	<b>838,2</b>		<b>2,3,5,8,11,13,14,17,18,21,22</b>	<b>815,6</b>
<b>Central America/ Caribbean</b>						
Mexico					2,5	81,5
<b>Total</b>					<b>2,5</b>	<b>81,5</b>

Region/ Country	Export licences granted			Actual exports	
	Number of licences granted	Main category of the licensed equipment (EU Common Military List)	Value of the licence (SEK million)	Main category of the licensed equipment (EU Common Military List)	Value of the exports (SEK million)
<b>South America</b>					
Argentina	1	2,3	7.5		
Brazil		2,4,5,10,11,14,15,1			
	3	7,18,21,22	43 005.8	2,3,10	2 820.7
Chile	3	3,5,22	9.3	3	8.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>2,3,4,5,10,11,14,15,1</b>	<b>43 022.7</b>	<b>2,3,10</b>	<b>2 829.3</b>
<b>North-East Asia</b>					
Japan	15	2,3,4,8,14,22	39.7	2,3,4,5,8,13,14	31.2
Republic of Korea	7	1,8,22	9.6	1,4,5,8,9,10,13,18,21,22	327.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>1,2,3,4,8,14,22</b>	<b>49.3</b>	<b>1,2,3,4,5,8,9,10,13,14,18,21,22</b>	<b>359.0</b>
<b>Central Asia</b>					
Kazakhstan	-	-	-	3	0.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0.3</b>
<b>South-East Asia</b>					
Brunei	1	2,22	10.0		
Indonesia	2	5,22	1.7		
Malaysia	5	2,5,11,21,22	50.4	2,5,11	14.2
Singapore	4	3,8,9,14,21,22	56.6	4,5,8,9,13,22	95.7
Thailand	7	2,4,5,9,11,21,22	886.4	2,4,5,10,11,21,22	424.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>2,3,4,5,8,9,11,14,21,22</b>	<b>1 005.0</b>	<b>2,4,5,8,9,10,11,13,22</b>	<b>533.9</b>
<b>South Asia</b>					
India	16	2,3,5,8,9,13,17,18,21,22	1 449.0	2,3,5,8,9,13,14,17,21,22	345.7
Pakistan	6	4,5,10,11,15,16,17,21,22	1 126.2	5,5,21,22	176.8
Sri Lanka	1	3	0.1	3	0.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>2,3,4,5,8,9,10,11,13,15,16,17,18,21,22</b>	<b>2 575.3</b>	<b>2,3,4,5,8,9,13,14,17,21,22</b>	<b>522.6</b>
<b>Middle East</b>					
United Arab Emirates	6	3,4,5,10,11,15,16,17,21,22	10 638.6	1,2,3,5,15,17,21	108.1



Region/ Country	Export licences granted		Actual exports		
	Number of licences granted	Main category of the licensed equipment (EU Common Military List)	Value of the licence (SEK million)	Main category of the licensed equipment (EU Common Military List)	Value of the exports (SEK million)
Jordan	1	13	7.5	13	8.0
Oman	1	3	1.8	3	1.8
Qatar	2	14,17	2.9	14,17	46.3
Saudi Arabia	2	21,22	1.5	5,10,21,22	1.9
<b>Total</b>				<b>1,2,3,5,10,13,14,15,17,21,22</b>	<b>166.0</b>
<b>North Africa</b>					
Algeria				5,17	37.8
<b>Total</b>				<b>5,17</b>	<b>37.8</b>
<b>Sub-Saharan Africa</b>					
Botswana	1	2	34.3	3	0.1
Namibia				3	0.3
South Africa	14	2,3,4,5,10,11,14,15,18,21,22	32.2	1,2,3,4,10,13,14,21,22	254.6
Zambia				3	0.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>2,3,4,5,10,11,14,15,18,21,22</b>	<b>66.5</b>	<b>1,2,3,4,10,13,14,21,22</b>	<b>255.2</b>
<b>Oceania</b>					
Australia	14	2,3,4,5,15,17,18,21,22	524.4	2,3,4,5,13,17,22	49.8
New Zealand	4	2,5,22	3.4	1,2,3	3.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>2,3,4,5,15,17,18,21,22</b>	<b>527.8</b>	<b>1,2,3,4,5,13,17,22</b>	<b>53.5</b>
<b>International organisations</b>					
International organisations	2	17,22	1.6	17,22	7.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>17,22</b>	<b>1.6</b>	<b>17,22</b>	<b>7.9</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>482</b>	<b>1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,13,14,15,16,17,18,21,22</b>	<b>61 878.7</b>	<b>1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,13,14,15,17,18,21,22</b>	<b>10 989.7</b>

**Table 8 a Actual exports of military equipment 2014–2016 broken down by country and region and divided into MEC and OME (SEK million)**

Region/Country	2014			2015			2016		
	MEC	OME	Total	MEC	OME	Total	MEC	OME	Total
<b>EU</b>	<b>607</b>	<b>1 620</b>	<b>2 227</b>	<b>936</b>	<b>1 510</b>	<b>2 446</b>	<b>709.4</b>	<b>1 746.0</b>	<b>2 455.4</b>
Belgium	20	2	22	4	11	15	8.7	2.5	11.2
Bulgaria	0	0.7	0.7	0	0.2	0.2	12.7	5.9	18.5
Denmark	20	120	140	6	154	160	5.7	166.7	172.4
Estonia	1.5	6.5	8	0.07	4	4	46.8	62.5	109.3
Finland	108	152	260	386	155	541	53.3	163.1	216.4
France	132	321	453	25	286	311	22.6	329.2	351.8
Greece	0	49	49	0	2	2	0	0.6	0.6
Ireland	-	-	-	8	23	31	-	-	-
Italy	14	83	97	202	50	252	5.2	73.5	78.7
Croatia	0	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.8	1	0	0.7	0.7
Latvia	0.004	1	1	19	3	22	36.4	7.3	43.7
Lithuania	0.007	4	4	58	14	72	39.7	4.0	43.7
Luxembourg	0	0.4	0.4	0	0.02	0.02	27.4	0.2	27.6
Netherlands	0.5	176	176	0.04	241	241	0	274.1	274.1
New Caledonia, Fr	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0.05	0.05
Poland	4	23	27	6	40	46	27.6	61.2	88.8
Portugal	9	2	11	0	2	2	0	1.5	1.5
Romania	0	0.2	0.2	0	0.5	0.5	1.1	0.4	1.5
Slovakia	0	1	1	16	2	18	0.5	11.0	11.5
Slovenia	0.003	0.3	0.3	0.006	0.5	0.5	0.003	0.4	0.4
Spain	9	19	28	7	24	31	3.1	17.4	20.5
United Kingdom	233	294	527	138	177	315	136.0	101.9	237.9
Czech Republic	4	3	7	2	20	22	6.0	14.7	20.7
Germany	50	352	402	58	283	341	276.0	343.2	619.2
Hungary	0.3	3	3	0.001	7	7	0.5	6.4	6.9
Austria	0.08	9	9	1	9	10	0.2	97.5	97.7
<b>Rest of Europe</b>	<b>1 250</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>1 304</b>	<b>1 961</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>2 225</b>	<b>2 590.3</b>	<b>281.3</b>	<b>2 871.6</b>
Andorra	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0.4	0.4
Iceland	0.06	0	0.06	0.003	0	0.003	0.1	0.6	0.7
Montenegro	0	0.1	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Norway	1 246	23	1 269	1 951	161	2 112	2 588.5	138.8	2 727.3
Switzerland	4	30	34	3	75	78	1.6	53.0	54.6
Turkey	0.2	0.3	0.5	7	28	35	0.1	88.5	88.6

Region/Country	2014			2015			2016		
	MEC	OME	Total	MEC	OME	Total	MEC	OME	Total
<b>North America</b>	<b>1 092</b>	<b>573</b>	<b>1 665</b>	<b>269</b>	<b>594</b>	<b>863</b>	<b>456.5</b>	<b>359.1</b>	<b>815.6</b>
United States	982	336	1 318	269	300	569	444.2	274.5	718.7
Canada	109	238	347	0	294	294	12.3	84.5	96.8
<b>Central America and the Caribbean</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>70.3</b>	<b>11.2</b>	<b>81.5</b>
Mexico	0	25	25	0	54	54	70.3	11.2	81.5
Trinidad and Tobago	-	-	-	4	0.5	4	-	-	-
<b>South America</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>3.6</b>	<b>2 825.7</b>	<b>2 829.3</b>
Brazil	16	63	79	39	24	63	0	2 820.7	2 820.7
Chile	7	0	7	0	1	1	3.6	5.0	8.6
Peru	-	-	-	0.3	0	0.3	-	-	-
<b>North-East Asia</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>158</b>	<b>175</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>309</b>	<b>342</b>	<b>30.9</b>	<b>328.1</b>	<b>359.0</b>
Japan	14	26	40	33	6	39	26.7	4.5	31.2
Republic of Korea	3	132	135	0.4	303	303	4.2	323.5	327.7
<b>Central Asia</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.3</b>	<b>0.3</b>
Kazakhstan	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0.3	0.3
<b>South-East Asia</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>671</b>	<b>714</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>376</b>	<b>395</b>	<b>152.1</b>	<b>381.9</b>	<b>534.0</b>
Brunei	3	12	15	5	1	6	-	-	-
Indonesia	0	0.3	0.3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Malaysia	0	9	9	0	1	1	0	14.2	14.2
Singapore	21	137	158	0.7	187	187	0.1	95.6	95.7
Thailand	19	513	532	14	187	201	152.0	272.0	424.0
<b>South Asia</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>476</b>	<b>483</b>	<b>165</b>	<b>246</b>	<b>411</b>	<b>283.2</b>	<b>239.5</b>	<b>522.7</b>
India	7	461	468	165	215	380	113.2	232.5	345.7
Pakistan	0	14	14	0.5	31	31	170.0	6.8	176.8
Sri Lanka	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0.2	0.2
<b>Middle East</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>345</b>	<b>381</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>172</b>	<b>185</b>	<b>89.1</b>	<b>76.9</b>	<b>166.0</b>
Bahrain	0	0.6	0.6	0	0.2	0.2	-	-	-


Region/Country	2014			2015			2016		
	MEC	OME	Total	MEC	OME	Total	MEC	OME	Total
United Arab Emirates	0	40	40	0	68	68	89.1	18.9	108.1
Jordan	-	-	-	0	1	1	0	8.0	8.0
Kuwait	-	-	-	0	76	76	-	-	-
Oman	1	1	2	-	-	-	0	1.8	1.8
Saudi Arabia	34	304	338	13	1	14	0	1.9	1.9
Qatar	0	0.2	0.2	0	26	26	0	46.3	46.3
<b>North Africa</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>192</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>151</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>37.8</b>	<b>37.8</b>
Algeria	58	134	192	40	40	80	0	37.8	37.8
Tunisia	-	-	-	63	8	71	-	-	-
<b>Sub-Saharan Africa</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>167</b>	<b>167</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>235</b>	<b>236</b>	<b>9.8</b>	<b>245.4</b>	<b>255.2</b>
Botswana	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0.1	0.1
Namibia	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0.3	0.3
South Africa	0	167	167	1	235	236	9.7	244.8	254.6
Zambia	0.01	0	0.01	-	-	-	0	0.2	0.2
<b>Oceania</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>232</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>15.3</b>	<b>38.2</b>	<b>53.5</b>
Australia	117	231	348	16	67	83	15.1	34.7	49.8
New Zealand	2.5	0.5	3	0.2	0.5	1	0.2	3.5	3.7
<b>International organisations</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.06</b>	<b>0.06</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>7.9</b>	<b>7.9</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3 258</b>	<b>4 521</b>	<b>7 779</b>	<b>3 560</b>	<b>3 900</b>	<b>7 460</b>	<b>4 410.4</b>	<b>6 579.3</b>	<b>10 989.7</b>

**Table 8 b Actual exports, broken down by region in per cent of value in 2016**

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Bilaga 1

Region	Share of total exports (%)
EU	22.3
South Asia	4.8
Middle East	1.5
South-East Asia	4.9
North America	7.4
Rest of Europe	26.1
Sub-Saharan Africa	2.3
Oceania	0.5
North-East Asia	3.3
North Africa	0.3
Central America and the Caribbean	0.7
South America	25.7
Central Asia	0.0
International organisations	0.1

**Figure 8c Actual exports of military equipment broken down by countries grouped according to income**



The country groupings are based on the World Bank's synthesis of countries' economic status. A complete list of the country groupings can be found on the website [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org). The countries Sweden exports military equipment to or has granted export licences to in 2016 are grouped as follows:

**High-income countries:** Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands,

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Bilaga 1

New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States. **Upper-middle-income countries:** Algeria, Argentina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, Namibia, Romania, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey. **Lower-middle-income countries:** India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Zambia.  
**Low-income countries:** -

**Table 9 Follow-on deliveries in 2016 (relates to countries outside the EU and OECD circle)**

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Bilaga 1

Country	Number of licences	Of which follow-on delivery licences	Of which new licences	Items, new licences
Argentina	1	1		
Botswana	1		1	Weapon sights
Brazil	3	1	2	Combat aircraft, Camouflage suits
Brunei	1	1		
United Arab Emirates	6	3	3	Camouflage equipment, Airborne radar systems
India	16	8	8	Camouflage nets, Submarine components, Armour plate, Explosives, Gyros
Indonesia	2	1	1	Telecommunications training
Jordan	1		1	Armour plate
Malaysia	5	4	1	Ship components
Oman	1		1	Aircraft components
Pakistan	6	6		
Qatar	2	1	1	Camouflage equipment
Saudi Arabia	2	2		
Singapore	4	1	3	Ammunition, Submarine components, Explosives
South Africa	14	2	12	Anti-tank weapons, Rocket-propelled grenades, Weapon simulator, Components for development and production
Thailand	7	5	2 (contracts before 2014)	Naval command system, Ship's propeller
<b>Total</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>36</b>	

**Table 10 Actual exports of small arms and light weapons in 2016 as defined in the UN Register of Conventional Arms**

<b>Categorised in accordance with the UN Register of Conventional Arms</b>	
<b>Small arms</b>	
1. Revolvers and self-loading pistols	No exports
2. Rifles and carbines	No exports
3. Sub-machine guns	No exports
4. Assault rifles	No exports
5. Light machine guns	No exports
6. Other	Small-bore ammunition was exported to Austria, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Poland, Switzerland and the United States.
<b>Light weapons</b>	
1. Heavy machine guns (12.7 mm)	No exports
2. Hand-held underbarrel and mounted grenade launchers (40 mm)	Components to Australia and Denmark Grenades to Norway
3. Portable anti-tank guns	No exports
4. Recoilless rifles (rocket-propelled grenades)	Rocket-propelled grenades were exported to Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa and the USA.  Spare parts, training equipment, components and ammunition were exported to Australia, Austria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, India, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, New Zealand, Poland, Slovakia, South Africa and the United States.
5. Portable anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems	Anti-tank missile launchers and rocket systems were exported to Luxembourg and South Africa. Spare parts, training weapons and components were exported to Brazil, Finland and South Africa.
6. Mortars of calibres less than 75 mm	No exports
7. Other	No exports



**Table 11 Actual exports of MANPADS (man-portable air defence systems) in 2016 as defined in the UN Register of Conventional Arms.**

Follow-on deliveries consisting of missiles, spare parts, training equipment etc. were exported to Australia, the Czech Republic, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Pakistan, Singapore and Thailand to a total value of SEK 211 498 000. Sights intended for MANPADS were exported to Lithuania (modernisation).

**Table 12 Licences issued in 2016 for re-export of equipment originally exported from Sweden.**

Application from	Equipment concerned	Destination
Canada (2)	Naval gun equipment, ML 2	Sweden
Norway	Combat Vehicle 90, ML 6	Estonia
Norway	Ammunition, ML 3	Chile, via Sweden
United States (2)	Ammunition, ML 3	Other recipient in United States and Sweden
United States	Radar components, ML 5	Sweden
United States	Explosive, ML 8	Sweden

**Table 13 Exporting companies and authorities in 2016**

The following companies and authorities exported equipment to a value of more than SEK 10 million (SEKm):

Company	MEC	OME	Total
Saab AB, Aeronautics	0	3 100	3 100
BAE Systems Hägglunds AB	2 415	567	2 982
Saab Dynamics AB	879	443	1 322
Saab AB, Surveillance	147	944	1 091
BAE Systems Bofors AB	369	80	449
Norma Precision AB	11	258	269

<b>Company</b>	<b>MEC</b>	<b>OME</b>	<b>Total</b>
SSAB EMEA AB	0	234	234
EURENCO Bofors AB	231	0	231
FFV Ordnance AB	113	74	187
Nammo Vanäsverken AB	176	0	176
Saab Underwater AB	0	151	151
Saab AB, Training & Simulation	0.5	123	124
Saab Barracuda AB	0	79	79
Saab AB, Industrial Products and Services	0	70	70
Scania CV AB	0	66	66
Saab Kockums AB, Malmö	0	65	65
GKN Aerospace Applied Composites AB	0	60	60
FLIR Systems AB	42	5	47
Nammo LIAB AB	21	23	44
FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency	0	33	33
Aerodynamics Research Center STARCS AB	0	31	31
Exsensor Technology AB	0	26	26
Patria Helicopters AB	0	24	24
Polyamp AB	0	16	16
FMV, Swedish Defence Materiel Administration	1	15	16
Taiga AB	0	15	15
GKN Aerospace Applied Composites AB	0	12	12
Aimpoint AB	2	9	11

**The following companies exported equipment to a value of between SEK 1 million and SEK 10 million in 2016:**

Carmenta AB, VO Vapen AB, Befyraem Technologies AB (B4M), SSPA Sweden AB, Saab AB, Support and Services, Deform AB, BAE Systems SWS Defence AB, Strömsholmen AB, SKF Motion Technologies AB, AimSport Sweden AB, Life Time Engineering AB, Exova Materials Technology AB, ECAPS AB.

**The following companies exported equipment to a value of less than SEK 1 million in 2016:**

Schill Reglerteknik AB, Waltreco AB, Techsonoc Aerosystems AB, Airsafe Sweden AB, Ekenäs Mekaniska AB, Stalon AB, Sepson AB, AmmoTech Sweden AB, Rolls-Royce AB, Vricon Systems AB, Åkers Krutbruk Protection AB, Comtri AB, SnigelDesign AB, Arma Tech AB, Lesjöfors

Of other companies with manufacturing or brokerage licences in 2016, 60 companies only undertook sales in Sweden. 58 companies did not sell any military equipment or technical assistance in 2016.

**Table 14 Individual brokerage licences granted in 2016<sup>2</sup>**

From country	To country	number	ML Category	Item
Afghanistan	Afghanistan	1	ML 13	Helmet, bulletproof vests and ballistic plates
Estonia	France	1	ML 6	Black-out lighting
	Netherlands	1	ML 6	Black-out lighting
	Poland	1	ML 6	Black-out lighting
	Germany	1	ML 6	Black-out lighting
France	Australia	1	ML 5	IFF equipment
	France	1	ML 6	Vehicle chassis
	Singapore	1	ML 5	IFF equipment
Latvia	India	1	ML 17	Diving equipment
Lithuania	Netherlands	1	ML 6	Black-out lighting
Netherlands	Finland	1	ML 6	Black-out lighting
	Finland	1	ML 6	Vehicle chassis
	Germany	1	ML 6	Vehicle chassis
Norway	Poland	1	ML 21/22	Software/technology
Poland	Norway	1	ML 21/22	Software/technology
Singapore	Singapore	1	ML 13	Armour plate
United Kingdom	Australia	2	ML 5	Ground sensors
	Singapore	1	ML 5	Ground sensors
	United Kingdom	11	ML 13	Armour plate
South Africa	South Africa	13	ML 13	Armour plate
Czech Republic	Finland	1	ML 8	Components

<sup>2</sup> Individual brokerage licences are issued for Swedish companies, authorities and private individuals when military equipment deals are brokered between two foreign entities. The number of brokerage licences issued has increased sharply over the past three years due to distribution of Swedish-made armour plate frequently being distributed between warehouses abroad to a large number of customers.

Germany	Belgium	1	ML 13	Armour plate
	France	5	ML 13	Armour plate
	Greece	1	ML 13	Armour plate
	Italy	1	ML 13	Armour plate
	Netherlands	2	ML 13	Armour plate
	Switzerland	2	ML 13	Armour plate
	Slovenia	1	ML 13	Armour plate
	Germany	15	ML 13	Armour plate
United States	Canada	9	ML 13	Armour plate
	Mexico	1	ML 13	Armour plate
	United States	1	ML 4	Aircraft ammunition
	United States	8	ML 13	Armour plate

### Companies only holding brokerage licences in 2016

BAE Systems SWS Defence AB, Buffers Marine AB, Caliber 44 Varberg, Defendor AB, Equipnor AB, EX&PLOSE AB, FFV Ordnance AB, Gripen International KB, ILEK AB, JoWill AB, Krille Linderoth AB, Lars-Gunnar Svensson, LEAF Supply & Services AB, Lifetime Engineering AB, Milmac Sweden AB, MP-Sec International AB, Neptunus Hav & Land AB, 9-Line AB, Patria Helicopters AB, Promoteq i Sandviken AB, Saab Underwater Systems AB, Sako Oy Finland Filial, Scanjack AB, Scandinavian Risk Solutions AB, SKF Eurotrade AB, SKF Sverige AB, Swedish Ordnance AB, Taiga AB, Teknikinformation i Krokomb AB (TIKAB), Tempest Security AB, Venatio AB, Vesper Group AB, W.L. Gore & Associates Scandinavia AB, Volvo Defense AB.

**Table 15** General licences, certifications and the number of individual and global licences granted to other EEA countries in 2016

### General licences

The ISP has determined five categories of general licences, which are published in the Swedish Customs' statute book (TFS) and also on the ISP website [www.isp.se](http://www.isp.se). The licences cover only transfer within the European Economic Area (EEA). Each category has an appendix describing the military equipment and technical assistance it covers.

<b>TFS</b>	<b>Scope</b>
2012:7	The transfer of military equipment and the provision of technical assistance to armed forces or a contracting authority in a country within the European Economic Area (EEA)
2012:8	The transfer of military equipment and the provision of technical assistance to a certified recipient in a country within the European Economic Area (EEA)
2012:9	The transfer of military equipment and the provision of technical assistance to a country within the European Economic Area (EEA) for demonstration, evaluation and exhibition
2012:10	The transfer of military equipment and the provision of technical assistance to a country within the European Economic Area (EEA) for maintenance or repair
2012:11	The transfer of military equipment and the provision of technical assistance to a country within the European Economic Area (EEA) following maintenance, repair or demonstration

Utilisation of a general licence is conditional on the company concerned informing ISP no later than four weeks prior to the first day on which the licence is used.

In 2016, five companies informed ISP of the use of general licences, as follows:

<b>TFS 2012:7</b>	<b>TFS 2012:8</b>	<b>TFS 2012:9</b>	<b>TFS 2012:10</b>	<b>TFS 2012:11</b>
1	1	3	1	1

Whoever utilises the licences only needs to inform ISP the first time the licence is used. A cumulative number of notifications since 2012 is therefore also presented, as follows:

<b>TFS 2012:7</b>	<b>TFS 2012:8</b>	<b>TFS 2012:9</b>	<b>TFS 2012:10</b>	<b>TFS 2012:11</b>
12	7	21	12	12

Actual exports in 2016 under general licences:

<b>TFS</b>	<b>Category</b>	<b>Value (SEK thousand)</b>	<b>Recipient country</b>
2012:7	ML 4	1 026	United Kingdom
	ML 5	8 321	United Kingdom, Norway
	ML 6	214 064	Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Netherlands, United Kingdom

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	ML 10	24 860	Finland, Norway
	ML 11	156	United Kingdom
	ML 14	109 950	Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway, Poland, United Kingdom
	ML 15	1 340	France
	ML 21	503	Finland
	ML 22	2 135	Norway
2012:8	ML 21	3 836	France

### **Certification**

A company can apply for certification as a recipient of military equipment and technical assistance and thus receive components sent from any other EEA country via general licences.

No new Swedish companies were certified in 2016.

Up to and including 2016, 48 companies in 14 EU countries had been certified.

Up-to-date information is available on the European Commission's website: <http://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/certider>

### **Proportion of global and individual licences to other EEA countries**

In 2012, ISP granted a total of 362 export licences to EEA countries, of which 20 per cent global and 80 per cent individual.

In 2013, ISP granted a total of 642 export licences to EEA countries, of which 15 per cent global and 85 per cent individual.

In 2014, ISP granted a total of 552 export licences to EEA countries, of which 20 per cent global and 80 per cent individual.

In 2015, ISP granted a total of 565 export licences to EEA countries, of which 16 per cent global and 84 per cent individual.

In 2016, ISP granted a total of 541 export licences to EEA countries, of which 22 per cent were global and 78 per cent individual.

**Table 16** Export licences concerning exports of civil firearms (hunting and sport shooting weapons) and parts and ammunition for such weapons outside the EU

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Table 16 presents statistics relating to export licences for civil firearms (hunting and sport shooting weapons) and parts and ammunition for such weapons outside the EU<sup>3</sup>.

**Number of cases received concerning civil firearms (hunting and sport shooting weapons) and parts and ammunition for such weapons**

Type of case	2014	2015	2016
Applications for export licences	277	342	271

The table below presents the total sum regarding export licences per importing country under the EU Regulation.

Value of export licences granted (SEK million)			
Region/Country	2014	2015	2016
<b>Rest of Europe</b>			
Andorra	1.2	0.3	0.3
Georgia	0.007	0	0
Greenland	0	0.6	0
Iceland	0.7	0.4	0.7
Norway	134	172	166
New Caledonia	0.4	0.4	0.05
Russia	3.7	0	0
Switzerland	2.5	3	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>177</b>	<b>169</b>

<sup>3</sup> Examination takes place in accordance with an EU Regulation – Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 implementing Article 10 of the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN Firearms Protocol), and establishing export authorisation, and import and transit measures for firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, and in accordance with the Military Equipment Act (1992:1300). This does not, however, apply to exports of smooth-bore shotguns and parts and ammunition for such weapons, where assessment takes place only according to the EU Regulation mentioned.

<b>North America</b>			
Canada	1	1	2
United States	227	103	130
<b>Total</b>	<b>228</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>132</b>
<b>South America</b>			
Chile	0.6	0.4	0
Ecuador	0.7	0	0
Uruguay	0	0.1	00
<b>Total</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>North-East Asia</b>			
Japan	0.7	1	0.4
Republic of Korea	0.3	0.09	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0.4</b>
<b>Central Asia</b>			
Kazakhstan	0.3	3	0.3
Mongolia	0.02	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>0.3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0.3</b>
<b>Middle East</b>			
United Arab Emirates	0	11	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Sub-Saharan Africa</b>			
Botswana	0.08	0.1	0.2
Namibia	0.3	0.08	0.3
South Africa	12.4	14	1
Tanzania	0.01	0.3	0
Zambia	0.1	0	0.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>1.8</b>
<b>Oceania</b>			
Australia	2.4	3	4
New Zealand	0.7	2	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>390</b>	<b>316</b>	<b>310</b>



## Export of Dual-Use Items

**Table 1. Number of export cases etc. received concerning dual-use items (DUIs) 2014–2016**

<b>Export cases</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
<b>Total</b>	1 324	1 467	1 662
Export licences, global and individual, of which:			
The Wassenaar Arrangement	766	793	751
The Missile Technology Control Regime	11	9	11
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (Part 2)	18	149	234
The Australia Group	365	332	333
Sanctions	164	184	333
<b>Sanctions against Iran – financial applications</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
<b>Total</b>	626	693	26
Cases concerning the transfer of assets and financial services			
Notifications	520	584	17
Licences	106	109	9

**Table 2. Number of advance decisions, enquiries about non-controlled items relating to DUIs 2014–2016**

	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>
Total number of advance decisions issued	196	139	112
Of which, number of enquiries about non-controlled items	126	97	73

**Table 3. Number of resolved cases affecting applications for advance decisions – controlled and non-controlled items – 2016**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Non-controlled items</b>			<b>Controlled items</b>		<b>Total</b>
	<b>No reason to apply catch-all</b>	<b>Catch-all negative</b>	<b>Catch-all</b>	<b>Listed item, positive</b>	<b>Listed item, denial</b>	
USA				1		1
Angola				1		1
Syrian Arab Republic	2					2

Country	Non-controlled items			Controlled items		
	No reason to apply catch-all	Catch-all negative	Catch-all	Listed item, positive	Listed item, denial	Total
Egypt					2	2
People's Republic of China	1		1	10	2	14
United Arab Emirates	1					1
India				3		3
Iran	37	1		7		45
Israel				1		1
Kazakhstan	2					2
Libya					1	1
Mexico				1		1
Myanmar (Burma)	1				2	3
Pakistan		2			2	4
Russian Federation	4	3	5	6	2	20
Singapore	2					2
Slovakia	1					1
Sweden	1					1
South Africa				1		1
Thailand					1	1
Turkey	1			1	1	3
Vietnam	1					1
Belarus	1					1

**Table 4. General licences**

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In 2012, the EU introduced further general licences in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1232/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

The companies in question are obliged to notify the ISP at least 30 days after their first use.

The number of companies that notified such use in 2016 is as follows:

EU 001	EU 002	EU 003	EU 004	EU 005	EU 006
21	1	4	2	0	0

As the companies in question need to register use only once, below is a report of the accumulated number of registrations since 2009 (EU 001) and 2012 (EU 002–006):

EU 001	EU 002	EU 003	EU 004	EU 005	EU 006
143	3	8	5	1	0

**Table 5 Export licences granted for dual-use items (DUIs), belonging to Category 0 in Annex 1 of Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009, from companies in Sweden (source: SSM)**

In the nuclear area, licences are mandatory for exports outside the EU. For the majority of products, licences are also required for transfer between EU countries. The items affected are described in Annex IV Part 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009. General licences may not be used for these products. 42 licences were granted for exports or for transfers within the EU in 2016.

Recipient country	Number of global licences	Number of individual licences	Item category
Argentina		1	0A001
Australia		1	0C001
Finland	1*		0D001, 0E001
France	1*		0D001, 0E001
Japan	1		0D001, 0E001
Mexico		1	0A001
Norway		3	0A001, 0C002
Russia	1		0E001
Switzerland	1	3	0A001, 0C001, 0C002, 0D001, 0E001
Slovakia	1*		0D001, 0E001
Slovenia	2*		0D001, 0E001
Spain		3	0A001
United Kingdom	3*		0D001, 0E001
Czech Republic	3*	1	0A001, 0D001, 0E001
Germany	1*	6	0A001, 0D001, 0E001
Ukraine		2	0A001, 0C002
United States	5	7	0A001, 0C002, 0D001, 0E001

\* two of the granted licences concern more than one recipient country

**Table 6 Membership of multilateral export control regimes in 2016**Skr. 2016/17:114  
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Country	ZC	NSG	AG	MTCR	WA
Argentina	X	X	X	X	X
Australia	X	X	X	X	X
Belgium	X	X	X	X	X
Brazil	-	X	-	X	-
Bulgaria	X	X	X	X	X
Cyprus	-	X	X	-	-
Denmark	X	X	X	X	X
Estonia	-	X	X	-	X
Finland	X	X	X	X	X
France	X	X	X	X	X
Greece	X	X	X	X	X
India	-	-	-	X	-
Ireland	X	X	X	X	X
Iceland	-	X	X	X	-
Italy	X	X	X	X	X
Japan	X	X	X	X	X
Canada	X	X	X	X	X
Kazakhstan	X	X	-	-	-
China	X	X	-	-	-
Korea (Rep.)	X	X	X	X	X
Croatia	X	X	X	-	X
Latvia	-	X	X	-	X
Lithuania	-	X	X	-	X
Luxembourg	X	X	X	X	X
Malta	-	X	X	-	X
Mexico	-	X	X	-	X
Netherlands	X	X	X	X	X
Norway	X	X	X	X	X
New Zealand	X	X	X	X	X
Poland	X	X	X	X	X
Portugal	X	X	X	X	X
Romania	X	X	X	-	X
Russia	X	X	-	X	X
Switzerland	X	X	X	X	X
Serbia	-	X	-	-	-
Slovakia	X	X	X	-	X
Slovenia	X	X	X	-	X
Spain	X	X	X	X	X

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<b>Country</b>	<b>ZC</b>	<b>NSG</b>	<b>AG</b>	<b>MTCR</b>	<b>WA</b>
United Kingdom	x	x	x	x	x
Sweden	x	x	x	x	x
South Africa	x	x	-	x	x
Czech Republic	x	x	x	x	x
Turkey	x	x	x	x	x
Germany	x	x	x	x	x
Ukraine	x	x	x	x	x
Hungary	x	x	x	x	x
United States	x	x	x	x	x
Belarus	x	x	-	-	-
Austria	x	x	x	x	x
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>41</b>

**Table 7. Global licences for permanent exports granted in 2016**

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
All countries with the exception of embargo countries/sanction countries	21	1C202,	Aluminium alloy	428/2009	WA
		2B352,	Filter equipment		AG
		3A001,	Electronic components		
		3A002,	Telecom products (information security)		
		5A002,	IR camera		
		5D002,	Motion sensor		
		5A001,			
5E001,					
6A003,					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
Algeria	1	7A002, 5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA
USA	1	9A117, 9E102	Adapters Technical assistance	428/2009	MTCR
Syrian Arab Republic	2	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	36/2012	WA
Armenia	3	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA
Azerbaijan	1	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA
Bangladesh	1	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA
Brazil	2	1C010, 2E001,	Carbon fibre Technology transfer	428/2009	WA AG



Region/Country	Civilian end-use		EU Regulation	Regime
	Number of licences	Item category		
		2E002, 2E301, 5A001, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	
Burundi	1	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009 WA
Canada	1	9A117, 9E102	Adapters Technical assistance	428/2009 MTCR
Chile	1	1C010	Carbon fibre	428/2009 WA
Democratic Republic of Congo	2	5A002,	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009 WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
		5D002			
Ivory Coast	2	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA
People's Republic of China	8	2E001, 2E002, 2E301, 3A001, 3A002, 5A001, 5A002, 5D002	Technology transfer Electronic components Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA AG
Greenland	1	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA
Hong Kong, Kina	3	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use			EU Regulation	Regime
	Number of licences	Item category	Item		
India	7	1C010, 2E001, 2E002, 2E301, 3A001, 3A002, 5A001, 5A002, 5D002	Carbon fibre Technology transfer Filter equipment Electronic components Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA AG

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				EU Regulation	Regime
	Number of licences	Item category	Item			
Iraq	2	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)		428/2009	WA
Iran	2	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)		267/2012	WA
Japan	2	2B350, 9A117	Plate heat exchanger Adapters		428/2009	WA AG
Kenya	1	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)		428/2009	WA
Kosovo	1	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)		428/2009	WA
Kuwait	1	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)		428/2009	WA
Lebanon	1	5A002,	Telecom products (information security)		428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use		EU Regulation	Regime
	Number of licences	Item category		
		5D002		
Liberia	1	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009 WA
Libya	2	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009 WA
Malaysia	3	3A001, 3A002, 5A001, 5A002,	Electronic components Telecom products (information security)	428/2009 WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
		5D002			
Mexico	2	5A002, 5D002	Electronic components Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA
Pakistan	3	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA
Qatar	1	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA
Republic of Korea	6	1C010, 2B350, 5A002, 5D002, 6A003	Carbon fibre Plate heat exchanger Telecom products (information security) IR camera	428/2009	WA AG

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
Russian Federation (Russia)	6	3A001, 3A002, 3E001, 5A002, 5B001, 5B002, 5D001, 5D002, 5E001, 5E002	Electrical components Technical assistance Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA MTCR

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
Singapore	1	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA
Sri Lanka	1	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA
Sudan	1	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA
South Africa	1	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA
Taiwan	3	1C010, 2E001, 2E002, 2E301, 5A002,	Carbon fibre Technology transfer Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA AG



Region/Country	Civilian end-use		EU Regulation	Regime
	Number of licences	Item category		
		5D002		
Thailand	2	1C010, 5A002, 5D002	Carbon fibre Telecom products (information security)	428/2009 WA
Turkey	1	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009 WA
Belarus	1	5A002,	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009 WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
Zimbabwe	1	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA
Region/Country	Civilian end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
All countries with the exception of embargo countries/sanction countries	19	2B352, 3A001, 3A002, 5A001, 5E001, 6A003,	Filter equipment Electronic components Telecom products (information security) IR camera	428/2009	WA AG
Algeria	2	5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use			EU Regulation	Regime
	Number of licences	Item category	Item		
USA	2	5A002, 5D002, 9A117, 9E102	Telecom products (information security) Adapters Technical assistance	428/2009	WA MTCR
Syrian Arab Republic	2	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	36/2012	WA
Argentina	2	1C002, 5A002, 5D002,	Aluminium alloy Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use			EU Regulation	Regime
	Number of licences	Item category	Item		
		7A002			
Armenia	4	5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Australia	1	5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Azerbaijan	2	5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Bahrain	1	5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use		EU Regulation	Regime
	Number of licences	Item category		
Bangladesh	2	5A002, 5D002, 1C202	Telecom products (information security) Aluminium alloy	428/2009 WA
Barbados	1	5A002, 5D002, 7A002,	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009 WA
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1	5A002, 5D002,	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009 WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
		7A002			
Botswana	1	5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Brazil	4	1C010, 1C202, 2E001, 2E002, 2E301, 5A001, 5D002, 7A002	Carbon fibre Aluminium alloy Technology transfer Telecom products (information security) IR camera Motion sensor	428/2009	WA AG
Burundi	1	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA
Canada	2	5A002, 5D002,	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA MTCR

Region/Country	Civilian end-use			EU Regulation	Regime
	Number of licences	Item category	Item		
		7A002, 9A117, 9E102	Adapter Technical assistance		
Chile	3	1C010, 5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Carbon fibre Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Colombia	2	1C202, 5A002, 5D002,	Aluminium alloy Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
Costa Rica	2	7A002,	Aluminium alloy Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
		1C202, 5A002, 5D002, 7A002			
Democratic Republic of Congo	2	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA
Dominican Republic	2	1C202,	Aluminium alloy Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
		5A002, 5D002, 7A002			
Ecuador	2	1C202,	Aluminium alloy Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
		5A002, 5D002, 7A002			



Region/Country	Civilian end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
Egypt	2	1C202, 5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Aluminium alloy Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
El Salvador	2	1C202, 5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Aluminium alloy Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Ivory Coast	3	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
Fiji	1	5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Philippines	2	1C202, 5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Aluminium alloy Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
People's Republic of China	11	2E001, 2E002, 3A001, 3A002, 5A001, 5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Filter equipment Electronic components Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA AG

Region/Country	Civilian end-use			EU Regulation	Regime
	Number of licences	Item category	Item		
French Polynesia	1	5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
United Arab Emirates	2	1C202, 5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Aluminium alloy Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Georgia	1	5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
Greenland	1	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA
Guatemala	2	1C202, 5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Aluminium alloy Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Guyana	1	5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Honduras	1	5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Hong Kong, Kina	4	5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
India	11	1C010, 1C202, 2E001, 2E002, 2E301, 3A001, 3A002, 5A001, 5A002, 5D002,	Carbon fibre Aluminium alloy Technology transfer Filter equipment Electronic components Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA AG

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
Indonesia	2	7A002, 1C202, 5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Aluminium alloy Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Iraq	2	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA
Iran	4	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	267/2012	WA
Iceland	1	5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Israel	1	5A002,	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use			EU Regulation	Regime
	Number of licences	Item category	Item		
		5D002, 7A002	Motion sensor		
Jamaica	1	5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Japan	3	2B350, 5A002, 5D002, 7A002,	Plate heat exchanger Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor Adapter	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
		9A117			
Jordan	1	5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA
Cambodia	1	5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Kazakhstan	1	5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Kenya	3	1C202, 5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Aluminium alloy Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Kosovo	2	5A002,	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA



Region/Country	Civilian end-use			EU Regulation	Regime
	Number of licences	Item category	Item		
		5D002			
Croatia	2	1C202, 5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Aluminium alloy Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Kuwait	3	5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Lebanon	4	1C202, 5A002,	Aluminium alloy Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use			EU Regulation	Regime
	Number of licences	Item category	Item		
		5D002, 7A002	Motion sensor		
Liberia	1	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA
Libya	3	5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Liechtenstein	1	5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Macau	1	5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Macedonia (FYROM)	1	5A002,	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use			EU Regulation	Regime
	Number of licences	Item category	Item		
		5D002, 7A002	Motion sensor		
Malaysia	4	3A001, 3A002, 5A001, 5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Electronic components Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Maldives	1	5A002, 5D002,	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
		7A002			
Morocco	1	5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Mauritius	1	5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Mexico	4	1C202, 5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Aluminium alloy Electronic components Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Moldova	1	5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Montenegro	1	5A002,	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use			EU Regulation	Regime
	Number of licences	Item category	Item		
		5D002, 7A002	Motion sensor		
Nepal	1	5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Nicaragua	1	5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
New Caledonia	1	5A002, 5D002,	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
New Zealand	1	7A002			
		5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Pakistan	3	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA
Paraguay	1	5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Peru	2	1C202, 5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Aluminium alloy Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Qatar	2	5A002,	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use			EU Regulation	Regime
	Number of licences	Item category	Item		
		5D002, 7A002	Motion sensor		
Republic of Korea	8	1C010, 1C202, 2B350, 5A002, 5D002, 6A003, 7A002	Carbon fibre Aluminium alloy Plate heat exchanger Telecom products (information security) IR camera Motion sensor	428/2009	WA AG

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
Russian Federation (Russia)	10	3A001, 3A002, 3E001, 5A002, 5B001, 5B002, 5D001, 5D002, 5E001, 5E002, 9E102	Electrical components Technical assistance Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA MTCR
Saudi Arabia	2	1C202, 5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Aluminium alloy Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA



Region/Country	Civilian end-use			EU Regulation	Regime
	Number of licences	Item category	Item		
Switzerland	1	5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Serbia	2	1C202, 5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Aluminium alloy Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Singapore	2	5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
Sri Lanka	3	1C202, 5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Aluminium alloy Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Sudan	1	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA
South Africa	4	1C202, 5A002, 5D002, 6A003, 7A002	Aluminium alloy Telecom products (information security) IR camera Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
South Sudan	1	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use			EU Regulation	Regime
	Number of licences	Item category	Item		
Taiwan	5	1C010, 1C202, 2E001, 2E002, 2E301, 5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Carbon fibre Aluminium alloy Technology transfer Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA AG
Thailand	4	1C010, 1C202,	Carbon fibre Aluminium alloy	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use			EU Regulation	Regime
	Number of licences	Item category	Item		
		5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor		
Trinidad and Tobago	1	1C202	Aluminium alloy	428/2009	WA
Tunisia	2	1C202, 5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Aluminium alloy Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Turkey	5	1C202, 5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Aluminium alloy Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use		EU Regulation	Regime
	Number of licences	Item category		
Turkmenistan	2	5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009 WA
Ukraine	1	5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009 WA
Uruguay	2	1C202, 5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Aluminium alloy Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009 WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime
Venezuela	2	1C202, 5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Aluminium alloy Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Vietnam	1	5A002	Telecommunications (information security)	428/2009	WA
Belarus	3	1C202, 5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Aluminium alloy Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Yemen	1	5A002, 5D002, 7A002	Telecom products (information security) Motion sensor	428/2009	WA
Zimbabwe	1	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA

**Table 8. Individual licences for permanent exports granted in 2016**

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
Afghanistan	1	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					
Algeria	8	2B350, 3A225, 5A002, 5D002.	Heat exchanger Frequency inverter Telecom products	428/2009	WA					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
		6A003	(information security) IR camera							
USA	1	1C010	Carbon fibre	428/2009	WA					
Argentina	7	2B230, 2B350, 2B352, 3A001, 3A225, 5A002, 5D002	Heat exchanger Telecom products (information security) Frequency inverter Bioreactors	428/2009	WA NSG AG					
Armenia	2	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					
Bahrain	1	1A004	Chemical protection suit	428/2009	WA	1	5A002,	Telecommunication products (information security)	428/2009	WA



Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
							5D002			
Bangladesh	3	5A002,5D002,	Telecom products	428/2009	WA					
Bhutan	1	5A002 5D002	Telecom products	428/2009	WA					
Bolivia	1	5A002	USB adapters	428/2009	WA					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2	3A225, 5A002	Frequency inverter Telecom products	428/2009	WA NSG					
Botswana	1	3A225	Frequency inverter	428/2009	NSG					
Brazil	58	1A004, 1C010, 2B350, 3A225, 5A002, 5D002	Chemical protection suit Carbon fibre Heat exchanger Frequency inverter Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA NSG AG	1	5A002,5D002,	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA
Chile	14	1A004, 2B350, 3A225,	Chemical protection suit Heat exchanger Frequency inverter	428/2009	WA NSG AG					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use			Military end-use						
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
Colombia	13	2B350, 3A225, 5A002,5D0 02, 9A012	Heat exchanger Frequency inverter Telecom products (information security) UAV	428/2009	WA AG NSG					
Costa Rica	1	3A225	Frequency inverter	428/2009	NSG					
Curaçao	1	5A002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
Democratic Republic of Congo	2	2B350, 5A002	Plate heat exchanger Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	AG WA					
Dominican Republic	4	3A225, 5A002	Frequency inverter Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	NSG WA					
Ecuador	4	2B350, 3A225	Plate heat exchanger Frequency inverter	428/2009	NSG AG					
Egypt	15	3A225, 5A002, 5D002	Frequency inverter Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA NSG					
El Salvador	2	3A225, 5A002,	Frequency inverter Telecom products	428/2009	NSG WA					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
		5D002	(information security)							
Ivory Coast	2	5A002,5D002,	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					
Ethiopia	6	5A002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					
Philippines	4	1A004,2B350,5A002	Chemical protection suit Diaphragm pump Telecom products	428/2009	WA AG					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
			(information security)							
People's Republic of China	214	1A004, 1C002, 1C010, 2B001, 2B004, 2B104, 2B204, 2B350, 2B352, 2D002, 2E001, 2E002, 2E301,	Chemical protection suit Titanium powder Carbon fibre Technology transfer Isostatic press Pressure sensors Heat exchanger Frequency inverter Bioreactors Printed circuit cards Data collection cards Low-noise amplifiers Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA NSG AG MTCR					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
		3A001, 3A002, 3A225, 3C005, 5A002, 5A101, 6A003, 6A008	IR camera Lasers Radar sensors Technology transfer Integrated circuits							
United Arab	28	1A004,	Chemical protection suit	428/2009	WA	12	5A002,	Telecom products	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
Emirates		1C010, 2B350, 3A225, 3C005, 5A002, 5D002, 6A003, 9A012, 9D004	Carbon fibre Pumps Plate heat exchanger Substrates Telecom products (information security) IR camera UAV		NSG AG		5D002, 6A003,	(information security) IR camera		
Ghana	2	5A002,5D002,	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					
Guinea	1	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					
Hong Kong, Kina	13	2B352,5A0	Hollow fibre	428/2009	AG WA					



Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
		02,5D002, 6A003,	Telecom products (information security) Camera gimbal							
India	37	1A004,2B001, 2B003,2B006,2B201, 2B204,	Chemical protection suit Grinding machine Optical multimeter Bioreactors Plate heat exchanger	428/2009	WA NSG AG	1	5A002,5D002,	Telecom products	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
		2B350,	Technology transfer							
		2B352,	Frequency inverter							
		2E001,	Telecom products							
		3A225,	(information security)							
		5A002,	IR camera							
		5D002,								
		6A003,6A008								
Indonesia	21	2B230,	Pressure transmitter	428/2009	WA					
		2B350,	Plate heat exchanger		NSG					
		3A225,	Valves		AG					
		5A002,	Frequency inverter							
		5D002,	Telecom products							
		6A003	(information security)							

Region/Country	Civilian end-use			Military end-use			EUR	Regime
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences		
			IR camera					
Iraq	4	2B350, 5A002, 5D002	Heat exchanger Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA			
Iran	277	II.A1.003, II.A2.007, II.A2.009, II.A2.015, III.A1.003,	Frequency inverter Heat exchanger Pumps Telecom products (information security)	267/2012	Sanctions			

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
		III.A2.009, III.A2.010, 5A002, 5D002								
Iceland	10	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					
Israel	42	1A004,1C0 02, 2B350, 2B352, 3A001, 3A225, 6A003	Chemical protection suit Titanium powder Plate heat exchanger Pumps Hollow fibre Microprocessor IR camera	428/2009	WA NSG AG					
Japan	2	2B350,3C0	Plate heat exchanger	428/2009	AG WA					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
		01	Silicon wafers							
Jordan	15	2B350,3A225,5A002,5D002	Plate heat exchanger Frequency inverter Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	AG NSG WA	4	5A002,5D002,5E002	Telecom products (information security)		WA
Kazakhstan	3	3A225,5D002	Frequency inverter Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	NSG WA					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
Kosovo	2	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					
Cuba	1	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					
Kuwait	3	2B350, 3A225,	Heat exchanger Frequency inverter	428/2009	AG NSG					
Lebanon	13	5A002, 5D002, 6A003	Telecom products (information security) IR camera	428/2009	WA	2	5A002, 5D002,	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA
Libya	2	5A002, 5D002,	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					
Macedonia (FYROM)	1	2B350	Heat exchanger	428/2009	AG					
Malaysia	17	1A004, 2B0	Chemical protection suit	428/2009	WA	2	6A003, 6A0	IR camera	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use			Military end-use			EUR	Regim e
	Num ber of licenc es	Item category	Item	EU Regulatio n	Regim e	Num ber of licenc es		
		01,2B230, 2B350, 3A225, 5A002, 5D002, 6A003	Grinding machine Pressure transmitter Pumps Frequency inverter Telecom products (information security) IR camera		NSG AG	08	Radar	
Mali	2	5A002,5D0 02,	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA			

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
Morocco	7	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA	1	6A003	IR camera	428/2009	WA
Mexico	32	1A004, 2B001, 2B350, 3A225, 5A002, 5D002, 9A012	Chemical protection suit Grinding machine Heat exchanger Frequency inverter Telecom products (information security) UAV	428/2009	WA NSG AG					
Moldova	4	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					
Monaco	1	2B350	Plate heat exchanger	428/2009	AG					
Myanmar	3	5A002,	Telecom products	428/2009	WA					



Region/Country	Civilian end-use			Military end-use			EUR	Regime
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences		
(Burma)		5D002,9A001	(information security) Parts for aero-engines					
Namibia	2	2B350,3A228	Heat exchanger Transistor	428/2009	AG NSG			
Netherlands	1	6A003	IR camera	428/2009	WA			
Nepal	1	3A225	Frequency inverter	428/2009	NSG			
Nicaragua	2	1A004,3A225	Chemical protection suit Frequency inverter	428/2009	WA NSG			

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
Niger	1	5A002,5D002,	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					
Nigeria	6	2B350,3A225,5A002	Heat exchanger Frequency inverter Telecom products	428/2009	AG NSG WA					
Oman	7	2B350,5A002,5D002,6A003	Plate heat exchanger Pumps Telecom products (information security) IR camera	428/2009	WA AG	7	5A002,5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA
Pakistan	12	1C010,2B350,3A225,5A002,	Carbon fibre Heat exchanger Frequency inverter Telecom products	428/2009	WA AG NSG	1	1C210	Carbon fibre	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
		5D002	(information security)							
Panama	1	3A225	Frequency inverter	428/2009	NSG					
Papua New Guinea	1	5A002,5D002,	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					
Peru	3	1A004, 3A225,5A002, 5D002	Chemical protection suit Frequency inverter Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA NSG					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
Qatar	11	1C002, 2B350, 5A002, 5D002, 6A003	Titanium powder Plate heat exchanger Telecom products (information security) IR camera	428/2009	WA AG					
Republic of Korea	44	1C002, 1C010, 2B001, 2B350, 2B352, 3A001, 3A225, 5A002, 6A002,	Titanium powder Carbon fibre Machine tool Plate heat-exchanger, Bioreactor Microprocessor Frequency inverter Telecom products (information security) IR camera	428/2009	WA NSG AG					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
		6A003, 6A008, 9A012	Radar sensors UAV							
Rwanda	2	3A225, 5A002, 5D002	Frequency inverter Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	NSG WA					
Russian Federation	95	Catch-all 1A004,	Machine press Chemical protection suit	428/2009	WA NSG					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
(Russia)		2B104,	Titanium powder		AG					
		2B230,	Isostatic press		MTCR					
		2B350,	Pressure transmitter							
		2B352,	Heat exchanger							
		3A001,	Bioreactors							
		3A225,	Microprocessor							
		5A002,	Frequency inverter							
		5D002,	Telecom products							
		6A003,	(information security)							
		9E102,9A1	IR camera							
		17	Technical assistance							
			Adapter							
Saudi Arabia	26	2B350,	Heat exchanger	428/2009	WA					
		3A225,	Pumps		NSG					
		5A002,	Frequency inverter		AG					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
		5D002	Telecom products (information security)							
St Helena, Guadeloupe	1	3A225	Frequency inverter	428/2009	NSG					
Switzerland	1	2B350	Heat exchanger	428/2009	AG					
Serbia	5	2A101,2B007, 3A225, 5A002,6D0	High-precision bearings 3D scanner Frequency inverter Telecom products	428/2009	WA NSG					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
		03	(information security) Air traffic management system							
Sierra Leone	1	5A002,5D002,	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					
Singapore	20	1A004, 1C002, 2B350, 2B352, 5A002, 5D002 6A008	Chemical protection suit Titanium powder Plate heat exchanger Bioreactors Telecom products (information security) Radar sensors	428/2009	WA AG	1	5A002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA
Sudan	2	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					



Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
South Africa	14	2B350, 3A225, 5A002, 5D002, 6A003	Heat exchanger Frequency inverter Telecom products (information security) IR camera	428/2009	WA NSG AG					
South Sudan	2	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
Taiwan	35	1A004, 1C010, 1C002, 2B104, 2B350, 2B352, 3A225, 3C005, 4A001, 5A002, 5D002, 6A008	Chemical protection suit Carbon fibre Titanium powder Isostatic press Plate heat exchanger Hollow fibre Frequency inverter Substrates Computer Telecom products (information security) Radar sensors	428/2009	WA NSG AG MTCR					
Thailand	27	1A004, 1C010,	Chemical protection suit Carbon fibre	428/2009	WA NSG AG					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
		2B350, 3A225	Heat exchanger Pumps							
		3A225, 5A002, 5D002	Frequency inverter Telecom products (information security)							
Trinidad and Tobago	3	3A225	Frequency inverter	428/2009	NSG					
Tunisia	13	3A225, 5A002,5D0	Frequency inverter Telecom products	428/2009	NSG WA					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
Turkey	34	02, 2B001,2B350,3C001,3C005,3A225,5A002,5D002,6A003,9A012	(information security) Machine tools Plate heat exchanger Frequency inverter Substrates Telecom products (information security) IR camera UAV	428/2009	WA NSG AG					
Turkmenistan	1	5A002,5D002,	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					
Turks and Caicos Islands	1	5A002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					
Uganda	4	3A225,5A0	Frequency inverter	428/2009	NSG					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
		02,5D002, 6A003	Telecom products (information security) IR camera		WA					
Ukraine	17	1C002,2B004, 2B350, 3A225, 5D002, 6A003	Titanium powder Isostatic press Plate heat exchanger Frequency inverter Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA NSG AG					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
			IR camera							
Uruguay	2	6A003, 6A008	IR camera Radar		WA					
Uzbekistan	2	5A002,5D002,	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					
Vietnam	9	1A004, 2B350, 2B352,3A25, 5A002, 5D002	Chemical protection suit Pumps Hollow fibre Frequency inverter Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA AG NSG					
Belarus	2	1A004, 5A002,5D002	Chemical protection suit Telecom products	428/2009	WA					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use			Military end-use			EUR	Regime
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences		
			(information security)					
Zambia	1	6A003	IR camera	428/2009	WA			
Region/Country	Civilian end-use			Military end-use			EUR	Regime
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences		
Afghanistan	1	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA			

Region/Country	Civilian end-use			Military end-use						
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
Algeria	8	2B350, 3A225, 5A002, 5D002, 6A003	Heat exchanger Frequency inverter Telecom products (information security) IR camera	428/2009	WA					
USA	1	1C010	Carbon fibre	428/2009	WA					
Argentina	7	2B230, 2B350, 2B352, 3A001, 3A225, 5A002, 5D002	Heat exchanger Telecom products (information security) Frequency inverter Bioreactors	428/2009	WA NSG AG					



Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
Armenia	2	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					
Bahrain	1	1A004	Chemical protection suit	428/2009	WA	1	5A002, 5D002	Telecommunication products (information security)	428/2009	WA
Bangladesh	3	5A002, 5D002,	Telecom products	428/2009	WA					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
Bhutan	1	5A002 5D002	Telecom products	428/2009	WA					
Bolivia	1	5A002	USB adapters	428/2009	WA					
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2	3A225, 5A002	Frequency inverter Telecom products	428/2009	WA NSG					
Botswana	1	3A225	Frequency inverter	428/2009	NSG					
Brazil	58	1A004, 1C010, 2B350, 3A225, 5A002, 5D002	Chemical protection suit Carbon fibre Heat exchanger Frequency inverter Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA NSG AG	1	5A002,5D002,	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use			Military end-use						
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
Chile	14	1A004, 2B350, 3A225,	Chemical protection suit Heat exchanger Frequency inverter	428/2009	WA NSG AG					
Colombia	13	2B350, 3A225, 5A002,5D0 02, 9A012	Heat exchanger Frequency inverter Telecom products (information security) UAV	428/2009	WA AG NSG					
Costa Rica	1	3A225	Frequency inverter	428/2009	NSG					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
Curaçao	1	5A002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					
Democratic Republic of Congo	2	2B350, 5A002	Plate heat exchanger Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	AG WA					
Dominican Republic	4	3A225, 5A002	Frequency inverter Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	NSG WA					
Ecuador	4	2B350, 3A225	Plate heat exchanger Frequency inverter	428/2009	NSG AG					
Egypt	15	3A225, 5A002, 5D002	Frequency inverter Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA NSG					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
El Salvador	2	3A225, 5A002, 5D002	Frequency inverter Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	NSG WA					
Ivory Coast	1	5A002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					
Ethiopia	6	5A002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
Philippines	4	1A004,2B350,5A002	Chemical protection suit Diaphragm pump Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA AG					
People's Republic of China	213	1A004,1C002,1C010,2B001,2B004,2B104,2B204,2B350,2B352,2D002,	Chemical protection suit Titanium powder Carbon fibre Isostatic press Pressure sensors Heat exchanger Frequency inverter Bioreactors Printed circuit cards Data collection cards	428/2009	WA NSG AG MTCR					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use			Military end-use						
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
		3A001, 3A002, 3A225, 3C005, 5A002, 5A101, 6A003, 6A008	Low-noise amplifiers Telecom products (information security) IR camera Lasers Radar sensors Technology transfer Integrated circuits							
United Arab	28	1A004,	Chemical protection suit	428/2009	WA	12	5A002,	Telecom products	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
Emirates		1C010, 2B350, 3A225, 3C005, 5A002, 5D002, 6A003, 9A012, 9D004	Carbon fibre Pumps Plate heat exchanger Substrates Telecom products (information security) IR camera UAV		NSG AG		5D002, 6A003,	(information security) IR camera		
Ghana	2	5A002,5D002,	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					
Guinea	1	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					
Hong Kong, Kina	13	2B352,5A0	Hollow fibre	428/2009	AG WA					



Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
		02,5D002, 6A003,	Telecom products (information security) Camera gimbal							
India	35	1A004,2B001, 2B003,2B006,2B201, 2B204,	Chemical protection suit Grinding machine Optical multimeter Bioreactors Plate heat exchanger	428/2009	WA NSG AG	1	5A002,5D002,	Telecom products	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
		2B350, 2B352, 3A225, 5A002, 5D002,  6A003,6A008	Frequency inverter Telecom products (information security) IR camera							
Indonesia	21	2B230, 2B350, 3A225, 5A002, 5D002, 6A003	Pressure transmitter Plate heat exchanger Valves Frequency inverter Telecom products (information security) IR camera	428/2009	WA NSG AG					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use			Military end-use			EUR	Regime
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences		
Iraq	4	2B350, 5A002, 5D002	Heat exchanger Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA			
Iran	275	II.A1.003, II.A2.007, II.A2.009, II.A2.015, III.A1.003, III.A2.009,	Frequency inverter Heat exchanger Pumps Telecom products (information security)	267/2012	Sanctions			

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
		III.A2.010								
Iceland	10	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					
Israel	42	1A004, 1C002, 2B350, 2B352, 3A001, 3A225, 6A003	Chemical protection suit Titanium powder Plate heat exchanger Pumps Hollow fibre Microprocessor IR camera	428/2009	WA NSG AG					
Japan	2	2B350, 3C001	Plate heat exchanger Silicon wafers	428/2009	AG WA					
Jordan	15	2B350, 3A225,	Plate heat exchanger Frequency inverter	428/2009	AG NSG	4	5A002, 5D002, 5E0	Telecom products (information security)		WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
		5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)		WA	02				
Kazakhstan	3	3A225, 5D002	Frequency inverter Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	NSG WA					
Kosovo	1	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
Cuba	1	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					
Kuwait	3	2B350, 3A225,	Heat exchanger Frequency inverter	428/2009	AG NSG					
Lebanon	10	5A002, 5D002,6A003	Telecom products (information security) IR camera	428/2009	WA	2	5A002,5D002,	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA
Libya	2	5A002,5D002,	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					
Macedonia (FYROM)	1	2B350	Heat exchanger	428/2009	AG					
Malaysia	17	1A004,2B001,2B230, 2B350,	Chemical protection suit Grinding machine Pressure transmitter	428/2009	WA NSG AG	2	6A003,6A008	IR camera Radar	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
		3A225, 5A002, 5D002, 6A003	Pumps Frequency inverter Telecom products (information security) IR camera							
Mali	2	5A002,5D002,	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					
Morocco	7	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA	1	6A003	IR camera	428/2009	WA

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
Mexico	32	1A004,2B001,2B350,3A225,5A002,5D002,9A012	Chemical protection suit Grinding machine Heat exchanger Frequency inverter Telecom products (information security) UAV	428/2009	WA NSG AG					
Moldova	4	5A002,5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					
Monaco	1	2B350	Plate heat exchanger	428/2009	AG					
Myanmar (Burma)	3	5A002,5D002,9A001	Telecom products (information security) Components for aero-engines	428/2009	WA					



Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
Namibia	2	2B350,3A228	Heat exchanger Transistor	428/2009	AG NSG					
Netherlands	1	6A003	IR camera	428/2009	WA					
Nepal	1	3A225	Frequency inverter	428/2009	NSG					
Nicaragua	2	1A004,3A225	Chemical protection suit Frequency inverter	428/2009	WA NSG					
Niger	1	5A002,5D002,	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
Nigeria	6	2B350, 3A225, 5A002	Heat exchanger Frequency inverter Telecom products	428/2009	AG NSG WA					
Oman	7	2B350, 5A002, 5D002,6A0 03	Plate heat exchanger Pumps Telecom products (information security) IR camera	428/2009	WA AG	7	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA
Pakistan	12	1C010, 2B350,3A2 25, 5A002, 5D002	Carbon fibre Heat exchanger Frequency inverter Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA AG NSG	1	1C210	Carbon fibre	428/2009	WA
Panama	1	3A225	Frequency inverter	428/2009	NSG					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
Papua New Guinea	1	5A002,5D002,	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					
Peru	3	1A004, 3A225,5A002, 5D002	Chemical protection suit Frequency inverter Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA NSG					
Qatar	11	1C002, 2B350, 5A002,	Titanium powder Plate heat exchanger Telecom products	428/2009	WA AG					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use			Military end-use						
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
		5D002, 6A003	(information security) IR camera							
Republic of Korea	44	1C002, 1C010, 2B001, 2B350, 2B352, 3A001, 3A225, 5A002, 6A002, 6A003, 6A008, 9A012	Titanium powder Carbon fibre Machine tool Plate heat-exchanger, Bioreactor Microprocessor Frequency inverter Telecom products (information security) IR camera Radar sensors UAV	428/2009	WA NSG AG					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use			Military end-use						
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
Rwanda	2	3A225, 5A002, 5D002	Frequency inverter Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	NSG WA					
Russian Federation (Russia)	93	Catch-all 1A004, 2B104, 2B230, 2B350,	Machine press Chemical protection suit Titanium powder Isostatic press Pressure transmitter	428/2009	WA NSG AG MTCR					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
		2B352,	Heat exchanger							
		3A001,	Bioreactors							
		3A225,	Microprocessor							
		5A002,	Frequency inverter							
		5D002,	Telecom products							
		6A003,9A17	(information security) IR camera Adapter							
Saudi Arabia	26	2B350,	Heat exchanger	428/2009	WA					
		3A225,	Pumps		NSG					
		5A002,	Frequency inverter		AG					
		5D002	Telecom products (information security)							
St Helena, Guadeloupe	1	3A225	Frequency inverter	428/2009	NSG					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use			Military end-use						
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
Switzerland	1	2B350	Heat exchanger	428/2009	AG					
Serbia	5	2A101,2B007,3A225,5A002,6D003	High-precision bearings 3D scanner Frequency inverter Telecom products (information security) Air traffic management system	428/2009	WA NSG					
Sierra Leone	1	5A002,5D0	Telecom products	428/2009	WA					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
Singapore	20	02,	(information security)	428/2009	WA AG	1	5A002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA
		1A004,	Chemical protection suit							
		1C002,	Titanium powder							
		2B350,	Plate heat exchanger							
		2B352,	Bioreactors							
		5A002,	Telecom products							
5D002	(information security)									
Sudan	2	5A002,	Telecom products	428/2009	WA					
		5D002	(information security)							
South Africa	14	2B350,	Heat exchanger	428/2009	WA NSG AG					
		3A225,	Frequency inverter							
		5A002,	Telecom products							
		5D002,	(information security)							



Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
		6A003	IR camera							
South Sudan	1	5A002, 5D002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					
Taiwan	35	1A004, 1C010, 1C002, 2B104, 2B350,	Chemical protection suit Carbon fibre Titanium powder Isostatic press Plate heat exchanger	428/2009	WA NSG AG MTCR					



Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
Trinidad and Tobago	3	3A225	Frequency inverter	428/2009	NSG					
Tunisia	13	3A225, 5A002,5D002,	Frequency inverter Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	NSG WA					
Turkey	34	2B001,2B350,3C001, 3C005, 3A225,	Machine tools Plate heat exchanger Frequency inverter Substrate	428/2009	WA NSG AG					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
		5A002, 5D002, 6A003, 9A012	Telecom products (information security) IR camera UAV							
Turks and Caicos Islands	1	5A002	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					
Uganda	4	3A225,5A002,5D002, 6A003	Frequency inverter Telecom products (information security) IR camera	428/2009	NSG WA					
Ukraine	17	1C002,2B004, 2B350, 3A225,	Titanium powder Isostatic press Plate heat exchanger Frequency inverter	428/2009	WA NSG AG					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use			Military end-use						
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
		5D002, 6A003	Telecom products (information security) IR camera							
Uruguay	2	6A003, 6A008	IR camera Radar		WA					
Uzbekistan	2	5A002,5D0 02,	Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					
Vietnam	9	1A004, 2B350,	Chemical protection suit	428/2009	WA AG					

Region/Country	Civilian end-use				Military end-use					
	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EU Regulation	Regime	Number of licences	Item category	Item	EUR	Regime
		2B352,3A2 25	Pumps Hollow fibre							
		5A002, 5D002	Frequency inverter Telecom products (information security)							
Belarus	2	1A004, 5D002	Chemical protection suit  Telecom products (information security)	428/2009	WA					
Zambia	1	6A003	IR camera	428/2009	WA					

## **The Military Equipment Act**

The Military Equipment Act (1992:1300) applies both to equipment designed for military use and that constitutes military equipment under government regulations and to technical support regarding such military equipment. In Ordinance (1992:1303) on Military Equipment, the Government specified in more detail what is covered by the provisions of the Act. What constitutes military equipment under the Ordinance coincides with the EU's Joint Military List, with three national supplements. In addition, a distinction between military equipment for combat purposes and other military equipment is made. Military equipment for combat purposes means equipment with a destructive impact including sights for such equipment and fire control equipment. Certain parts and components for military equipment for combat purposes, as well as equipment that does not have a directly destructive impact in a combat situation are counted as other military equipment.

Under the Military Equipment Act, there are general prohibitions on manufacturing, supply and export of military equipment and on the provision of technical assistance to anyone outside the country. Licences may, however, be granted for these activities.

Manufacturing is defined as the production of such equipment or parts therefore as constitutes military equipment. Supply is understood in the Act to mean sale, granting, offering for sale, loan, gift and brokering. Swedish authorities, Swedish companies and persons resident or permanently domiciled in Sweden may neither conduct activities abroad which relate to supply of military equipment or in an individual case supply to someone abroad military equipment which is located abroad. Agreements involving the granting or transfer of manufacturing rights to a party abroad and agreements to develop military equipment together with another party abroad also require a licence. Furthermore, with certain exceptions, a licence is required to carry out military training.

There are three types of technical assistance for export and supply of technical assistance: individual, global and general. Individual licences concern one export (which may, however, consist of several deliveries) to one recipient. A global licence entitles a supplier to export to one or more recipients or categories of recipients in one or more other countries such military equipment or to provide such technical assistance as is specified in the licence. A general licence means that a supplier can directly, without applying for a licence, export such military equipment or provide such technical assistance as is specified in the licence. The Inspectorate of Strategic Products (ISP) has issued several different regulations on general licences. A general licence is thus a precedent-setting decision aimed at all suppliers who fulfil the terms stated in the licence.

With effect from 1 February 1996, questions on whether to grant licences under the Military Equipment Act are examined primarily by the ISP, except in such cases where a matter is deemed to be of fundamental significance or otherwise of particular importance. In such a case, the

matter must be handed over to the Government for a ruling. The Export Control Council may be consulted before decisions are made on more important matters.

The holder of a licence to manufacture and supply military equipment is under the supervision of ISP.

The Military Equipment Act further contains provisions on the liability of anyone who infringes the provisions of the Act.

Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology requires, in certain cases, export licences for products that are not encompassed by the term military equipment, but which are associated with exported military equipment.

### **Swedish guidelines for exports of military equipment and other foreign cooperation**

Under Section 1, second paragraph of the Military Equipment Act, licences for exports of military equipment may only be granted if they are justified for security or defence reasons and do not conflict with Sweden's foreign policy. The principles applied when examining licence applications were established on the basis of government practice and were detailed in the Government's guidelines for the export of military equipment and other foreign cooperation, approved by the Riksdag (cf. Govt Bill 1991/92:174 p. 41 f., Government Bill 1995/96:31 p. 23 f. and Report 1992/93:UU1). The complete text of these guidelines is provided below.

#### *Overriding criteria and assessment criteria*

The guidelines have broad parliamentary support and are used by the ISP when assessing export licence applications in accordance with the Military Equipment Act and the Military Equipment Ordinance.

In addition to the guidelines themselves, international commitments Sweden has made and is bound by are also considered. These are, first and foremost, the EU Common Position on Arms Exports (2008/944/CFSP) and Articles 6 and 7 of the UN Arms Trade Treaty, but may also include other commitments, e.g. not to export anti-personnel mines, under the Ottawa Convention.

The guidelines contain two overriding criteria under which licences may legally be granted; partly that the foreign cooperation is required to meet the Swedish Armed Forces' requirements for equipment, expertise or is otherwise desirable for security policy reasons and partly that the cooperation does not conflict with the principles and objectives of Sweden's foreign policy. These overriding criteria may be regarded as constituting a clarification of Section 1, second paragraph of the Military Equipment Act.

The guidelines also define the factors that should be taken into consideration in the assessment of individual applications. A basic requirement is that all relevant circumstances in a particular case are to be considered, whether or not they are expressly included in the guidelines. These assessment criteria also apply to cooperation with



persons or companies abroad relating to the development or manufacture of military equipment.

The guidelines particularly emphasise the importance that must be attached to the respect for human rights in the recipient country when assessing each export application in terms of foreign policy. The human rights situation in the recipient country must always be taken into consideration, even in cases involving equipment that in and of itself cannot be used to violate human rights.

#### *Unconditional obstacles to exports*

The guidelines state three types of unconditional obstacle that, if present, are considered to make exports impossible. These three are: decisions of the UN Security Council, international agreements to which Sweden is a party (e.g. EU sanctions) and export bans imposed under international legal rulings concerning exports from neutral states to those in a state of war.

#### *Military equipment for combat purposes and other military equipment*

In 1993, the term military equipment was broadened to also include certain equipment with civilian or partly civilian uses. The broadening of the term resulted in exports that were previously uncontrolled being made subject to political assessment and to their inclusion in the military equipment export statistics. This broadening was accompanied by the separation of military equipment into two categories with guidelines that differ in certain respects.

For the category of military equipment for combat purposes (MEC), the presumption is that export licences should not be issued if the recipient is a state involved in armed conflict with another state, a state embroiled in an international conflict that is in danger of becoming an armed conflict or a state where there is internal armed unrest. A licence should be withdrawn if the recipient state becomes involved in armed conflict or internal armed unrest. However, the revocation of a licence may be forgone if this is consistent with international law and the objectives and principles of Swedish foreign policy. Furthermore, licences should not be granted for exports to a state in which there are widespread and serious human rights violations. These are the same requirements that were applied prior to 1993; the difference being that, previously, it was only necessary to take human rights violations into consideration if the equipment itself could be used to violate human rights. For exports of other military equipment (OME), which consists largely of products that were not considered to be military equipment prior to 1993 (e.g. reconnaissance radar or training simulators), an export licence should be granted to countries not engaged in armed conflict with another state, that do not have internal armed unrest and where there are no widespread and serious human rights violations. Accordingly, the risk of armed conflict is not a specific criterion applied when assessing exports of other military equipment.

The different guidelines for military equipment for combat purposes and other military equipment mean that a greater number of countries may be considered as potential recipients of other military, i.e. non-

destructive, equipment, than as recipients of military equipment for combat purposes.

*Follow-on deliveries and “Swedish identity”*

With regard to follow-on deliveries, the guidelines state that “licences should be granted for exports of spare parts for military equipment exported previously with the requisite licence, provided there are no unconditional obstacles. The same should apply to other deliveries, e.g. of ammunition, linked to previous exports, or where it would otherwise be unreasonable to refuse a licence”.

In the case of cooperation with foreign partners, exports to third countries should be assessed in accordance with the Swedish guidelines if the item has a predominantly Swedish identity. If the item has a predominantly foreign identity, or if Sweden has a strong defence policy interest in the partnership, the export rules of the partner country may be applied.

*Full text of the Swedish guidelines (Govt Bill 1991/92:174 p. 41 f.)*

Licences for exports of military equipment or for other cooperation with foreign partners involving military equipment should only be granted where such exports or cooperation:

are judged to be necessary to meet the Swedish Armed Forces’ requirements for equipment or expertise or are otherwise desirable for reasons of national security and do not conflict with the principles and objectives of Swedish foreign policy.

When considering a licence application, the ISP will make a complete assessment of all the relevant circumstances, taking into account the basic principles mentioned above.

There are no obstacles in terms of foreign policy to cooperation with, or exports to, the Nordic countries and the traditionally neutral countries of Europe. In principle, cooperation with these countries may be considered consistent with Sweden’s security policy. As cooperation with the other countries in the European Union develops, the same principles regarding cooperation with foreign partners and exports should be applied to these countries.

Licences may only be granted to governments, central government authorities or government-authorised recipients; an end-user certificate or an own production declaration should be presented in connection with exports of military equipment. A state which, despite undertakings given to the Swedish Government, allows, or fails to prevent, unauthorised re-export of Swedish military equipment will not, as a rule, be eligible to receive such equipment from Sweden as long as these circumstances persist.

In accordance with the Military Equipment Act, licences for exports or for other cooperation with foreign partners must not be granted if this would contravene an international agreement to which Sweden is party, a decision of the UN Security Council or international legal rulings

concerning exports from neutral states during a war (unconditional obstacles).

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Licences for exports of military equipment or for other cooperation with foreign partners concerning military equipment should not be granted where the recipient country is a state where there are widespread and serious human rights violations. Respect for human rights is a key condition of the granting of licences.

Licences for exports of military equipment for combat purposes or for other cooperation with foreign partners concerning military equipment for combat purposes or other military equipment should not be granted if the state in question is involved in an armed conflict with another state, regardless of whether or not war has been declared, is embroiled in an international conflict that is in danger of becoming an armed conflict or is the site of internal armed unrest.

Licences should be granted for exports of equipment classified as other military equipment, provided that the recipient country is not involved in an armed conflict with another state, is not the site of internal armed unrest or widespread and serious human rights violations and that there are no unconditional obstacles.

An export licence that has been granted should be revoked not only if unconditional obstacles to exports arise, but also if the recipient state becomes involved in an armed conflict with another state or becomes the site of internal armed unrest. Exceptionally, revocation of a licence may be foregone in the latter two cases if this is consistent with international law and the principles and objectives of Swedish foreign policy.

Licences should be granted for exports of spare parts for military equipment exported previously with the requisite licence, provided there are no unconditional obstacles. The same should apply to other deliveries, e.g. of ammunition, linked to previous exports, or where it would otherwise be unreasonable to refuse a licence.

With specific reference to agreements with a foreign partner on the joint development or manufacture of military equipment, the basic criteria mentioned above are to be applied when licence applications are assessed. Exports to the partner country under the agreement should be permitted unless an unconditional obstacle arises. If a cooperation agreement with a foreign partner is dependent on exports from the partner country to third countries, the issue of such exports should, insofar as the end-product in question has a predominantly Swedish identity, be assessed in accordance with the guidelines for exports from Sweden.

As regards equipment with a predominantly foreign identity, exports from the partner country to third countries should be considered in accordance with the export rules of the partner country. If Sweden has a strong defence policy interest in cooperation taking place and the partner country's cooperation is conditional on certain exports being allowed to take place from that country, then, depending on the circumstances, exports to a third country within the scope of the partner country's export rules may, in general, also be permitted.

In cases involving more extensive and, for Sweden, more important cooperation with a foreign partner in the field of military equipment, an intergovernmental agreement should be concluded between Sweden and

the partner country. The Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs should be consulted before such agreements are concluded.

**Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 implementing Article 10 of the United Nations' Protocol against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UN Firearms Protocol), and establishing export authorisation, and import and transit measures for firearms, their parts and components and ammunition.**

The Ordinance (2013:707) on the control of certain firearms, their parts and ammunition, and including certain amendments to the Military Equipment Ordinance (1992:1303) came into force on 30 September 2013.

The Ordinance, and the amendments to the Military Equipment Ordinance, complement Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012, which regulates licences to export civilian firearms, their parts and ammunition outside the EU, as well as certain import and transit measures for such exports. A list of the firearms, their parts and essential components and ammunition that are subject to control is contained in an annex to Regulation 258/2012.

The ISP is the licensing authority under the Ordinance.

**Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items**

*Common EU legislation*

In 2009, the Council adopted Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 setting up a Community regime for control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use products (Recast). The Regulation came into force on 27 August 2009, replacing an EU regulation from 2000, Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000. Unlike the international export control regimes, the Regulation is legally binding for Sweden and all other EU Member States. The purpose is to, as far as possible, establish free movement of controlled products within the internal market while reinforcing and harmonising the various national systems for the control of exports to third countries.

The Regulation unites Member States' undertakings within the scope of the international export control regimes with the greatest possible freedom of movement of goods within the internal market. Developments within the regimes are taken into account through regular amendments and updates of the item lists included in the Regulation. The annexes to the Regulation are determined within the framework of first pillar cooperation within the EU, meaning they have a direct effect at the

national level. In accordance with the Regulation, the annexes are to be updated annually.

The Regulation facilitates the assessment of licence applications by including common criteria that Member States have to take into account in their assessments. However, licences are granted at the national level (see below). In addition, there is a general community licence for exports of certain products to certain specified third countries. This type of licence facilitates the work of exporting companies in that the same licence can be invoked regardless of where in the EU the exports originate. This has also led to increased consensus in the EU on exports of this kind.

### *Swedish legislation*

In Sweden, the EU Regulation is complemented by the Dual-use Items and Technical Assistance Control Act (2000:1064) and Ordinance (2000:1217). Both statutes came into force on 1 January 2001.

In contrast to the military equipment legislation, where export licences represent exceptions to a general prohibition on exports, the reverse is true under the regulations governing the controls on dual-use items. In this case, the basic premise is that an export licence will be granted as long as this does not conflict with the interests of foreign or security policy as these are described in the EU Regulation.

Licences are required for exports, transfers and brokering of dual-use items. The ISP is the licensing authority. However, the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) provides licences that apply to nuclear materials etc. included in category 0 in Annex I of the EU Regulation.

Like its predecessor, the dual-use Items and Technical Assistance Control Act lacks specific rules regarding opportunities to receive advance decisions regarding whether or not an export licence will be provided for any potential export of dual-use items to a specific destination. However, a practice has been developed that involves the ISP providing companies with advance decisions.

### *The catch-all clause*

Under Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009, a licence may also be required for exports of items that are not specified in the annexes to the Regulation (non-listed items) if the exporter has been informed by the Swedish authorities that the item is or may be intended to be used in connection with the production of weapons of mass destruction or missiles that are capable of delivering such weapons. This catch-all clause has been included to prevent the regulations from being circumvented due to the fact that, on account of rapid technological developments, the lists are seldom completely comprehensive.

For the catch-all clause to be applicable, the exporter must have been informed of the item's area of use by the Swedish authorities. However, if the exporter is aware that an item is entirely or partly intended for uses regulated in Articles 4(1) to 4(3) of the EU Regulation, they are required to report this to the Swedish authorities. The ISP or the SSM will then determine whether a licence is required for the export.

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In certain cases, the catch-all clause also contains special licensing requirements for exports related to military end-use or military equipment and for exports of non-listed items that are or may be intended for military end-use in a country subject to a UN, EU or OSCE embargo, as well as for non-listed items that are or could be intended for use as parts or components for illegally exported military equipment.

**Denial.** A negative decision by an authority regarding an application for a licence to export military equipment or dual-use items to a certain country. A member of a multilateral export control regime is expected to inform the other members of the negative decision. In accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009, the relevant authorities in the EU Member States have to inform one another and the Commission of denials.

**Export control regimes.** The Zangger Committee (ZC), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Australia Group (AG), the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The aim of these international regimes is to identify goods and technologies that should be made subject to export controls, to exchange information about proliferation risks and to promote non-proliferation in their contact with countries that do not belong to the regimes.

**Catch-all.** This term refers to the opportunity to subject dual-use items that are not included in the export control lists to export controls. An exporter has to advise the export control authority if that authority has informed it that the item the exporter wishes to export may be intended for the production etc. of weapons of mass destruction. The authority determines whether it is appropriate to require a licence for the export. The same applies where the exporter is aware that the item is intended for use in the production etc. of such weapons.

**Non-proliferation.** Measures that are implemented at both national and international levels to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This has mainly taken the form of a number of international agreements and cooperation in several export control regimes.

**Intangible transfers.** Transfers of software or technology by means of electronic media and from person to person from one country to another.

**Weapons of mass destruction.** Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction also address certain delivery systems such as long-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.

**No-undercut.** When a denial is issued, the other members of the international export control regimes are expected to consult the state that has issued this denial before deciding whether to grant an export licence for an equivalent transaction. The purpose of this is to prevent the buyer that has been denied from finding a supplier in another country and to avoid a situation where different countries' export controls distort

competition. In accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009, the relevant authorities in the EU Member States have to inform one another and the Commission of denials.

**Outreach.** Providing information and support to states, authorities, companies, etc. in export control contexts.

**Export licenses.** In accordance with Section 6 of the Military Equipment Act (1992:1300), military equipment may not be exported from Sweden without permission, unless otherwise stipulated by the Act or another statute. A company applies for an export licence for the amount agreed in a contract with a particular country. Deliveries are then usually conducted over several years and seldom commence in the year in which the contract was signed. Consequently, export licences are not the same thing as an actual delivery; they merely indicate the volume of orders for controlled products won by Swedish companies in the international market in a given year.



# Abbreviations

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AG	Australia Group
ASD	AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe
ATT	Arms Trade Treaty
BTWC	Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention
CBW	Chemical and Biological Weapons
COARM	Council Working Group on Conventional Arms Exports
COCOM	Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
CONOP	Council Working Group on Non-Proliferation
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
EDA	European Defence Agency
EC	European Community
EKR	Export Control Council
EU	European Union
FA	Framework agreement
FMV	Swedish Defence Materiel Administration
FN	United Nations
FOI	Swedish Defence Research Agency
FRA	Swedish National Defence Radio Establishment
FXM	Swedish Defence and Security Export Agency
GTRI	Global Threat Reduction Initiative
CFSP	EU Common Foreign and Security Policy
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ISP	The Inspectorate of Strategic Products
MEC	Military equipment for combat purposes
LoI	Letter of Intent
MANPADS	Man-portable air defence systems
ML	Military List
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
Must	Swedish Military Intelligence and Security Directorate
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NETTEM	New and Evolving Technologies Technical Experts Meeting
NL	National additions, where applicable
NPT	Non-Proliferation treaty
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
DUIs	Dual-Use Items

Skr. 2016/17:114	PGD	Policy for Global Development
Bilaga 5	PSI	Proliferation Security Initiative
	SALW	Small arms and light weapons
	SCB	Statistics Sweden
	SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
	SOFF	Swedish Security and Defence Industry Association
	SSM	The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority
	Säpo	Swedish Security Service
	SÖ	Swedish Treaty Series
	TI	Transparency International
	TSC	Technical-Scientific Council
	UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
	WA	Wassenaar Arrangement
	WPDU	Working Party on Dual-Use Goods
	ZC	Zangger Committee
	OME	Other military equipment

### Source references in alphabetical order

The Australia Group: [www.australiagroup.net](http://www.australiagroup.net)

The European Parliament: [www.europarl.europa.eu](http://www.europarl.europa.eu)

The Council of the European Union: [www.consilium.eu](http://www.consilium.eu)

The European Union: [www.europa.eu](http://www.europa.eu)

The Export Control Council: [www.isp.se/sa/node.asp?node=1057](http://www.isp.se/sa/node.asp?node=1057)

The United Nations: [www.un.org](http://www.un.org)

The International Atomic Energy Agency: [www.iaea.org](http://www.iaea.org)

The Inspectorate of Strategic Products: [www.isp.se](http://www.isp.se)

The Missile Technology Control Regime: [www.mtcr.info](http://www.mtcr.info)

Nuclear Suppliers Group: [www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org](http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org)

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons:  
[www.opcw.org](http://www.opcw.org)

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: [www.osce.org](http://www.osce.org)

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: [www.sipri.org](http://www.sipri.org)

The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority: [www.ssm.se](http://www.ssm.se)

The Swedish Export Control Society: [www.exportkontrollforeningen.se](http://www.exportkontrollforeningen.se)

The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs: [www.ud.se](http://www.ud.se)

The Wassenaar Arrangement: [www.wassenaar.org](http://www.wassenaar.org)

The Zangger Committee: [www.zanggercommittee.org](http://www.zanggercommittee.org)

## Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Extract from the minutes of the Cabinet meeting held on 16 March 2017

Present: Prime Minister Löfven, Chair, and Ministers Lövin, Y  
Johansson, M Johansson, Baylan, Bucht, Hultqvist, Andersson, Hellmark  
Knutsson, Ygeman, A Johansson, Bolund, Bah Kuhnke, Strandhäll,  
Shekarabi, Fridolin, Wikström, Eriksson, Linde, Skog, Ekström

Rapporteur: Minister Johansson

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The Government approves Communication 2016/17:114 Strategic Export  
Control in 2016 – Military Equipment and Dual-Use Items (Strategisk  
exportkontroll 2015 - krigsmateriel och produkter med dubbla  
användningsområden)